By Generalmajor Hitschhold
At Latimer House, England, 24 October 1945
1.The prerequisite for successful and lasting operations of ground attack units is air superiority. Wherever the Germans did not have air superiority, their ground attack operations were almost always ineffective. This lesson was confirmed in Africa, in Italy, and on the Western Front. There, suffering from high losses of aircraft, planned and effective support of ground operations was not achieved. Raising the number of ground attack units would only have been useful if air superiority could have been won back.
2.The tactical support of armies from the air requires, in addition to attacks on small individual targets, action against large area targets. In the GAF there were no special TE bomber units set up for this purpose. Instead, as an improvised solution, bomber units originally organized and equipped for strategic operations were used. With the later attempt to use these bombers for their original purpose (converting of Fliegerkorps IV to long range bombing in the east) the effective use of these aircraft in the tactical area was stopped completely. Its absence was appreciably felt.
3.The technical planning was not far-seeing enough. Despite the continuous increase in the effectiveness of enemy defense, up to 1943, the equipment of dive bomber units with the outmoded Ju.87 was continued. Only after the post of General der Schlachtflieger was created could the equipping of them with aircraft like the FW 190, which suited the combat conditions, be effected.
4.The reconnaissance Staffeln which were very effectively attached to every ground attack Geschwader were not retained (even though they still existed with Stuka units) but were given up in 1942. The necessary reconnaissance for ground operations now had to be flown by the ground attack units themselves. Inadequate training of crews did not bring about all the success possible. The hitting power of concentrated formations was thus reduced. Equipment and personnel shortages prevented the reestablishment of the reconnaissance units.
5.The short range of ground attack aircraft worked to the disadvantage of operations. Where there was a lack of forward airfields, operations in the depth of the tactical area might become impossible. In some cases all operations were impossible. Where the enemy had air superiority, take-offs and landings on airfields near to the front could be prevented as a result of action by enemy fighters. Moreover, the stay over the battle field, which should be as long as possible, was too limited if the airfields were far behind the front. The building of forward airfields with pierced steel planking, commonplace in the USAAF, did not happen in the German Air Force.
6.The delayed development of rocket projectile weapons was a great disadvantage. The combatting of certain targets like tanks and ships could have been considerably more effective. The goal of having every ground attack unit equipped, if necessary, for anti-tank work with rockets was not attained. This was due to the delay in beginning development and to the use in the interim of the inadequate 21 cm. army rockets which required a great amount of special training. No adequate amount of aircraft fuel for the required training could be made available.
Furthermore, the specialization of anti-tank ground attack units resulted in tactical disadvantages. Because of their special training, they could only be used under certain circumstances, especially against tanks. Thereby long gaps between operations often came about for such units, in which they could not be used as ordinary ground attack units. In general, the development of rocket projectiles and the necessary sights was begun too late. The ground attack arm showed a way to combat targets effectively from low altitude and great ranges without coming into the anti-aircraft fire around the target.
7.The lack of rockets, bombs, or cluster bomb units (which gave good results in low level attacks) was felt especially in Russian offensives which were often conducted in bad weather. Ground attack aircraft at such times had mainly to be used for strafing attacks only because bombs dropped with delayed action fuses (to protect the aircraft against damage from their own bombs) had little effect.
8.In respect to tactics, no basic mistake or deficiency can be called to mind.
9.Because of lack of fuel, the training of new pilots was too short. A deepening of flying experience could not be attained. In the ranks of new pilots, this led often to great losses in their first operations and to small successes, especially on operations in difficult situations where enemy defense was strong. The necessary training in instrument flying and blind flying had to be almost entirely left out.
10. The replacement and supply system of ground attack officers was far too small. After we suffered heavy losses of Staffel and Gruppe COs, it was often impossible to replace them with satisfactory officers with good experience. This led repeatedly to situations where NCO’s led Staffeln in operations.
The training units could not entirely be Staffed with experienced and fully qualified officers.
A planned school for formation leaders and Staffel COs (formation leaders course) could not easily be carried out, because officers would have had to be called in from their training or operational units for the course. A reserve of officers which were temporarily not fully occupied was never available. The same thing came up when officers had to be sent to pilot schools, officer training schools, and staffs. The interests of the supply of new men and the success of operations prevented the units sending only bad officers to meet these needs. Replacements for those sent to these tasks were seldom supplied. The consequence was many vacancies in the operational units. A planned exchange of men between the front and the homeland to give crews timely and sufficient rest time was out of the question.
11. The operations of ground attack units was controlled by commands staffed by officers who partly had not experience in ground attack operations. Their decisions were often impractical and did not get the most out of the units. It was sought to have these positions occupied by experienced ground attack men, but in view of the lack of officers in the ground attack arm this was very difficult.
Courses for all the officers in command positions were planned from the autumn of 1944, but they never were carried through. In these courses the high commanders, their chiefs of staff, and operations officers, were to get a broad perspective over the operational principles and possibilities of air force units in cooperating with the army.
12. The lack of understanding throughout the army or about cooperation with the air force made [more difficult] the successful cooperation of the two forces. The army often made demands which were impossible to carry out. On the other hand, the army did not always utilize the effect of air raids which were carried out. A planned training of all army officers in air operations was lacking. This was first recognized very late.
13. The establishment of the office of General der Schlachtflieger, combining oversight of the ground attack and dive bomber units under one Waffengeneral, did not take place until too late. The result was that the following main jobs were not carried out on time:
a. Evaluation of flying units which operated in the tactical areas, combining of their experiences, the evaluation of these and incorporation into training.
b. Unified technical planning for ground attack units (especially belated conversion from the Ju.87 to the FW 190).
c. Expansion of cooperation with the army, especially in supporting the training of the army.
d. Training of formation leaders.
14. The operation readiness of ground attack units often suffered by repeated transfers, because the units did not have enough transport space to take with them sufficient technical equipment and personnel. Not enough transport aircraft were available for this. Furthermore, the equipping of formations with trucks was not adequate, and the ones available were not equal to the terrain conditions which often confronted them, especially in the bad weather period in Russia. In addition the available number of trucks was continually being reduced so that the maintaining of operational readiness of units was difficult and the number of sorties went down.