Interrogation of Generalleutnant Galland, Oberstleutnant Bär and Oberstleutnant Dahl
At Kaufbeuren, Germany, 20–23 September 1945
In the build-up period of the Luftwaffe, the defensive and point-protection use of fighters was planned as a secondary mission. During the Polish Campaign only about 6 Gruppen were held back in the West for protective purposes. Even after the declaration of war by France and England, Germany did not reckon with any offensive aerial warfare from the West.
After the end of the Polish Campaign, the movement of all fighter units to fields behind the West Wall, in the Ruhr, and in northwest Germany took place.
The first successes of fighter units in defensive warfare were against large RAF Wellington formations attacking Wilhelmshafen in 1939.
Until the beginning of the campaign in the West in June 1940, German fighters were given only purely defensive missions. From the beginning of the French campaign until 1941, the fighter arm went over completely to the offensive.
In general, fighter units were under Fliegerkorps or Fliegerdivisionen. For temporary defensive operations, formation leaders were themselves responsible for operations. Already before the beginning of the campaign in the West in May 1940, while the fighter units were forming behind the front, two Jafus were set up, one for each Luftflotte in the West (2 and 3), but these Jafus did not actually appear until the Battle of Britain in August 1940.
Only after the movement of most fighter units to the Eastern Front in the Spring of 1941 did the fighter force in the West have to go over to the defensive again. The well-known operations of German fighters of J.G.2 and J.G.26 in the West in this period were not the predecessors of Defense of the Reich, but the actual beginning of it. The air war took place over the western coastal areas; behind these areas there was little activity, reflecting the limited range of enemy daylight operations.
This was begun at the end of 1940 along the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts. In the later course of events, night fighting with the XII Fliegerkorps won the unequivocal lead position in resource allocation.
The necessary signals facilities for defensive aerial fighter operations were neglected in 1939 and 1940 because of the offensive role of the fighter force in these years. The planning and the unexpected course of the Russian campaign now presented signals construction demands which were impossible to fulfill in time. This was especially true for night fighting and also for day operations. The period of need could have been bridged with sufficient fighter forces, but these were just what was lacking.
For Luftflotte 3 in France the following commands were set up: Jafu 2 and Jafu 3, Jafu Bretagne with the Subordinate Jafu Bordeaux (Unterabschnitt Bordeaux), and the Jafu Sudfrankreich (Jafu South France). From 1941 onward, Jafus 2 and 3 with their staffs became the first fighter control units of the daylight aerial defense system of the Luftwaffe.
Over the course of the daylight bomber offensive, 1942–45, the following evolution of American operations over Germany and occupied Europe were observed:
(a) Unescorted 4-engine bomber formations.
(b) Bomber formations with partial fighter escort on outward legs and reception on return flight. No escort over the target.
(c) Missions with escort in waves, from base to target and back. Fighter escorts throughout missions.
(d) Continuous fighter escort on way in and out without reliefs.
(e) Broad fighter escort sweeps ahead of and to the flanks of the bomber formations.
(f) Release of the fighters from the narrow escort concept, going over to fighter sweeps. Pursuit of German fighters down to their fields, which were also heavily strafed.
(g) Splitting up of the large bomber formations into smaller formations.
The year 1942 was the decisive year in the struggle for air superiority in the West. Under the given conditions, it was necessarily lost, even though every German fighter pilot had done more than his share. The decision was clear as the USAAF in the Fall of 1942 appeared in the ETO. The air offensive against Germany began in the second half of this year with the clear division of missions: Americans by day and RAF by night.
The measures seized upon by the German High Command to counteract this offensive cannot be regarded as planned. They included only the most pressing momentary stop-gaps. A clearly defined defensive plan never evolved. The grounds for this were not in a false underestimation of the enemy. Rather, the entire interest of the Luftwaffe was focussed towards Russia. The over-throw of the Russians was, in 1942, seen as the most important condition for a successful continuation of the war.
So the Luftwaffe ran along from 1942 onwards. It fell farther and farther behind in the eventualities of the strategic air war. Finally, in 1944, a clear recognition of the situation (and some results) came about.
At the beginning of the first attacks by four-engined bombers against the occupied countries in the West in August 1942, only three fighter Geschwader (with about 120 fighters each) were on the Channel coast and in Holland (J.G.2, J.G.26, and J.G.1.) These Geschwaders gained the first battle experience against unescorted and escorted heavy bomber formations.
In Germany itself at this time were no fighter units besides the two OTUs, Erganzungs Jagdgruppen West and Sud, which had little or no operational significance. These OTUs, together with factory-testing Staffeln and the Fighter Schools, could put up only a few Schwärme, which as a result of their organization and other missions could not later successfully be used against escorted heavy bomber formations.
When, in January 1943, the daylight attacks began to traverse North-west Germany, including the North Sea Coast, a new Geschwader, J.G. 11, was set up in the area of Jagddivision 2, near Bremen. This Geschwader flew, along, with J.G.1, based in Holland, against the first missions over German territory since the daylight attacks of the RAF during the Polish campaign.
In 1943 Jafus 2 and 3 were placed under the Higher Jafu West (Hohere Jafu West), the predecessor of the II Jagdkorps, not yet approved by the High Command.
At the beginning of 1943 several fighter Gruppen were withdrawn from the East and the South, and transferred to Northwest Germany to build up the Defense of the Reich. In the summer of 1943, J.G.27 and J.G.3 were transferred into Germany with all their Gruppen for the protection of the Ruhr and the basins of the Rhein and Main Rivers. Besides these Gruppen, two high altitude formations were set up for combatting high-flying reconnaissance aircraft such as Mosquitos. They were J.G.25 in the Berlin area under Obstlt. Ihlefeld and J.G.50 in the Rhine-Main basin, both equipped with the Me. 109G-5, with pressure cabins and ether methanol or GM 1 injection in their engines. They were set up by order of Goring.
In the fall of 1943 was created II Jagdkorps with Jagddivision 4 under it, containing the area of the former Jafu 2 (now Jafu 4), and Jagddivision 5, containing the area of the former Jafu 3 (now Jafu 5). Jagddivision 6 was planned for South France, but was not set up.
In Germany itself, under Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte (GAF Command for central area, later Luftflotte Reich) developments were a little further along. Fighters under Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte were commanded by the XII Fliegerkorps of Kammhuber. Influenced by the clear organization and fine signals network of Kammhuber’s XII Fliegerkorps, Divisionen were formed early. Since Kammbuber’s unit had night fighters almost exclusively at first, the Jagddivisionen first set up under it were really night fighter Divisionen. The day fighters which were set up to operate under XII Fliegerkorps as Allied aerial activity increased over Germany in 1942–43 were controlled not by the newly created Jagddivisionen of XII Fliegerkorps, but by the old Jafus which were already there, also under Kammhuber’s XII Fliegerkorps. During 1943 the functions of the night fighter Jagddivisionen were changed into the I Jagdkorps, controlling through Jagddivisionen 1, 2, 3, and 7 all the day and night fighter units in Germany. (1945 Editor: the I Jagdkorps stayed under Luftwaffenbefelshaber Mitte, later Luftflotte Reich). Its CO was Kammhuber, until Beppo Schmid replaced him in Fall 1943. Schmid kept command until Winter 1944–45, when he turned command over to Hut for the Ardennes offensive and himself took over Luftwaffenkommando West, the unit which replaced Luftflotte 3 when the Germans were driven out of France. Under Schmid in late 1943 and in 1944, Jagdkorps I became the most powerful command in the control of the fighter defense of Germany. The next higher command, Luftflotte Reich, which controlled and commanded all Luftwaffe units in Germany, was not important for the actual running and planning of fighter operations.
Jagdkorps II, set up in France and controlling Jagddivisionen 4 and 5, was under Luftflotte III. The first CO of Jagdkorps II was Jung, who was succeeded by Bulowius at the time of the invasion in June 1944. Bulowius functioned well during the terrible retreat into Germany, and there Peltz, himself a bomber man, took over the Korps, to lead it disastrously through the Ardennes offensive and the 1st January attack on Allied airfields. Schmid was not even a pilot, but he was far better than Peltz. Jagdkorps II was dissolved in the first catastrophic months of 1945.
Meanwhile the enemy from the West flew, on the 15 August 1943, the first really deep penetration raid into the Reich; the first attack on the Schweinfurt ball bearing industry. At the same time, the southern air front was opened with attacks on Southern Germany and Austria from the Foggia area.
It was planned to set up Jagdkorps II in the south East but this was cancelled. No fighter Units were available to warrant the setting up of another corps. With the coming of the second air front from the south, Jagdkorps I therefore had to combat also the attacks from Africa and Italy into Germany.
As a counter, in September 1943, J.G.27 was sent to the Vienna area and J.G.3 to the Munich area. Z.G.26 was used in northern Germany and Z.G.76 in Southern Germany in conjunction with the fighter units in these areas. Thus, by the time of the second attack on Schweinfurt on 14 October 1943, all the fighter and Zerstorer forces then stationed in Germany could effectively be brought to bear. In this action, the Zerstorer units with the 21 cm. RP proved to be especially effective.
The bomber mission of 14 October 1943 was the last attack by four-engine bombers without fighter escort to the target area. After that, Thunderbolts and Lightnings (usually in small numbers), were with the bombers continually over the target area.
At the beginning of 1944 the fighter escort was continually strengthened by the Allies, making the combatting of bomber formations more and more difficult. Especially for the twin engine fighters (Zerstoren), the missions became, as a result of their technical inferiority, more and more dangerous. Most German fighter formations at this time flew attacks from head on. This type of attack required very good flying and shooting ability. Because our units still exhibited high cohesion in formation flying, the attack from head on was still possible. Some successes resulted.
However, despite the later success with head-on attacks by the Sturmgruppen, the attack from the rear became standard in the fighter force. Closed-up flying of the entire Gruppe of fighters with the smallest possible interval between aircraft, opening of fire from very close range, and good discipline were prerequisites for the successful carrying out of attacks from the rear. On the whole, this type of attack brought more victories than the attack from head on, which was harder from a flying and gunnery standpoint. Especially for the young pilot and because of the progressive decline of formation flying skills, we considered that the attack from the rear was best.
Still another Jagddivision, the 8th, had to be set up in the Vienna area and in Hungary. In Hungary the German Jafu Hungary led the German and Hungarian fighters there. In Silesia and Jafu Schlesien and in East Prussia the Jafu Ostpreussen were set up under Jagddivision 1. For a while the idea of setting up a Jagdkorps against the East was toyed with. In this was to be included the Jafu Rumanien, Jafu Bulgarien, and Jafu Griechenland (Greece), all of which were temporarily under a higher Jafu Balkan. Day and night fighting were combined under these Jafus. Despite the participation of Rumanian and Bulgarian fighter units in fighter operations, the air defense of the Balkans was prevented, by lack of strength, from ever getting out of the token stage.
Terrific overloading of the organizational set up and the High Command would have resulted if either the Russians or the Americans had opened up a third air front from the East against Germany. Even the operating of American fighters from the East in cooperation with bomber attacks from the West would have brought a great deal of difficulty for the High Command in the Defense of the Reich.
In early 1944, the concentration of previously dispersed fighter formations into fighter geographical areas took place and the use of larger formations was accomplished. These were called Gefechtsverbände. The purpose of this change was to bring larger fighter forces against the bombers in smaller intervals of time and space. Up until then the fighter Gruppen had run one after another – into the fighter escort. The Gefechtsverbände formed were J.G.1 in Holland, J.G. 11 and 3 in the Westphalia and Rhine areas, J.G.z.b.V (with three Gruppen under it) in the Rhein-Main basin, and J.G. 27 covering Linz, Passau, and Vienna.
In May 1944, the first planned enlargement of Gruppen in the Defense of the Reich took place. This included raising the strength of each Staffel from 12 to 16 aircraft. More significant was the adding of a 4th Staffel per Gruppe, (drawing these Staffeln from Geschwader in the East). These changes brought about the long awaited ‘1000 Fighter Missions’. The Luftwaffe would now be capable of sending a thousand sorties against a massed USAAF bomber mission. But this never took place.
A still closer concentration of the Gefechtsverbande was made for the purpose of mass missions at the end of May 1944 with the transfer of six fighter Gruppen into the Nürnberg-Ansback-Würzburg area. These were placed under the Staff of Geschwader z.b.V. (A special staff set up to control miscellaneous units which were separated from their home units.) The centralized position of those Gruppen under Geschwader z.b.V was favorable for them to engage attacks from the South as well as for attacks from the West.
This strengthening of fighter units did not continue, however, because of the invasion on 6 June 1944. This forced the transfer of almost all fighter units to the West, except for Geschwader z.b.V, J.G.300 and J.G.301 (these units had been set up for single engine night fighting and converted in Summer 1944 to day fighting in bad weather). As a result, on 7 June 1944, there were only 4 regular SE fighter aircraft ready to start in the Defense of the Reich.
Now there followed the conversion of the SE night fighters to day fighting, and J.G. 300 and 301 were converted. In the middle of June the transfer of the single existing Sturmgruppe, J.G.3, from the invasion front back into Germany took place. By the end of June, the conversion of J.G.300 was so far along that IV/J.G.3 could be combined with J.G.300 into a Gefechtsverband, under the Geschwader staff of J.G.300. Thus for the first time since the beginning of the invasion a formation strong enough to give battle was set up for the Defense of the Reich. Its average strength on a mission was about 100–120 fighters. The first successful mission of this formation was on 7 July 1944, when the ex-night fighters of J.G.300 gave a good account of themselves. It should be noted that the conversion of these SE night fighters to day operations took place with no break in operations.
In mid-July, II/J.G.300 was formed into the second Sturmgruppe of the Defense of the Reich. At the end of July a third Sturmgruppe, II/J.G.4, was organized, drawing its cadre from the two Sturmgruppen already in existence. The missions of July and August 1944 were flown only by those Sturmgruppen and their escort Gruppen, IV/J.G.3, II/J.G.300, and II/J.G.4. Meanwhile, in the Reich, the rebuilding of the Gruppen beaten down on the invasion front was taking place. A reserve of about 700 fighters was built up for the purpose of strengthening the Defense of the Reich. Hitler ordered instead that this reserve be thrown into the invasion front, where German forces were already in full retreat. Despite this, three large Gefechtsverbande could be formed in the north of Germany with fighter units withdrawn from the West. For the big missions of 11, 12 and 13 September 1944, 400–500 fighters were again put up against the enemy. On these missions it was possible to use the various Gefechtsverbande concentrated in time and space. Although these missions brought considerable victories against the bombers, a large number of German fighters were shot down by the American fighter escort, mostly Mustangs.
As a result of these losses, especially against fighters going after the bombers, in a series of conferences, among them one at the Hq. of Hitler on 15th September, 1944, the Geschwader Kommodore demanded a clear division between escort and attack fighters (Sturmjäger) with the ratio of 3:1 or at least 2:1. The highest order of the high command remained as before: the principle that the main function of German fighters was to shoot down bombers and that combat with fighters was to be avoided (Galland says: ‘I was in sharp opposition to this order. It was, in my opinion, false to try to get to the bombers with the Sturmjagers escorted in this type of defensive fighter formation. I would have allotted a fighter escort to the Sturmgruppe in a ratio of 1:1. For the rest, I would have had the other 50 fighters attack the enemy fighter escort without giving them any escort missions for the Sturmgruppen. The Tactical Regulations which were given out at this time were given out against my will.’)
In the meantime the Western Front had been thrown back to the Siegfried Line. Fighter operations during this retreat had been extremely ineffective. On the Rhein a new grouping of forces resulted:
JG 26 at the northern end of the line.
J.G. 27 in the Bonn area.
J.G. 2 in the Frankfurt area.
J.G.53 on the southern end.
All the rest of the Jagdgeschwader were in the area of Jagd-division 1 in Central Germany around Berlin, either flying against bombers or building up again. The southern front was stripped of fighters, the same as South Germany and Austria. The great effort which was still possible was termed ‘The Big Blow’, a massive proposed attack on a daylight raid on Berlin. This required a realigning of all Geschwader and concentration of forces in the Berlin area for a great action.
Temporarily J.Gs. 3, 4, 11 and other units had to be transferred into the Holland area for combat against English airborne operations at Arnhem. They returned later to the area of Jagd-division 1.
Now the ‘Big Blow’ was feverishly prepared for. By mid-November, the Geschwader were up to the increased strength. J.G. 27 was pulled back from the West to take part in the ‘Big Blow’ in the area of Jagd-division 1. There were now available J.G. 300, 301, 1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 27, and 77, all under Jagdkorps I, with a considerable proportion of inexperienced pilots. Jagdkorps II, with JG 2, 53, and 26, was to combat the bombers on the way out. The forces under Jagdkorps I could, for the most part, have flown a second mission against the bombers on the big day, so that at least 2,000 fighters of Jagdkorps I could have flown the first mission and 500 the second, while Jagdkorps II could have put up at least 150 fighters. 80–100 night fighters were ready to take part and attack stragglers.
The ‘Big Blow’ (planned by Galland) never took place. Up until the transfer of all these forces into the West to support the Ardennes offensive, bad weather prevented the carrying through of the mission. Then, in late November and early December, all the Geschwader but J.G.300 and J.G.301 were transferred into the West, to be used up in a type of combat for which they were not trained, experienced or equipped. With the Ardennes offensive, the history of the organized Defense of the Reich comes to an end. It went on through January in sporadic form and continued until the end of the war with the Me.262 missions.
(a)The building up of the Defense of the Reich was organic only as far as the command and control organizations were concerned. No special units were always assigned to defense against bombers.
(b)All decisions were made too late and then were not far-seeing enough.
(c)Decisive in the Defense of the Reich was not the command organizations, but the strength of the fighter units.
(d)The Russian campaign and the African and Italian campaigns prevented the preparation and building-up of adequate forces for the Defense of the Reich.
(e)In complete mis-recognition of the situation, the necessary materials, production, and personnel were not given to the fighter force.
(f)The final recognition of the situation came in summer 1944, when it was too late.
(g)The final recognition of the situation in 1944 was manifested by the preparation of the first two 1000 fighter missions and then the Big Blow. All these attempts were liquidated either by the High Command or by the situation.
(h)Despite all these errors, the decisive factor in the Defense of the Reich was the American fighter. Without the fighter escort and its depth of penetration, it would have been possible to stop the day attacks.
(i)The operational superiority won by the long range American fighter was only to be counteracted by a German fighter arm which was superior in strength, fighting ability, and technical achievement. The means for building up such a force were not made available to the fighter arm.
(j)The threat posed by escort fighters was not properly appreciated by the German High Command. They were not interested in them because they did no direct damage to Germany; nevertheless, a success against the bombers could only be achieved when the fighter escort was beaten down or knocked out altogether.
(k)The tactical employment of German fighters in the Defense of the Reich was often false, for reasons set out in point (j).
(l)The training of pilots and the production of aircraft were not well coordinated, but were constantly out of harmony, due to the Russian campaign, lack of fuel, and the keeping up of bomber production.
(m)The problem of large fighter missions in very bad weather against enemy formations over the clouds was never successfully solved by the Germans in regard to training, flying safety, flying control, radio navigation aids, and equipment.
(n)It was not appreciated what had to be done to break down Allied air superiority and what the consequences would be if this superiority was not broken down.
(o)The armament program neglected quality for numbers, not developing new types with more powerful engines. A force inferior in numbers can only hold its own through superior quality.
(p)Only the Me. 262 had the necessary superiority. The story of its development and belated use tell the reasons behind the final dramatic collapse of the Luftwaffe.