Following the traumatic events before Moscow, the New Year brought fresh hope and optimism. Those closest to the Führer saw that his iron leadership had, in effect stabilized the front. Even some of Hitler’s bitterest critics, who had argued persistently about withdrawals, were amazed at his grand strategy. Hitler’s policy to hold his battered and frost-bitten forces in front of the Red capital had saved ground, but at an alarming cost in men and materiel. The Red Army, as he had predicted, finally ran out of steam because of the harsh weather, and were unable to achieve any deep penetration into the German lines. Consequently, this had saved Bock’s Army Group Centre from complete destruction. Although Hitler was to later say that the battle of Moscow was the finest hour, his army had in fact failed to capture the city, crucified by the Russian winter and by fanatical enemy resistance. Bock’s failure to capture Moscow was essentially owing to the remarkable Russian recovery and their winter offensive. The battle had completely transformed the Wehrmacht from its glorious days in June 1941. Even Hitler himself could not mask the doubts about completing the huge task of beating the Red Army, despite his outward display of optimism at the war conferences. At mealtimes he appeared tense and uneasy beneath the avalanche of work that had descended upon him since taking command of the Army. Those working with him could see the gradual alteration in his temper and appearance. Hewel told a friend:
He is not the man he was. He has grown gloomy and obdurate. He will shrink from no sacrifice and show no mercy or forgiveness. You would not recognize him if you saw him.13
For the ensuing weeks Hitler’s thoughts at the war conferences totally revolved around planning for the spring offensive. The Wolf’s Lair was a hive of activity, especially the daily war conferences. During these long, drawn out sessions there was a widespread feeling of pessimism on the Eastern Front. But doubts were hardly ever raised.
On 7 February, Reich Minister for Munitions Fritz Todt entered the snow-covered compound of Security Zone I and reported to the Führer. After a short conference they had supper, and then continued their lengthy discussion with a large group, talking about Germany’s war economy. The next morning, strained and fatigued from spending a very long night in the company of the Führer, Todt was driven out to the Rastenburg airfield to catch his Heinkel back to Berlin. Later that morning, Hitler was handed a message to say that Todt’s Heinkel had crashed on take-off killing him instantly. News of the tragedy sent shock waves through the entire headquarters. Hitler appeared desolate at the loss. Over the breakfast table he nevertheless appeared unmoved by the minister’s untimely death, and spoke about who would be the most suitable candidate to replace him. Although everyone agreed he was irreplaceable, there was one man the Führer had confidence in as his successor, Albert Speer, his trusted architect and beloved friend. On 9 February Speer was appointed successor to minister Todt.
The following day Hitler left the headquarters and returned to Berlin to attend Todt’s funeral. When he returned to East Prussia on 15 February he was depressed and bad tempered. The snow and the arctic temperatures had deepened his despondency. Hitler’s secretary described the mood inside the compound as bleak:
After two days of warmer weather the temperature suddenly dropped again … the chief is always dog-tired, but he won’t go to bed, and this is often a torment for the rest of us. We used to play records most evenings, and then you could fall back on your own thoughts; but since Todt’s unfortunate end times for playing music have been few and far between.14
His secretaries were finding life at the headquarters increasingly difficult and this included the conversation, which they often considered tedious. They noticed that the Führer had changed since the traumatic events in the East. The winter crisis had undoubtedly seriously undermined his health, but in front of everyone he still showed that he would not be deterred from the mammoth task ahead. For him there could be no rest until victory was achieved. Despite his resolution, visitors to the Wolf’s Lair found him tired and drawn. Over dinner he spoke persistently of the appalling winter as an ordeal successfully mastered, and he continued to pour scorn on his pessimistic commanders and blamed Brauchitsch for most of the setbacks. In his eyes, a number of his cowardly generals had completely sabotaged the entire plan of Barbarossa. Hitler said that Brauchitsch wanted prestige victories instead of real ones. He announced with fervour and excitment that the thaw in the East had begun and this would pave the way to final victory.
With the coming German spring offensive Hitler’s health improved, he slowly regained his confidence and those that saw him daily felt that the worst on the Eastern Front was now over. Throughout March, the gradual German recovery in Russia continued until the spring mud and floods brought both sides to a temporary standstill. This enabled Hitler and staff time to draw up meticulous plans for the new offensive. In a three-hour conference, Hitler said that the summer offensive codenamed ‘Blue’, would commence with a southward thrust along the Don River towards Stalingrad. Following the capture of Stalingrad he planned using the city as an anchor, and to send the mass of his Panzer force south to occupy the Caucasus, where it would be used to cut off vital Russian oil supplies. The directive, dictated by Hitler himself was to be executed in two stages. The first part of the summer operation was a determined all-out drive of successive enveloping thrusts along the Kursk-Voronezh axis, where it was to destroy the Soviet southern flank and carry on to the Don River. The second part was the advance to Stalingrad and across the lower Don into the Caucasus. For this operation Army Group South would be divided. He ordered General List’s Army Group A south, toward Rostov and the Caucasus, while General Weichs’ Army Group B would be responsible for the drive across the lower Don to the Volga and into Stalingrad. It would be in the Caucasus, Hitler said, that they would ensure the Reich’s survival in the War and bring about the ultimate victory he was yearning for.
On 20 April, Hitler’s birthday, he diverted some of his attention from the coming summer offensive and received a number of guests at the headquarters. Göring, Ribbentrop, Milch, Raeder, and a group of other officials and guests attended his birthday held in a dining room which was set out with tablecloths and flowers. The headquarters officers and staff celebrated the occasion with cups of real coffee and a glass of Piesporter Goldtropfchen. After lunch Hitler and his guests were led out of Security Zone I where just on the edge of the forest they marvelled at a demonstration of the first two Tiger tanks.
Four days later Hitler gathered his headquarters staff for the long journey to Bavaria. His visit was not to rest in the solitude of his Berghof mountain retreat, as prescribed by Morell, but to prepare a major speech before the Reichstag. By the time he arrived back at the Wolf’s Lair the German spring offensive had finally been unleashed in the Crimea, on 8 May. During the following days Hitler and his generals watched as the high drama unfolded in the map room. At first, reports brought encouraging signs. But as the Russians intensified their resistance, telephone calls from anxious commanders began to flood the communications room appealing (in vain) to withdraw. To the outrage of Hitler, Von Bock once again – as he had done before Moscow the previous year – requested an urgent withdrawal from Kharkov. An angry Hitler told his staff that Bock was a defeatist. The offensive, he argued, was to continue as planned and his generals would just have to keep their nerve if they were to succeed. For the next few days the headquarters was in crisis. Hitler would emerge each day from the conference room pale and tired after arguing with his staff for hours. He was convinced that his forces should hold Kharkov at all costs and told them it would be destroyed. By the 22nd, that obstinate belief became reality. He was handed a report that thousands of his troops with a massive assemblage of armour had encircled Red Army formations and taken some 240,000 prisoners. That day, Hitler exultantly left his Führerbunker as the victor of Kharkov. Over at the Keitelbunker he openly marvelled at his military genius and the victory he had just won for his generals. Those that saw him that day found him beaming with confidence.
Emboldened by the first military victory of 1942, Hitler appeared convinced more than ever at the war conferences that the coming Blue offensive would be equally successful. The Caucasus, he predicted, was where the Russian bear would suffer its bloodiest defeat. For many months his generals had argued with him and opposed his grand strategy, but now he would prove them wrong.
On 28 June, Operation Blue began in earnest. At the midday war conference there was a widespread feeling of anxious activity as news bulletins began to come through from the front lines. The 2nd and 4th Panzer Army opened up the Blue offensive. Almost immediately the Panzers smashed their way through lines of Red Army defences and drove at breakneck speed east of Kursk and pushed toward Voronezh, reaching the outskirts of the smouldering city in four days. Following the capture of the city 4th Panzer then swung south-east along the Don where it met with Paulus’s 6th Army east of Kharkov. Over the next week, strung out over more than 200 miles, the 6th Army with 20 divisions, 250,000 men, 500 panzers, 7,000 guns and mortars and 25,000 horses, pushed down towards the Don corridor on Stalingrad. The tremendous distances which these divisions had to cover could only be achieved by long foot marches but it appeared to be going well.
On 3 July, Hitler left his headquarters for a brief visit to Von Bock’s field headquarters in Poltava. On his return flight back to Rastenburg he had given Von Bock permission to capture the strategic city of Voronezh, but categorically ordered him not be drawn into protracted urban fighting and reiterated that under no circumstances did he want another Moscow or Leningrad on his hands.
Three days later, he received reports that Voronezh was captured, but still Hitler held his breath. As he paced his bunker he was told that Bock’s units had found themselves inexplicably engaged in a series of heavy street battles, and for two days tried fanatically to hold the city. Seething with anger, Hitler could not believe what had happened. He was so incensed with Bock’s negligence that he announced he would relieve him of his command forthwith. Although he admitted that Bock had proven himself as an adequate Eastern Front commander he could not work with generals that were unable follow his directives to the letter.
As Bock headed into retirement, Hitler told his staff to begin packing as the headquarters was being transferred from East Prussia to a forward Eastern Front headquarters in the Ukraine. A week later, on 16 July at 8.15 am his entire staff left the Wolf’s Lair and flew in sixteen planes to the new installation, which was situated six miles north of Vinnitsa, just east of the Vinnitsa/Shitomir road.
Inside the dull compound there was an array of wooden huts, very different from the concrete bunkers at the Wolf’s Lair. There were no trees, no hills, simply an endless terrain of nothingness. Hitler and his staff hated the place and for the next three months they were compelled to live there. Each evening everyone had to swallow anti-malaria tablets. At night it was very cold inside the log cabins, whilst during the day it was hot and stuffy. Here at Werewolf, Hitler watched Operation Blue unfold. He was optimistic that his forces would soon capture Stalingrad. For the soldiers of the 6th and 4th Armies, whose task it was to take the city, the name Stalingrad bore no real significance, other than it was a city that marked the end point of a very costly summer offensive. To Hitler, however, Stalingrad held more significance. He regarded the city as an ‘incubator’ of Bolshevism, and despised it as the place where in 1918 Stalin, Budenny, Timoshenko and Voroshilov had defied Trotsky over his policy of war against the Whites, which eventually saw Stalin rise to power.
Hitler was confident of taking the city, but the Russians were equally determined to defend it at all costs. For the Soviets, the time had come for every comrade and citizen to prevent the hated enemy from completing any more ambitious plans in the east. Already millions of soldiers and civilians had perished, and although the Russians had suffered the highest casualties, their devotion to the Motherland and their determination and courage to halt the German crusade continued with fanatical violence. Thus, by late August 1942, with news of German forces on the Don poised to strike across to the west bank of the Volga, the Russians began frantically making preparations not to evacuate the area, but to defend their beloved city.
By 22 August, news reached Werewolf that soldiers of the 6th Army had completed the pontoon bridges across the Don. Tanks, halftracks, self-propelled assault guns, dozens of trucks and reconnaissance vehicles from General Hube’s 16th Panzer Division rattled remorselessly across the broad expanse of water onto the east bank. Early the following morning, Count von Strachwitz’s Abteilung of the 2nd Panzer Regiment, reinforced with panzergrenadier companies, advanced forward from the Don towards the Volga. As they drove eastwards, churning up huge dust clouds, panzer crews could be seen standing fearlessly in their turrets waving their companies forward across the hot and dusty steppe. For these men of the 6th Army it was an historic moment, one their Führer would be proud of.
During the daily war conference Hitler’s health once again worsened, and in turn markedly affected his relationship with everybody, most of all his generals. By August, as the 6th Army prepared to attack the outskirts of Stalingrad Hitler was convinced that he could no longer trust his generals. He had been ill-advised, lied to by commanders in the field and deceived by those at his headquarters. His suspicions grew each day and eventually at the conferences he would rarely listen to advice, never to criticism. His growing hatred for the General Staff, coupled with the summer heat, saw him make decisions hastily, especially in one of his raging arguments. His conviction that he was surrounded by traitors escalated as further setbacks on the Eastern Front emerged. Gradually, through the rest of the summer he began to convince himself that his generals were to blame for all the military disappointments and various withdrawals on the Eastern Front.
In early September, after a huge argument with Jodl, Hitler was determined that never again would his orders be disputed or deflected at the conferences. In future all briefing conferences would now take place in his hut. A team of Reichstag Stenographers were immediately flown out from Berlin to Vinnitsa to record every word that was spoken during the conferences. The atmosphere at these meetings was uncomfortable, to say the least. No one initiated conversation, but waited anxiously. Hitler would rarely look any of his staff officers in the eye and did not shake hands with them. He would greet them with an icy stare and would conduct the conference in a curt and detached manner.
The stenographers recorded the discussions during these conferences, under the supervision of Martin Bormann. Their records could amount to as much as 500 pages in a single day. Every page was meticulouslyly checked by Hitler’s adjutants, and then filed away in secrecy.
In October, the headquarters staff noticed that Hitler once more seemed to be more relaxed and optimistic. The weather at Werewolf was dramatically changing and freezing rain would soon bring snow. Fearing winter in the depths of the Ukraine, Hitler announced over dinner that he intended leaving Vinnitsa for the Wolf’s Lair. During the last week of October a memorandum was circulated at the headquarters, instructing the staff of Security Zone I and II, and the field echelon of the OKH quartered nearby in to the town of Vinnitsa, to begin packing for departure.
On 1 November, the entire headquarters returned to Wolf’s Lair. War diarist Greiner found it increasingly unpleasant:
It’s horrid here in this dirty green, gloomy, airless forest encampment. It’s permanently swathed in fog, it has an exceptionally nasty dining room that couldn’t compete with even the ugliest village pub, it has hideous bunkers and barracks that are either overheated or freezing. What’s worse is the way things are turning out, there are endless differences of opinion.15
Over the last seven months the installation had undergone another major reconstruction. This time more wooden hutments had been erected, which were later covered with brick walls and concrete ceilings to protect them against enemy bombs. Many other buildings too were protected in the same way, including the Navy liaison offices, a second officer’s mess, Jodl’s offices, Göring’s offices, the cinema, the wooden annexes to the Führerbunker, the Keitelbunker, and the army personnel office. The new tea house that was built adjacent to and east of Kasino I was another very important building that received additional protection. North of Otto Dietrich’s bunker/office No.1, stood a very heavily built guest bunker, No.15, for VIP visitors. In order to increase space and additional safety for the SS-Begleitkommando, officers of the RSD and his servants, several barracks and bunkers were completed. This included the completion of a sauna. North of the guest bunker, a well guarded barracks-type building was erected. A high fence topped with barbed wire was then added and surrounded the new barracks. Inside this compound were the newly housed stenographers. The building was heavily guarded and no one was allowed in this fenced area except those transcribing what had been said at the military conferences. In one of the larger rooms thousands of transcribed short hand notes were held in boxes and dated. If any discrepancies were ever to arise during the military conferences Hitler and the OKW staff were able to support their position by referring to the recorded discussions that were now held under lock and key in the stenographer barracks.
South of the headquarters, through the western gate into Security Zone II, a number of other buildings were constructed, including one for foreign minister von Ribbentrop’s liaison man, one that had been originally assigned to Dr Todt, now Albert Speer, two for the Navy High Command liaison office, and one for the Luftwaffe High Command liaison office; their respective command staffs also had their own liaison officers here.
On 2 November, Hitler spoke at length about another theatre of war that Germany were bitterly contesting, North Africa. That evening, the Wolf’s Lair received word that Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was requesting permission to withdraw from El Alamein. By early November, Rommel had lost nearly 12,000 men and 350 panzers. Only a handful of tanks were now at his disposal. With his forces now fighting for survival, he decided to send an urgent message to Rastenburg. That same evening, Hitler duly dispatched a reply telling the ‘Desert Fox’ that he must not under any circumstances fall back one inch. His troops must, as they had done on the Eastern Front, ‘triumph or die’. Yet, during the early hours of the morning a lengthy daily report announcing that Rommel would withdraw from El Alamein arrived by teletype. The night duty officer quickly jotted down the report, but failed to declare that Rommel was actually retreating, thinking that the message was not important enough to disturb the Führer until later that morning. When Hitler awoke at 9.00 am, his adjutant handed him the report over at his bunker. Unsurprisingly, when Hitler read the report he became purple with rage and began shouting, accusing some of his staff officers of conspiring against him. He immediately suspected that OKW had intentionally withheld vital information from him, and had forced Rommel to withdraw. He irritably ordered the night duty officer to be arrested forthwith and marched over to the Führerbunker under armed escort. The young, nervous duty officer was then stood in front of Hitler and made accountable for his actions. Broken and drained the duty officer was reduced to the ranks and then marched out of the headquarters to a Detention Battalion. Rommel was exonerated for his part, but General Warlimont, who had been sleeping through Rommel’s urgent appeals, took the full blame. As a form of punishment he was relieved of his post forthwith.
Warlimont’s sudden departure from the Wolf’s Lair had come as a bitter disappointment, especially to the officers of his staff, many of whom were angry over Hitler’s behaviour. Keitel for one, openly expressed how sorry he was that he was being evicted from OKW. Schmundt too was also deeply upset and even went to see Hitler to try and get him to recognize that Warlimont may have been treated unfairly. Jodl, on the other hand, was quite unmoved and said with blind obedience that the Führer was the supreme law of the land, and what he said everyone must follow.
A few days later, after much deliberating, Hitler too gradually became aware that Warlimont’s dismissal had been unwarranted and asked Schmundt to telephone Warlimont, asking him to return to his post at the Wolf’s Lair.
Although the report episode had finally been put to rest, in North Africa the situation had gone from bad to worse, with Rommel continuing to retreat across the blistering desert. Though Hitler had finally approved the decision to withdraw, he felt that the Field Marshal had become increasingly pessimistic, and like so many of his commanders, had completely lost his nerve. He told some of his more intimate staff that if it were not for the regrettable succession of events that had transpired, which had prevented him from intervening in time, defeat in Africa would never have begun.
To add to the problems in North Africa, a shocking intelligence report arrived at the headquarters on 7 November. A huge fleet of enemy ships had entered the Mediterranean and seemed to be bound for the North Africa coast. Over several days intelligence reports had indicated the ships assembling at Gibraltar. Hitler and OKW had assumed that the enemy was bound for Sardinia or Corsica. But to their great surprise, it now looked as if the invasion of Algeria was imminent.
Early that afternoon, with news of the enemy armada still at the forefront of Hitler’s mind, he cut short the midday conference and, accompanied by most of his high-ranking staff, left the freezing temperatures of East Prussia bound for Munich. Whilst Hitler was away delivering his anniversary speech to the party’s old guard at the Lowenbraukeller, back at the Wolf’s Lair the General Staff were watching with anxiety one of the fiercest dramas unfolding on the Eastern Front. Within days the burly 47-year-old General Kurt Zeitzler, who had replaced Halder1, telephoned the Berghof and told the Führer of the bitter fighting that was now raging in the smouldering city of Stalingrad.
During the last week of September the 6th Army was still struggling to capture Stalingrad. Inside the city, intense fighting continued as General Zhukov made plans to bring catastrophe to the Germans. On 6 October General Paulus, commander of the 6th Army, temporarily suspended further attacks into the city. His infantry strength had been badly depleted. In the first six weeks since his army moved from the Don, 7,700 soldiers had been killed and 31,000 wounded. Ten per cent of his army was destroyed. In one division, the infantry battalions had an average of three officers, eleven non-commissioned officers, and only 62 men. The ammunition too was dwindling and they were in desperate need of re-supply. In September, the Army had fired off more than 25 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 500,000 anti-tank rounds, and 750,000 artillery shells.
Even Hitler now seemed unsure exactly what to do. Throughout October, the headquarters followed the unmistakable signs of an army being drawn into a protracted urban battle. Reports confirmed that units were pushing forward into the city and resuming their relentless incursion. Through the rubble, the twisted steel of factories, shattered and burnt out wooden houses, cells, sewers, trenches and holes, they fought and tried to survive. During 14 October Paulus sent five divisions against the Barrikady and tractor factory. By midnight, after heavy sustained fighting they had completely surrounded the tractor plant. Losses, however, had been very heavy and during the course of the night some 3,500 wounded were reported. Hour after hour the fighting raged with uncompromising harshness as the German 389th Infantry Division moved deeper into the city. While Zhukov’s armies moved into position, the Germans tried their best to gather up enough strength for further fighting in the rubble and burning remains of the doomed city. The difficulties were made worse by the increasing reports of larger Russian formations bearing down on Stalingrad. The situation deteriorated further when Hungarian, Italian, and Rumanian Allied forces began to show signs of crumbling. These ill-equipped, badly trained soldiers had been sent to help bolster their German allies, but after weeks of constant fighting against overwhelming enemy forces many of the soldiers began deserting.
By 23 October, encouraging signs reached the Berghof that the Germans were successfully holding the tractor factory and most of the Barrikady factory, whilst the Red Army held positions inside the Red October Factory. Two days later the Germans captured the centre of Spartakovka, and the 6th Army nearly reached the Volga. German forces now held most of the city, and the remaining part was under merciless fire. These were still tense and critical times at the headquarters. What worried Hitler and his General Staff was the fact that in spite of the situation being dire for the Red Army, they were still fanatically holding out. The Red Army’s grim determination to hold at all costs had proven vital for the survival of its men fighting in the ruins of Stalingrad. With the onset of winter fast approaching Hitler was deeply concerned that the tide would turn in their favour.
As the killing continued, the subject of the battle of Stalingrad dominated the situation conferences. Hitler’s staff once again noticed a marked changed in his temperament and as a consequence mealtimes with him became rarer. During the conferences as further setbacks were reported on the Eastern Front arguments intensified, Hitler had already openly observed that his generals’ nerves were not up to the strain and considered many of them numbskulls.
By mid-November it became increasingly obvious to everyone attending the daily war conferences that Stalingrad was in the process of being encircled. The Red Army was slowly closing its mighty jaws around the city. German troops were swamped by a sea of death and fire. As Russian soldiers surged forward, the tanks and artillery remained in front of them, carpeting the area ahead with shells, rockets and gunfire.
Over the next few days the signs were ominous for Hitler as the Germans struggled against overwhelming numbers. Zhukov had moved some 134 divisions over the Don. Masses of tanks and infantry then spewed across the frozen steppe, whilst hard pressed German forces madly tried to contain them. Frantic calls from Bavaria had already urged Paulus to stand fast until the temporary encirclement had diminished. Hitler was convinced by earlier reports that the Russians were at the point of being bled to death, he still expected the encirclement to last only a matter of days. But as Hitler left Berchtesgaden station during the evening of 23 November, en route to the Wolf’s Lair, he received shocking reports that the situation had worsened. To raise Paulus’s spirits during one of the darkest, most desperate situations on the Eastern Front thus far, Hitler sent a personal message to him telling the general that he was doing everything he could to help relieve the 6th Army.
As Amerika steamed its way through the darkness bound for East Prussia, Hitler and Jodl discussed at length a courageous plan to relieve the beleaguered army at Stalingrad. When Zeitler telephoned Hitler during the train’s next halt, he asked for permission to instruct the 6th Army to break out of the city before it was destroyed, but predictably the Führer refused outright.
Later that day the train shunted into Rastenburg station. Through the windows the staff could see that the headquarters were covered in thick snow, adding to the general feeling of despondency. Hitler tried his best to conceal his gloom. When he arrived back in Security Zone I, to his surprise he found Zeitzler already waiting for him outside the Führerbunker. He greeted the general with a smile and firmly shook his hand, remarking that he had done everything he could at Stalingrad. As they entered the bunker they spoke at length about the 6th Army. Even though these were the very uneasy times, Hitler still appeared hopeful. Zeitzler, on the other hand, did not share his Führer’s confidence and brazenly announced that Paulus’s army was doomed if it continued fighting where it was. Hitler lashed out, thumped the desk and cursed the general for his defeatist attitude. Under no circumstances, he yelled, are we moving from the Volga.
Despite rumours that Paulus’s army was dying a lingering death, the belief at the Wolf’s Lair that the situation was not as desperate as it looked. Already, reserves were on the move preparing for a huge relief offensive directed by Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein. In the weeks to come this relief operation would produce a drama at the headquarters far greater than anything yet experienced. Word in the installation entirely revolved around the only subject anyone wanted to talk about – Stalingrad.
Whilst Hitler and his staff continued to busy themselves with the enormous task of defeating the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Rommel arrived at Security Zone I unannounced and without the Führer’s permission. Keitel and Jodl cautiously greeted the Field Marshal and asked him why he had come to the Wolf’s Lair without being invited. By five that evening the ‘desert fox’ was called into the conference room. Hitler was clearly perturbed at Rommel’s appearance, especially when he considered that North Africa was a relatively quiet theatre. Grim-faced and hardly able to retain his composure, he listened irritably as Rommel went on about the dire situation in the desert and the problems of the Italian supply line. Pacing the conference room, Hitler did not believe the extent of the problems in North Africa, but reluctantly assured the field marshal that he would send out shipments of supplies. A drained Rommel was then ushered out of the conference room and escorted to the gates of the compound with strict orders to get the Italians to speed up supplies.
In the days that followed, focus was reverted to the Eastern Front. At the map room, Hitler was seen pouring over the map table for hours on end. With a magnifying glass in one hand and colour pencils in the other he scrutinized the red arrows that were deluging the Eastern Front. By the end of November the Russian encirclement of Stalingrad was finally completed. The Red Army had won a great victory in the bend of the Don and had cast out a gigantic envelopment around more than 250,000 German troops between the Don and Stalingrad. Inside the city, the physical condition of the once glorious 6th Army that had steamrolled into Russia seventeen months earlier were now a force fighting for survival. A combination of an inadequate diet, the bitter cold and dwindling mail from loved ones at home, had resulted in an acute decline in morale. Paulus was aware that if his army was to be saved, it would have to be done soon. Tension gripped the headquarters as Hitler and staff worked out a relief operation. To save the 6th Army from complete destruction Manstein was given the task of leading the relief operation, codenamed ‘Winter Storm’. The plans seemed impressive, but as each day ominously dragged on towards Manstein’s launch date, Winter Storm grew less promising. It was certain that if Manstein failed in his relief effort, then the 6th Army would perish in the fiery cauldron of Stalingrad.
Whilst Paulus did what he could to alleviate the terrible conditions inside Stalingrad, news reached the Wolf’s Lair that Manstein’s relief attack had begun in earnest in the grey pre-dawn light on 12 December. Winter Storm was spearheaded by General Kirchner’s LVII Panzer Corps, consisting of the 6th Panzer Division, which was bolstered by some 160 tanks and 40 self-propelled guns, and the mauled 23rd Panzer Division. Protecting the Panzer corps flanks were Rumanian troops and two weak cavalry divisions. OKW positively predicted that the enemy’s tank strength had been strongly reduced and success was inevitable. Hitler seemed more cautious and did not want to appear overly confident as he had done about Stalingrad previously.
At the map room they watched in great suspense as Manstein’s force pushed across the frozen plains bound for Stalingrad. During the first few uneasy days of the attack the panzers steadily rolled forward, making good progress over the light snow. Despite this auspicious beginning Manstein’s forces were up against resilient opponents. On the second day of the operation the LVII Panzer Corps reached the Aksay River and captured the bridge at Zalevskiy. With heavy Luftwaffe support the advance progressed, but Manstein’s forces still had another 45 miles to cover before it reached the pocket. On 17 December the LVII Panzer Corps was increased to three divisions by the arrival of the 17th Panzer Division. With this added strength Kirchner pushed his forces hard across the snow, fighting bitterly as they advanced. Around the town of Kumsky, halfway between the Aksay and Mishkova Rivers, the corps became bogged down in a morass of heavy, protracted fighting against two strong Russian mechanized corps and two tank brigades. It seemed that Manstein’s objective to reach the kessel to relieve Paulus at Stalingrad was slowly slipping from his grasp. On 18 December, with the cream of his armour burning and his troops fighting to break through what became known as the Aksay Line, the Field Marshal wearily sent a message to Zeitzler requesting immediate steps to initiate the breakout of the 6th Army towards the 4th Army.
At the Wolf’s Lair the tension had become so acute that Hitler’s health once more changed for the worse. On 17 December, during an important evening conference he suddenly felt weak and dizzy, and could not go on. Morell was immediately called for.
Next day, the Italian foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Cianon arrived at the Wolf’s Lair and was met with a frosty atmosphere. Hitler had blamed the Italians for not holding out at Stalingrad and greeted the minister caustically. The visit was made worse when the Count mentioned at the tea house that Mussolini was considering reaching a political settlement with Russia. Hitler bluntly told the minister that there would be no settlement with the Soviets. It was inconceivable, he said, that the Duce even entertained such a proposal for a second when there had already been so much bloodshed. As the Italian party left the Wolf’s Lair, a member of the entourage enquired if the Italian forces fighting north-west of Stalingrad had suffered significant losses. An OKW staff officer replied that the troops had not stopped running.
Out in the field, the Italian front had indeed deteriorated and many of its troops were reported to have abandoned their positions. Manstein was frustrated by Germany’s allies and telephoned the Wolf’s Lair requesting permission for Paulus to break out. Zeitzler approved the request, but Hitler remained resolute, firm in his belief that if the 6th Army pulled out it would jeopardize the entire southern front. The following afternoon, 19 December, the headquarters received another urgent radio appeal from Manstein for permission to break out the 6th Army. During the situation conference that day, Hitler’s commanders also voiced their concerns, but despite the noisy consternation of his grumbling commanders, he was adamant that Paulus must stand fast if it meant to the death. Manstein pleaded with Hitler but his efforts were in vain. On 21 December Manstein reported to Hitler that the 4th Panzer Army had advanced to within 30 miles of Stalingrad, but that the resistance from the enemy was so great it could make no more progress. There was also no more fuel for the vehicles and without adequate supplies they were doomed to failure. Hitler had initially been encouraged by the success of the 4th Panzer and had ordered the SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking to be transferred from Army Group A to support the Army’s drive to Stalingrad, but it was already too late.
Over the next few days leading to Christmas, uneasiness beset the headquarters. No one could relax. Hitler postponed retiring to bed longer every night, deeply concerned that without his leadership Stalingrad might fall. During the daily war conference Hitler was more agitated and this consequently led to arguments with his commanders. Reports only reinforced his worse fears that the 6th Army was on the point of collapse. On Christmas Eve, under merciless Russian attack OKH ordered the 4th Panzer Army to withdraw behind the Aksay River. As German units evacuated the area east of the river, more Russian reinforcements poured across the Volga, both fresh infantry and new tanks, and replaced the exhausted units holding the foothills on the western banks. From their well fortified positions, the Russians continued to use a variety of weaponry to attack German soldiers trapped inside the pocket. Between 22 November and 23 December the 6th Army alone had lost some 28,000 men.
The army reported just before Christmas that the remaining strength inside the pocket was 246,000, including 13,000 Rumanians, 19,300 Russian auxiliaries, and 6,000 wounded. Though the total strength appeared impressive, many of the soldiers were in poor shape and lacked sufficient weapons and ammunition. The combat effectiveness of the troops was further reduced by exhaustion and exposure. Those soldiers that were still fit enough to fight were often frustrated by bad weather. Between the Don and Volga rivers the weather varied considerably. Driving rain, thick snow, and fog perpetually delayed operations.
On Christmas Eve, Manstein brought only despondent news from the front when he radioed the Wolf’s Lair that evening. The Field Marshal’s blunt revelation that all seemed lost echoed around the headquarters and confirmed Hitler’s worst fears of how desperate the situation was at Stalingrad. After Christmas, Hitler was once more warned about the appalling cost of life, but he told Manstein he believed that the 6th Army was safe inside its ‘fortress’, and could hold out until the spring of 1943. He had ordered Göring to increase the air supply to at least 300 tons a day, believing that this would be sufficient for the 6th Army to survive. But the situation was far worse than Hitler could have ever imagined. His 6th Army was slowly being starved to death. The kessel had become littered with thousands of dead, and those stilling holding out were edging towards total obliteration.
On 27 December, Zeitzler arrived unannounced at the headquarters and requested urgently to see the Führer in his private bunker. After being given authorization to enter Security Zone I, the General was escorted by an RSD guard to the Führerbunker, which was now being guarded night and day by the SS-Begleit-Kommando. Showing his official pass he was granted access to the bunker and then was then escorted by one of Hitler’s adjutants to the Führer’s room. In the corner of the room a gramophone was playing a record of Beethoven with Hitler sitting in a soft chair listening. During their conversation the General told Hitler in no uncertain terms of the looming disaster in the Caucasus. He told the Führer blatantly that if he did not order the withdrawal from the Caucasus front forthwith he would have another Stalingrad on his hands. At first Hitler sat quietly and digested the words, and then told Zeitzler to order the withdrawal. But once the General had left, Hitler regretted what he had said and immediately telephoned the general’s staff headquarters to try and prevent Zeitzler from executing his order. After numerous attempts to speak to the General he finally came to the telephone, but it was already too late, the order had been issued. As Hitler put down the receiver he was well aware of the consequences that now were beginning to unfold. A general withdrawal from the Soviet Union now seemed inevitable.
In the remaining days of 1942, the stress of the Russian campaign was causing Hitler considerable health problems and ageing him significantly. Dr Morell was seen regularly walking over to the Führerbunker to increase Hitler’s medication and injections, which frequently included sedatives. His staff tried what they could to relieve him of the constant worries, but generally failed to bring him out of his depression.
During the last conferences held at the end of the year, Hitler had to listen to how the Russians had brilliantly executed their plans of sealing the fate of the 6th Army and breaking up Manstein’s attempt to reach the trapped forces. The original success of the battle was mainly attributed to Soviet armour, and not the infantry. In many of the clashes with German forces, it was reported that when the odds were even, Russian troops showed themselves to be distinctly inferior. In fact, although the 6th Army was now dying a lingering death from starvation and exhaustion, its force still processed small advantages against their enemy. One of the main advantages was that in and around Stalingrad, the kessel was heavily built up and troops had some shelter. This meant that the chance of survival was far greater than if it had to defend the flat and often treeless steppe between the Don and Volga Rivers. As a consequence, the Soviets did not have the crushing effects that were initially expected, and during the fighting inside the city it regularly lost momentum. The results were often catastrophic, with many thousands of soldiers being killed or wounded. It seemed that the Russians too were paying a very high price in blood for Stalingrad.
Hitler saw the high casualty rate among the Red Army as a glimmer of hope. In front of his intimate staff he even began speaking of turning failure into victory, and optimistically bragged to his secretaries that in 1943, he intended to go on the offensive, in spite of the inevitable disaster looming at Stalingrad.
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1 Halder was dismissed at the Werewolf headquarters on 24 September 1942, after Hitler had blamed the General for the gradual stagnation of the summer offensive. He was replaced by the energetic General Kurt Zietzler, who was considered by Hitler to be his most influential tactical advisor on the Eastern Front.