By Generalleutnant Galland and Generalleutnant Schmid
At Latimer House, England, 23 October 1945
1.The job and the significance of the fighter force in a strategic air war was not recognized by the German High Command even in the years when the force was being set up. This resulted, among other things, in the wrong size relationships of the fighter arm to the bomber arm, in Autumn 1939:
about 30 bomber Gruppen
9 Stuka Gruppen
13 fighter Gruppen
Thus the fighter force was from the beginning too small to provide a basis of development to meet wartime requirements.
2.The fighter force was not considered a part of the strategic air force. From then on it took a second-rate position. This situation later bitterly avenged itself in the fields of organization, personnel, and materiel as well as in combat.
3.The fighter force had, in the High Command, no representation which could be taken seriously. The personalities of the Inspectors of the Fighter Force and the quick turn over in this position did not permit the office to become important. From this position especially in the building up and preparation period these should have become decisively important stimuli.
4.Neither in the building up, in attack nor in defense were German fighters ever combined under an overall fighter command. This was an organizational disadvantage.
5.The tempo of setting up and training the fighter force just before the war was far too fast. Thus a wearing down of the quality of formation leaders, pilots and of the standard of combat training began too soon.
6.After the beginning of the war, no new units of the Fighter Force were set up until 1942. At the beginning we had at our disposal nine Geschwader (J G 2, 3, 26, 27, 51, 52, 54, 77) and from 1942 to 1944, eight Geschwader were set up J G 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 300, and 301) and enlargement by still a third more was attained by increasing the TO strength of the units. This setting-up of new units had to be carried on despite rising losses of men and materiel in order to even try to keep up with the enemy numerically. Naturally, the level of achievement and battle potency of the units sank. The build-up was therefore not organic and evolutionary, but forced, since in the two good years of the war, 1940 and 1941, nothing at all was done for an enlargement of the fighter force.
7.For the build-up and training of the fighter force, the necessary training organization was lacking. (In 1941 there were only two fighter pilot schools.)
8.In the High Command, the people always let themselves be surprised by developments, instead of planning in advance. I have indicated at another point the detailed story of the delayed beginning of the organizational building up of the Defense of the Reich. At least one and a half years were thus lost. This had great effect on the delayed development of radar equipment and other branches of technical matters.
9.The concept of ‘control of the air’ had not been grasped by the High Command in its true meaning. It was never clearly admitted that air superiority in modern war was the first requirement for all operations of all branches of the armed forces and especially of the branches of the air force. If this had been recognized, the GAF would have had to begin to wrest air superiority back from the moment it was first torn away from it at El Alamein. This was only recognized and acted upon by insulting the morale and bravery of the fighter arm instead of taking concrete measures. In the grand strategy of the air war, no alterations took place.
1.A great number of the mistakes in this field are grounded in the lack of planning and organization. They will not be further discussed here. Decisive at all times was the lack of a Tactical-Technical Section in the General Staff.
2.Our technical development program was not planned far enough into the future. In 1940, all developments which would not be ready for introduction into use within about two years were put aside, in order to accelerate the shorter term developments. This was a mistake of tremendous scope. For example, the Me.262, the further development of the F.W.-190, the gyro computing sight, engines of more than 2000 HP and many other developments were thus all delayed.
3.In the effort to raise the production figures of items in series production, new developments were not forced into series models with the necessary pressure. Even the preparation for series production was somewhat neglected in the pressure to get new designs into series production quickly. In addition, there was a certain dangerous (and partly unwarranted) self-satisfaction at every new technical advance.
4.For this reason the Me.109 was not taken out of series production for years, although this was absolutely necessary on the basis of performance figures from 1943 on. Similarly the beginning of the new series of FW 190 and of the Tank 152 was so delayed as to be almost ineffective.
5.Only after the end of 1943 was the lack of fighters recognized and a program for greater series production set up. Until then, the monthly production figures were actually comical. The highest production point was reached nevertheless after the heavy damaging of aircraft factories and synthetic oil plants. At this time our losses were so great that the increase of strength went far too sluggishly. Moreover, as a result of the loss of air superiority, ground attack units, reconnaissance units, and night fighter units needed to equip themselves with fighter aircraft.
6.A clear concentration of productive effort on fighters did not take place until mid-1944. The reasons for this lay in the demands of the High Command for bombers.
7.An especially crass case of a great mistake in technical development is that of the series production of the Me.262. This theme has so often been discussed that there is no use going into it anymore.
8.The series production of the He.162 was indeed a sign of decay in logical thinking, planning, and equipping. Instead of this the entire capacity of industry should have been thrown into the speeding up and broadening of the Me.262 series.
9.Especially the following technical improvements were lacking for the
Fighter Force in the various theaters of operations:
1940 |
Belly tanks for operations over England Engines with maximum performance at least 3,000 feet higher than ones on hand. FW 190s, especially for escort missions, for greater maneuverability and relative invulnerability. Possibility of temporary increase in performance – Methanol/Water under max. performance altitude and GM 1 above this altitude. Greater supply of new a/c. R/T communications with bombers in the air. Fighter Control procedures. |
1941 |
Greater altitudes of maximum performance FW 190 Methanol/Water, GM 1. Better supply of a/c. Fighter Control Procedures. |
1942 |
Faster conversion to FW 190 and less use of Me.109. |
1943 |
Heavier armament Increase in performance of Me.109 (As engines, use of Methanol/Water) Replacement a/c for the Me.109 (Me.209, Me.309) Increased performance for FW 190 (2000 HP engine with better altitude). Series production of the FW 190 D (with in-line engine). Gyro Computing sights. More aircraft Longer endurance of aircraft. |
1944 |
No more Me.109’s. Running out of the FW 190 A series and replacement with the FW 190 D. Series production of the Tank 152. Series production of the Me.262 as a fighter. Fuel for operations of Me.163. Gyro Computing Sights. Longer Endurance of Fighter a/c. Automatic Pilots for Bad Weather Operations. Series production of the Dornier 335 as a TE fighter (Zerstorer). |
1945 |
Entire Messerschmitt production to be concentrated on Me.262 production. No more Me.109. Ending of FW 190D production. Entire Focke Wulf productive capacity to be concentrated on Tank 152. Jumo 213 and DB 603 as fighter engines both over 2000 HP. Series production of Me.263 and fuel for it. |
1.For principles of selection of fighter pilots the principle of setting up an elite standard did not occur soon enough.
2.For the selection of fighter pilot trainees in the flight schools a low scale of requirements for physical, mental, and character qualities was set up. The bomber arm was clearly given preference in the allotment of personnel.
3.The supply of flying officers for the fighter arm was numerically neglected in the first half of the war, and neglected also as to quality and training. Hereby arose the acute lack of formation leader candidates.
4.The flying and fighter training of the trainees was too low in flying hours. The training facilities (fighter schools) had increased sixfold during the war. While there was, until 1944, a continual lack of fighter aircraft for training purposes, there were enough of these aircraft from this time on, but far too little fuel was available.
5.With the increase in the rate of loss of fighter pilots – at the latest after 1943 – the training of the supply of new pilots should have been continually bettered, because the possibility no longer existed as before for pilots perfecting their training and getting experience in the operational units themselves. This was, on the other hand, numerically impossible and later, in 1944, impossible also for lack of fuel. There was simply a lack of training emphasis on fighter pilots and nothing but fighter pilots.
6.The gaps in the training which most often became evident were:
a. Insufficient experience with the operational fighter types under combat conditions (too few flying hours).
b. Too little formation training in operational fighter types.
c. Lack of gunnery training.
d. Lack of combat training.
e. Almost complete lack of instrument flying training.
1.As a result of the lack of reserves of formation leaders, it became the general rule that units had to replace them from their own ranks. This method proved completely unfeasible after 1943, because the quality sank very low and the Geschwader were no longer in a position to close the gaps. Only now was a systematic training of formation leaders begun in a regular course. This innovation should have been in existence from the beginning of the war as the ‘University of Fighter Operations.’
2.At the beginning of the war, pilots of World War I were used throughout as Geschwader CO’s. These men were no longer able from a flying standpoint to lead their formations in the air. In the Battle of Britain the first ‘rejuvenation’ had to take place. Even though this step in my opinion proved good, still too many good young Gruppe COs became Geschwader COs, and the evolutionary development of the formation leader corps was thus shaken. It would have been better to carry out this process slower or to have begun it in peace time.
3.As already noted, there was no fighter command office before the war and in the first year of the war. Only during the French campaign were fighter commanders Jagdfliegerführer) set up under the Fliegerkorps, with little influence on operations. During the Battle of Britain their influence grew. With the beginning of the Air Defense of the Continent the Jafus and, later, the Jagddivisionen were the operationally controlling staffs. There was, however, a lack of accomplished, battle experienced, and able commanders and staff men for these staffs. Both types of officers should have had operational experience in the war and have been trained either as pilots or as staff men. That would only have been possible if this training had been begun in peace time. But even during the war the training of General Staff Officers from the fighter force was neglected. Thus is explained the lack of unit leaders and staff officers for the fighter force.
4.For many sorts of personal reasons Jafus and Jagddivision CO’s were, during the course of the war, relieved of their jobs by the C. in C. (Goring). Thus the commands never could collect the necessary experience and have the necessary peace of mind.
1.Continuous lack of forces led after 1942 to a permanent overloading of the Fighter Force with too many missions. This affected both the planning of operations and their conduct.
2.After 1942 the fighter force fought on all fronts against numerically superior forces. But on no front were the operations of the GAF and especially the fighter force primarily directed toward winning back air superiority. Instead of this, the operations of bombers, dive bombers, and ground attack units in the support of the army were supposed to be escorted by fighter forces using defensive measures.
3.The draining off of fighter forces from the Western Front in 1941 for the Russian offensive was bearable at most for a few months. For a longer duration, the air superiority passed first to the English and, from 1943, still more decisively to the Americans.
4.The building up of the Defense of the Reich against attacks by American four engine bomber missions failed from the beginning because of lack of forces. A timely withdrawal of forces from the east and from the south was never decided upon; instead individual Gruppen were transferred one by one. Thus we were always behind the strengthening of American forces, without once winning a lead position.
5.The High Command operated with fighter Gruppen and transferred them here and there according to the main effort of battle, instead of regarding the fighter Geschwader as the organic, undividable unit. In this way the Gruppen went into the different phases of operations always confused, the influence of Geschwader organization was lost and the largest amount of operational value was not extracted from the fighters.
6.The ground organization and signals net of all kinds, especially in rear areas behind the various fronts, were very much neglected. In retreats and in the building up of the Defense of the Reich, therefore, the units usually ran up against considerable shortages.
7.In operations during bad weather fighter units were completely overtaxed in view of their state of training and equipment. Great losses due to bad weather shook confidence in the High Command and caused great uncertainty in the units.
8.Especially in the Defense of the Reich, the High Command never let an economical employment of strength prevail. Every large attack had to be attacked with all forces, regardless of weather, strength of units, dislocation of organization, or approach route. This order prevented until 1944 any rebuilding of worn out units and quickly consumed any Gruppen which were hard hit or broken up.
9.The long persistence in using twin engine fighters (Zerstörer) in the face of the American fighter escort and the use of the 5 cm. cannon were tactical and technical errors of the High Command (Hitler and Goring).
10. In 1944, three huge preparations for strategic employment of fighters in the Defense of the Reich were made. The First Reserve thus formed was thrown into the battle at the beginning of the invasion.
The Second Reserve was ordered into France at the end of August 1944 and had no effect at all.
The Third and largest Reserve, trained and equipped only for a mass operation in the Defense of the Reich, the Big Blow, was not used here, but was torn to pieces in the Ardennes Offensive.
Three times therefore, in 1944, the strengthening of the Defense of the Reich was wrecked before it bore fruit, by order of the High Command. In the first case the situation permitted no other possibility; in the second and third cases the use of the reserve forces in the West was each time an out-and-out mistake from the beginning.
Without regard to these points, the picture presented by the story of the building up of the Defense of the Reich is completely false. It looks now as though the High Command in 1944 prevented a decisive success of the fighter force in the Defense of the Reich.
11. Göring as C. in C. of the Luftwaffe had from the moment of the loss of air superiority on the various fronts, permitted no realistic reflection, argument, or decision to prevail. Instead he squandered time and energy in the most disgusting insulting of the fighter force. By this he achieved in the fighter force itself, as well as in the other branches and among the people themselves, exactly the opposite effect of that he sought. Everyone spoke in general terms about the failure of the fighter force.
12. The planning for carrying out large operations required time. To hold out during this time, in the face of the terrific strength of the enemy in the air and to nevertheless temporarily keep down the fighter force, in order to build up to where an effective blow could be struck, was always too much for the courage of the High Command.
13. The taking over of the bomber units of the IX Fliegerkorps en masse into the Fighter Force had a disastrous impact on the Force when the future hung in the balance. The turning over of almost all fighter units to a bomber man without any experience in fighter operations before the Ardennes offensive (when Peltz of IX Fliegerkorps became CO of II Jagdkorps) was the dagger thrust into the heart of the Fighter Force. Dissolution and ruin were the results.
14. In operational and combat tactics, a great series of mistakes were made, of course. But these must not be given too much importance. Only the basic things already indicated were decisive.
I support to the last ditch the standpoint of the offensive, the principle of action that is the aggressive advantage of fighters. Whoever forgets this factor (as in the purely defensive conduct of the escort Gruppen for Sturmgruppen formations in the Defense of the Reich, etc.) makes the first decisive tactical error.
This was the case with us, as already often stated, in the Battle of Britain, the Malta operation, and at various times in the Defense of the Reich.
15. Even in defense the fighter must not avoid combat, but must accept it, otherwise he gives the enemy a further advantage. This principle was violated by our formations especially after the beginning of 1944. Numerical, technical, and flying superiority of RAF and American pilots was the cause of it.
16. The absolute integrity of formations in combat is one of the most important requirements for decisive success and low losses. I must admit without reserve our weakness in this respect.
17. In operational tactics and in battle technique, no fixed scheme should be allowed to take hold. Surprise, cunning, and maneuverability must be combined with aggressiveness and dash. Since the urge toward this could not come from the Jafus and Jagddivision CO’s as a result of their lack of practical experience, it had to come from unit CO’s and formation leaders. From time to time weakness and failure were evident here.
18. The examination of the victory and loss lists, the recognition of the great numbers against them and finally the crushing enemy superiority in the air, must, however, when realistically evaluated, give the impression of a hard and courageously fighting German fighter force.