10 Ontology II: From World–Brain Relation to Consciousness

Part III: Ontology of Consciousness—World–Brain Problem

World–Brain Problem Ia: Subjectivity and Spatiotemporal Structure

The critic may not be satisfied yet though. The hardest nut to crack with regard to the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features is their subjectivity (Nagel, 1974; Searle, 2004). Mental features are intrinsically subjective, which distinguishes them from physical features that are nonsubjective and thus objective. How is it possible that something as subjective as consciousness or other mental features can occur in a world characterized by brains and bodies that are objective rather than subjective?

What does the quest for subjectivity imply for world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal features? If the world–brain relation serves as OPC, it must also provide the necessary condition of the subjective nature of consciousness and mental features in general. The spatiotemporal features of world–brain relation must thus predispose the subjective nature of consciousness. There must thus be an intrinsic linkage, that is, a necessary ontological connection between spatiotemporal and subjective features in world–brain relation.

The necessity of such intrinsic linkage between spatiotemporal and subjective features is well reflected in the following quote by Nagel (2000):

The right point of view would be one which, contrary to present conceptual possibilities, included both subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure from the outset, all its descriptions implying both these things at once, so that it could describe inner states and their functional relations to behavior and to one another from the phenomenological inside and the physiological outside simultaneously—not in parallel. (pp. 45–46; emphasis added)

Extending Nagel, I now argue that such intrinsic linkage, that is, a necessary ontological connection between subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure is included “from the outset” in the ontological concept of world–brain relation. My argument includes two steps. I first determine the concept of subjectivity in a novel way, that is, in spatiotemporal terms (in a brief way though without going into the myriads of literature on this topic). That, in turn, serves as a basis for the second step, that is, showing the necessary ontological connection between subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure within world–brain relation, including the necessary connection to mental features. Let me start with the first step, the determination of subjectivity.

World–Brain Problem Ib: Spatiotemporal Subjectivity versus Mental Subjectivity

We traditionally determine subjectivity in reference to mental features such as consciousness—everything that is mental is subjective as distinguished from that which is nonmental and thus objective rather than subjective. When determining the concept of subjectivity, we usually presuppose (most often in an implicit and tacit way) consciousness and mental features and, more generally, the mind as such as our reference, that is, as epistemic reference (see chapters 12–14 for more detailed determination of this concept). This renders subjectivity by default mental—I therefore speak of mental subjectivity. This, for instance, renders it rather paradoxical if not incoherent to determine something that is nonmental and observable like the brain as subjective. Hence, mental subjectivity is the wrong frame or epistemic reference to characterize the brain in a subjective way.

How about taking the world itself and its spatiotemporal features rather than mental features as the epistemic reference for determining the concept of subjectivity? In that case, we no longer reference subjectivity against mental features and the mind but, alternatively, compare and set it against the spatiotemporal framework of the world. For instance, when comparing the smaller spatiotemporal scale or range of both world–brain relation and brain against the much larger one of the world itself (i.e., independent of world–brain relation and brain), the former can be characterized as subjective when compared to the objective nature of the latter.

Subjectivity is here determined on spatiotemporal grounds, that is, in reference to the spatiotemporal scale or range of the world itself. Such spatiotemporal determination of subjectivity can be described as spatiotemporal subjectivity. The concept of spatiotemporal subjectivity determines subjectivity on purely spatiotemporal rather than mental grounds for which reason it must be distinguished from mental subjectivity. Specifically, spatiotemporal subjectivity is determined on the grounds of spatiotemporal discrepancy to the world that is objective (on spatiotemporal grounds) and therefore serves as an epistemic reference for determining spatiotemporal subjectivity.

The concept of spatiotemporal subjectivity fulfills Nagel’s requirement of a concept that “included both subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure from the outset, all its descriptions implying both these things at once.” Let me specify that in both directions, from space and time to subjectivity as well as from the latter to the former.

The concept of “spatiotemporal” in spatiotemporal subjectivity refers to relational time and space (chapter 9). As it is relational, relational time and space imply relation between world and its parts such as the brain (i.e., world–brain relation), which show different, that is, smaller, spatiotemporal scales or ranges than the world itself. Relational time and space thus imply what I described as spatiotemporal discrepancy. As spatiotemporal discrepancy defines spatiotemporal subjectivity, relational time and space and, more specifically, their “spatiotemporal structure” (to use Nagel’s term) cannot but include spatiotemporal subjectivity right from the outset.

What about the reverse, namely, that spatiotemporal subjectivity includes time and space, that is, spatiotemporal structure, from the outset? When setting and comparing subjectivity against mental features and mind as the epistemic reference, we cannot draw any necessary connection to spatiotemporal features. Since the mind is traditionally determined in an aspatial and atemporal way (see above and chapter 13), mental subjectivity is not conceived in spatiotemporal terms at all and therefore shows no necessary connection to spatiotemporal features.

That changes once one shifts the epistemic reference from mind to world though. As the world itself can be characterized by time and space, we can now set and compare subjectivity against the spatiotemporal features of the world, that is, relational time and space, including its respective spatiotemporal scale or range. That renders transparent the necessary connection between subjectivity, that is, spatiotemporal subjectivity, and time and space, that is, relational time and space. This, in turn, makes it possible that, unlike the concept of mental subjectivity, spatiotemporal subjectivity (as in its name) includes reference to time and space right “from the outset.”

World–Brain Problem Ic: Spatiotemporal Subjectivity as Necessary Condition of Mental Subjectivity

The critic may now want to argue that I showed very well the necessary connection between subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure as it is suggested by Nagel. In contrast, I have not shown that the necessary connection between subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure is related to both world–brain relation and mental features. This is the easy part, which leads me to the second part of my argument, the hard part.

World–brain relation is essentially spatiotemporal—it consists in the spatiotemporal relation between the world’s larger spatiotemporal range and the smaller one of the brain. That includes spatiotemporal discrepancy and therefore entails spatiotemporal subjectivity (see above). Hence, when compared to the world itself, that is, independent of its relation to the brain, world–brain relation cannot be but subjective (rather than objective) in a spatiotemporal sense. In short, world–brain relation entails and can therefore be characterized by spatiotemporal subjectivity.

How is the spatiotemporal subjectivity of world–brain relation related to mental features and their mental subjectivity? I showed that world–brain relation provides the necessary OPC which is possible on spatiotemporal grounds (see above). I now argue that world–brain relation can provide the OPC by means of the subjective nature of its spatiotemporal features (i.e., spatiotemporal subjectivity). Because its spatiotemporal features are subjective (in a spatiotemporal sense), the world–brain relation can predispose the mental subjectivity of consciousness and mental features.

World–Brain Problem Id: Self-Mediation between Spatiotemporal Subjectivity and Mental Subjectivity

Without providing a separate argument, I postulate that the relationship between spatiotemporal and mental subjectivity is mediated by the self: the self is intrinsically relational (as based on world–brain relation), spatiotemporal (as based on relational time and space), and subjective (as based on spatiotemporal subjectivity; see Northoff, 2016, 2017, for the concept of self in the realm of neuroscience). At the same time, the self is not necessarily mental, that is, conscious or experienced as such, while it enables consciousness—the self is thus preconscious or prephenomenal (or proto-conscious, as philosophers might want to say) rather than nonconscious or nonphenomenal (see Northoff, 2014b, for the concept of prephenomenal). This makes the self an ideal candidate to mediate between spatiotemporal and mental subjectivity by providing the bridge between the nonphenomenal world and the phenomenal consciousness of a specific subject with its mental subjectivity.

In sum, I postulate that the spatiotemporal subjectivity of world–brain relation is a necessary condition of its role as OPC, which, through mediation by the self, makes possible mental subjectivity. Put simply, spatiotemporal subjectivity of world–brain relation is an ontological predisposition of mental subjectivity. This makes it possible for world–brain relation to simultaneously (rather than in parallel) predispose “the phenomenological inside and the physiological outside” (as described by Nagel, 2000, quoted above) of mental features: both “phenomenological inside” and “physiological outside” can be traced to one and the same underlying spatiotemporal structure, that is, relational time and space, that features world–brain relation by spatiotemporal subjectivity.

Finally, note that the concept of spatiotemporal subjectivity is tied neither to a first-person perspective (FPP) nor to a second- or third-person perspective (SPP, TPP). True, mental subjectivity can be featured by FPP and physical objectivity by TPP. However, as it provides the basis for both, including their distinction, spatiotemporal subjectivity itself cannot be characterized by either FPP or TPP as it would be to confuse the necessary condition with what it conditions. Instead, spatiotemporal subjectivity as based on world–brain relation is by itself nonperspectival or preperspectival as it provides the necessary ontological condition of possible epistemic distinction between FPP and TPP.

This carries major reverberations for consciousness. As I characterize consciousness by spatiotemporal subjectivity, consciousness itself cannot be characterized by either FPP or TPP—FPP only provides the epistemic access to consciousness that ontologically remains nonperspectival (or preperspectival). Hence, to characterize consciousness by FPP (or TPP) is to confuse ontological (i.e., non- or preperspectival) and epistemic determination of consciousness (which I would, for instance, charge against the distinction between first- and third-person ontology as suggested by Searle, 2004).

World–Brain Problem IIa: Brain—Subjective or Objective?

The critic may now be inclined to argue that the ontological redefinition of the brain in terms of world–brain relation renders the brain subjective and conscious rather than objective and nonconscious. The only way for the brain to account for its necessary connection to consciousness is that the brain is by itself subjective and conscious. Otherwise, following Nagel, the brain could not bridge the gap between objective spatiotemporal order and subjective phenomenological order. However, the ontological characterization of the brain as subjective entails some sort of panpsychism, which ultimately would undermine my own approach in terms of OSR.

Such an ontological determination of the brain as subjective and conscious has indeed been assumed by some authors. These include the nineteenth-century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who spoke of the brain as subjective (Schopenhauer, 1818–1819/1966), and more recently Colin McGinn (1991), who assumes specific mental properties in the brain. Finally, Nagel himself seems to tend in this direction when speaking of a “conscious brain” (Nagel, 1993, p. 6). The concept of a conscious brain is also somewhat entailed by John Searle (2004) in his concept of first-person ontology (as distinguished from third-person ontology), even though he does not explicitly characterize the brain itself as conscious or subjective (Searle, 2004): first-person ontology accounts for the FPP of consciousness (see chapter 8 for discussion of FPP vs. TPP with regard to consciousness) and its underlying neuronal mechanisms in the brain that thereby must be subjective and conscious (or at least pre- or proto-conscious).

I reject any such ontological definition of the brain as subjective and/or conscious (or as given by first-person perspective as related to first-person ontology). The ontological redefinition of the brain in terms of world–brain relation can be considered neither subjective nor objective. It pertains to neither the objective spatiotemporal order nor the subjective phenomenological order. That, as I argue, would be to confuse the world–brain relation as a necessary condition, that is, as an OPC, with what it conditions, that is, the brain as we observe it within the objective spatiotemporal order and its necessary connection to and upward spatiotemporal entailment of consciousness as featured by its subjective phenomenological order. Let me explain in more detail.

To regard the brain as either subjective and conscious or as objective and nonconscious is to simply confuse world–brain relation and brain on ontological grounds. The brain’s existence and reality can only be defined by its relation to the world, the world–brain relation (chapter 9). If one now conceives the brain by itself, that is, as separate and detached from the world (as when characterizing it as subjective and conscious), one replaces world–brain relation by what can ontologically be described as world–brain isolation. Such world–brain isolation is possible only by presupposing a particular conception of time and space though: the brain could then longer be defined by space-time relation with relational time and space but only by space-time points or events as in observational time and space.

World–Brain Problem IIb: Brain Paradox—Dissolution

The characterization of the brain in terms of world–brain isolation provides the necessary condition of the possible distinction between world and brain and their subsequent characterization as objective and subjective: the world is objective while the brain is subjective and as both are isolated from each other, there is no necessary connectivity between objective physical and subjective mental features. The isolation between world and brain thus entails the dissociation and segregation between objectivity and subjectivity including their determination as physical and mental.

Moreover, world–brain isolation provides the presupposition for the “brain paradox” (Northoff, 2004; Schopenhauer, 1818–1819/1966). In a nutshell, the brain paradox consists in the fact that one and the same brain cannot be objective (i.e., physical) and subjective (i.e., mental) at the same time. Because both determinations of the brain, that is, subjective/conscious and objective/nonconscious, are opposite and mutually exclusive, the connection between subjective/conscious and objective/nonconscious brain remains contingent by default. The mind–body problem thus resurfaces in what can be called the brain–brain problem, the problem of the relationship between subjective and objective brain.

We can avoid both the brain paradox and the brain–brain problem by shifting our ontological presuppositions. Instead of presupposing world–brain isolation as based on element- or property-based ontology (chapter 9), one can account for world–brain relation as based on OSR. The latter renders impossible any segregation between world and brain, including the brain paradox, while it makes possible the introduction of spatiotemporal subjectivity. The brain can then ontologically be characterized by spatiotemporal subjectivity as based on its spatiotemporal relation to the (spatiotemporally) objective world, the world–brain relation.

This undermines the paradoxical dichotomy between subjective/conscious and objective/physical brain by putting it into the larger spatiotemporal framework of world and world–brain relation. That, in turn, makes it possible to dissolve the brain paradox: the characterization of the brain as both subjective and objective is at best epistemic or even better empirical but not ontological anymore—the paradoxical nature of double determination of the brain is thus dissolved.

World–Brain Problem IIIa: World–Brain Relation—Ontological Predisposition of Consciousness

I demonstrated two necessary connections, the one between world and brain (i.e., world–brain relation), as well as the one between brain and consciousness through world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal subjectivity. Moreover, I argued that the second necessary connection, that is, the one between world–brain relation and consciousness, is based on the first one, that is, the necessary connection between world and brain in terms of world–brain relation. This was specifically reflected in the assumption that mental subjectivity is based on and presupposes spatiotemporal subjectivity.

This carries major implications for consciousness. Taken both necessary connections together, this amounts to the claim that the necessary (a posteriori) connection between world and brain (i.e., world–brain relation) is a necessary ontological condition of possible consciousness. Formulated in a converse way, without the necessary (a posteriori) connection between world and brain (i.e., the world–brain relation), consciousness remains altogether impossible. Therefore, world–brain relation is a necessary condition of possible consciousness, an OPC, as I say.

How can we describe the notion of ontological predisposition in more detail? The notion of predisposition in OPC refers to the necessary (rather than sufficient) ontological conditions of possible (rather than actual) consciousness (i.e., OPC). Conceived in this way, the concept of predisposition mirrors to a certain extent Kant’s concept of the transcendental as distinguished from the empirical. Following Kant (in in a loose sense), transcendental conditions (i) cannot be directly accessed, (ii) operate in the background and are, at the same time, (iii) indispensable. That holds well for the world–brain relation: (i) it cannot be accessed as such in a direct way but only indirectly, (ii) it remains in the background, and (iii) it is nevertheless indispensable for the existence and reality of consciousness. I consequently postulate that the world–brain relation is a necessary condition of possible consciousness (i.e., OPC) by means of which it takes on a transcendental role (in the sense of Kant) or, as I would say, a neurotranscendental role.

World–Brain Problem IIIb: World–Brain Relation as OPC—Panpsychism or Neutral Monism?

The critic may now want to argue that the introduction of world–brain relation as OPC implies panpsychism (Strawson, 2016) or, at least, proto-panpsychism (Chalmers, 1996). Briefly, the world–brain relation can only serve as OPC if the world can be characterized by the existence and reality of some kind of psychic elements or properties or, at least, psychic proto-properties. Otherwise, in the absence of such psychic properties in the world, the world–brain relation could not serve as OPC. I reject the assumption of panpsychism, however.

The advocate of panpsychism is certainly right that the world itself must show certain ontological features that make possible and ultimately necessary its relation to the brain, the world–brain relation. However, those ontological features do not need to be psychic or proto-psychic elements by themselves. That would mean to take something as a sufficient ontological condition of actual consciousness (i.e., ontological correlate of consciousness; OCC) that is only a necessary condition of possible consciousness (i.e., OPC). Instead, the world and its relation to the brain only need to provide those spatiotemporal features that predispose or make possible consciousness—neither the world nor world–brain relation are conscious by themselves. As we will see in the next chapter (chapter 11), in more detail, we can indeed ontologically define the world by spatiotemporal features that predispose consciousness.

Most importantly, these spatiotemporal features entail relational time and space, which goes hand in hand with relation-based ontology (chapter 9). Relation-based ontology stands square to the panpsychist or proto-psychic assumption of psychic or proto-psychic properties or elements. Therefore, the assumption of world–brain relation as OPC is not compatible with any form of panpsychism or proto-psychism. Instead, one may rather want to ontologically presuppose what I describe as spatiotemporalism of world and world–brain relation. Such spatiotemporalism can, ontologically, be considered as a necessary condition of possible consciousness (i.e., an OPC).

The assumption of world–brain relation as OPC bears some superficial similarity to yet another approach in the realm of possible mind–body relation, that is, neutral monism (NM). NM assumes that mind and body can ontologically be traced to some more basic and fundamental ontological existence and reality that are neutral, that is, they are neither mental nor physical by themselves. The proponent of NM may now be inclined to argue that my concept of world–brain relation can be considered a candidate for such neutral ontological basis: the world–brain relation provides the OPC while, at the same time, it is closely related to physical features.

The analogy to NM is only superficial though as there are some basic differences. First, the assumption of such neutral ontological basis in NM provides the answer to the question of how we can link mind and body. That is different in my case. The world–brain relation and its role as OPC provides the answer to the question of the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features. Hence, NM still presupposes the concept of mind whereas that is no longer the case in world–brain relation.

The difference in starting point, that is, presupposition versus nonpresupposition of mind, carries major implications. Because it still presupposes the (possible existence and reality of) mind, NM must provide a necessary relation of the neutral ontological basis to both mind and body. That is no longer necessary in my case. There is no need to provide a necessary connection of world–brain relation to the mind as the latter is simply no longer presupposed. Moreover, unlike in NM, the relationship to the body is already entailed in world–brain relation as the body is part of the world for the brain (chapter 8 for details). Taken together, this relieves the world–brain relation of establishing a necessary connection to both mind and body, which is one of the major puzzles in NM. Therefore, the similarity of my assumption of world–brain relation as OPC with NM is at best superficial with major differences becoming apparent once one compares both in more depth.

World–Brain Problem IVa: Mind–Body Problem versus World–Brain Problem

The ontological redefinition of the brain in terms of world–brain relation carries far-reaching implications for the concept of mind and subsequently the mind–body problem. We recall the concept of mind was introduced to address the question of the lacking necessary connection between brain/body and consciousness (or mental features in general). (See chapter 13.)

To establish a necessary connection of consciousness (and mental features in general) to its underlying ontological substrate, philosophers introduced the concept of mind: they assumed the possible existence and reality of mind that is connected necessarily and a priori to consciousness (and to mental features in general). However, that turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. While solving one problem, that is, that of the necessary connection between body/brain and consciousness, another one was created, that is, that of the ontological relationship between mind and body, the mind–body problem.

I now argue that the concept of mind becomes superfluous for establishing a necessary connection to consciousness and mental features as this role can be taken over by world–brain relation. The world–brain relation is an OPC. As an OPC, the world–brain relation makes possible consciousness, implying that neither world alone nor the brain itself could account for a necessary connection to consciousness. Therefore, to understand the necessary (a posteriori) ontological connection between brain and consciousness, we need to go back to the relationship between world and brain (the world–brain relation).

This shifts the ontological focus away from the mind–body problem to a novel problem that I call the world–brain problem. We need to understand the relation between world and brain (the world–brain relation) to account for the necessary (a posteriori) ontological connection between brain and consciousness. Specifically, we first need to investigate the necessary ontological connection between world and brain to understand the necessary connection between world–brain relation and consciousness. Therefore, I speak of a world–brain problem that must be raised to address the question of the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features. As such, the world–brain problem renders the mind–body problem simply superfluous as the question raised by the latter can well be addressed by the former.

World–Brain Problem IVb: World–Brain Problem—Brain–World Problem?

What is the world–brain problem? The world–brain problem is an ontological problem that concerns the ontological relationship between world and brain. Specifically, the world–brain problem concerns the question of how the existence and reality of the world are related to those of the brain. The concepts of world and brain are understood in a strictly ontological sense rather than either an epistemic or an empirical sense: the world–brain problem is about existence and reality of world and brain rather than our knowledge or observation as related to either world or brain. The world–brain problem is thus about the ontological rather than epistemic or empirical relationship between world and brain.

The world–brain problem as ontological problem intentionally puts the terms world and brain in this sequence, as distinguished from brain–world problem. The brain is part of the world as a whole. Conceived in purely logical–conceptual terms, the assumption that the brain is part of the world as a whole comes close to trivial as there is no brain outside or beyond the world (see below for more details on the argument of triviality). This changes once one conceives their relationship in empirical and ontological terms, however. Instead of mere passive entailment on a logical–conceptual basis, there are active construction processes, both empirically and ontologically, that first and foremost make it possible for the brain to become part of the world as a whole. Using a term from Sellars (1963), the brain as part of the world as a whole is not a “given” (Sellars 1963, p. 128).

Empirically, such active construction processes were, for instance, manifest in specific coding mechanisms, that is, difference-based coding (chapter 2), and spatiotemporal mechanisms such as spatiotemporal alignment of the brain’s rhythmic structure to the one of the world (chapter 8). While ontologically, such active construction is provided by differences de re that constitute relation and structure with relational time and space (chapter 9) which make possible integration of the brain as a part within the world as a whole. If one were now locating these active construction processes within the brain itself, one would indeed better change the sequence of terms and speak of the brain–world problem rather than the world–brain problem. That is not the case, though. Relation and structure as postulated in OSR operate across the observational divide between world and brain by aligning and integrating the latter as part (i.e., brain) within the former as a whole (i.e., world). Therefore, ontologically conceived, we would better speak of the world–brain problem rather than the brain–world problem.

While the concept of world–brain problem is ontological, the reverse sequence as in brain–world problem may be understood in epistemic and empirical terms. The brain–world problem may epistemically concern how we can obtain knowledge of the world on the basis of our brain on the basis of first-, second-, and/or third-person perspective. Empirically, the brain–world problem describes the various ways in which our brain can process and interact with events in the world (chapter 2). As my main focus in this book is on the ontological question of the relationship between brain and consciousness, I concentrate on the world–brain problem while, in contrast, I leave open the epistemic issues related to the brain–world problem.

The critic may now want to argue that the world–brain problem may be just a mereological problem about the relationship between whole and part rather than being a genuine ontological problem. I reject that argument though. True, the brain is indeed part of the world as a whole. However, OSR defines the world by relation and structure that, by definition, include its parts such as the brain in a necessary (a posteriori) way.

As that very same connection remains contingent when one presupposes element-based ontology, the world–brain problem is not just merely mereological but concerns a much deeper ontological problem (see chapters 13 and 14 for discussion of mereological issues). Specifically, the world–brain problem raises the question of how relation and structure must be defined such that they can link world and brain necessarily, in such a way that their relation entails consciousness and mental features. Therefore, the question of world–brain relation is not just a mereological question but rather a basic ontological issue about relation and structure and, more generally, relationship.

World–Brain Problem IVc: World–Brain Problem—Two Halves

That is only half of the world–brain problem, however. The other half consists in the question of the existence and reality of mental features such as consciousness—that shall be explicated in the following.

What must the ontological relationship between world and brain be like to serve as an OPC? I argued that the characterization of the ontological relationship between world and brain in terms of elements (i.e., element-based ontology) is not plausible. Specifically, the definition of world and brain in terms of element-based ontology leaves the connection between brain and consciousness contingent (see above) and therefore fails to account for the existence and reality of consciousness. Therefore, defined by element-based ontology, neither the world nor the brain alone (nor their mere combination or addition) can serve as OPC. Instead, we need to presuppose an alternative ontology, that is, relation-based ontology (i.e., OSR), where structure and relation (rather than elements) constitute world and brain including their relation (i.e., world–brain relation). That allows for the necessary connection between world–brain relation and consciousness with the former serving as OPC.

Taken together, I suppose that the ontological redefinition of the brain in terms of OSR leads to an ontological shift from the mind–body problem to the world–brain problem. Instead of raising the question of the ontological relationship between mind and body, we better question how the world is related to the brain (the world–brain problem) when addressing the question of the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features.

Unlike the mind–body problem, the world–brain problem can well address the original problem of the lack of a necessary connection and upward entailment between brain and consciousness without reverting to either the concept of mind or intuitive relation (as in identity theory or eliminative materialism; see above). This puts the world–brain problem in a superior position when compared to the mind–body problem, which therefore can be replaced by the former.

World–Brain Problem IVd: World–Brain Problem—World–Body Problem?

Finally, one may argue that the world–brain problem can be identified with or even be replaced by what may be called the world–body problem as it may, for instance, be postulated in embodiment approaches (Park et al., 2014; Thompson, 2007; see chapter 8 for more details). I reject that, though. As discussed in chapter 8, the body is transformed from a merely objective body into a lived body by the brain’s alignment to body and world. Ontologically, the lived body presupposes the constitution of consciousness on the basis of world–brain relation as OPC since otherwise there would be no experience of the body as lived body.

Specifically, this means that the body is related to the world on the basis of the brain’s active construction of time and space in terms of the world’s relational time and space. Therefore, the brain and its relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation) must be considered a necessary condition of transforming the merely physical or objective body into a lived body, the body as we experience it (chapter 8). I therefore speak of the world–brain problem rather than the world–body problem.

However, the proponent of embodiment may not yet be satisfied. We do not experience world–brain relation at all while we do experience our body as lived body and its relation to the world (i.e., world–body relation). Therefore, the world–body problem must be more basic and foundational than the world–brain problem. This is to confuse phenomenal and ontological realms though. True indeed, we do not experience world–brain relation by itself as it is only a predisposition but not a correlate of consciousness (i.e., OPC rather than OCC).

However, to infer from experience of the body and the concomitant lack of experience of world–brain relation to the ontological primacy of the world–body problem over the world–brain problem is to confuse phenomenal and ontological realms. The fact that we do not experience world–brain relation as such in our consciousness does not entail that it cannot serve as OPC of consciousness. More generally put, we cannot infer from the phenomenal realm of consciousness, that is, the experience of the body as lived body, to its ontological basis, world–body relation. This amounts to what I describe as the phenomenal–ontological fallacy. The proponent suggesting the ontological primacy of the world–body problem over the world–brain problem can make that claim only by committing such phenomenal–ontological fallacy. Therefore, her or his argument can be rejected.

The inference from the phenomenal realm of the lived body to the ontological primacy of world–body relation is more or less analogous to the following scenario. Imagine we were inferring from our lacking consciousness of H₂O to the claim that H₂O cannot constitute the molecular basis of water. This would be considered absurd given our current knowledge. In contrast, this is not considered absurd in the case of world–brain relation by at least the proponent of embodiment. Let us put things straight. In the same way that H₂O provides the molecular basis of water, world–brain relation constitutes the ontological basis of consciousness including our experience of the body as lived body. Therefore, as with H₂O with respect to water, world–brain relation must be ontologically more basic and foundational for consciousness than the lived body including world–body relation.

The critic may want to argue that the concept of world–brain relation is way too abstract as we can neither observe it nor experience it as such. Even if ontologically valid, the concept of world–brain relation is too abstract to serve as OPC for something as concrete as our consciousness. This is to neglect the history of science though. As pointed out in chapter 2, several discoveries in science including quantum theory and the genetic code are rather abstract and not directly accessible as such in both observation and experience. However, that neither hinders quantum theory in serving as an ontological predisposition of physical reality nor the genetic code in providing the ontological basis of inheritance. Hence, the argument of abstraction as an argument that world–brain relation is too abstract to serve as OPC must be rejected on scientific and ontological grounds (see also chapter 14 for a similar argument).

World–Brain Problem Va: World–Brain Problem—Argument of Triviality

One may now want to argue that the world–brain problem is trivial. The argument of triviality posed here with regard to the world–brain problem can be considered an ontological extension of the argument of triviality I raised in the empirical context of the spatiotemporal model of consciousness (chapter 7). Specifically, the world–brain problem may be regarded as trivial on empirical, conceptual, and ontological grounds.

First, the world–brain problem is empirically trivial in that it refers back to the brain and its neuronal mechanisms. Therefore, conceived empirically, the world–brain problem really turns out to be a “brain problem” rather than world–brain problem. Second, the world–brain problem is trivial on conceptual grounds. The addition of the brain does not add anything new to the concept of world, which includes the brain by default since the latter is part of the former. Therefore, considered conceptually, we could replace the world–brain problem by what can be called the world problem.

Third, the world–brain problem is ontologically trivial. The existence and reality of the world must also characterize the existence and reality of the brain as the latter is part of the former. For instance, the physical or mental properties that characterize the world, as in materialism or panpsychism, also apply to the brain and must thus characterize its existence and reality. Therefore, the inclusion of the brain in the world–brain problem is rather trivial on ontological grounds.

However, I reject all three claims of triviality. First, I demonstrated that a specific neuronal mechanism, that is, spatiotemporal alignment, accounted for the brain’s empirical relation to the world (chapter 8). The absence of such spatiotemporal alignment renders impossible, on empirical grounds, world–brain relation, which is then replaced by world–brain isolation. Hence, considered empirically, the world–brain problem includes different kinds of empirical options, that is, mechanisms by means of which the brain’s neural activity could position itself in regard to the world, that is, world–brain relation versus world–brain isolation. Therefore, the assumption of the world–brain problem is far from trivial on empirical grounds.

Second, the world–brain problem is not conceptually trivial. The world–brain problem contains different options with respect to the relationship between world and brain. For instance, there can be a necessary or a contingent connection between world and brain. If the connection between world and brain is necessary, the world–brain problem can account for the necessary connection between brain and consciousness. If, in contrast, the connection between world and brain remains contingent, the world–brain problem cannot account for the necessary connection between brain and consciousness and remains therefore unable to address the question of the existence and reality of mental features. Since the world–brain problem includes different conceptual options, that is, necessary versus contingent, for the relationship between world and brain, it cannot be considered trivial on conceptual grounds.

Third and finally, the world–brain problem is not ontologically trivial. One can presuppose different ontological frameworks such as element-, relation-, process-, and capacity-based ontology. We have already seen that the relationship between world and brain will be different when presupposing either element- or relation-based ontology. Other ontological options for their possible relationship emerge when presupposing either process-based ontology (Northoff, 2016a,b) or capacity-based ontology (chapters 5 and 9). Since the ontological characterization of world and brain, including their relationship, depends on the presupposed ontological framework that entails different ontological options, the world–brain problem cannot be conceived as ontologically trivial.

World–Brain Problem Vb: World–Brain Problem versus World–Brain Relation—Question versus Answer

The critic may now want to argue that we did not really define the various terms included in the notion of world–brain problem. We defined neither the concept of world nor that of relation; only the concept of brain was defined somewhat as it relied on the previous chapter (chapter 9). I will define the concept of world in an ontological sense in more detail in the next chapter, chapter 11. Here I shall focus on the concept of relation. We can distinguish between at least two (possible) distinct concepts of relation in world–brain relation, for example, narrow and wide.

“Relation” in “world–brain relation” can be understood in a narrow sense. In that case, “relation” refers to the ontological definition of relation in terms of OSR. Empirically, the narrow meaning of relation is determined by spatiotemporal alignment (chapter 8) while, conceptually, it implies a necessary (rather than contingent) and therefore intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) connection between world and brain. Hence, the narrow meaning of relation is determined in a specific way on empirical, conceptual, and ontological grounds. Such determination, and consequently the narrow meaning of “relation,” is presupposed when I consider world–brain relation as the answer to the world–brain problem (as the underlying question).

What about the wide concept of relation in world–brain relation? The wide meaning of “relation” refers to relationship in general, that is, the commonsense notion of relationship, which includes all possible ontological, conceptual, and empirical options. Thus, the wide meaning of “relation” in “world–brain relation” remains empirically, conceptually, and ontologically undetermined. This is the notion of relation I presuppose when I speak of the world–brain problem. Since it includes several empirical, conceptual, and ontological options with regard to the relation between world and brain, the world–brain problem cannot be considered trivial at all on any of these grounds (i.e., empirical, conceptual, and ontological).

In conclusion, my rejection of the trivial nature of the world–brain problem on all three levels, that is, empirical, ontological, and conceptual, presupposes the wide meaning of the concept of relation in my concept of world–brain relation. The world–brain problem must therefore be distinguished from world–brain relation: the former raises the question of the possible relationship between world and brain by adopting a wide meaning of relation while the latter provides an answer by determining relation in a specific and thus narrow meaning. If, in contrast, one presupposes the narrow meaning of relation in the concept of the world–brain problem, the latter will indeed be rendered trivial—that is to confuse answer (i.e., the world–brain relation with its presupposed narrow meaning of relation) and question (i.e., the world–brain problem presupposing the wide meaning of relation).

Conclusion

How can we determine the existence and reality of consciousness? As based on the ontological determination of the brain in terms of world–brain relation and OSR, I suggest the world–brain relation as a necessary, nonsufficient ontological condition of possible consciousness (i.e., as OPC). Most important, because of its constitution of spatiotemporal structure with space-time relation, the world–brain relation allows us to take into view and thus conceive a necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness. That must be distinguished from the contingent relationship between brain and consciousness that plagues most past and present philosophical and neuroscientific approaches to consciousness and mental features in general.

To allow for a necessary rather than contingent ontological connection between brain and consciousness, we have to revise our standard ontological presuppositions though. Instead of element-based ontology with mental and physical properties, we rather need to presuppose OSR with structure and relation as basic units of existence and reality. This makes possible the ontological redefinition of the brain in terms of relation, that is, world–brain relation, rather than by some intrinsic features within the brain itself such as physical or mental properties.

How and why can world–brain relation allow for a necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness? I propose that it is connected with its spatiotemporal characterization by relational time and space. Relational time and space make necessary the ontological relation between world and brain (i.e., world–brain relation). That, in turn, puts the brain, through its world–brain relation, in a necessary ontological connection to consciousness as defined by its phenomenal features, which I propose are characterized by space-time relation (reflecting relational time and space).

Hence, time and space and, more specifically, relational time and space provide the missing glue or missing link between brain and consciousness and, even more generally, between world and consciousness. The proposed empirical spatiotemporal theory of consciousness (chapter 7) can thus be complemented on the ontological side by an analogous spatiotemporal model of consciousness.

Such spatiotemporal model of consciousness provides a new view on some of the problems discussed in philosophy of mind such as the explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1998), which shall be briefly indicated here (awaiting further detailed discussion in the future). The explanatory gap problem argues that there is an explanatory gap between physical and mental features which, applied to the case of the brain, can be reframed as the gap between neuronal and phenomenal features (Northoff, 2014b). Within the current ontological framework of structural realism, the concept of such an explanatory gap is not plausible and therefore can no longer be sustained. The role of world–brain relation as OPC implies the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness. Such a necessary connection stands counter to the assumption of a gap between neuronal and phenomenal features, which in turn renders the assumption of an explanatory gap implausible and even nonsensical in the present framework.

Most important, characterization of world–brain relation in terms of spatiotemporal ontology renders superfluous the need to introduce the concept of mind for drawing the necessary connection to consciousness and mental features. The role of the mind can now be taken over by world–brain relation, which serves as OPC. This renders the concept of mind and subsequently the mind–body problem superfluous in our account of consciousness and mental features. All that we aim to answer by the concept of mind and the mind–body problem can now be addressed in a much more empirically and ontologically plausible way by the world–brain problem. In short, we can replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem.

Several issues remain open, however. First, I identified the necessary ontological conditions, that is, predisposition of consciousness (OPC); this left open the sufficient ontological conditions of actual consciousness though, the OCCs. Second, I left open the nature of phenomenal features of consciousness and how they are related to world–brain relation as OPC. Third, one may wonder about the sequence of the terms “world” and “brain” in “world–brain relation.” One may, alternatively, suggest brain–world relation, which I reject though as the latter is at best epistemic or empirical rather than ontological. Finally, I left open the exact determination of the concept of world in my account of world–brain relation. These issues shall be addressed in the next chapter.

10
Ontology II: From World–Brain Relation to Consciousness

Introduction

General Background—Ontology of Consciousness

Aim and Argument—Spatiotemporal Model of Consciousness

Part I: Ontology of Consciousness—Spatiotemporal Model

Spatiotemporal Model Ia: Spatiotemporal Mechanisms—Spatiotemporal Structure

Spatiotemporal Model Ib: Spatiotemporal Structure—Ontological Features

Spatiotemporal Model IIa: Ontology of Consciousness—Relation and Organization

Spatiotemporal Model IIb: Ontology of Consciousness—Difference and Relational Time and Space

Spatiotemporal Model IIc: Ontology of Consciousness—Mind versus World–Brain Relation and Internalism versus Externalism

Part II: Ontology of Consciousness—Contingency Problem, or Necessary Ontological Connection between Brain and Consciousness

Contingency Problem Ia: Internal Relation—Double Necessary Ontological Connection

Contingency Problem Ib: External versus Internal Relation—Causal versus Constitutive Relation

Contingency Problem IIa: Brain and Consciousness—Necessary versus Contingent Connection

Contingency Problem IIb: Introduction of Mind—Mind–Body Problem

Contingency Problem IIIa: Brain and Consciousness—Upward Spatiotemporal Entailment

Contingency Problem IIIb: Ontological Redefinition of Brain—Structural Realism and Relational Time and Space

Contingency Problem IIIc: Ontological Redefinition of Brain—Necessary Connection to Consciousness in Terms of Upward Spatiotemporal Entailment

Contingency Problem IVa: Criteria of Necessity—Spatiotemporal Fit into the World

Contingency Problem IVb: Criteria of Necessity—Third Shared and Commonly Underlying Feature

Contingency Problem IVc: Criteria of Necessity—Spatiotemporal Transparency through World–Brain Relation