By the beginning of 1866, the growth of the Fenian Brotherhood and their increased activities had created considerable unease in New Brunswick. The public felt very vulnerable, and newspapers demanded that the government take immediate action to protect the province. These concerns turned the focus onto the provincial militia.
In 1787, the New Brunswick legislature had passed a militia act requiring that every man between the ages of sixteen and sixty be enrolled in the militia. Those who failed to appear, properly equipped, at the annual muster parade were fined. This system successfully met the military crises that confronted the province in the early years, but by the 1850s the militia had become ineffective and was in need of major reform. Moreover, the British government felt that it had carried total responsibility for imperial defence long enough – the long-suffering British taxpayer deserved relief. With the advent of responsible government in the provinces of British North America, British authorities felt strongly that part of the burden for defence should be passed to the provinces and the British garrisons reduced, if not eliminated completely. The New Brunswick government, however, had absolutely no desire to assume any responsibility for defence. In 1852, the legislative assembly obstinately suspended the militia act and all defence expenditures. It argued that relations with the United States had been excellent since the settlement of the Maine border dispute and New Brunswick faced no possibility of a war of its own making; therefore, the province had no need for expensive defence measures. Stoutly resisting pressure from the British Colonial Office, members of the legislature held firm to their belief that colonial defence was an imperial and not a provincial matter.
This impasse dissolved with the reappearance of cross-border tension and the spread of a volunteer militia movement. During the Napoleonic Wars, military units formed voluntarily across Britain to defend the country against a French invasion. In 1859, when Napoleon III again threatened to invade England, the volunteer response was overwhelming and the British militia was revitalized. Major General Sir William Fenwick Williams, the general officer commanding the British regular forces in Canada, suggested that this volunteer movement could be successfully and beneficially transported to North America. The concept quickly gained acceptance, and, with Williams’s assistance, volunteer militia companies sprang up across New Brunswick. The legislature could not resist this patriotic groundswell and was forced to provide the necessary legislation and funds to support it. By March 1860, thirteen voluntary infantry companies and six voluntary artillery batteries had been created. The first public appearance of the volunteer militia occurred during the visit of the Prince of Wales in 1860. Its impressive appearance and performance during this visit resulted in wide public acclaim for the volunteer movement in New Brunswick.
The Honourable Arthur Hamilton Gordon assumed his post as lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick in mid-October 1861. His aristocratic background and temperament did not prepare him for the rough and tumble responsible government practised in colonial New Brunswick. Although his powers were limited, they did exist, and he was fiercely protective of them. In addition to being lieutenant-governor, Gordon was also commander-in-chief of the New Brunswick militia, one area where he could discharge his duties without political interference.
Facing growing tension with the northern states involved in the American Civil War, New Brunswick politicians were soon forced to recognize the need for an effective defence force. In 1861, the Trent Affair brought Britain and the United States to the brink of war. When the USS Jacinto stopped the British Royal Mail Packet Trent upon the high seas and forcibly removed two Confederate agents, the British public was inflamed and demanded action. In response, Britain sent eleven thousand British regular soldiers to reinforce the North American garrisons. Late in December 1861, with little warning, ships arrived in Saint John with 6,823 British regulars who were to be transported over several hundred miles of snow-covered wilderness to the St. Lawrence River Valley. Saint John lacked the necessary facilities to handle an influx of that size, and the road and rail systems were totally inadequate. Although not strictly within his area of responsibility, Gordon assumed control of the support activities within New Brunswick. He commandeered schools, temperance halls, customs houses and any place else that could provide accommodation. He made arrangement for beds, bedding, stoves and other supplies. He called on the local militia to do sentry duty, construct and staff overnight halting places, and police the route to prevent desertion by passing British soldiers. Thanks to brilliant military staff work and the excellent support provided by Gordon, the move of the British reinforcements in midwinter occurred smoothly and without a single fatality. The appearance of this large number of soldiers in a time of crisis greatly boosted New Brunswickers’ morale, as it demonstrated that in time of need Britain was committed to the protection of her colonies. However, this event added not a single soldier or cannon to the defence of the province.
Following the Trent Affair, Gordon set up a commission of selected officers to review the state of the militia and make recommendations. The result was the innovative Militia Act of 1862 and a vote of two thousand pounds annually for three years put into effect the recommendations. The new act divided the active militia into three components. Class A consisted of able-bodied men of military age who volunteered to undergo military training. This group was formed into cavalry, artillery, engineer and infantry units. Classes B and C consisted of all other male inhabitants of the province between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, with Class B being unmarried men and widowers without children, and Class C being married men and widowers with children. These two classes were required to assemble one day annually for enrolment and training. All men between the ages of forty-five and sixty belonged to the sedentary militia.
Taking advantage of his experience with the volunteer movement in his native Scotland and using the full authority of his office as commander-in-chief, Gordon set about improving the effectiveness of the New Brunswick militia. He was ably assisted in this task by a series of efficient adjutants general, all of whom were professional British army officers. Gordon and his staff maintained tight control over promotions and the granting of commissions, brooking no political interference. All new commissions were limited to a five-year period, and officers were required to pass a drill examination before taking up an appointment. Those over the age of sixty or physically unfit were retired. Volunteer companies were to number not less than forty men and no more than seventy-five. Those units that fell below minimum strength were disbanded. Arms and accoutrements were issued to volunteer companies, but to ensure security and proper maintenance, they were kept in public armories. Funds were provided for the rental of drill halls and rifle competitions. In addition to the training conducted by their own officers, the militia received six days of training annually under an experienced paid drill instructor. Eight experienced drill instructors arrived from the British Army to perform this function. To assess the effectiveness of his reforms and directives, Gordon visited and inspected the militia units regularly and frequently.
Gordon was personally involved in all aspects of the provincial militia and did not hesitate to enforce the Militia Act. The 1863 Order No. 2 declared, “His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief learns with regret from the Monthly Progress Returns, that the members of several of the Volunteer Companies of militia are extremely remiss in their attendance at drill.” Gordon warned that if there was no improvement he would disband ineffective companies. True to his word, he disbanded several units. In September 1864, the commander-in-chief dispensed with the service of the Richibucto Company of Volunteers, which had “fallen below the strength by Law.” In March 1865, the artillery battery commanded by Captain M’Lachlan, having “for a long time been irregular and unsatisfactory,” was disbanded. “In consequence of the Report of a Court of Enquiry … his Excellency has been pleased to dispense with the services of Captain Sandford, and the Officers and Men composing the Volunteer Company under his command” from the 1st Battalion Charlotte County Militia. Nothing escaped Gordon’s notice: “The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Officers commanding Companies, that the custom of permitting their men to keep their own arms and accoutrements, is directly in opposition to Section 13 of the Militia Act.” He pointed out that commanding officers were given forty dollars to defray the cost of weapon storage. Gordon also used the Militia General Orders for public commendations. For example, in September 1863, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Foster of the New Brunswick Regiment of Artillery and Lieutenant Colonel Honourable John Robertson were congratulated on the good performance of their units at a military review at Camp Torryburn, outside Saint John, which had been the first opportunity that they had had to work with British regulars.
Despite these charges, Gordon and his military staff faced many obstacles. It proved difficult to maintain volunteer units in rural areas because of the demands imposed by frequent drill parades and the distance volunteers had to travel. As a result, volunteer units were concentrated in urban centres, with half of the companies located in Saint John. It was also difficult to expand the number of volunteer units because the available pool of recruits was restricted. The average labourer worked at least twelve hours a day, six days a week, leaving little time for military training. It was hard to find men of ability and proven leadership willing to make the necessary commitment to accept positions of command. In addition, there was the usual spate of local jealousies and complaints with which to contend. The petty complaint that some volunteer units had been favoured with the prized short Enfield rifle annoyed Gordon. With some irritation, he explained that only long Enfield rifles had been issued in New Brunswick, although “It is obviously impossible that all Companies should be armed with Rifles of exactly the same date and some Rifles have shorter stocks than others.”
Class A volunteer units were the main priority, and they received most of the available resources and funds. The other two classes continued to exist, but their effectiveness varied widely. In October 1865, the Fredericton Headquarters reported on the annual muster of the local companies. “The muster was merely for the purpose of calling the roll and ascertaining numbers. Some of the companies mustered in good force, others hardly quarter strength. Some of the officers appeared en regle in uniform, others without any badge of any rank. The whole affair went off very quiet and orderly.” A letter to the editor signed by “Flat Foot” commenting on the same muster provided a very different picture:
Sir, how can I describe the gathering assembled. Between ten and eleven o’clock, the Colonel and Adjutant (in uniform) might be seen on horseback riding here and there, and the Sergeant Major, with an armful of books, rushing in different directions, endeavoring to post his Sergeants, as I afterwards judged. Here might be seen one or two officers in full (undress) uniforms; there another batch with a sword alone; others with a pencil or roll call to distinguish them from privates. Then, as to men, what can I say, as it would be impossible to do justice to them in a description of the scene. One company mustered perhaps 75 men, and the rest of the companies ranged from that down to about 20 each; and those composed principally of over aged men and boys.
Flat Foot called it “a farce” and claimed he attended only to avoid the fine.
For the same muster period, the Saint John Morning News reported that “veterans to Col. Robertson’s Battalion of the City Light Infantry were called upon to assemble themselves on the Barrack Square to answer the roll-call and perform certain other military formalities … Promotions among the officers during the past year seems to have been so great and transfers so extensive, that mostly all the Companies have got new Captains. This, together with the rain, caused a good deal of confusion among the ‘Rank and File,’ who kept wandering about in all directions searching eagerly for their missing chief.” A very critical description of the muster followed. Three days later, the same newspaper made a more complimentary report on the muster of the Saint John City Rifles. Nine companies were on a parade, with five or six hundred men in attendance, all officers except one were in uniform, and all companies “were put through sundry movements.” It said that “Lieutenant Colonel Thurgar, who was in command of the force, did himself ample justice.” Similarly, William C. Anslow noted in his diary that on a beautiful September day in 1865 he went up the Miramichi River about a mile above Wilson’s Point to attend the annual militia muster. “There were a large number present and after some time had elapsed, were formed into line & the names called. They were then marched up & formed into a kind of square & were then addressed by the Governor & then dismissed.” It had been intended that the annual muster include drill instruction. However, this proved unworkable due to the lack of qualified instructors and the untrained men proved both awkward and unruly. The drill training during the annual muster was abandoned for a simple assembling and roll call. The result was that the bulk of the Class B and C militia was a mere paper force. To face the Fenian crisis, it was clear that the defence of New Brunswick would rest on the Class A volunteer militia and British regulars.
Gordon appointed a second militia commission to review the success of the Militia Act of 1862 and make further recommendations. The result was the Militia Act of 1865, which provided that grants to volunteer companies would be based proportionately on their strength and this strength would include only men who had attended at least fifteen drills in a six-month period. A major innovation called for the establishment of annual camps of instruction, of twenty-eight days duration, designed to train volunteers who would in turn train their home units. The first camp of instruction was held in Fredericton in July 1865, with 947 volunteers quartered in the Exhibition Hall. They were treated like professionals, governed by the Code of Military Discipline, drilled by qualified drill instructors and paid a small allowance. The camp commandant was Captain H. J. Hallowes, an experienced regular British officer, and the instructors were provided by the 15th Regiment from the Fredericton British garrison. It was an unqualified success and provided another boost to the volunteer movement in New Brunswick. By 1866, as a result of Gordon’s determination and energy, the force consisted of 2,099 volunteers organized into seven troops of cavalry, ten batteries of artillery, one company of engineers and twenty-one companies of infantry. As small and inadequate as this volunteer militia was, New Brunswick could be thankful that Gordon’s reforms had occurred prior to the arrival of the Fenian Brotherhood on the Maine border.
Training battalion on parade during the Camp of Instruction at the Fredericton Exhibition Grounds, July 1865. PANB P5-378