Where are we now? I first discussed the existence and reality of brain, that is, ontology of brain (chapter 9). That let me to define the existence and reality of brain in the sense of ontic structural realism (OSR), that is, by structure and relation as realized and manifest in world–brain relation (chapter 9). The existence and reality of brain thus consists in world–brain relation—the brain is world–brain relation. That very same world–brain relation is of central importance for consciousness (and mental features in general). Specifically, the world–brain relation serves as a necessary ontological condition of possible consciousness, that is, as an ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC; chapter 10).
However, despite all emphasis on brain and world–brain relation, the ontological characterization of the world itself, including its role for consciousness, remains open. The world as considered so far is important for consciousness only through its relation to the brain, the world–brain relation, that serves as OPC. That leaves the world by itself (i.e., independent of brain) ontologically underdetermined though: the world’s existence and reality extend and reach far beyond its relation to the brain. There is thus “more” to the world than world–brain relation, and this “more” may be central for the existence and reality of mental features such as consciousness.
Main Aim and Argument
The main aim in the present chapter is to characterize the existence and reality of world itself and its relevance for consciousness. Thereby, I focus specifically on the phenomenal features of consciousness and how they are related to the ontological, that is, spatiotemporal features of world and world–brain relation. Moreover, it shall be noted that I here presuppose the concept of world in the ontological terms of OSR—the world is ontologically characterized by structure and relation with relational time and space (chapter 9).
Such structural–relational ontological determination of the world must be distinguished from other meanings of world such as empirical, for example, physical (as in science), phenomenal (as in phenomenology), mental (as in idealism), and cognitive–representational (as most often in cognitive neuroscience) characterizations. Moreover, I clearly distinguish such ontological meaning of world from any metaphysical determination as I sharply distinguish metaphysics and ontology (see the introduction to chapter 9). Finally, note that I presuppose the concept of world in a phenomenal rather than noumenal sense (as in the meaning of Kant) as the world in a noumenal sense may not be accessible to us (which, as I argue, is due to world–brain relation; see chapters 13 and 14).
My main argument in this chapter is that the world itself is ontologically indispensable for the existence and reality of consciousness. This is specified by three ontological features of the world, including “calibration process” (part I), “constitution of structure” (part II), and “complex location” (part III), that are all necessary for the existence and reality of consciousness. I therefore conclude that the world itself must be included in our ontology when addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features such as consciousness.
Part I: World and Consciousness—Argument of Calibration
Argument of Calibration Ia: World—Superfluous, Trivial, and Nonnecessary?
Why do we need to include the world when addressing the question of the existence and reality of consciousness? We have already seen in the empirical part that the brain’s spatiotemporal alignment to the world is a necessary empirical condition of actual consciousness, that is, a neural prerequisite of consciousness (chapter 8). However, the empirical relevance of world for consciousness does not imply its ontological relevance. Ontologically, brain or mind may be fully sufficient by themselves to account for the existence and reality of mental features such as consciousness. Let us detail that in the following.
One can, for example, define and trace the existence and reality of consciousness to the brain (as most often in materialism and physicalism). In that case, the world itself, that is, independent of the brain, does not take on any role in consciousness—the world itself thus remains irrelevant if not superfluous in this case. One may now want to argue that the here suggested world–brain relation gives at least some role to the world. However, that role is merely indirect as it is based on the brain and how it relates to the world. One may, for instance, argue that the relation between world and brain, the world–brain relation, is sufficiently dependent upon the brain itself—this renders superfluous the world itself, that is, independent of the brain, for consciousness.
Does the world itself really remain irrelevant? Another argument for the world could be mereological, pointing out that the brain is part of the world as whole. One can therefore not avoid including the world in at least an indirect way as the part implies the whole. Such mereological inclusion is rather trivial though (as it is implied by the concepts of world and brain) and, even more important, it does not change anything in our ontological determination of consciousness (when compared to its definition by the brain as part independent of the world as whole). Therefore, the hint toward mereological part-whole relationship between brain and world does not really render the world itself (i.e., independent of the brain) relevant for consciousness beyond mere triviality.
How is the role of world when defining mental features such as consciousness by mind rather than brain? In that case, the world is not even included in either an indirect (as through mind–world relation as analogous to world–brain relation) or mereological (as a whole including the brain as a part) sense. In contrast, determination of mental features by the mind even excludes world to sharpen its distinction from the physical features of the world (including brain and body). Accordingly, ontological determination of mental features by mind excludes the world almost by default, that is, in a necessary way.
Taken together, the critic may want to argue that, ontologically, the world has no role in our ontological determination of mental features. Mental features can be sufficiently determined ontologically by either brain or mind without considering the world itself (i.e., independent of brain and mind). I will argue against this argument. Contrary to the argument, I will argue that the inclusion of world is necessary for the ontological determination of mental features; this is based on the central role of the world for what I describe as the “calibration process” which is essential for consciousness. I therefore speak of an “argument of calibration.”
Argument of Calibration Ib: World—Spatiotemporal Frame versus Spatiotemporal Baseline
I presuppose OSR that characterizes the basic units of existence and reality by relation and structure. I so far applied OSR to brain (chapter 9) and consciousness (chapter 10). However, as it concerns the basic units of existence and reality, OSR must also apply to the world itself, that is, its existence and reality, as it remains independent of both brain and consciousness. Specifically, as I characterized OSR in a spatiotemporal way, one would claim that the world can ontologically be characterized by what I described as “relational time and space” (chapter 9). I now aim to develop OSR of the world in order to understand how that makes possible phenomenal features of consciousness.
How can we now characterize relational time and space in more detail? Spatiotemporal relation and structure are characterized by a certain spatiotemporal scale or range: within the boundaries of the world’s spatiotemporal scale or range, the world exists and is real whereas outside the boundaries of its spatiotemporal range, the world, that is, the world we live in, does not exist. That does not exclude that another world or even another universe exists that shows a different spatiotemporal scale or range. The spatiotemporal range thus provides a boundary or frame for the world—I therefore speak of “spatiotemporal frame.” Presupposing OSR in a spatiotemporal sense, the notion of spatiotemporal frame is an ontological concept that characterizes existence and reality of world in a spatiotemporal way.
Why and how is the spatiotemporal frame of the world related to consciousness? For that, we need to first introduce yet another concept. I considered world–brain relation as OPC (chapter 10). Specifically, the world–brain relation can be characterized by the coupling of the world’s larger spatiotemporal range to the smaller one of the brain (chapter 9).
Such spatiotemporal coupling between world and brain in the world–brain relation constitutes the basis for subsequent consciousness: as the world–brain relation provides the OPC, its spatiotemporal features provide the baseline for possible consciousness. As the baseline is determined by the spatiotemporal scale or range of world–brain relation, I speak of “spatiotemporal baseline.” The concept of spatiotemporal baseline is an ontological concept that describes the spatiotemporal features of world–brain relation and, more generally, the spatiotemporal relation between the world as whole and its parts such as the brain.
Let me illustrate the concept of spatiotemporal baseline by the example of the bat as put forward by the philosopher Thomas Nagel in his famous paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (Nagel, 1974). The bat can process ultrasonic frequency waves that are not included in the spatiotemporal frequency range of the human brain. Therefore, the bat’s world–brain relation shows a different spatiotemporal range than the world–brain relation in humans—humans and bats thus exhibit different spatiotemporal baselines. As the world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal baseline provide the OPC, the spatiotemporal range of consciousness will also be different between bats and humans. Accordingly, the answer to Nagel’s (1974) famous question “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” consists in investigating the species-specific spatiotemporal range of the bat’s spatiotemporal baseline, that is, its species-specific world–brain relation.
Argument of Calibration Ic: World—Divergence between Spatiotemporal Frame and Spatiotemporal Baseline
How does the concept of spatiotemporal baseline stand in relation to that of spatiotemporal frame? First and foremost, both are ontological concepts that describe different spatiotemporal features of the world within the context of OSR. Specifically, the concept of spatiotemporal frame concerns only the world itself independent of our experience or consciousness of the world including the underlying world–brain relation. This distinguishes spatiotemporal frame from spatiotemporal baseline.
Unlike spatiotemporal frame, the concept of spatiotemporal baseline refers to the relation between the world’s spatiotemporal range and that of the brain, that is, the world–brain relation. Therefore, to equate or identify spatiotemporal frame and spatiotemporal baseline would be to confuse world itself, that is, as it remains independent of its parts such as the brain, and the world’s relation to the brain as one of its parts, that is, world–brain relation.
The distinction between the two concepts makes it possible for “spatiotemporal baseline” and “spatiotemporal frame” to diverge from each other. It is, for instance, well conceivable that two different spatiotemporal baselines like those of humans and bats refer to one and the same “spatiotemporal frame” as they are “located” and situated within a commonly shared world. Whereas their “spatiotemporal baseline” apparently differ from each other as indicated above. Such possible divergence between “spatiotemporal frame” and “spatiotemporal baseline” lend further support to the assumption that both concepts cannot be identified with each other.
Finally, the difference between spatiotemporal frame and spatiotemporal baseline does not preclude that the latter is dependent upon the former. The spatiotemporal range of the spatiotemporal frame predisposes the spatiotemporal difference between world and brain, that is, the spatiotemporal baseline: the larger the spatiotemporal range of the spatiotemporal frame, the larger the spatiotemporal difference that the spatiotemporal baseline needs to bridge to couple, that is, relate, world and brain. Accordingly, the spatiotemporal baseline is dependent upon the world’s spatiotemporal frame (while the reverse dependence does not hold, i.e., the spatiotemporal frame remains independent of the spatiotemporal baseline).
Argument of Calibration IIa: Consciousness—Spaces of Experience and Their Calibration Processes
I so far characterized the world ontologically by spatiotemporal frame and spatiotemporal baseline. However, that leaves open why and how both spatiotemporal frame and spatiotemporal baseline are relevant for consciousness. That shall be the focus in the following. For that, I turn to Isaac (2014), who suggests a structural realist account of experience and, more specifically, of secondary qualities. While he focuses exclusively on secondary qualities, I enlarge his focus by applying his ideas to phenomenal features of consciousness in general.
Isaac (2014) compares the occurrence of secondary qualities such as the experience of heat to a measurement or calibration process. When we, for example, measure temperature, we measure temperature not in an absolute way but rather in a relative way since we compare it against our thermometer and its scale. Depending on the scale or calibration of the measurement device (e.g., the thermometer), one obtains a certain value for the temperature. This is, for instance, well reflected in the difference between Celsius and Fahrenheit as the temperature scales used in Europe and the United States, respectively: the same room with the same absolute temperature will be characterized by different temperatures in Europe and the United States since in both instances different scales are used. We thus obtain a relative rather than absolute value of temperature as depending on the calibration of the measurement device, the thermometer (Isaac, 2014).
The same holds now analogously, according to Isaac (2014), in the case of secondary qualities. The physical causes of heat are set and compared against a baseline that is calibrated in a certain way. Depending on the calibration of that very same baseline, we may experience one and the same temperature as either hot or cool. Based on its calibration, the “baseline” may allow for a certain scope or range within which the temperatures can be experienced in various ways, that is, degrees—the experience of temperature, including its secondary qualities, is thus dependent upon the presupposed baseline and its subsequent calibration process.
Argument of Calibration IIb: Consciousness—Prephenomenal versus Phenomenal and Nonphenomenal Spaces of Experience
I now extend Isaac’s notion of “calibration process” from secondary qualities to phenomenal features of consciousness in general. For that, we need to characterize such calibration process in more detail. Following Isaac (2014), there are three ingredients in the calibration process when it comes to secondary qualities. There is (i) a “space of possible experience” that, for instance, may include possible experience of hot or cold, and therefore serves as the “baseline” of possible experience; (ii) a “space of possible external correlates to experience” that, for instance, may include temperature; and (iii) a process by which the two are linked that allows for calibrating the latter with respect to the former, that is, “calibration process,” as I say.
What exactly is meant by the concept of “space” in the first two ingredients, that is, the space of possible experience and the space of possible external correlates to experience? Though Isaac himself does not really discuss the concept of space, it is clear that it is not meant in a purely physical and observational sense. This is more or less excluded by characterizing such space by experience and, as I say, consciousness and its phenomenal features. However, to identify the concept of space as phenomenal would be to confuse possible and actual experience. Isaac is talking about a “space of possible experience” and a “space of possible external correlates to experience” rather than “actual experience” or “actual external correlates to experience.”
The distinction between “possible” and “actual” makes it impossible to characterize Isaac’s concept of space in a phenomenal sense by itself. However, at the same time, Isaac clearly indicates that the two spaces are relevant for experience and its external correlates as they determine the possible ranges of both. Both spaces thus provide the necessary condition of possible experience and its external correlates—they are predispositions of experience and thus of consciousness for which reason I characterize them as “prephenomenal” (rather than phenomenal; see Northoff, 2014b, for extensive discussion and usage of the concept of prephenomenal).
The characterization of both spaces as prephenomenal must be also distinguished from their nonphenomenal determination. Even though they are not yet phenomenal by themselves, both spaces can nevertheless not be characterized as nonphenomenal—that would be to cut their relationship to possible experience and its external correlates, which ultimately would render the latter two impossible. Therefore, I characterize the concept of space in both “space of possible experience” and “space of possible external correlates to experience” as prephenomenal rather than as either phenomenal or nonphenomenal.
How can the two spaces serve as a necessary condition of consciousness? I propose that, following Isaac’s third ingredient, they allow for the calibration process. The comparison and calibration between both space of possible experience and space of external correlates of experience can by itself not be experienced—it is not accessible for us in consciousness. However, experience and thus consciousness nevertheless are based and thus depend on such calibration process, which therefore can by itself by characterized as prephenomenal (rather than either phenomenal or nonphenomenal).
Argument of Calibration IIc: Consciousness—Space of Possible Experience and Spatiotemporal Baseline
How is the prephenomenal realm of the two prephenomenal spaces related to the ontological realm of world–brain relation? More specifically, I raise the question of how the prephenomenal space of possible experience is related to the ontological characterization of the world in terms of spatiotemporal baseline and spatiotemporal frame. I will argue that the prephenomenal features, as postulated by Isaac, are closely related to and can be traced to the ontological determination of the world in terms of spatiotemporal frame and spatiotemporal baseline. Let me start with the first prephenomenal feature, the space of possible experience.
The spatiotemporal baseline is ontologically determined by world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal features (see above). At the same time, both world–brain relation and its role as spatiotemporal baseline serve as a necessary condition of possible consciousness, that is, OPC. In contrast, the world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal baseline cannot be considered sufficient conditions of actual (rather than possible) consciousness (chapter 10). This is mirrored also on the prephenomenal side where the “space of experience” refers to “possible experience” rather than “actual experience.”
I now argue that what Isaac describes as “space of possible experience” in the prephenomenal realm is directly related to what is ontologically referred to as the “spatiotemporal baseline” as constituted by world–brain relation. The spatiotemporal baseline constituted by world–brain relation provides the necessary ontological condition of the prephenomenal space of possible experience. The prephenomenal space of possible experience is thus ontologically dependent upon the spatiotemporal scale or range of the world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal baseline.
This entails a rather radical consequence. If the prephenomenal space of possible experience is ontologically dependent upon world–brain relation as spatiotemporal baseline, phenomenal features of consciousness must by themselves be characterized in spatiotemporal terms (see Northoff, 2014b, for details on that point). We should be careful about the concepts of time and space, however. The concept of spatiotemporal refers here to relational time and space and thus to structure and relation as distinguished from observational time and space (chapter 9). Therefore, the spatiotemporal characterization of the phenomenal features of consciousness does not entail their scientific and ultimately merely physicalistic determination in terms of observational time and space.
In sum, I suppose that the spatiotemporal baseline of world–brain relation provides the necessary ontological condition of the prephenomenal space of possible experience. The range of possible experiences and thus consciousness (with both terms being used synonymously for the sake of simplicity) is thus predisposed ontologically by the spatiotemporal range of the spatiotemporal baseline as constituted by world–brain relation. This not only links and relates ontological and prephenomenal levels of consciousness but also makes it necessary to characterize phenomenal features in spatiotemporal terms, that is, relational time and space.
Argument of Calibration IIIa: Consciousness—Space of Possible External Correlates to Experience and Spatiotemporal Frame
How about the second feature of experience in the sense of Isaac, the “space of possible external correlates to experience”? This refers to the objects or events that can possibly be associated with consciousness. The events or objects with which consciousness can possibly be associated are part of the world and its spatiotemporal frame. Therefore, the events or objects themselves must be characterized by specific spatiotemporal features which relate them in a particular way to the world and its spatiotemporal frame, that is, “world–object/event relation,” as I say.
How can we characterize the concept of world–object/event relation? As with world–brain relation, the concept of world–object/event relation can be described in spatiotemporal terms: the objects or events, including their specific spatiotemporal features, stand in a certain spatiotemporal relationship to the world and its spatiotemporal frame. The spatiotemporal frame is thus explicitly present in world–object/event relation in that it shapes the relation between world and object/event in a spatiotemporal way. Importantly, that very same world–object/event relation remains independent of the spatiotemporal baseline as provided by world–brain relation as that is distinct from world–object/event relation.
I now argue that the world–object/event relation, including its dependence upon the world’s spatiotemporal frame, is a necessary ontological condition of the prephenomenal space of possible external correlates to experience. The way the objects and events stand in spatiotemporal relation to the world and its spatiotemporal frame determines whether they can be included or excluded within the space of possible external correlates to experience. As in the case of the space of possible experience, I determine the space of possible external correlates of experience in a spatiotemporal way, that is, in relation to the world’s spatiotemporal frame.
The prephenomenal space of possible external correlates to experience is not solely determined by the world’s spatiotemporal frame and world–object/event relation, however. Additionally, we need to consider the world–brain relation and its spatiotemporal baseline. More specifically, we need to consider the degree to which world–object/event relation and world–brain relation overlap spatiotemporally: the more the spatiotemporal baseline of world–brain relation overlaps with the spatiotemporal frame of world–object/event relation, the more likely the respective objects or events will be included in the space of possible external correlates to experience. If, in contrast, their spatiotemporal overlap is minimal or absent, the respective events or objects will not be included in, and thus excluded from, the space of possible external correlates to experience.
Argument of Calibration IIIb: Consciousness—Phenomenal versus Empirical Meanings of “Internal” and “External”
I discussed how the world–object/event relation provides the ontological condition of the prephenomenal space of possible external correlates of experience. In contrast, I left open the meaning of the notion of “external”—that shall be the focus in the following.
The concept of “external” obviously stands in contrast to the notion of “internal.” There are external correlates as well as internal correlates in the prephenomenal space of experience. I characterized the world–object/event relation and its spatiotemporal overlap with world–brain relation as an external correlate of experience. In contrast, the internal correlate of experience may consist in the world–brain relation that provides the spatiotemporal baseline (and necessary ontological condition) for the prephenomenal space of possible experience.
We need to be careful, though. The meanings of “internal” and “external” are here understood in a prephenomenal or phenomenal sense as distinguished from their empirical meaning. Empirically, the meaning of “internal” refers to brain and body as distinguished from the world as “external”: everything that happens inside brain and body is internal while events or objects outside in the world are considered external.
However, that is to be distinguished from the prephenomenal or phenomenal meaning of “internal” and “external.” In that case, the notion of “external” refers to the objects or events of experience, that is, those objects or events which are associated with experience. Importantly, this can include events or objects outside in the world as well as events or objects inside in brain (such as spontaneous thoughts) or body (such as the heartbeat or heart palpitations). Hence, the prephenomenal or phenomenal meaning of “external” includes both notions “internal” and “external” as understood in an empirical sense.
What about the concept of the internal in the prephenomenal or phenomenal sense? This refers to the experience itself, that is, experience as such, independent of the objects or events, that is, the “external” correlates, with which it is associated. Experience itself is thus internal while the objects or events with which it is associated are its external correlate. One may now be inclined to argue that the prephenomenal or phenomenal meaning of “internal” corresponds more or less to the empirical determination of “internal”: in the same way, the empirical notion of the “internal” is restricted to the inside of brain and body, the prephenomenal or phenomenal determination of the “internal,” that is, experience, takes place within the inside of brain and body.
That is not true, though. Experience and thus consciousness is not limited to the inside of brain and body. Consciousness extends beyond both brain and body as well as beyond our person as a whole—it links us to and “anchors” us in the world as part of the world. When we experience something, that is, an event or object, as an “external” correlate, we do not experience that event or object within our brain or body. Instead, we experience that event or object as well as its relationship to ourselves as part of the wider world—consciousness thus aligns us to the world.
Accordingly, the internal character of experience, that is, consciousness, cannot be restricted to and thus compared with the notion of internal as understood in an empirical sense. As in the case of external, the prephenomenal or phenomenal concept of internal does not obey the boundaries between brain, body, and world. Instead, it operates across those boundaries that are therefore empirical but not phenomenal. Ontologically, such phenomenal (rather than empirical) operation across the boundaries between brain, body, and world is predisposed by the relationship between world–brain relation and world–object/event relation—their relationship first and foremost makes possible the prephenomenal or phenomenal concepts of internal and external as distinguished from their empirical siblings.
Argument of Calibration IIIc: Consciousness—Spatiotemporal Calibration as Ontological Correlate of Consciousness
What about the third feature in Isaac’s structuralist account of experience, the calibration process, which links the space of possible experience and the space of possible external correlates to experience? I suppose that such linkage is provided by the calibration process as mentioned above. The calibration process consists in comparing and matching the “external correlates to experience” with and against the space of possible experience. The central question here concerns the comparison and matching—what exactly happens here, and how does it calibrate our experience?
I traced the prephenomenal space of possible experience ontologically to world–brain relation while the space of possible external correlates to experience is predisposed by world–object/event relation (and its relationship to world–brain relation; see above). How, now, can both world–brain relation and world–object/event relation be compared and matched with each other in such way that the former calibrates the latter?
We recall that the world–brain relation provides a spatiotemporal baseline while the world is characterized as a spatiotemporal frame. Both world–brain and world–object/event relation share two ontological features. First, both are relations and can therefore be directly compared with each other (which otherwise would remain impossible as when, for instance, one were a property and the other a relation). Second, both world–brain relation and world–object/event relation include the world as a commonly shared spatiotemporal frame that provides a common reference for both brain and objects/events, including their relation to the world.
Because of the world’s spatiotemporal frame as common reference, world–brain relation and world–object/event relation can be compared and matched with each other in terms of their spatiotemporal features. Specifically, the world–brain relation provides the spatiotemporal baseline against which world–object/event relation is set, compared, and matched and thus calibrated. The calibration process is thus spatiotemporal for which reason I speak of “spatiotemporal calibration.”
What exactly do I mean by the concept of spatiotemporal calibration? First and foremost, the concept of spatiotemporal calibration is an ontological concept. As such, it must be distinguished from an empirical concept. Spatiotemporal calibration describes the ontological comparison of different spatiotemporal scales and, more specifically, the comparison of the spatiotemporal ranges of world–object/event relation against those of the world–brain relation that serves as a spatiotemporal baseline. By serving as a spatiotemporal baseline, the world–brain relation can conform and adjust, that is, “calibrate,” the possible objects/events (including their world–object/event relation) according to its own spatiotemporal range.
Such conformation and adjustment of the spatiotemporal features of the objects or events of the world to those of world–brain relation, in turn, make it possible to associate the former with consciousness. Let me detail that. The conformation allows for integration of the spatiotemporal features of the objects or events, including their world–object/event relation, within the spatiotemporal range of world–brain relation—that, in turn, is central for consciousness (chapters 6–8 and 10). Hence, what I describe by “spatiotemporal calibration” provides the sufficient ontological condition of the actual linkage between the two prephenomenal spaces, that is, the space of possible experience and the space of possible external correlates to experience. Their linkage, in turn, allows for transforming the prephenomenal realm of possible experience (including its possible external correlates) into the phenomenal realm of actual experience of objects or events.
Taken together, spatiotemporal calibration can be considered a sufficient ontological condition of actual consciousness and thus what I describe as an “ontological correlate of consciousness” (OCC). Spatiotemporal calibration as OCC must be distinguished from world–brain relation as OPC (chapter 10): without spatiotemporal calibration, world–brain relation as the ontological basis of the two prephenomenal spaces, that is, the space of possible experience and the space of possible external correlates to experience, cannot yield consciousness and mental features. At the same time, world–brain relation is also necessary, since without world–brain relation as OPC, there would be no ontological capacity (see chapter 5 for the concept of capacity in a more scientific context) to render possible spatiotemporal calibration as OCC.
Argument of Calibration IVa: Consciousness—Spatiotemporal Calibration versus Neuronal Calibration
The neuroscientist and empirically minded philosopher may now be confused. Why not take the brain itself rather than world–brain relation as the spatiotemporal baseline for the calibration process? That is, for instance, suggested in an implicit way by Raichle (2015), who considers the default-mode network (DMN) as such spatiotemporal baseline against which neural activity in the resting state of the brain is calibrated. The term “default-mode” within “default-mode network” already includes reference to some kind of baseline and calibration process—he even speaks of a “default-mode function” (Raichle, 2015).
However, the concept of the DMN or default-mode function indexes a merely empirical (rather than ontological) concept of the calibration process. In that case, the calibration process concerns only the brain itself and consequently remains within the confines of the brain itself and its neuronal activity—I therefore speak of neuronal calibration. Neuronal calibration remains merely empirical whereas, unlike spatiotemporal calibration, it is not ontological. Such merely empirical neuronal calibration may be relevant for the brain itself whereas it remains insufficient for consciousness.
To account for consciousness, we need to go beyond the brain and consider the world–brain relation as a spatiotemporal baseline that makes possible spatiotemporal calibration as distinguished from neuronal calibration. Accordingly, I suppose that we need an ontological (rather than empirical or neuronal) calibration, that is, spatiotemporal calibration, to link the two prephenomenal spaces, that is, the space of possible experience and the space of external correlates to experience, and thus to make possible consciousness.
Argument of Calibration IVb: Consciousness—From Ontological Correlate of Consciousness to Neural Predisposition of Consciousness
How does neuronal calibration stand in relation to spatiotemporal calibration? As mentioned above, neuronal calibration concerns only the brain, independent of the world, for which reason it remains merely empirical. In contrast, spatiotemporal calibration explicitly includes the world and reaches therefore beyond the confines of the brain; it is thus ontological rather than empirical (see chapter 14 for a more detailed discussion of the concept of “beyond the confines of the brain”). However, despite their differences, neuronal and spatiotemporal calibration are not incompatible with each other.
Usually, neuronal calibration of the brain’s neural activity by the DMN is based on and builds on spatiotemporal calibration by world–brain relation. However, in extreme cases such as schizophrenia (chapters 3 and 8), spatiotemporal calibration by world–brain relation is disrupted, which leaves neuronal calibration by the DMN without an underlying spatiotemporal ground within the world.
That, in turn, radically changes the spatial and temporal organization and structure of these patients’ consciousness, which leads to major perceptual, motor, affective, and cognitive changes (Northoff & Duncan, 2016, as well as Northoff, 2015, 2016, for such spatiotemporal approach to schizophrenia). Such possible divergence between neuronal calibration and spatiotemporal calibration in schizophrenia further underlines the importance of distinguishing these concepts from one another.
However, the difference between the ontological concept of spatiotemporal calibration and the more empirical one of neuronal calibration does not preclude their linkage and transition. Together with world–brain relation as OPC, spatiotemporal calibration as OCC provides the ontological basis for the necessary empirical, that is, neuronal, conditions of possible consciousness, that is, the neural predispositions of consciousness (NPC; chapters 7 and 8). The NPC can be found in spatiotemporal alignment of the brain to the world as well as in DMN, serving as neuronal calibration for the brain’s neural activity. We can thus see how spatiotemporal calibration as OCC provides the ontological basis for neuronal calibration as NPC. Hence, there is distinction and transition between ontological and empirical realms, that is, from OCC to NPC.
Argument of Calibration IVc: Consciousness—Neuro-ecological/Ontological Intimacy
Why and how is spatiotemporal calibration so important for consciousness? By calibrating objects or events, including their spatiotemporal features, against world–brain relation as a spatiotemporal baseline, both objects/events and world–brain relation are set in an intimate relation to each other that crosses the internal–external boundary between brain, body, and world (see above for a discussion of the concepts of internal vs. external). One can thus speak of what I describe as “neuro-ecological intimacy.” Such neuro-ecological intimacy makes possible the phenomenal notions of “internal” as “external” as distinguished from their empirical determination (see above).
The concept of neuro-ecological intimacy (which may also be formulated as “neuro-ontological intimacy”) borrows from and adapts what Thomas Nagel describes as “physico-mental intimacy,” that is, the “apparent intimacy between the mental and its physical conditions” (Nagel, 1986, p. 20). I postulate that what Nagel refers to as “physico-mental intimacy” can be traced ontologically to neuro-ecological intimacy as based on world–brain relation and spatiotemporal calibration.
Following Nagel, “physico-mental intimacy” provides the brain with “insideness” that accounts for its foundational character for subjective experience:
It [the brain] can be dissected, but it also has the kind of inside that can’t be exposed to dissection. There’s something it is like from the inside to taste chocolate because there’s something it’s like from the inside to have your brain in that condition that is produced when you eat a chocolate bar. (Nagel, 1987, pp. 34–35)
Most interestingly, Nagel traces such “insideness” of the brain to a “fundamental essence” (Nagel, 1979, p. 199) which can be defined by complex forms of organization and combinations of matter, that is, “unusual chemical and physiological structure” (Nagel, 1979, p. 201).
What Nagel describes as “insideness” of the brain can now be specified. Due to its ontological definition by world–brain relation, the brain shows an “insideness” with regard to the world: what appears as mere “outsideness” when considering the brain alone by itself (i.e., independent of the world) is transformed into “insideness” when defining the brain’s existence and realty by its relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation).
The world–brain relation thus allows the brain to constitute an “insideness” with regard to the world—that very same “inside” is manifest in “neuro-ecological/ontological intimacy” as well as in spatiotemporal calibration of objects or events in the world by world–brain relation. Taken in such sense, world–brain relation may account for what Nagel describes as “fundamental essence”: the latter’s description by “unusual chemical and physiological structure” can now be specified ontologically by “spatiotemporal structure” and, more generally, OSR.
Part II: Structure and Consciousness—Argument of Structure
Argument of Structure Ia: World and Consciousness—No Structure and Dynamics?
The spatiotemporal model determines the existence and reality of consciousness by spatiotemporal structure. That stands square to the so-called structure and dynamics argument (Chalmers 2003, p. 247; see also Alter, 2016; Pereboom, 2011; Stoljar, 2006). In a nutshell, the structure and dynamics argument (i.e., the “argument of structure,” as I call it) points out that the microphysical world with quanta and Hilbert space can be described in terms of abstract structure and dynamics. In contrast, that very same abstract structure cannot be found on the macroscopic and phenomenal level of consciousness, which therefore cannot be described in terms of structure and dynamics.
The argument of structure relies on and is based on the dichotomy between structure and nonstructure; however, I reject such dichotomy on the grounds of OSR and the spatiotemporal model of consciousness. Rather than being nonstructural and nondynamic, consciousness is highly structural and dynamic as reflected in its spatiotemporal structure. This, as I suggest, can be traced to the world–brain relation and its constitution of relational time and space. Following OSR, that very same spatiotemporal structure is pervasive throughout the whole world, including all its parts such as body and brain, as well as at all levels such as microphysical, macrophysical, and phenomenal levels. Therefore, the dichotomy between structure and nonstructure must be rejected, which, in turn, makes it possible to rebut the argument of structure.
The aim in this second part is to show that there is strong structure on both the macroscopic level of world and the phenomenal level of consciousness. Note that I understand the concept of “structure” in an ontological sense, which allows me to rely on OSR. In the following I will specify OSR with respect to the world by showing its spatiotemporal structure. Importantly, relation and structure as basic units of existence and reality transgress the boundaries between micro- and macrolevels and phenomenal levels. To better understand such ontological transgression, we need to determine the concept of structure in more ontological detail.
Argument of Structure Ib: World—Spatiotemporal Nestedness
How can we describe the world–brain relation in more specific spatiotemporal terms? First and foremost, world and brain can be characterized by different spatiotemporal ranges or scales and thus in their degree of spatiotemporal extension. The brain shows a smaller spatiotemporal scale or range when compared to that of the world: the “inner durations” and “inner extensions” (see chapters 7 and 12 for these terms) of the world are much larger when compared to those of the brain. World and brain can thus be characterized by different degrees of “spatiotemporal extension.”
How can the brain’s smaller spatiotemporal scale or range be related to the larger one of the world? We encountered the same problem of linking different spatiotemporal scales in the empirical domain. The empirical data show, for instance, that different frequencies (with different temporal scales) are linked in terms of “cross-frequency coupling” (CFC; chapters 1 and 7). Specifically, the phase of slower frequencies is linked to the amplitude of the faster frequencies. This means that the shorter time scale of the faster frequency is contained by and nested within the longer time scale of the slower frequency. One can therefore speak of “nestedness” which encompasses different frequencies and thereby also different regions—this amounts to “spatiotemporal nestedness” (chapters 5 and 7).
Spatiotemporal nestedness in that context is understood in an empirical sense as being restricted to the brain. However, as the data show, spatiotemporal nestedness may extend and operate across the boundaries of brain, body, and world. We discussed data showing CFC from stomach to brain that nested the amplitude of the brain’s faster frequencies (i.e., alpha) within the phase of the stomach’s slower frequency (chapter 8). One may therefore want to speak of “spatiotemporal nestedness” of the brain within the body. The same can be observed in the case of brain and world: the brain’s frequencies can be aligned to and thus nested within the larger frequency range of the world (see chapter 8)—the brain is thus spatiotemporally nested within the world.
Taken together, these data demonstrate that CFC and spatiotemporal nestedness operate across the boundaries between brain, body, and world. There are not only different frequencies nested within each other within the brain itself, that is, its spontaneous activity, but the brain itself is nested and contained within the spatiotemporal features of body and world. The existence and reality of the brain can consequently no longer be determined by the brain alone—instead, the basic units of existence and reality featuring the brain operate across the boundaries between brain, body, and world. I therefore determine the existence and reality of world by spatiotemporal nestedness between world, body, and brain, which is then understood in an ontological (rather than merely empirical) sense (see figure 11.1).
Figure 11.1 Spatiotemporal nestedness and spatiotemporal directedness between world and brain.
Argument of Structure Ic: World—Spatiotemporal Directedness
Let us briefly compare the brain’s spatiotemporal nestedness to the example of the Russian dolls. In the same way the smaller Russian doll is nested or contained within the next larger one, the spatiotemporally smaller brain is nested and contained within the larger spatiotemporal scale or range of the world. Most importantly, we cannot determine the existence and reality of the smaller doll independent of the larger ones—the shape and spatiotemporal extension of the smaller doll are dependent upon the next larger doll. Analogous to this, the spatiotemporal structure of the brain’s spontaneous activity is dependent upon the larger spatiotemporal scales of body and world. The spatiotemporal nestedness of the smaller Russian doll within the larger ones thus corresponds well to how the brain is spatiotemporally nested within body and world.
Let us further dwell on our example of the Russian dolls. We would never conceive that the smaller Russian doll includes and harbors the next larger one and so forth. Instead, we take it for granted that the larger one contains or nests the next smaller one. Spatiotemporal nestedness thus goes hand in hand with a certain directionality, that is, “spatiotemporal directedness,” as I describe it. There is spatiotemporal directedness from the larger to the smaller doll rather than from the smaller to the larger one.
The same applies to the relation between world and brain. The larger spatiotemporal scale or range of the world makes it possible for the world to contain or nest the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale—this is what I mean by “world–brain relation.” In contrast, the reverse scenario remains spatiotemporally impossible: the smaller spatiotemporal scale of the brain makes it impossible for the brain to contain or nest the world with its larger spatiotemporal scale—“brain–world relation,” as one may say, remains spatiotemporally impossible on an ontological level as it would violate spatiotemporal directedness (see figure 11.2).
Figure 11.2 World–brain relation versus brain–world relation.
In sum, I characterize the existence and reality of world in spatiotemporal terms and, more specifically, by spatiotemporal nestedness and spatiotemporal directedness. This allows for the concept of world–brain relation on ontological grounds as distinguished from the reverse one, that is, brain–world relation. Unlike world–brain relation, the concept of brain–world relation cannot be regarded as an ontological concept: due to the impossible nesting of the world’s larger spatiotemporal scale within the smaller one of the brain, the concept of brain–world relation cannot be determined ontologically as, for instance, by spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness. Note that this does not exclude the possible determination of brain–world relation in epistemic terms—that is beyond the scope of this chapter though.
Argument of Structure Id: Rejection of the Argument of Structure
How do spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness stand in relation to the argument of structure? We recall that the argument of structure rests on the distinction between micro- and macrophysical levels with only the former being structural and dynamical. This can now be refuted. Micro- and macrophysical levels reflect different spatiotemporal scales or ranges and may therefore be ontologically nested or contained within each other, entailing spatiotemporal nestedness. Spatiotemporal nestedness makes it possible for smaller scaled features to be nested and contained within larger scaled features and their spatiotemporal structure.
What seems to look nonstructural on the macrophysical level may be intrinsically structural (and dynamical) when considered in the context of spatiotemporal nestedness. Compare that once more to the Russian doll. If one only sees the largest Russian doll from the outside but not its inside, one is indeed inclined to suppose that the Russian doll is not structured at all. However, once one opens the large Russian doll, one sees the various smaller ones. Moreover, it becomes clear then that the shape and size of the largest doll is strongly determined, that is, predisposed, by the smaller ones. Hence, what looks unstructured from the outside reveals itself as highly structured from the inside.
The same holds analogously in the case of consciousness. Taken by itself, that is, from the outside, consciousness looks unstructured without any spatiotemporal features. That changes once one conceives consciousness from the inside, that is, from the brain and world–brain relation. We can then see how much world–brain relation shapes and configures consciousness by providing it with a complex spatiotemporal structure. Consciousness, as signifying the macrolevel and phenomenal level, is thus highly structured and spatiotemporal. Therefore, we can refute the argument of structure as it simply neglects the spatiotemporal context and highly structured nature of consciousness as it can be traced to world–brain relation.
Argument of Structure IIa: Spatiotemporal Nestedness and Consciousness
How do mental features stand in relation to the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of spatiotemporal nestedness? I will argue that, based on the empirical data, spatiotemporal nestedness plays a central role in yielding consciousness (chapters 4, 5, and 7). I will briefly recount some of the empirical data in the following.
The brain’s scale-free activity can be characterized by the inclusion of different temporal scales or ranges, implying spatiotemporal nestedness in an empirical sense (chapters 4, 5, and 7). Moreover, the brain’s degree of scale-free activity is central for consciousness: states such as anesthesia or sleep where one loses consciousness show decreased levels of scale-free activity with loss of nestedness (chapters 4 and 5). The spatiotemporal nestedness of the brain’s spontaneous activity is thus central for consciousness.
Moreover, a recent study conducted by my colleagues and myself also showed that the degree of scale-free activity predicts yet another mental feature like self-consciousness (Huang et al., 2016). Though the exact neuronal mechanisms mediating the relation between the brain’s scale-free activity and consciousness remain to be clarified, the data show that spatiotemporal nestedness of the brain’s spontaneous activity is central (see also Northoff & Huang, 2017, as well as Northoff, 2017). Even more relevant, the data show that spatiotemporal nestedness of the brain’s neural activity within body (Park et al., 2014) and world (Monto et al., 2008) is directly related to consciousness (chapters 7 and 8).
What does this imply for the ontological determination of consciousness? The basic unit of the existence and reality underlying consciousness can ontologically not be “localized” within the brain and thus is not restricted to the confines and boundaries of the brain. Instead, consciousness needs to be characterized ontologically by a basic unit of existence and reality that, analogous to the empirical data, crosses the boundaries of the brain and makes possible the latter’s spatiotemporal nestedness within body and world.
I postulate that spatiotemporal nestedness is central for rendering world–brain relation as OPC (chapter 13). To predispose consciousness, the underlying predisposition, that is, world–brain relation, must transgress the boundaries of the brain. Otherwise, if restricted and limited to the confines of brain, body, or world, the respective ontological feature (such as elements or properties) remains unable to predispose consciousness. Importantly, spatiotemporal nestedness makes possible integration of different time and space scales, which, in turn, is central for consciousness: spatiotemporal nestedness between world, body, and brain provides the kind of spatiotemporal structure that makes possible consciousness (see above).
Argument of Structure IIb: Spatiotemporal Directedness and Mereological Fallacy
In addition to spatiotemporal nestedness, world–brain relation can also be characterized by spatiotemporal directedness (see above). Spatiotemporal directedness points out that there is directionality from the larger spatiotemporal range to the smaller one and thus from world to brain. I therefore speak of world–brain relation and distinguish it from brain–world relation (see above). That very same spatiotemporal directedness is central for the ontological definition of the brain in that it is related to the world by being nested within the latter’s larger spatiotemporal extension.
How about consciousness? I now argue that the same holds for consciousness. The empirical findings show that the directionality in CFC from the slower to the faster frequencies is central in mediating consciousness (chapters 7 and 8) while that very same directionality is disrupted during the loss of consciousness (chapters 5 and 7). The empirical findings thus support a central role of spatiotemporal directedness in consciousness.
Something analogous holds true on the ontological level. Spatiotemporal directedness, as based on spatiotemporal relation, makes it possible for consciousness to experience ourselves as part of the world. In contrast, the reverse direction, namely, that we experience the world as part of us, remains impossible. There is thus spatiotemporal directedness from world to consciousness with the latter integrating us as part of the former as a whole.
The ontological characterization of consciousness by spatiotemporal directedness also carries major conceptual implications. Spatiotemporal directedness makes it impossible to “locate” consciousness in the brain and thus to confuse the brain as part with the conscious person as whole. Bennett and Hacker (2003) pointed out that brain as part and person as whole are often confused in current neuroscience and philosophy of mind—they therefore speak of a “mereological fallacy” (Bennett and Hacker 2003, p. 2).
Such mereological fallacy is ruled out when determining consciousness by spatiotemporal directedness: consciousness can no longer be located in the brain but must instead be traced to world–brain relation. The person who, as whole, experiences the world as whole in consciousness can consequently no longer be conflated with her or his own brain as part. Instead, the person’s consciousness is rather based on her or his brain’s relation to the world, the world–brain relation—the risk of a mereological fallacy is precluded. Moreover, it excludes possible confusion between consciousness and brain, which, following Bergson, can lead to either empiricism or idealism of consciousness (Bergson, 1904; Northoff, 2016b).
How about the argument of structure with regard to consciousness? Consciousness is characterized ontologically by spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness from world to brain. This means that, spatiotemporally, the macrophysical level of consciousness contains or nests the microlevel of abstract physical description. Hence, the microphysical structure and dynamics are contained and nested within the macrophysical structure of world–brain relation and consciousness.
The argument of structure supposes that structure only exists on the micro- but not macrophysical level. That is to neglect spatiotemporal directedness and nestedness though. Any structure, independent of how abstract it is, is nested and contained within the next larger and more concrete one. That also holds for consciousness that is contained or nested within the world–brain relation as its underlying larger spatiotemporal structure, which, in turn, is nested and contained within the even more concrete structure of the world itself, that is, its spatiotemporal frame. The argument of structure claiming for the absence of structure on the macrolevel of brain and the phenomenal level of consciousness can thus be rebutted on spatiotemporal grounds.
Part III: Location and Consciousness—Argument of Location
Argument of Location Ia: Can We Locate Brain and Consciousness in Time and Space?
One of the major gaps between brain and consciousness consists in their location in time and space. We can locate the brain at the “here” and “now” of specific space-time points or events within the world. This, in contrast, remains impossible for consciousness. We cannot locate consciousness at a particular here or now of specific space-time points or events within the world. Instead, consciousness must be characterized by “nonlocation.” The problem we are facing when linking brain and consciousness is thus to bridge the gap between location and nonlocation.
How about location in the context of the ontological determination of brain and consciousness in terms of OSR? One may argue that this makes matters even worse. Defining the brain by relation and structure makes it impossible even to locate the brain at the “here” and “now” of specific space-time points or events within the world. The brain must consequently be characterized by nonlocation, which puts it on an equal footing with consciousness. That does not bring us any further toward linking brain and consciousness though.
Instead of “nonlocating” the brain, one may therefore better aim to locate consciousness, which makes it possible to link consciousness to the brain and its location. That is, for instance, possible by suggesting mental or physical properties that can be located at specific space-time points or events in an ontological sense. The specific space-time points or events at which the brain is located can then be linked to the specific space-time points or events of mental or physical properties.
However, as OSR defies any such location of consciousness, it remains unable to link brain and consciousness; for that reason, that is, its inability to locate both brain and consciousness, OSR needs to be rejected. I therefore speak of an “argument of location” that can be considered an ontological argument against OSR. I will counter that argument by showing that it conflates the specific kind of location implied by OSR, that is, “complex location,” with both “simple location” and “nonlocation.”
Argument of Location Ib: Simple Location—Empirical Meaning
We usually locate the brain at a particular discrete point in time and space. The anatomist sees the brain “here” and “now” in front of her or him while the brain imager locates stimulus-induced activity and even spontaneous activity at specific points in time and space within the brain. In either case, the brain is located in the time and space of the observer, that is, observational time and space, that the observer herself or himself imposes and employs during her or his observation. Location in this sense is characterized by specific points in time and space, that is, space-time points or events, which presupposes observational time and space (chapter 12).
Moreover, such “localization” at different space-time points or events does not consider any other or additional space-time points or events. The localization of the brain at specific space-time points or events remains independent of its respective spatiotemporal context—the dependence of space-time points or events on “space-time relation,” as postulated in OSR (see above) is completely neglected. Because “localization” here is restricted to specific space-time points or events independent of others with the neglect of the respective spatiotemporal context, I speak of “simple location.”
Simple location is based on observational time and space, which renders it primarily empirical (chapter 12). For instance, neuroscience considers the brain in purely observational terms and thus characterizes it by observational time and space. For that reason, neuroscience locates the brain and its neural activity at specific space-time points or events in the world. In contrast, neuroscience neglects the brain’s relation to other space-time points or events outside the brain as in the world—that neglect renders it impossible to consider, for example, world–brain relation as it is based on relational time and space.
Argument of Location Ic: Simple Location—Ontological Meaning
How about simple location in an ontological sense? In that case, one would locate the basic units of existence and reality at specific space-time points or events. Such location is, for instance, presupposed in element-based ontology: elements such as physical or mental properties are supposedly located at specific space-time points or events in the world. That very same location at specific points in time and space remains completely independent of the other space-time points or events in the world. For example, physical properties may show a location that is different and remains independent from that of mental properties. One can therefore speak of “simple location” of elements or properties in element-based ontology.
How are empirical and ontological concepts of simple location related to each other? One may want to argue that simple location is simply transferred from the empirical, that is, observational, to the ontological level: one infers from the simple location of our observations to the simple location of the underlying elements or properties. For instance, from the observation of the simple location of the brain’s neural activity, one infers to the simple location of its physical or mental properties. Since such inference from the empirical to the ontological level is fallacious, one can speak of an “empirical–ontological fallacy” as I call it (see chapter 9 for details) in the case of simple location in an ontological context.
The process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead argues that the empirical–ontological fallacy of simple location can be traced to the modern period. This is well reflected in the following quote:
One such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the modern period. It is embodied in the conception which is supposed to express the most concrete aspect of nature. The Ionian philosophers asked, What is nature made of? The answer is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or material—the particular name chosen is indifferent—which has the property of simple location in space and time, or, if you adopt the modern ideas, space-time. What I mean by matter, or material, is anything which has this property of simple location. By simple location I mean one major characteristic which refers equally both to space and time, and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between space and time. The characteristic common to both space and time is that material can be said to be here in space and here in time, or here in space-time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time. (Whitehead, 1925, pp. 48–49; see also Whitehead, 1925, p. 58, as well as Griffin, 1998, p. 119)
Following Whitehead, I postulate that an analogous empirical–ontological fallacy is still prevalent today. The attempt to locate the basic units of existence and reality at specific space-time points or events, as presupposed in element-based ontology, is modeled after and based on the empirical concept of simple location. Elements such as physical or mental properties are supposedly located in a simple way at space-time points or events, which defines their very existence and reality. Hence, the empirical meaning of simple location of the brain is simply transferred to the ontological level of consciousness. However, that falls short for both brain and consciousness as we will see in the following.
Argument of Location IIa: Complex Location versus Distributed Location
Simple location is based on space-time points or events and neglects the respective spatiotemporal context. I now argue that we need to contrast simple location with what I describe as complex location (I owe this distinction to Da Dong, who is a student of mine in Hangzhou, China).
How can we characterize such complex location? Unlike in simple location, we can no longer “localize” different existences and realities such as brain and nonbrains at one specific space-time point or event independent of each other and their respective spatiotemporal context. Instead, brains and nonbrains may be located on different positions of an underlying commonly shared spatiotemporal spectrum, a “spatiotemporal trajectory,” as I say (chapter 12).
Let me give an empirical example of such complex location in terms of spatiotemporal trajectories. Take the brain’s spontaneous activity. The brain’s spontaneous activity shows continuous activity changes across time and space, that is, in different regions and frequency ranges. One can now locate each activity change by itself at each specific space-time point or event—this amounts to simple location. Alternatively, one can consider the different activity changes in relation to each other: the degree of change in space-time points or events from one activity to another and so forth. One then locates the different activity changes in dependence on each other along the line of an ongoing spatiotemporal trajectory—this amounts to complex location in an empirical sense.
Taken in an ontological context, complex location allows us to locate the brain in relation to and dependence on its respective spatiotemporal context as constituted by body and world. More specifically, the brain and its neural activity can be located in relation to the spatiotemporal features of body and world in terms of space-time relation. Complex location thus locates the brain ontologically in a way that operates across the observable space-time points or events of brain, body, and world. This distinguishes complex location from simple location that remains within the confines and boundaries of the brain and its space-time points or events.
The proponent of simple location may now be inclined to argue that complex location amounts to nothing but “distributed location.” Instead of being located at one specific space-time point or event, one now simply supposes several space-time points or events that are distributed across time and space. For instance, Schechtman (1997) speaks of a “distributed view” where the mind is distributed across the whole body; she distinguishes that from a “standard view” where the brain is conceived as the locus of the mind.
That is to neglect that complex location is determined by space-time relation with relational time and space rather than space-time points or events though. The mere addition or collection of different space-time points or events does not constitute any kind of relation between the distributed space-time points or events. The mere “collection of space-time points” must therefore be distinguished from “relational space and time.” For that reason, location in terms of space-time relation, that is, complex location, cannot be identified with distributed location.
I suppose that the space-time relation of the brain with the world defines its existence and reality rather than its involvement of different distributed space-time points or events. The brain thus presupposes complex location rather than either simple location or distributed location. Finally, it shall be noted that the brain’s complex location is not “complex” because it involves a high number of distributed space-time points or events. Instead, the brain’s location is “complex” because of its space-time relation with body and world, which “position” the brain on their spatiotemporal trajectories across the empirical boundaries of brain, body, and world.
Argument of Location IIb: Complex Location versus Nonlocation
The proponent of simple location may want to put forward yet another argument, however. Specifically, she or he may want to say that complex location amounts to nonlocation. If the brain cannot be located at specific space-time points or events, it is “everywhere at all times” (Whitehead, 1925, p. 91; see also Whitehead, 1968, pp. 3–4, as well as Griffin, 1998, p. 144)—this amounts to nonlocation rather than complex location.
This is to neglect that there are different space-time relations though. Space-time relation can show different spatiotemporal scales or ranges. For instance, the space-time relation between world and brain extends over a much larger spatiotemporal scale than the one between body and brain. The brain can thus be located in different ways relative to world and body—hence, the distinction between world–brain relation and body–brain relation (with the latter being a specific instance of the former; chapters 8 and 13). This contrasts with nonlocation in which case the brain should be “everywhere at all times” and thus in both world and body in the same way at all time.
Taken together, we need to distinguish complex location from simple location and distributed location as well as nonlocation. Complex location is based on space-time relation with relational time and space; this distinguishes it from both simple location and distributed location that presuppose space-time points or events with observational time and space. At the same time, “complex location” refers to location in terms of positioning on spatiotemporal trajectories, which distinguishes it from nonlocation, where “everything is everywhere at all times.”
Argument of Location IIc: Complex Location of Consciousness
What about the location of consciousness and other mental features? Historically, consciousness could not be located in terms of simple location for which reason it was characterized by nonlocation. This opened the gap between simple location of brain and body, on the one hand, and nonlocation of consciousness, on the other. The assumption of mental properties as analogous to physical properties can be seen as an attempt or remedy to overcome this gap: simple location of physical properties is now simply doubled on the mental level with mental properties showing analogous simple location.
I reject both assumptions, that is, nonlocation and simple location, of consciousness, however. Instead, I suppose that consciousness (and mental features in general) can be located in a complex way, that is, complex location, which can be traced to the complex location of the brain in the world in terms of world–brain relation.
How can we illustrate the complex location of consciousness? For that, I briefly turn to the empirical findings. The various neuroscientific investigations show that mental features such as consciousness cannot be located in the “here” of one particular region or network in the brain (chapters 5 and 6). Instead, the neural activity must be integrated and globalized across several regions and networks to yield consciousness (Koch et al., 2016)—this is highlighted in both integrated information theory and the global neuronal workspace theory (chapters 5 and 7). The same holds analogously on the temporal side. Consciousness cannot be associated with one specific frequency in the brain; rather it involves the different frequency ranges and their coupling as in CFC and scale-free activity (chapters 5–7).
What do these empirical data tell us about the “ontological location” of consciousness in the brain? First and foremost, they tell us that we cannot locate consciousness in specific space-time points or events in the brain—simple location of consciousness in an empirical sense remains simply impossible.
The same holds analogously on the ontological level. Consciousness cannot be located in the world at its various space-time points or events such as body or brain—this precludes simple location of consciousness in the world. The failure of simple location does not imply nonlocation, though. The dichotomy of simple location versus nonlocation is misplaced in the present ontological framework. To avoid such a misplaced dichotomy, I speak of complex location. The term ‘location” refers now to spatiotemporal relation rather than to space-time points. Consciousness can then be “located” in a complex way in and through the spatiotemporal relation and trajectories featuring the world–brain relation.
The possible location of consciousness in terms of complex location renders futile and superfluous the ontological assumption of physical and mental properties. These properties are, in part, introduced to overcome the gap between simple location of brain and the presumed nonlocation of consciousness. If consciousness can now be located in terms of complex location, we no longer need to introduce physical and/or mental properties to close the ontological gap between simple location and nonlocation.
In sum, consciousness (and mental features in general) can be located, though not in terms of simple location but complex location as distinguished from nonlocation. This is based on OSR with the ontological characterization of both brain and consciousness by world–brain relation. Importantly, OSR allows us to completely close the gap between simple location of brain and nonlocation of consciousness; this is possible by ontologically characterizing both brain and consciousness by complex location as distinguished from simple location and nonlocation. The argument of location as argument against the spatiotemporal model and OSR of brain and consciousness can thus be refuted.
Conclusion
We need to consider the world. More specifically, the world and its large spatiotemporal scale take on an important and indispensable ontological role for consciousness. First, the world, as in world–brain relation, serves as a spatiotemporal baseline that makes possible spatiotemporal calibration and defines the space of possible experience. Second, the world and its large spatiotemporal scale allows for nesting and containing the smaller spatiotemporal scales, including the ones of the brain—that very same spatiotemporal nestedness is central for consciousness in both empirical (chapter 8) and ontological (this chapter) terms. Finally, third, the world allows for complex location of consciousness and brain in the world as distinguished from simple location and nonlocation.
What does this imply for our ontology of consciousness? We cannot reduce the ontology of consciousness to the question of the existence and reality of the brain, an ontological “brain problem,” as one may say. Nor can we conceive consciousness in terms of “brain–world problem” in which case one would assume ontological primacy of brain over world (see chapter 10 for details). In either case, one neglects that the world takes on multiple roles for consciousness, that is, as spatiotemporal baseline for spatiotemporal calibration, as spatiotemporal frame for complex location, and as structure providing spatiotemporal nestedness of consciousness.
Instead, we need to approach the question of the existence and reality of consciousness in terms of the world and its relation to the brain, that is, “world–brain problem” (chapter 10). Importantly, in the same way that we cannot reduce the world–brain problem to brain or brain–world relation, we cannot reduce the world–brain problem to the world alone and thus to what ontologically can be described as “world problem.” Though not argued explicitly for in the present chapter, the world itself, that is, independent of its relation to the brain (or an analogue of the brain), remains unable to take on an ontological role in predisposing consciousness (i.e., as OPC).
Why is there consciousness rather than nonconsciousness in the world? This amounts (more or less) to what Chalmers defined as the “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995, p. 210). Briefly, the hard problem consists in the metaphysical question of why there is consciousness rather than nonconsciousness. The answer I give is ontological (while leaving the respective metaphysical issues open; see the introduction to chapter 9 for their distinction) and consists in the following: there is consciousness because the world shows spatiotemporal structure and relation that make possible world–brain relation as OPC.
If, in contrast, there would be no spatiotemporal structure and relation in the world but, for instance, elements such as physical properties, consciousness would remain impossible—in that case, the neural and ontological predispositions of consciousness are no longer given—consciousness would thus remain absent while nonconsciousness would prevail. The hard problem is thus resolved by shifting from an element- to a relation-based ontology of the world.
Can consciousness occur independently of the brain in, for instance, artificial intelligence or neuromorphic computers? The criteria for the possible existence and reality of consciousness are clear. Empirically, such artificial creature would need to show spatiotemporal mechanisms such as spatiotemporal alignment, nestedness, and expansion (chapters 7 and 8) as well as difference- rather than stimulus-based coding (chapters 2 and 12). Ontologically, the existence and reality of such artificial creature need to be based on differences rather than elements and consequently on structure and relation, that is, spatiotemporal structure and relation with the inclusion of a wider spectrum of different spatiotemporal scales (chapters 12 and 13). That makes possible world–machine relation, which then, analogously to world–brain relation, could be conceived as OPC.
In sum, we need to include both the brain’s relation to the world and the world’s relation to the brain in our question concerning the existence and reality of consciousness. We cannot reduce the existence and reality of consciousness to either the world alone (i.e., independent of the brain) or the brain by itself (i.e., independent of its relation to the world). Therefore, I speak of a world–brain problem as distinguished from both the brain problem and the world problem. I consider the world–brain problem an empirically, conceptually, and ontologically more coherent, that is, more plausible problem than both the brain problem and the world problem for addressing the question of the existence and reality of consciousness (and mental features in general).
