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Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology: Vantage Point from beyond Earth

Introduction

Mind-Body Problem versus World–Brain Problem

No doubt, mental features such as consciousness must be attributed to the mind as their underlying ontological origin. We usually take that for granted and thus as given. This is the standard (most often tacit or implicit) background assumption of the mind–body problem, that is, the question of how the existence and reality of mind are related to those of the body. However, is it really evident and necessary that the existence and reality of mental features must be attributed to the mind? I suggested an alternative strategy in the third part of this book. Instead of considering the mind as their potential ontological origin, I attributed mental features to world–brain relation—this led me to what I call the world–brain problem (chapters 10 and 11).

The concept of mind is pervasive. Common sense speaks of mind and attributes all mental features such as consciousness to the mind. Neuroscience investigates the mind empirically in terms of cognition as in “cognitive neuroscience” (see Parts I and II of this book) while philosophy even developed a separate discipline concerning specifically the mind, that is, philosophy of mind, to investigate its ontological and epistemic features (Searle, 2004). Hence, the assumption of mind is seemingly taken for granted. All we need to do is search for the empirical and ontological underpinnings of mind in both neuroscience and philosophy. That, as tacitly presupposed, will ultimately resolve the current questions revolving around mind, including the mind–body problem.

However, unlike common sense as well as current neuroscientific and philosophical discussions, I do not take the mind for granted. Instead of providing yet another answer to the question of the empirical and ontological underpinnings of mind, I questioned the question itself. I demonstrated that the question of mind and its relationship to the body, the mind–body problem, is superfluous and thus no longer necessary. Mental features can be necessarily connected to the brain through world–brain relation that then serves as an ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC; chapter 10). We thus no longer need to introduce the concept of mind to account for the necessary connection of mental features to their underlying ontological substrate—the role of mind can now be taken over by world–brain relation (chapters 10 and 11). This shifts the focus from mind–body to world–brain problem with the former being replaced by the latter.

Mind versus World–Brain Relation—Intuition of Mind

The philosopher of mind may now want to argue that the world–brain problem may nevertheless remain rather counterintuitive. We have no direct access to our brain, let alone to the brain’s relation with the world (i.e., the world–brain relation), in our knowledge—we suffer from what I described earlier as “auto-epistemic limitation” (Northoff, 2004, 2011). Because we cannot access brain and world–brain relation by themselves, world–brain relation is not an option for our knowledge, that is, a possible epistemic option (see below for details)—this renders the world–brain problem rather counterintuitive on epistemological grounds.

In contrast, we have direct access to the mind in our knowledge—the mind, unlike world–brain relation, is thus a possible epistemic option which, as I will argue, is the basis for what philosophers describe as an “intuition pump” (Dennett, 2013, p. 5) or “sympathetic imagination” (Nagel, 1974, p. 445; see also Papineau, 2002) of mind. The “intuition of mind” may pull us toward the mind and the mind–body problem when addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features. How can we counter the intuition of mind, including mind–body problem, and, at the same time, render the world–brain problem more intuitive? That is the central question in this and the next two chapters in this final part.

Intuition of Mind—Aim and Argument

The main aim in this chapter is to provide the ground for derailing the intuition of mind, including mind–body problem. At the same time, I aim to render the world–brain problem as an ontological problem for addressing mental features more intuitive on epistemic grounds. My main argument is that we need to modify the possible epistemic options that are included in our presupposed logical space of knowledge (see below for definition). That, as I argue, is possible by shifting our vantage point (see below for definition), that is, the viewpoint we take, when investigating the existence and reality of mental features.

The first part in the present chapter focuses on defining the concepts of logical space of knowledge and vantage point while the second part describes the Copernican revolution in cosmology and physics as a paradigmatic example of how we can change and modify our possible epistemic options as they are included in our presupposed logical space of knowledge: that, as I argue, was possible for Copernicus by shifting our geocentric vantage point from within Earth to a heliocentric vantage point from beyond Earth (see below for details).

Why do I revert to the Copernican revolution? The Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology provides the epistemic template for an analogous shift in our current vantage point that includes mind as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge as the basis of our intuition of mind and mind–body problem (chapters 13 and 14). We need to replace such vantage point with a different vantage point that allows for the world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge while, at the same time, excluding mind and mind–body problem as an impossible epistemic option (chapter 13). I will argue in the final chapter (chapter 14) that such shift in vantage point requires nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy.

Part I: Logical Space of Knowledge—Epistemic Options and Vantage Point

Logical Space of Knowledge Ia: Logical Space of Knowledge—Definition

How can we define the concept of logical space of knowledge? I adopt the concept of logical space of knowledge from the concepts of the logical space of nature and the logical space of reason as suggested by Sellars (1964) and McDowell (1994). Put in a nutshell, the concepts of logical spaces of nature and reason provide what I describe as operational background spaces (i.e., as a necessary or transcendental condition in a Kantian sense) for science, that is, logical space of nature, and philosophy, that is, logical space of nature. I shall not go into detail here about how the logical spaces of nature and reason provide the operational background spaces for the world–brain and the mind–body problem—that shall be subject of future investigation.

We need to consider the operational background space of our intuition of mind though. That leads us back to our epistemic presuppositions, namely, to that which we claim to know. We presuppose that we can know the mind when intuiting the mind—otherwise, if we were not presupposing to possibly know the mind, we could not intuit the mind at all. The intuition of mind thus presupposes the mind as what I describe as a possible epistemic option. To rule out the intuition of mind, we therefore need to render the mind an impossible epistemic option (see below for details): as long as the mind is still a possible epistemic option, we are in danger of falling prey to the intuition of mind.

How can we change our epistemic options and, more specifically, render the mind an impossible epistemic option? For that we need to go back to the operational background space we (most often tacitly or implicitly) presuppose, which I describe as logical space of knowledge. What do I mean by this concept? As its siblings, that is, the logical spaces of nature and reason, the logical space of knowledge remains in the realm of what is conceivable and possible as distinguished from what is actual. More specifically, the logical space of knowledge concerns our possible knowledge, that is, what we can possibly know, which reflects what I describe by the term possible epistemic options.

Taken in such sense, the logical space of knowledge describes our possible epistemic options for knowing the world. The logical space of knowledge includes certain possible epistemic options while excluding others, that is, impossible epistemic options. What about the mind? The strong pulling forces of our intuition of mind suggest that the mind is included as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge (see below for detail). In contrast, the counterintuitive nature of world–brain relation may be related to, as I argue, its exclusion as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge.

Finally, as with the logical space of nature (McDowell, 1994), the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge are malleable. They can be shifted by us, which changes our epistemic options, that is, those that are included as possible epistemic options and excluded as impossible epistemic options. For example, what is excluded as an impossible epistemic option in one particular conception of the logical space of knowledge may be included as a possible epistemic option in another one. I will argue that that is, for instance, the case in the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology.

Logical Space of Knowledge Ib: Phenomenal versus Noumenal Features

Let me detail those epistemic options that are excluded from our logical space of knowledge, that is, impossible epistemic options. For instance, Kant argued that we cannot know noumenal features, which limits our knowledge to phenomenal features—noumenal features are thus excluded as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. In contrast, Kant argued that we can know the world in a phenomenal way—our logical space of knowledge thus includes phenomenal features as a possible epistemic option. Alternatively to Kant, one may argue that the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge are malleable, which can then be conceptualized in such a way as to include noumenal features as a possible epistemic option.

The staunch Kantian may reject such move though and argue for a special kind of impossible epistemic option. Noumenal features cannot be known in principle; they are intrinsically unknowable. Thus, it remains in principle impossible to include noumenal features as possible epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge: the intrinsic unknowability of noumenal features renders it in principle impossible to include them as possible epistemic options. Therefore, the logical space of knowledge is not malleable when it comes to noumenal features—the assumption of the malleability of the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge must hence be rejected. Noumenal features are thus not only impossible epistemic options but, even stronger, epistemic nonoptions (see below for details).

The critic is right and wrong. She or he is right in that there are limits to the malleability of the logical space of knowledge. However, that does not exclude the possibility that the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge are nevertheless malleable within certain limits. This requires me to distinguish different types of impossible epistemic options, that is, impossible epistemic options and epistemic nonoptions.

Logical Space of Knowledge Ic: Impossible Epistemic Options versus Epistemic Nonoptions

First, we may need to consider those impossible epistemic options that are excluded from our logical space of knowledge but are nevertheless knowable for us (rather than unknowable). This concerns phenomenal features (in a Kantian sense). We may, for instance, exclude certain phenomenal features as impossible epistemic options from our logical space of knowledge that are knowable for us. Let us consider a concrete example.

The world–brain relation as OPC is apparently excluded as an impossible epistemic option from the logical space of knowledge we currently presuppose in philosophy of mind while, at the same time, the world–brain relation can be known by us in phenomenal (rather than noumenal) terms (as taken in the epistemic sense of Kant). However, world–brain relation is apparently not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge we presuppose when investigating the existence and reality of mental features. We may therefore need to change the boundaries of our logical space of knowledge in such a way that we can include world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option.

Second, we need to consider those impossible epistemic options that neither are included in our logical space of knowledge nor can be known by us in principle, thus remaining intrinsically unknowable. These impossible epistemic options concern, for instance, noumenal features in the sense of Kant. As they remain intrinsically unknowable to us, these impossible epistemic features can never be included as possible epistemic options in our logical space of knowledge for which reason they are noumenal (rather than phenomenal). No matter how we define the boundaries of our logical space of knowledge, it will never include these epistemic options as possible epistemic options. As these epistemic options thus remain impossible by default, that is, in principle, I describe them as epistemic nonoptions.

Taken together, the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge are malleable with regard to the first type of impossible epistemic option, that is, the phenomenal features. I conceive world–brain relation as a paradigmatic example of such impossible epistemic option for which reason it is considered counterintuitive. In contrast, there is a limit to the malleability of the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge when it comes to the second type of impossible epistemic option that, by default and in principle can never be included as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. To distinguish both types of epistemic options on conceptual grounds, I will describe the second type of impossible epistemic option as an epistemic nonoption.

My focus in this and the subsequent chapters is on those impossible epistemic options that can, in principle, be included as epistemic options in our logical space of knowledge—these are phenomenal rather than noumenal features (to use Kantian language). My focus is not on the epistemic nonoptions that, as being noumenal rather than phenomenal (in a Kantian sense), can, in principle, not be included as possible epistemic options in our logical space of knowledge.

Logical Space of Knowledge IIa: Possible Epistemic Option—Mind

What about the logical space of knowledge we presuppose in our investigation of the existence and reality of mental features? For that, we need to shed an even more detailed light on what is included as a possible epistemic option and excluded as an impossible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

Let me start first with what is included as a possible epistemic option. The epistemic options included in the logical space of knowledge may be subdivided in two. First, there are epistemic options which correspond to something that, ontologically, exists and is real. For instance, the brain is an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge, that, as verified by empirical investigation, is real and existent. Second, there are possible epistemic options included in our logical space of knowledge that do not correspond to something that is ontologically real and existent. Hallucinations are such an example: the hearing of voices is a possible epistemic option that is included in our logical space of knowledge (as manifest actually in the schizophrenic patient) even though those voices do not correspond to something that is shared with other subjects in the world.

More generally put, the possible epistemic options that are included in the logical space of knowledge may either correspond to or diverge from the ontological options included in the logical space of existence that describes the different options to describe existence and reality (as, for instance, in terms of properties or relation; chapter 9). If both epistemic and ontological options correspond with each other, we know something about the world itself, that is, independent of us. If, in contrast, our epistemic options cover something that is not included in the possible ontological options of the logical space of existence, we do not know the world itself as it remains independent of us, that is, mind-dependent.

I now argue that an example of the latter case concerns the mind. The mind is an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge—otherwise, we would not be able intuit and subsequently assume the mind as a possible ontological origin of mental features. The intuition of mind is ultimately based on our inclusion of mind as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. Such inclusion of the intuition of mind as a possible epistemic option of our logical space of knowledge is, as I argued, based on our ability to draw a necessary connection between mind and mental features (chapter 10).

However, as empirical and ontological evidence shows (see Parts I–III of this book), that very same epistemic option, that is, the intuition of mind, does not correspond to something real and existent in the world, we could not find any support for the assumption of mind in the world. There is thus a discrepancy between logical space of knowledge and logical space of existence: what is included as an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge is at first excluded as an impossible ontological option from our logical space of existence. However, as the mind is included as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge, it exerts strong impact, that is, pulling forces, on the ontological options of the logical space of existence. The inclusion of mind as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge forces us to include mind as a possible ontological option in our logical space of existence. Most important, that very same inclusion of mind as a possible ontological option in the logical space of existence is based solely on its inclusion as an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

In contrast, there is no independent empirical or ontological evidence for including mind as a possible ontological option in our logical space of existence—the existence and reality of mind as a possible ontological option remain consequently a mere “intuition,” the “intuition of mind,” as I say. Accordingly, the inclusion of the mind as an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge exerts pulling forces on us to include the mind as an ontological option in our logical space of existence—the intuition of mind is ultimately merely epistemic rather than ontological.

How can we escape the pulling forces of the intuition of mind? We need to render impossible the pulling forces of the intuition of mind and exclude the mind as an epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. I argue that for that, we need to shift the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge—that shall be the main focus in this and the next chapters.

Logical Space of Knowledge IIb: Impossible Epistemic Option—World–Brain Relation

Which epistemic options are excluded from the logical space of knowledge we presuppose in our investigation of the existence and reality of mental features? I argue that world–brain relation is excluded as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. Why? We can only perceive and thus know contingent connection between brain and consciousness when considering the brain in isolation from the world (chapter 10). Moreover, we remain unable to draw a necessary connection between world and consciousness—we can only account for a necessary connection between mind and mental features but not a necessary connection between either world or brain and mental features (chapter 10).

Because of our apparent inability to account for a necessary connection of brain and world to mental features, we exclude world, brain, and world–brain relation as epistemic options from our logical space of knowledge in our investigation of mental features. Specifically, world–brain relation is not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge we presuppose when addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features. Therefore, supposing world–brain relation to underlie mental features and, more generally, the world–brain problem seems counterintuitive to those who take the mind for granted as a possible epistemic option in their respective logical space of knowledge.

The critic may now want to argue that world–brain relation is noumenal and thus intrinsically unknowable (see above). If so, world–brain relation can in principle not become an epistemic option at all, which makes it impossible by default to include it as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. In short, world–brain relation is an epistemic nonoption rather than an impossible epistemic option (see above). However, that is to confuse noumenal and phenomenal features. The world–brain relation can be known by us and, relying on Kantian terms, is phenomenal rather than noumenal (see above). Therefore, world–brain relation is an impossible epistemic option rather than epistemic nonoption. It consequently depends on us and how we configure our logical space of knowledge whether we include world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option or exclude it as an impossible epistemic option.

Taken in such sense, world–brain relation must be distinguished from the kind of noumenal properties McGinn (1991) assumes when he characterizes the brain by mental properties, that is, property P. Following McGinn, property P is in principle unknowable for us and thus noumenal (in a Kantian sense). Therefore, property P is an epistemic nonoption rather than an epistemic option for which reason it can never be included in any kind of logical space of knowledge no matter how we shift and configure its boundaries.

Logical Space of Knowledge IIIa: Vantage Point—Transparency versus Opaqueness

How can we demarcate and restrict the logical space of knowledge in such a way that it excludes the mind as an impossible epistemic option and incudes world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option? Knowledge presupposes a certain point of view, viewpoint, or, vantage point, as I say in the following. By presupposing and taking a certain vantage point, we can know certain things while, at the same time, we remain unable to know others. This leads us to the definition of the concept of vantage point.

What is a vantage point? I here consider the concept of vantage point in its original definition as a “position or stand point from which something is viewed or considered” (Oxford Dictionary). Taken in this sense, the concept of vantage point comes close to those of point of view or viewpoint. The chosen vantage point may provide a specific view that includes a wide range of phenomena. For instance, being on the top of a mountain at the edge of the city provides us with a “vantage point from beyond the city,” as I say. We can then perceive and ultimately know the city as a whole, which thereby is rendered transparent to us. The vantage point thus allows us to include the whole city as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

That very same epistemic option is excluded when one takes a different vantage point though. If, in contrast, one remains within the city itself, one can only take a vantage point from within the city itself. This, for instance, allows us to perceive some details such as the door mosaic of the cathedral that we were unable to perceive when taking a vantage point from beyond the city. However, nothing is free. The city as a whole, including its boundaries, remains opaque to us—the vantage point from within the city renders opaque the city as a whole, which is thus excluded (rather than included) as an impossible epistemic option from the logical space of knowledge.

Accordingly, the concept of vantage point or viewpoint (I use both terms synonymously) implies that we can take something into view by means of which it becomes transparent to us. However, at the same time, that very same vantage point precludes us from taking something else into view, which therefore remains opaque to us. Hence, the vantage point we presuppose may impact what is transparent and included as a possible epistemic option as well as what remains opaque and thus excluded as an impossible epistemic option from our knowledge—the vantage point frames and determines the boundaries of the logical space of our possible and impossible epistemic options, that is, the logical space of knowledge.

Logical Space of Knowledge IIIb: Vantage Point—Malleability of Boundaries of the Logical Space of Knowledge

What does our example about the different vantage points with regard to the city tell us about the logical space of knowledge? The logical space of knowledge is malleable, we have an impact on it and can thus, in part, determine which possible epistemic options we want to include and which ones we prefer to exclude, that is, impossible epistemic options.

By shifting the vantage point, we also change the boundaries of the logical space of knowledge, which, in turn, may render something transparent that was opaque before. A vantage point from within the city itself renders transparent the detailed view of the cathedral door (which is included as a possible epistemic option) while the city as a whole remains opaque (and thus excluded as an impossible epistemic option). The reverse happens in the case of a vantage point from beyond the city that renders transparent the city as a whole (and is thus now included as a possible epistemic option) and renders opaque the detailed view of the cathedral (which thereby is excluded as an impossible epistemic option).

Why is that relevant in the present context? I will argue in the next chapter that we need to shift our vantage point from within mind (or brain) to a vantage point from beyond brain to render transparent the world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option for consideration as an ontological predisposition of mental features. However, at the same time, that renders opaque the mind as an impossible epistemic option of our possible knowledge.

Accordingly, I will argue that our vantage point determines whether world–brain relation is included as a possible epistemic option or excluded as an impossible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge. The inclusion of world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option will, as I postulate, render our assumption of the world–brain relation as the ontological origin of mental features intuitive. In contrast, because of its exclusion as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge, the assumption of mind as ontological origin of mental features will now appear rather counterintuitive.

Logical Space of Knowledge IVa: Distinction—Vantage Point versus God’s-Eye View

The concept of vantage point as understood here needs to be distinguished from both “God’s-eye view” and the concept of perspective as in first-, second-, and third-person perspective. Let us start with the former, a God’s-eye view or an Archimedean point.

The vantage point can be characterized by a specific balance between transparency and opaqueness. The vantage point from within the city renders transparent the cathedral and its door while it renders opaque the city as a whole, including its boundaries. In contrast, the vantage point from beyond the city makes transparent the city as a whole, including its boundaries, whereas now the cathedral door remains opaque. There is thus a balance between transparency and opaqueness which determines the epistemic options that are included and excluded in the logical space of existence.

That is different in the case of a God’s-eye view or an Archimedean point. In that case, the totality can be taken into view at one and the same time so that nothing remains opaque. For instance, a God’s-eye view renders transparent both the city as a whole as well as the cathedral door at one and the same time—there is no opaqueness at all since otherwise it would not be a view of totality as implied by a God’s-eye view or an Archimedean point. Accordingly, unlike the vantage point, any kind of view of totality such as a God’s-eye view or an Archimedean point no longer presupposes balance between transparency and opaqueness. There are thus no epistemic options excluded in the respective logical space of knowledge.

How can the view of totality include all possible epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge at one and the same time? That is possible by the fact that there is no specific stance. The vantage point takes a specific stance, such as “from within the city” or “from beyond the city.” That very same stance implies balance between transparency and opaqueness with the subsequent inclusion and exclusion of epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge. In contrast, such stance is no longer presupposed in the view of totality—the view of totality presupposes a view that resembles what Thomas Nagel described as a “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986).

Logical Space of Knowledge IVb: Distinction—Vantage Point versus Perspective

We also need to distinguish the concept of vantage point from the concept of perspective as in first-, second-, and/or third-person perspectives.

The vantage point concerns the world as a whole, that is, which parts of the world as a whole are transparent and which ones remain opaque to us. This remains independent of the specific way in which we perceive and cognize the world. That, in contrast, is relevant in the case of perspectives. We can perceive the world through consciousness (first-person perspective), social context (second-person perspective), and observation (third-person perspective). Accordingly, the notion of perspective can be characterized as a specific mode of perceiving the world, as in first-, second-, or third-person perspective. The concept of vantage point refers to a more basic way of approaching the world by taking a certain view, such as a perspectival versus a nonperspectival view.

Finally, I here understand the vantage point in a purely methodological or operational sense: it provides a methodological or operational tool that allows us to shape our epistemic options and thus the respectively presupposed logical space of knowledge. Analogous to the characterization of the logical space of knowledge as an operational background space (see above), one may describe the vantage point as an “operational background tool” that helps and allows us to shape the former. Put into Kantian terms, one may want to characterize both logical space of knowledge and vantage point as transcendental features in a methodological sense (rather than empirical, as understood in a Kantian way; see also Sullivan, 2000).

Note that the purely methodological or operational determination of the vantage point does not carry any ontological implications. When we take a vantage point from either within or beyond the city, the vantage point itself remains completely independent of the existence and reality of the city itself—the city is a possible (or impossible) epistemic option but must not necessarily be an ontological option. The vantage point itself thus remains indifferent to any ontological assumptions—it is an operational background tool that provides us with epistemic options to describe existence and reality but should not be confused with ontological assumptions themselves about existence and reality by themselves, that is, independent of our epistemic options.

Part II: Copernican Revolution in Physics and Cosmology—Vantage Point from beyond Earth

Vantage Point from beyond Earth Ia: Geo- versus Heliocentric Views—Copernican Revolution

I first discuss the shift in vantage point or viewpoint suggested by Copernicus in his attempt to understand the relationship between sun/universe and Earth. It shall be noted that I do not intend to reconstruct the Copernican revolution in full historical detail nor to point outs its implications for philosophy of science (see Kuhn, 1957). Instead, I only aim to schematically sketch the Copernican revolution to illustrate how a shift in vantage point can render something transparent that remained opaque before. In other terms, the Copernican revolution changed our epistemic options and thus our logical space of knowledge. This, as we will see in the next chapter, can serve as a blueprint for shifting our vantage point with respect to mind and brain.

The ancient Greeks and the medieval people considered the Earth the center of the universe around which the sun and the rest of the universe revolves. This was stated by the Greek cosmologist Ptolemy. He suggested that the heavens and thus the universe are spherical and show movements (see below for details) that revolve around the Earth: the only way to explain our observation of movement or motion in the universe as, for instance, the movement of the sun from east to west is to assume that the Earth lies at the very center of the universe and does not move by itself. The so-called Ptolemaic view is geocentric where the Earth is the center of the universe around which the sun revolves. Because the Earth is considered the center of the universe in the Ptolemaic view, one can speak of a geocentric view (see figure 12.1).

Figure 12.1 Geo- versus heliocentric models and their vantage points. Geocentric model with a vantage point from within Earth (the black arrows indicate the observed movements and their attribution to the sun).

The geocentric view was doubted by Nicolaus Copernicus, however. In his famous book On the Revolution of the Celestial Spheres (Copernicus, 1543/1952), he suggested the reverse relationship between sun and Earth, namely, that the sun (rather than the Earth) is the center of the universe (and the solar system) with the Earth revolving around the sun (rather than the sun revolving around the Earth). The Earth is no longer considered the center of the universe (or solar system); instead, the sun is now the center around which the Earth revolves—the geocentric view is thus replaced by a heliocentric view (see figure 12.2).

Figure 12.2 Heliocentric model with a vantage point from beyond Earth (the black arrows indicate the observed movements and their attribution to the Earth).

The Copernican shift marks the geocentric view as pre-Copernican while the heliocentric view can be characterized as post-Copernican. Subsequent empirical observations and mathematical formalization by Kepler, Bruno, Galileo, and Newton lend further empirical and mathematical credibility and support to the heliocentric view. Our current well-established view of the relationship between universe and Earth, the universe–Earth relation, was thus made possible by a shift from the pre-Copernican geocentric to a post-Copernican heliocentric view. The shift from a geo- to heliocentric view changed the epistemic options of our possible knowledge and thus the logical space of knowledge: it included now the heliocentric view as an epistemic option while excluding the geocentric view. I will argue in the following that such a change in the epistemic options of our logical space of knowledge was made possible by shifting the vantage point.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth Ib: Geocentric View—Spatiotemporal and Mereological Confusion

How can we further illustrate the difference between geo- and heliocentric views? Let us start with the geocentric view. The geocentric view takes the Earth itself as the vantage point or viewpoint from which the rest of the universe, including the sun, is conceived. For that reason, I speak of a vantage point from within Earth. Let us explicate such vantage point from within Earth in the following.

A vantage point from within Earth can take into view the universe including the sun—universe and sun are transparent and thus an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. In contrast, the Earth itself does not come into view when taking a vantage point or viewpoint from within Earth. We simply remain unable to see the Earth itself (including its own movements) when taking a vantage point from within Earth—the Earth itself remains opaque and is thus not an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

Such vantage point from within Earth also precludes our taking into view how the Earth itself is related to its respective context or environment, that is, the universe, including the sun, the universe–Earth relation, as I say. The universe–Earth relation, and, more specifically, how the Earth stands in relation to the universe, remains opaque and is therefore not an epistemic option in our presupposed logical space of knowledge.

As we remain unable to take into view the universe–Earth relation, we can view the connection between universe and Earth as contingent at best while we remain unable to see their necessary connection. Accordingly, the vantage point strongly impacts how and in which way we can conceive the relationship between universe and Earth. Specifically, the lack of transparency of the universe–Earth relation, including its merely contingent connection, may thus be related to our presupposed vantage point, the vantage point from within Earth.

How does the geocentric view allow us to conceive the universe–Earth relation? In the context of a geocentric view, the Earth is the center (see below for details on the concept of center) and is therefore supposed to nest or contain the universe including the sun. That is paradoxical though as it implies confusion between two different spatiotemporal scales, that is, spatiotemporal confusion: the geocentric view implies that something spatiotemporally smaller (i.e., the Earth) nests or contains something that is spatiotemporally larger (i.e., sun/universe). However, something smaller (i.e., the Earth) cannot contain or nest something larger (i.e., the universe)—this amounts to spatiotemporal confusion.

Such spatiotemporal confusion goes along with the confusion between part and whole: the Earth as part is confused with the universe as whole when supposing that the former nests or contains the latter rather than the latter nesting or containing the former. I therefore speak of mereological confusion (which is somewhat akin to Bennet and Hacker, who speak of a mereological fallacy [Bennet & Hacker 2003, p. 6] in the relationship between mental features and brain).

Vantage Point from beyond Earth Ic: Heliocentric View—No Spatiotemporal and Mereological Confusion

How about spatiotemporal and mereological confusion in the heliocentric view? I argue that the heliocentric view does not suffer from either spatiotemporal or mereological confusion, which renders it more plausible than the geocentric view (on conceptual–logical grounds).

Instead of presupposing a vantage point from within Earth as the geocentric view, the heliocentric view conceives Earth in a different way, for example, from beyond itself—this entails what I describe as a vantage point from beyond Earth. Because of such vantage point from beyond Earth, one is now able to conceive of how the Earth is related to the universe, the universe–Earth relation, in a more transparent way without spatiotemporal and mereological confusion. Let me detail that in the following.

Specifically, the Earth as center was supposed to contain the spatiotemporally larger world—this amounts to a mereological confusion between part and whole. Instead of the Earth itself (as part) nesting or containing the universe (the whole), the spatiotemporally smaller Earth (i.e., the part) can now be conceived as being nested or contained within the spatiotemporally larger universe (i.e., the whole).

Put conversely, the whole and its larger spatiotemporal scale (i.e., the universe) contain the part with its smaller spatiotemporal scale (i.e., the Earth)—this precludes spatiotemporal confusion. Because it cannot avoid both spatiotemporal and mereological confusion, the vantage point from beyond Earth must be conceived as more plausible than its sibling, the vantage point from within Earth.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIa: Ontic Location versus Ontic Center

What exactly led Copernicus to suppose the reverse relationship between Earth and sun when shifting from a geocentric to a heliocentric view? Following him, there are three types of movements that need to be explained: (i) the circuit of day and night, which implies movement from west to east that is not a movement of the heavens around Earth but rather a movement of the Earth itself; (ii) the annual movement of the Earth around the sun, which is inferred from the movement of the ecliptic; and (iii) the declination that must be assumed on the basis of change in the length of day and night throughout the year.

Copernicus argued that all three movements must be attributed to Earth as their origin rather than the sun. To see this, that is, to take this into view, requires a shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric view. The shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric view puts the sun rather than the Earth into the center. What exactly is meant by the concept of center here? I argue that this concept can be understood in two different ways, ontic and epistemic. Let us start with the ontic meaning.

First, the concept of center can be understood in an ontic sense in that it denotes our location within the universe: our existence and reality are located in the universe with the Earth’s providing that very same location—I therefore speak of ontic location (see chapter 11 for such ontic location when distinguishing between simple and complex location).

When supposing that the Earth is the center of the universe, as in the vantage point from within Earth, one assumes that our ontic location on Earth puts us into the ontic center of the universe. Our ontic location is then identical with the ontic center of the universe. If, in contrast, one denies the Earth to be at the ontic center of the universe, as in the vantage point from beyond Earth, one dislodges or dislocates us from our presumed position or location as ontic center within the universe. In that case, our ontic location diverges from the ontic center of the universe: our ontic location on Earth is no longer identical with the ontic center of the universe that now is supposed to consist in the sun rather than the Earth.

Such dislodgment from the ontic center of the universe does not imply that we completely “fall outside” the universe, however. The fact that our ontic location is no longer identical with the ontic center of the universe does not imply that we are “located” outside the universe. Instead, it only means that our ontic location on Earth is part of the universe rather than being its ontic center. Our ontic location consists then in the universe–Earth relation as it is, for instance, manifest and reflected in the movements of the Earth within the universe. Copernicus’s shift in vantage point from within to beyond Earth thus made possible divergence between our ontic location within the universe (i.e., Earth as related to the universe) and the ontic center of the universe itself (i.e., the sun).

Importantly, such divergence between our ontic location and ontic center of the universe enabled Copernicus to take into view the necessary relation between universe and Earth: by moving and revolving around the sun as center of the universe, the Earth is necessarily rather than contingently related to the universe. The shift in vantage point from within to beyond Earth thus rendered transparent the necessary connection between universe and Earth, the universe–Earth relation, that remained opaque before, that is, when taking a vantage point from within Earth.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIb: Epistemic Reference—Earth versus Universe

In addition to its ontological meaning, the concept of center can also be understood in an epistemic sense as an epistemic reference. The concept of center now denotes a baseline or standard against which we set and compare and ultimately calibrate our possible knowledge (see also chapter 14 for the concept of calibration)—the center is now understood in an epistemic sense as reference for our knowledge, that is, epistemic reference.

Copernicus shifted the epistemic reference. Instead of Earth itself serving as an epistemic reference for our possible knowledge about the universe, it is now the universe itself that provides the baseline or standard against which our knowledge, that is, our observation of the movements (see above), is set and compared (i.e., calibrated). Such shift in epistemic reference, that is, from Earth to universe, enabled him to take into view that the observed movements have their origin in the Earth itself rather than in the universe, that is, the sun.

The novel epistemic reference allowed Copernicus to include novel epistemic options within our logical space of knowledge in a more extended way. When presupposing the Earth as an epistemic reference, the logical space of knowledge is restricted to the Earth itself and thus to ourselves—any possible relation between universe and Earth, that is, necessary universe–Earth relation, as well as the origin of the movements of the Earth remain opaque and are thus excluded as epistemic options from the logical space of knowledge.

That very same logical space of knowledge is reconfigured once one shifts the epistemic reference from the Earth to the universe though. Now, the observed movements and the Earth itself can be set and compared (i.e., calibrated) against the universe rather than the Earth—the universe–Earth relation and the origin of the observed movements are no longer opaque but transparent. That, in turn, allows one to take into view the necessary connection between the universe and the Earth, which therefore can be included as an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIIa: Ontic Location and Epistemic Reference—Complete Dependence

The critic may now want to argue that ontic location and epistemic reference must be identical. We can only take something as an epistemic reference which conforms to our ontic location: only what is ontologically within our reach, that is, our own ontic location, can serve as an epistemic reference since otherwise we know something that is beyond the reach of ourselves and our ontic location. Since we are ontologically located on Earth, only the Earth itself (i.e., alone, independent of sun and universe) can serve as an epistemic reference. In contrast, the sun or the universe cannot serve as an epistemic reference since they do not conform to but rather reach beyond the Earth as our ontic location.

Let us rephrase the argument in a more formal way. Our ontic location must serve as a necessary and sufficient condition of epistemic reference—hence, the Earth as ontic location is by itself necessary and sufficient for epistemic reference. This amounts to complete dependence between ontic location and epistemic reference. One can conceive other possible relationships between ontic location and epistemic reference though—among others, these include complete independence and partial dependence, which I shall discuss in more detail below. As it is about the possible dependence between ontic location and epistemic reference, I speak of an argument of dependence.

The argument of dependence is a primarily conceptual–logical argument about the relationship between ontic location and epistemic reference. As such, the argument of dependence may be considered to raise the conceptual implications of the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology, which (as we will see in the next chapters) do also apply to the supposed Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy (chapter 14).

More specifically, the argument of dependence, as conceived here, argues for the complete dependence between ontic location and epistemic reference. Any possible divergence between both as in complete independence and partial dependence (see below) is thus excluded by the argument of dependence—that shall be discussed in the following.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIIb: Ontic Location and Epistemic Reference—Complete Independence

One may opt for the opposite extreme, namely, that the ontic location is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of epistemic reference. This amounts to complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference. We would then need to choose an epistemic reference that, unlike the sun, is not related at all to and therefore remains completely independent of Earth as our ontic location. Even the universe, including the sun, could then no longer serve as an epistemic reference since both are still related to our ontic location on Earth. To allow for complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference, we must thus search for an epistemic reference that lies outside the universe and thus remains completely independent of our ontic location on Earth.

What would such epistemic reference look like? It must lie outside or beyond the universe within which our Earth is ontically located. That also means that it must be different from the world we live in, the logical space of nature, as the philosopher may want to say. This excludes the logical space of nature as a possible epistemic reference. In contrast, the logical space of reason may then serve as an epistemic reference for our possible knowledge about Earth and the world we live in.

However, the logical space of reason lies outside or beyond the world we live in, that is, the logical space of nature. Therefore, presupposing the logical space of reason as an epistemic reference will render possible metaphysics (rather than merely ontology; see chapter 9 for details on their relationship). Such metaphysics remains without or better beyond the boundaries of our empirical, epistemic, and ontological evidence though. Let me explicate that point in more detail.

Empirical, epistemic, and ontological evidence is bound and tied to the world we live in (i.e., the logical space of nature). If now we take something, that is, the logical space of reason, as an epistemic reference that lies beyond that very same world and thus the logical space of nature, the various lines of evidence, as based on the world itself as logical space of nature, are rendered futile and invalid. The lack of applicable empirical, epistemic, and ontological evidence means that metaphysics becomes open to the “excesses of reason and speculation,” as Kant would have said, or “fictional forces,” as Sacks (2000, p. 312) says. As made clear, I reject any such metaphysics when opting for clear-cut distinction between metaphysics and ontology (chapter 9).

How does such scenario of complete independence stand in relation to the Copernican revolution? I postulate that complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference amounts to neither a pre-Copernican nor a post-Copernican stance but a non-Copernican stance, as I say. It is not pre-Copernican because it assumes complete independence, rather than complete dependence, between ontic location and epistemic reference.

At the same time, the scenario of complete independence is not post-Copernican either. Copernicus did not shift the epistemic reference outside or beyond the boundaries of the universe; instead, he only shifted them outside the boundaries of Earth, that is, beyond Earth, while remaining within the bounds of the universe. Therefore, I consider the case of complete independence as non-Copernican (rather than either pre- or post-Copernican). The distinction between non-Copernican and post-Copernican approaches will become highly relevant when it comes to mind and the vantage point we presuppose when investigating the existence and reality of mental features (chapters 13 and 14).

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIIc: Ontic Location and Epistemic Reference—Partial Independence

How can we counter the argument of dependence? The revolutionary move of Copernicus consisted in taking into view or seeing that our epistemic reference does not need to be identical with our ontic location. He diverged epistemic reference and ontic location: despite the fact that we are ontologically located on Earth (as in complete dependence), he nevertheless suggested taking an epistemic reference, that is, the sun as ontic center of the universe, that is different from the Earth as our ontic location within that very same universe.

One can thus speak of a divergence between ontic location and epistemic reference in the Copernican revolution. However, that dissociation is not complete but only partial. The sun as an epistemic reference is still related to the Earth since both are part of one and the same universe—there is thus still partial (rather than complete) dependence between epistemic reference and ontic location. Let us conceive that in more formal terms.

The universe is a necessary condition of our epistemic reference. In contrast, it is not sufficient by itself as it needs to be related to the Earth to serve as an epistemic reference. Conversely, the Earth by itself is not sufficient either (though necessary) for serving as an epistemic reference: the Earth must be related to the universe to serve as an epistemic reference. Accordingly, neither universe nor Earth are sufficient by themselves to serve as an epistemic reference—instead, it is the universe–Earth relation that is sufficient for epistemic reference. As neither universe nor Earth is sufficient by itself, we can characterize such a case as partial dependence as distinguished from both complete dependence and independence.

Vantage Point from beyond Earth IIId: Ontic Location and Epistemic Reference—Rejection of Metaphysics

What does the logical space of knowledge look like in the case of partial dependence? Because the epistemic reference is not supposed to be identical anymore with our ontic location, the logical space of knowledge is no longer restricted to knowledge about ourselves, that is, about Earth. Instead, the logical space of knowledge can now include epistemic options that reach beyond Earth itself to the universe and, more specifically, to the universe–Earth relation. The epistemic options and thus the logical space of knowledge itself are thus extended in the case of partial dependence: they are wider than in complete dependence while they are more restricted than in complete independence.

Why is the extension or expansion of epistemic options and thus of the logical space of knowledge relevant? The expansion of the logical space of knowledge, for instance, makes it possible to attribute the origin of the observed movements to the Earth rather than the sun. This, in turn, enables us to take into view the necessary connection between the universe and Earth, the universe–Earth relation, and subsequently also the necessary connection between Earth and movements. Accordingly, both necessary connections, that is, between universe and Earth as well as between Earth and movements, are rendered transparent when presupposing partial dependence between ontic location and epistemic reference.

This distinguishes the case of partial dependence from that of complete dependence, where both connections remain opaque and are thus not included as epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge. Moreover, unlike in the case of complete independence, the case of partial dependence allows for the epistemic reference to remain within the same universe within which the Earth as our ontic location is located and part of.

That opens the door for empirical, epistemic, and ontological evidence while it closes the door for metaphysical speculation and excesses including the “fictional forces.” Copernicus did not go down that road, however. Instead, he opted for partial dependence for which reason his revolution is not compatible with any form of metaphysics reaching beyond ontology. This, as we will see in the next two chapters, carries major implications for our question of intuition of mind and my aim to replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem.

Conclusion

Why are we so attached to the mind? Despite contrary empirical, epistemic, and ontological evidence, we nevertheless cling to the assumption of mind in our philosophical discussion. Philosophers such as Nagel (1974), Papineau (2000), or Dennett (2013) speak of imagination or intuition that pulls us toward assuming the mind. To completely replace the mind–body problem by the world–brain problem, we therefore need to eliminate our intuition of mind, as I call it.

I claim that the intuition of mind, including its strong pulling forces, can ultimately be traced to the fact that we include the mind as a possible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge. Analogous to “logical spaces of reason and nature” (McDowell, 1994; Sellars, 1963), I therefore speak of a logical space of knowledge. Like its siblings, the logical space of knowledge is an operational background space that, most often implicitly or tacitly, demarcates or delineates which epistemic options we include (i.e., possible epistemic options) and which ones we exclude (i.e., impossible epistemic options) from our possible knowledge.

Why is the logical space of knowledge relevant in the present context of mind? I postulate that we include the mind as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge—this renders intuitive addressing our question of the existence and reality of mental features in terms of mind and mind–body problem. In contrast, we exclude world–brain relation as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. This renders both world–brain relation and world–brain problem counterintuitive. Therefore, I argue that we need to include world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge while, at the same time, we need to exclude mind and the mind–body problem as impossible epistemic options.

How can we modify and change our logical space of knowledge in such a way that it includes world–brain relation and excludes mind as a possible epistemic option? That, as I argue, is possible by choosing the “right” vantage point. A paradigmatic example in this respect is the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology. Copernicus shifted the geocentric vantage point from within Earth to a heliocentric vantage point from beyond Earth: that made it possible to include the heliocentric view of the universe as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge while it excluded the geocentric view as an impossible epistemic option.

What can we learn from the example of the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology that can be applied to understanding the intuition of mind? This example shows that we can change our possible and impossible epistemic options and thus our logical space of knowledge by shifting our vantage point. That, in turn, renders something transparent which hitherto, as in the previous vantage point, remained opaque and was not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge.

Accordingly, I suggest that we can use the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology as a template for shifting our vantage point in such a way that it allows for including the world–brain relation as a possible epistemic option while, at the same time, excluding mind as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. That, as I will argue, requires an analogous Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy—this will be the focus in the next two chapters.