What are mental features? Mental features such as consciousness, self, free will, and sense of the other determine our relation to the world and thus our very existence and reality within the world. If, for instance, we lose consciousness, as in sleep or in a vegetative state, our relation to the world is disrupted. Since mental features are central to our existence within the world, we have an urgent need to understand their origin and mechanisms. Accordingly, to unravel the existence and reality of mental features, we need to understand their relation to the world.
Neuroscientists investigate the brain in empirical terms and search for neuronal mechanisms underlying mental features including consciousness, self, free will, and others. They mainly focus on the brain and its neural activity—however, that focus leaves out consideration of the world. Philosophers, in contrast, associate mental features with the mind. They subsequently raise the question of the existence and reality of mind and how it is related to the existence of the body, or what we may term the mind–body problem. In the shift of focus from brain to mind, however, once again any relation to the world is left out.
The central argument of this book is that we need to consider the world in both neuroscientific and philosophical investigation of mental features such as consciousness. Specifically, I argue that the need to include the world in our neuroscientific and philosophical investigation of mental features will change and shift our focus from brain and mind to world–brain relation as a necessary condition of mental features, specifically consciousness. We are then no longer confronted with the mind–body problem in our quest for the existence and reality of mental features. Instead, we may then need to shift our focus to what I describe as the “world–brain problem”—this requires nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy. This is the central thesis and argument in this book hence its title and subtitle.
From Mind–Body Problem to World–Brain Problem
The mind–body problem is one of the most basic and pressing questions in our time. However, a definite answer remained elusive so far in both neuroscience and philosophy. Descartes famously assumed that mind and body are related to different substances, that is, mental and physical—this established mind–body dualism. Since his time various answers ranging from interactive dualism over materialism and physicalism to panpsychism have been suggested to address the metaphysical question of the relationship between mind and body (Searle, 2004). However, despite the wide variety of different suggestions, no answer is considered definite.
Others even contested that the mind–body problem is a metaphysical problem at all. Instead, they provide epistemological (Stoljar, 2006), conceptual (Bennett & Hacker, 2003), or empirical (P. S. Churchland, 2002; Dennett, 1981; Snowdon, 2015) answers to the mind–body problem. Even worse, some consider the mind–body problem as mysterious and thus altogether insolvable (McGinn, 1991; Nagel, 2000, 2012). Taken all together, we are confronted with a deadlock. None of the current answers to the mind–body problem is conclusive. While, at the same time, attempts of shifting, eliminating, or declaring unknowable the mind–body problem are not convincing either. The mind–body problem thus remains a stubbornly resisting “knot” in our understanding of ourselves and the world that we have not untangled so far.
I here do not aim to provide yet another answer to the mind–body problem. Instead, I question the question itself. I argue that the question itself, that is, how the mind is related to body and brain, is simply not plausible on different grounds: empirical (parts I and II), ontological (part III), and epistemic-methodological (part IV). We therefore have to abandon the mind–body problem as the “right” approach to answer our question of the existence and reality of mental features.
What is the alternative to the mind–body problem? I argue that that alternative can be found in what I describe as the “world–brain problem.” The world–brain problem is an ontological problem, which distinguishes it from the mind–body problem, which is metaphysical (rather than ontological) (see chapters 9 and 14 for my distinction between ontology and metaphysics). As such, the world–brain problem focuses on the ontological relation between world and brain including its relevance for mental features: How is the world related to the brain; and how can that relation account for the existence and reality of mental features, foremost, consciousness?
The world–brain problem requires us to consider the brain in an ontological rather than merely an empirical context. To develop a plausible ontological model of brain, we may want to consider some of its empirical features. One such empirical feature consists of the brain’s spontaneous activity. In addition to neural activity related to specific tasks or stimuli, specifically, stimulus-induced or task-related activity, the brain shows an intrinsic activity, that is, a spontaneous activity (see discussion in next section for details).
I argue that that very same spontaneous activity is central for the brain’s ontological determination including its relation to world, that is, the world–brain relation and for mental features. Therefore, I consider the brain’s spontaneous activity central for shifting from the mind–body problem to a world–brain problem—hence the title and subtitle of this book. Such a shift from mind–body to world–brain problem is possible, however only when we shift our current pre-Copernican to a truly post-Copernican vantage point—this amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy (see chapters 12–14 for further discussion).
Model of Brain I—The Spontaneous Brain
How can we characterize the brain by itself, independent of mental features? The brain can empirically be characterized by neural activity that includes both spontaneous or resting-state activity and task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity (Northoff, 2014a; Raichle, 2015a,b). Although much attention in both neuroscience and philosophy has been devoted to the brain’s stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity and related sensory and cognitive functions, the central role of the brain’s spontaneous or resting-state activity has only recently been considered.
Historically, Hans Berger, who introduced the EEG (Berger, 1929), observed spontaneous activity in the brain that remained independent of any external tasks or stimuli. This theory was further advanced by Bishop (1933) and Lashley (1951) and has recently gained more traction in neuroscience with the observation of spontaneous oscillations (Buzsáki, 2006; Llinas, 1988; Yuste et al., 2005), spontaneous coherence or connectivity between neural activities in different regions of the brain (Biswal et al., 1995; Greicius et al. 2003), and the default-mode network (DMN) (Greicius et al., 2003; Raichle, 2015a,b; Raichle et al., 2001). These and other observations all point to a central role of the brain’s spontaneous activity for its neural activity including both resting state and task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity (see Northoff, 2014a,b; Northoff et al., 2010; as well as Huang et al., 2015, for an extensive discussion).
The observation of the brain’s spontaneous activity has profoundly shifted our model of brain. Instead of considering the brain as a purely extrinsically driven device, the spontaneous activity observed suggests what Raichle has described as an “intrinsic model of brain” (Raichle, 2009, 2010). This is reminiscent of a Kantian-like model of mind that, applied to the brain, suggests the brain’s spontaneous activity to structure and organize its own task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity and the related sensory and cognitive functions (Fazelpour & Thompson, 2015; Northoff, 2012a,b, 2014a,b).
The Kantian-like view of the brain carries important ramifications for our model of brain. Traditional models of brain are largely neurosensory and/or neurocognitive in that they focus on the brain’s sensory and/or cognitive functions as mostly mediated by its stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity (P. M. Churchland, 2012; Northoff, 2016a; Thagard, 2012a,b). The observation of spontaneous activity may put the brain’s neurosensory and neurocognitive functions into a larger empirical context—precisely what kind of model of brain this requires, however, remains unclear (Klein, 2014; Northoff, 2012a,b). Therefore, the first part of the present book investigates different models of brain and how these models can incorporate the brain’s spontaneous activity and its relation to stimulus-induced activity.
Model of Brain II—The Brain’s Spontaneous Activity and Its Spatiotemporal Structure
Why and how is the brain’s spontaneous activity relevant? Several investigations show that the spontaneous activity is relevant for mental features such as consciousness and self (Huang, Dai, et al., 2014; Huang, Zhang, Wu, et al. 2015, 2016; Northoff, 2014b; Qin & Northoff, 2011; Qin et al., 2015; and many others; see chapters 4–8 for a more thorough discussion of this topic and its implications). Importantly, mental features seem to be specifically related in an as yet unclear way to the spatiotemporal structure of the brain’s spontaneous activity. Let us briefly describe that spatiotemporal structure.
The brain’s spontaneous activity can spatially be characterized by various neural networks that consist of regions showing close functional connectivity with each other. There is for instance the DMN that includes mainly the cortical midline structures (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2016; Northoff et al., 2006), which show strong low-frequency fluctuations (Northoff, 2014a; Raichle, 2009; Raichle et al., 2001).
Other neural networks include the sensorimotor network, the salience network, the ventral and dorsal attention network, the cingulum–operculum network, and the central executive network (Menon, 2011, for a review). These neural networks are related to each other in continuously and dynamically changing constellations (de Pasquale et al., 2010, 2012), resulting in what may be described as spatial structure that, through its functional nature, supersedes the anatomical structure.
In addition to such spatial structure on the functional level, the spontaneous activity can also be characterized by a rich temporal structure. The temporal structure consists in fluctuations in its neural activity in different frequency bands ranging from infraslow (0.0001–0.1 Hz) over delta (1–4 Hz), theta (5–8 Hz), alpha (8–12 Hz) and beta (12–30 Hz) to gamma (30–180 Hz). Most importantly, these different frequency bands are coupled with each other, with for instance the phase of lower frequency bands being coupled to the phase or power of higher ones (Buzsáki, 2006; Buzsáki, Logothetis, & Singer, 2013; Northoff, 2014a). The coupling between different frequencies, that is, cross-frequency coupling, yields a complex temporal structure in the brain’s intrinsic activity that, as shown most recently, is related in some still unclear ways to the spatial structure and the brain’s various neural networks (e.g., Ganzetti & Mantini, 2013; Northoff, 2014a).
Model of Consciousness—From World–Brain Relation to Consciousness
Why and how is the spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal structure relevant for consciousness and mental features in general? The spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal structure does not end at the boundaries of the brain. Instead, it transgresses the boundaries of brain and skull by extending to both body and world. For instance, recent investigations show that the temporal structure of the body in the heart (Babo-Rebelo, Richter, et al., 2016, Babo-Rebelo, Wolpert, et al., 2016) and the stomach (Richter et al., 2017) is coupled and linked to the temporal structure of the brain’s spontaneous activity (Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014). The brain’s spontaneous activity and its temporal structure seem to align themselves to the temporal structure of the body—one can thus speak of spatiotemporal alignment of the brain to the body (see chapter 8 of this volume and Northoff & Huang, in press, for further discussion).
The same holds, analogously, with regard to the world—the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure align themselves to the world. This is most apparent when we listen to music and dance to its rhythm—we align our brain’s temporal structure of its neural activity (as in its frequencies and synchronization) to the temporal structure of the music and, more generally, the world (see chapter 8 for details on spatiotemporal alignment; Schroeder & Lakatos, 2008; Schroeder at el., 2008). One can thus speak of spatiotemporal alignment of the brain to the world (chapter 8; Northoff & Huang, 2017).
Most important, empirical data suggest that such spatiotemporal alignment of brain to body and world is central for consciousness (see the section on spatiotemporal alignment in chapter 8; Lakatos et al., 2013; Park et al., 2014). The better our brain aligns us to body and world, the more likely we can become conscious of the respective contents in body and world (see discussion in chapters 7 and 8). Hence, spatiotemporal alignment of brain to body and world is central for mental features such as consciousness. I therefore argue for a spatiotemporal model of consciousness (and mental features in general) (chapters 7 and 8; see also Northoff, 2014b, 2017a,b; Huang & Northoff, in press).
Such spatiotemporal model of consciousness conceives the relation of brain to world (with the body being part of the world) (see the section on spatiotemporal alignment in chapter 8), that is, the world–brain relation, as a core nucleus of mental features. The brain and its spatiotemporal features must be related to the spatiotemporal features of the world to make consciousness possible. If, in contrast, the brain and its spontaneous activity remain unable, for whatever reason, to constitute such spatiotemporal relation to the world, consciousness (and mental features in general) are lost. This is, for example, the case in altered states of consciousness such as unresponsive wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia (see discussion throughout chapters 4–5).
In sum, empirical data suggest that the brain’s spontaneous activity shows an elaborate spatiotemporal structure that extends beyond the brain itself to body and world. I therefore speak of the world–brain relation, which, as I argue, is central for mental features such as consciousness.
World–Brain Relation I—Ontic Structural Realism
How can we account for the existence and reality of mental features? Descartes attributed mental features such as consciousness to mind, whose existence and reality he characterized by a mental substance whereas the reality of the body is characterized by physical substance. Such substance-based metaphysics has since been replaced by property-based metaphysics. Property-based metaphysics suggests specific properties, physical or mental, to determine the existence and reality of body or mind. The properties are intrinsic to body or mind since without those very same properties, the physical or the mental, body or mind, would not exist. Properties are thus the basic units of existence and reality in property-based metaphysics (see chapter 9).
Although property-based metaphysics dominates the discussion around the mind–body problem, other approaches have been suggested as well. One such approach is, for instance, the capacity-based metaphysics advanced by McDowell (1994, 2009). Instead of supposing mental (or physical) properties, McDowell characterizes the mind by capacities that are conceptual and actualized and realized in mental features such as thinking and knowing (see also Schechtman, 1997, for a capacity-based approach although presented in a more empirical rather than conceptual sense).
A still different approach may be found in the process-based metaphysics of, for instance, Alfred North Whitehead (Griffin, 1998; Northoff, 2016a,b; Rescher, 2000; Whitehead 1929/1978). Processes as the basic units of existence and reality are here proposed to underlie mental features such as consciousness (Griffin, 1998; Northoff, 2016a,b). Such a process-based approach is, for instance, often associated with panpsychism when offered as a solution to the mind–body problem (Griffin, 1998; Strawson, 2006).
How, then, may we characterize the brain—can we even characterize its existence and reality by properties, capacities, or processes? I argue that, as based on empirical evidence alone, characterization of neither is plausible. The existence and reality of the brain cannot be found in properties, processes, or capacities. Instead, based on the spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure, we need to ontologically determine the brain’s existence and reality by structure and relation (chapter 9). More specifically, the brain’s structure and its relation to the world, the world–brain relation as I call it, determines the brain’s existence and reality (chapter 9). Therefore, ontologically considered, the world–brain relation replaces the physical or mental properties, capacities, or processes that all supposedly reside inside the brain. Note the concept of world–brain relation is now understood in an ontological rather than empirical sense.
Ontologically, this presupposes what is described as structural realism (SR) and, more specifically, its ontological variant ontic structural realism (OSR) (Beni, 2016, in press; Esfeld & Lam, 2010; Isaac, 2014; Ladyman, 1998; see chapters 12–14 on OSR of world–brain relation). Thus, OSR claims that structure and relation are the most basic units of existence and reality. The ontological claim of SR draws empirically mainly on physics (Esfeld & Lam, 2010). I here extend OSR to the brain, that is, to the world–brain relation and mental features (see Beni, 2016; Isaac, 2014; and chapters 10–11 in this volume for SR of mental features).
World–Brain Relation II—Ontological Predisposition of Consciousness
How does the world–brain relation, as defined in terms of OSR, stand in relation to mental features? I will argue that the world–brain relation, as defined by OSR, is a necessary condition of possible consciousness, that is, it is an ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC) (chapters 10 and 11). The world–brain relation establishes a necessary and, relying on Nagel (2000), a posteriori (rather than a priori) connection between brain and consciousness through the ontological definition of brain: the world–brain relation serves as OPC, and the brain, as based on its spatiotemporal relation to the world, is necessarily and a posteriori (rather than a priori) connected to mental features such as consciousness (see the section on Thomas Nagel in chapter 10 for details; see also Nagel, 2000, for discussion of the necessary and a posteriori [rather than a priori] connection between brain and mental features).
The characterization of world–brain relation as OPC with necessary and a posteriori connection between the brain and mental features allows me to take a novel view to a classic question. The classic question concerns the very existence or reality of mental features such as consciousness. This question is traditionally addressed in terms of the mind–body problem: mental features are supposed to be necessarily and a priori connected to the mind, which, in turn, raises the question of the mind’s relationship to the body, what we have termed the mind–body problem.
I argue that the role of the mind can be replaced by the world–brain relation. Like the mind, the world–brain relation allows for necessary (although a posteriori rather than a priori connection) connection to mental features. This makes it possible to trace the existence and reality of mental features to the world–brain relation. Most important, we then no longer need to assume the mind to account for the necessary connection of mental features to their underlying ontological origin. This renders the mind superfluous, and thus also the question of its relation to the body, the mind–body problem. If the mind is superfluous, it is nonsensical to even raise the question of the mind–body problem. The mind–body problem thereby also becomes superfluous and ultimately nonsensical.
Accordingly, instead of discussing different forms of a mind–body relation, we can better focus on the problem of explaining how world and brain are ontologically related to each other and how that relation can account for the existence and reality of mental features. This in essence is what I describe as the world–brain problem that can then replace the mind–body problem (chapters 10 and 11). For this reason I conclude that the world–brain problem offers a novel answer (one that is different from the mind–body problem) to an old question regarding the existence and reality of mental features. In short, I postulate that the mind–body problem can be replaced by the world–brain problem.
World–Brain Relation III—Eliminative Materialism or Identity Theory?
Without going into too much detail, I want to briefly flesh out some features that substantially distinguish the world–brain problem from other approaches in current philosophy of mind.
First and foremost, the suggestion to replace the concept of mind in favor of a world–brain relation seems to be reminiscent of eliminative materialism (EM) (Churchland, 1988, 2002). Roughly, EM claims that we can eliminate the concept of mind as well as mental features such as consciousness in favor of the brain and its neural activity. Although such elimination of mind seems to be well in accordance with the present approach, the similarity is only superficial at best (see chapter 13 for more detailed discussion). There are several important differences for us to consider.
First, there is methodological difference. EM pursues a reductive strategy in that it infers ontological assumptions from empirical observation; this stands counter to the approach that only claims compatibility between empirical and ontological realms while it considers any kind of inference to be fallacious (see the second section in chapter 9). Second, EM and my approach differ in their ontological presupposition: EM still presupposes property-based ontology with physical properties (although it denies mental properties), whereas my approach rejects exactly that when it favors relation-based ontology such as OSR (see the third section in chapter 9).
Finally, EM draws the radical conclusion that mental features such as consciousness do not exist and are not real because they can be eliminated and replaced by neuronal features. This stands counter to what I posit here. I claim that consciousness and its phenomenal features and, more generally, mental features cannot be eliminated but are real and existent in very much the same way as Earth’s water is real and exists. Moreover, in the same way that water can be traced to H2O as an ontological predisposition, consciousness and mental features can be traced to a world–brain relation as their ontological predispositions, or OPC.
Does my approach amount to an identity theory between the brain’s physical features and the mind’s mental features? The similarity is superficial at best. I no longer presuppose mind as a possible ontological substrate of mental features. However, it does not mean that I discard mental features such as consciousness. Contrary to the current philosophy of mind, I dissociate or disentangle mental features such as consciousness from the concept of mind (chapter 9): once we can draw the necessary (and a posteriori rather than a priori) connection of mental features to the world–brain relation as an underlying ontological predisposition, we no longer need the concept of mind, which thereby simply becomes superfluous.
That the assumption of the mind’s existence is simply superfluous in my approach marks a central distinction of identity theory. Identity theory claims a direct identity between brain and mental features with a necessary connection that remains somewhat obscure (see Searle, 2004, for discussion). I also postulate that brain and consciousness are necessarily (a priori) connected; however, such necessary connection is not direct but indirect as it is based on a world–brain relation as the underlying ontological predisposition (see the second part in chapter 9) that renders it less intuitive and more plausible on logical–conceptual grounds. Therefore, my approach with the world–brain problem must be distinguished from identity theory and related approaches.
World–Brain Relation IV—Neutral Monism or Panpsychism?
One may also sense some similarity to neutral monism (NM) as first put forward by Bertrand Russell. The theory of NM claims the existence and reality of a third neutral ontological substrate to which both mind (i.e., mental features) and body (i.e., physical features) can be traced. Such a neutral ontological substrate is neither physical nor mental but, as the name suggests, neutral as regards both. The assumption of such a third neutral ontological substrate seems to resemble what I describe as world–brain relation as an ontological predisposition of mental features. However, unlike NM, I no longer presuppose the concept of mind; this relieves me of tracing the mind to an underlying neutral ontological substrate that it shares with the body.
Moreover, the fact that I no longer need to find an ontological substrate of mind allows me to replace the triangular relation among the third neutral substance, body, and mind in NM by a much more simple and straightforward relation or necessary connection of world–brain relation to consciousness and mental features. The triple ontology of body, mind, and neutral substrate in NM can subsequently be replaced by an ontology that postulates structure and relation as sole and only ontological substrate. This does not only avoid the logical–conceptual complexities of NM but is also empirically rather plausible since it is in full accordance with the empirical data.
My approach also needs to be clearly distinguished from panpsychism in its various forms (Strawson, 2006). There are no psychic properties or processes—structure and relation as basic units of existence and reality are not psychic or mental by themselves. That would be to confuse the OPC, that is, the world–brain relation, with what it predisposes, consciousness (chapter 10). Whether the characterization of world–brain relation as OPC amounts to some structuralist–realist form of protopanpsychism (Chalmers, 1996) may well need to be discussed in the future.
In sum, the present approach must be distinguished from the various mind–body theories as it does not share the basic presuppositions of these theories, that is, the (possible existence and reality of) mind and property-based ontology. This does not only apply to the theories here discussed but to all mind–body theories in general.
World–Brain Relation versus Mind—Copernican Revolution
The proponent of mind may now want to argue that even if we can replace the mind–body relation by a world–brain relation on ontological grounds, our “intuition” of the mind (Dennett, 2013; Nagel, 1974; Papineau, 2002) nevertheless remains. Due to the pulling forces of the intuition of mind, we cannot but assume the existence and reality of mind (even if later we argue that its existence and reality consist in body or brain). Put in a slightly different way, even if rendered implausible on empirical and ontological grounds, the concept of mind nevertheless remains an option for our intuition, or intuition of mind as I have termed it (chapters 12–14).
How can we rule out and ultimately eliminate concept of intuition of mind? I argue that we need to shift our vantage point or viewpoint (see section 1 in chapter 12 for definition of the concept of vantage point). Copernicus shifted the world’s geocentric vantage point from Earth to a heliocentric vantage point beyond earth—this allowed him to take into view how Earth (including ourselves) is part of the universe and is related to the universe by revolving around the sun (chapter 12), generally described as the “Copernican revolution” in physics and cosmology.
Analogous to Copernicus (albeit in a weak rather than strong sense), I argue that we need to replace our current vantage point from within mind (or within brain) (chapter 13) to a vantage point from beyond brain (chapter 14). Such a vantage point from beyond brain will allow us to take the view that the brain is part of the world by being related to it, that is, by a world–brain relation comprising structure and relation as the basic units of existence and reality (and thus presupposing OSR). Most important, this shift in vantage point allows us to encompass that the very same world–brain relation is a necessary condition of possible mental features, thereby allowing for an ontological predisposition of consciousness.
To sum up, the shift in vantage point from within mind or brain to a vantage point from beyond brain renders transparent the necessary (and a posteriori rather than a priori) connection between brain and consciousness that hitherto has remained opaque to us. As we can now take into view how consciousness is necessarily connected to the brain, that is, through world–brain relation, we no longer need to posit or intuit a mind to allow for a necessary connection of consciousness to its underlying ontological substrate. The posit or intuition of mind thus becomes unnecessary and may be replaced by our view of the world–brain relation with its necessary connection to mental features that is now rendered transparent by our novel viewpoint presented above (chapter 14).
In the same way that an intuition of Earth as being the center of the universe was rendered impossible by the dramatic shift in vantage point of Copernicus, the vantage point from beyond brain now makes impossible the intuition of mind as the center of mental features, ourselves, and the world (chapter 17). This enormous paradigm shift allows us to replace the mind–body problem by the world–brain problem—this shift in viewpoint amounts to a Copernican-like revolution in the spheres of both neuroscience and philosophy.
World–Brain Problem I—Main Argument of the Book
The main argument of the book is that the world–brain problem is a more plausible problem than the mind–body problem when one addresses the question of the existence and reality of mental features. This argument is fleshed out for the reader in three different ways in the volume, empirically (Parts I and II), ontologically (Part III), and in epistemic–methodological terms (Part IV) terms (see figure 0.1).
Figure 0.1 From the mind–body problem to the world–brain problem.
Empirically this argument is based on the brain’s spontaneous activity and, more specifically, its spatiotemporal structure. That very same spatiotemporal structure makes it possible for the brain to extend beyond itself to body and world, thus constituting what I term the world–brain relation. The world–brain relation, in turn, is central for mental features such as consciousness.
Ontologically, the central empirical roles of the world–brain relation and spatiotemporal structure imply a novel ontology of brain and mental features, that is, one that is based on structure and relation—this leads us to ontic structural realism (OSR). OSR allows us to determine the existence and reality of the brain by a world–brain relation, which, in turn, serves as ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC). Since mental features can be traced to the world–brain relation, I speak of the world–brain problem. Given all the evidence both empirical and ontological, I argue that we can replace the mind–body problem by the world–brain problem when we address that basic question regarding the existence and reality of mental features.
World–Brain Problem II—Overview and Structure of the Book
The book is divided into four parts: (I) “Models of Brain”; (II) “Models of Consciousness”; (III) “World–Brain Problem”; and (IV) “Copernican Revolution.” A glossary contains definitions to key terms.
The first part discusses different models of brain as they are implied in the current neuroscientific discussion. This ranges from the spectrum model (chapter 1) over the interaction model (chapter 2) to the prediction model (chapter 3) of brain. These different models of brain are assessed with regard to the currently available empirical evidence. I remain within the purely empirical and, more specifically, neuronal realm without touching on ontological and mental issues at all. However, I propose that a proper model of brain is central for tackling ontological issues revolving around mental features.
The second part of the book extends the discussion of the first part from brain to consciousness. I now consider consciousness in empirical terms. Specifically, I now apply the different models of brain, including the spectrum model (chapter 4), the interaction model (chapter 5), and the prediction model (chapter 6), as discussed in the first part, to recent data on the neuronal features underlying consciousness. This is followed by elaboration of a spatiotemporal theory of consciousness (chapter 7) that highlights the central role of the brain’s alignment to both body and world (chapter 8). Note that such spatiotemporal theory of consciousness remains purely empirical at this point in the book—hence it is here understood as a neuroscientific theory of consciousness.
The third part focuses on the ontological characterization of brain (chapter 9), mental features (chapter 10), and world itself (chapter 11) with regard to mental features. I first develop an ontology of brain in which the brain’s existence and reality are defined by spatiotemporal relation and structure presupposing structural realism (chapter 9). That ontology of brain provides the foundation for an ontology of mental features with the world–brain relation as ontological predisposition of consciousness (chapter 10). Finally, I suggest the spatiotemporal ontology of world as being central for mental features (chapter 11). I conclude that world–brain relation and consecutively the world–brain problem, as I say, can well account for the existence and reality of mental features. The world–brain problem can thus replace the mind–body problem.
The fourth part of the book focuses on the epistemic-methodological presuppositions of both the mind–body and the world–brain problem. Specifically, I argue that we need to take a specific viewpoint or vantage point in order to be able to view how the world–brain relation can account for mental features and replace the mind–body problem. Drawing on the analogy of the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology (chapter 12), I argue that we need to change our ontological vantage point. Instead of presupposing a vantage point from within the mind or brain (chapter 13), we need to shift to a vantage point from beyond brain (chapter 14). This permits us to take into view the necessary connection between the world–brain relation and mental features, a paradigm shift that ultimately allows us to replace the mind–body with the world–brain problem. I therefore conclude that we require nothing less than a twenty-first-century Copernican-like revolution in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy.
