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Pre-Copernican Stance in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from within Mind or Brain

Introduction

Aim and Argument—Origin of Intuition of Mind

How can we free us from the chains of our intuition of mind, including its pulling forces? I am now ready to get to and demonstrate the origin of our intuition of mind (see chapter 12 for details). This is the focus in the present chapter. My aim consists in demonstrating that our intuition of mind is related to a specific vantage point, that is, the vantage point from within mind that remains pre-Copernican (part I). Moreover, the various escape strategies, that is, other vantage points such as the vantage point from within reason or from within brain or body, do not really yield a truly post-Copernican vantage point.

My main argument is that we need to shift our pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind (or from within brain or body) to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain to free ourselves from both intuition of mind and the mind–body problem. That, in turn, opens the door for taking into view both world–brain relation and the world–brain problem when addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy as will be developed in full detail in the next chapter.

Concept of Copernican Revolution

What do I mean by the concept of Copernican revolution? I propose an analogy between the Copernican revolution in physics/cosmology and the one suggested here in neuroscience and philosophy. We need to distinguish between a “weak” and “strong” analogy, however.

In the strong analogy, the Copernican revolutions in physics/cosmology and neuroscience/philosophy correspond to each other in almost a one-to-one way, coming close to one-to-one correspondence. In contrast, the weak analogy implies that there are analogous features in both Copernican revolutions without claiming a one-to-one correspondence between them. As there are essential differences in their respective frameworks (such as that the question of Earth–universe relation does not correspond one-to-one to the question of mind–body relationship), I here opt for the latter, the weak analogy between the Copernican revolution in physics/cosmology and the one suggested here in neuroscience/philosophy. Because of such weak analogy, I use the concept of Copernican revolution in a figurative rather than literal (as in the case of strong analogy) way.

Kant was the first to claim that a Copernican revolution is needed in philosophy (Kant, 1781/1998). Instead of questioning the relation between mind and brain, Kant’s supposed Copernican revolution concerned the relationship between subject and object—he, as I say, shifted the Humean vantage point from within object to a vantage point from within subject. However, commentators demonstrated that Kant’s Copernican revolution remained ambivalent at best or failed at worst (Allison, 1973; Bencivenga, 1987; Blumenberg, 1987; Broad, 1978; Cleve, 1999; Cohen, 1985; Cross, 1937; Engel, 1963; Gerhardt, 1987; Gibson, 2011; Guyer, 1987; Hahn, 1988; Hanson, 1959; Langton, 1998; Lemanski, 2012; Miles, 2006; Palmer, 2004; Patson, 1937; Robinson, 1990; Russel, 1948, 2004). Therefore, I will not discuss his Copernican revolution in more detail.

Yet another philosopher who has been connected to a Copernican revolution in philosophy is Alfred North Whitehead (see Sherbourne, 1983, p. 368; Wiehl, 1990). These commentators argue that Whitehead, because of his supposed inversion of the Kantian subject (Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 88; see also Northoff, 2016a and b), puts the subject back into nature, that is, the world—he, as I say, may have replaced the Kantian ambivalent vantage point from within subject by a truly post-Copernican vantage point from beyond subject. As in the case of Kant, a detailed investigation of Whitehead’s supposed Copernican revolution remains beyond the scope of this book. Thus, future investigations are needed to specifically compare the Copernican revolution suggested here and its vantage point from beyond brain with those concerning the vantage point from beyond subject as based on Kant and Whitehead.

Part I: Pre-Copernican Stance—Vantage Point from within Mind

Vantage Point from within Mind Ia: Mind—Ontic Origin and Ontic Location

We experience ourselves and the world in our consciousness. In addition to consciousness, there is also an experience of other mental features such as self, emotional feeling, free will, ownership, agency, and so forth (Searle, 2004). These various mental features are often considered hallmark features of our existence. We are not merely physical machines but mental creatures. Where are these mental features coming from, and what is their ontological origin? We usually take it almost for granted that they can be traced to mind as their underlying ontological origin the—mind is the “ontic origin” of mental features.

Since mental features characterize our existence in the world, we also assume that the mind “locates” us ontologically in the world—the mind is our ontic location within the world. The mind as ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location in the world provides the basis for what I describe as a vantage point from within mind. The mind provides the basis of our vantage point or viewpoint: we take into view ourselves and the world from the viewpoint of the mind—this amounts to a vantage point from within mind. Compare this to the vantage point from the summit of a mountain. We stand on the summit of the mountain and take into view everything else, that is, mountain and valleys, from that viewpoint. The mind as ontic center and ontic location is analogous to the summit we stand on, and it is from there that we take into view body and world (as more or less analogous to mountain and valleys; see figure 13.1).

Figure 13.1 Vantage point from within mind and its mento-centric view.

The vantage point from within mind is more or less analogous to the vantage point from within Earth. Like the former with regard to the mind, the latter suggests that Earth is our ontic origin and, at the same time, provides our ontic location within the universe. As we are based and find ourselves on Earth, we assume that the Earth locates us ontically in the universe. Analogously, the mind is supposed to ontically locate ourselves within the world—this provides us with a vantage point through which we can take a view onto the world. Just as Earth ontically locates us in the universe, the mind is our ontic location in the world.

The assumption of the mind as ontic location is especially striking given that we often suppose the world as merely physical. How can the mind as something that is purely mental and therefore different in principle from the rest of the merely physical world locate us ontically in that very same world? For the mind to locate us ontically in the world, one would suppose that it should share at least some basic features with the physical features that define the world. That seems to be not the case, though, as mind is mental and body is physical.

Let me explicate that in more detail. If the mind and its mental features do not share some basic features with the supposedly physical world, the mind cannot be part of the physical world. Therefore, the vantage point from within mind seems to locate us beyond or outside the physical world. Such an ontic location of the mind and its mental features beyond the supposedly physical world provides the basis for the mind–body problem: how can the mind and its mental features be related to the physical features of the world?

Vantage Point from within Mind Ib: Mind and World—Mereological and Spatiotemporal Exclusion

The vantage point from within mind confronts us with major spatiotemporal problems. The vantage point from within mind only allows us to postulate mental features as aspatial and atemporal: since it is tied to the mind (as distinguished from the physical world), the vantage point from within mind does not allow us to take into view the spatial and temporal features of the physical world. This puts mental features into conflict with physical features that are spatiotemporal rather than aspatial and atemporal.

The ascription of different mutually exclusive features dissolves any part–whole relationship between mind and world. Something like the mind that is aspatial and atemporal cannot be part of something like the physical world that is spatiotemporal. We can reconcile both mind and world only if we characterize the world itself either as mental or, alternatively, as both mental and physical. That results in either panpsychism or dualism—but neither position is supported on empirical or ontological grounds. Moreover, either position dissolves the part–whole relationship between mind and world: panpsychism assimilates the part (mind) into the whole (world), while dualism separates mind (part) and world (whole) into two wholes.

The dissolution of the part–whole relationship goes hand in hand with the the mutual exclusion of mind and world on spatiotemporal grounds. Presupposing a vantage point from within mind, mind cannot but be characterized as aspatial and atemporal while the world is spatiotemporal. Since aspatial/atemporal and spatiotemporal features entail different frames, mind and world are not spatiotemporally included within a commonly shared frame but excluded—there is spatiotemporal exclusion rather than spatiotemporal inclusion of mind and world. Accordingly, taken together, the vantage point from within mind entails both mereological and spatiotemporal exclusion of mind from world.

How does such mereological and spatiotemporal exclusion of mind and world stand in relation to mereological and spatiotemporal confusion (chapter 12)? Mereological and spatiotemporal exclusion presuppose that mind and world no longer share a common frame. This makes it impossible to even raise or conceive the question of the part–whole relation between mind and world as that presupposes some commonly shared frame, that is, mereological inclusion. That, in turn, makes impossible any possible answer including mereological confusion: if there is no question anymore, any answer becomes subsequently impossible—mereological confusion is not even an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge.

The same holds on the spatiotemporal level. Because mind is supposedly aspatial and atemporal, any relationship with the spatiotemporal world is rendered impossible from the very beginning—such spatiotemporal exclusion excludes spatiotemporal confusion as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge. Taken together, I claim that mereological and spatiotemporal exclusion of mind and world renders impossible their spatiotemporal and mereological confusion as the latter is not even included as an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge entailed by the vantage point from within mind.

In sum, I characterize the vantage point from within mind by (i) assumption of the mind as ontic location; (ii) mereological exclusion, which renders impossible any mereological confusion as an epistemic option; and (iii) spatiotemporal exclusion, which renders impossible any spatiotemporal confusion as an epistemic option.

Taken in this sense, the vantage point from within mind can be somewhat compared to the vantage point from within Earth that, analogously, also suffers from mereological and spatiotemporal problems, that is, mereological and spatiotemporal confusion (chapter 12). However, as mereological and spatiotemporal exclusion are much stronger than mereological and spatiotemporal confusion (which are possible only on the basis of mereological and spatiotemporal inclusion), the vantage point of mind is even stronger pre-Copernican than its sibling, the vantage point from within Earth.

Vantage Point from within Mind Ic: Mind as Ontic Center of the World—Mento-centric and Ego- and Anthropocentric View

How can we characterize such vantage point from within mind? The main problem in the pre-Copernican view and its vantage point from within Earth consisted in the fact that Earth as our ontic location within the universe was also considered the supposed ontic center of that very same universe. Our ontic location and the ontic center of the universe were thus identical, which marked the pre-Copernican view as a geocentric view (chapter 12). I now claim an analogous mento-centric view when we presuppose a vantage point from within mind.

Imagine again the situation of the mountain summit. You stand on the mountain summit—this provides your “stance” within the world, that is, your ontic location. That very same ontic location, that is, the mountain summit, also provides the vantage point or viewpoint from which you perceive the valleys, their various villages, and thus the rest of the world—this amounts to a vantage point from within mountain summit. Now, while perceiving the valleys and their villages, you suppose to stand at the center of the rest of the world—you assume the mountain summit to be the ontic center of the world.

The same applies analogously to the vantage point from within mind. The mind does not only provide your ontic location within the world and your vantage point or viewpoint from which you perceive and conceive the world. Additionally, the mind is also supposed as the ontic center of the world. The mind thus takes on a triple role for us, that is, as ontic location, vantage point, and ontic center.

Because we consider the mind as the ontic center of the world, our view of the world becomes mento-centric when taken to an extreme. This compares well to the geocentric view in pre-Copernican times: in the same way that the pre-Copernican cosmologists conceive the Earth as the ontic center of the universe, we conceive ourselves as the ontic center of the world. Hence, our view of the world with ourselves as ontic center is as much mento-centric as our pre-Copernican view of the universe with the Earth as ontic center is “geocentric.”

Moreover, such mento-centric view of the world is, at the same time, egocentric or anthropocentric rather than allocentric or eco-centric (see below for the latter). Since we suppose that the mind as ontic center of the world also provides our own ontic location within that very same world, the mento-centric view of the world cannot be but egocentric or anthropocentric: we conceive the world in terms of our own mental features and thus our mind. The identification of mind as both ontic center and ontic location excludes any possible allocentric or eco-centric view of the world—the latter views are simply not included as epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge as entailed by a vantage point from within mind.

Vantage Point from within Mind IIa: Mind as Epistemic Reference—Exclusion of Necessary Ontological Connection

The main aim of Copernicus was to locate the origin of the different types of movements we observe in the universe. The pre-Copernican cosmologists attributed these movements to the universe itself that was supposed to move around the Earth as ontic center. That, as stated in chapter 15, was possible only by supposing that the Earth itself served as the baseline, standard, or reference, that is, as the epistemic reference, for calibrating our knowledge, that is, the observation of the movements.

Why is the choice of epistemic reference so important? The pre-Copernican cosmologists referenced their observations, that is, the observed movements, against the Earth itself—that very same reference renders it impossible to attribute the observed movements to the Earth itself: something (i.e., the Earth) that serves as reference for something else (i.e., observed movements) cannot be connected and thus related in a necessary way to that for which it serves as reference (i.e., the observed movements). The necessary ontological connection between Earth and the observed movements is thus not a possible epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within Earth—the vantage point from within Earth renders it impossible for us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and the movements as a possible epistemic option.

Note that my argument does not concern whether the connection between the Earth and the movements is actually necessary (and a posteriori) or not. It only concerns our possible knowledge, that is, whether our possible knowledge of the world includes a necessary connection between the Earth and the movements as a possible epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge. I argue that the vantage point from within Earth renders impossible such epistemic option: the logical space of knowledge as presupposed by the vantage point from within Earth is such that it does not allow us to take into view a necessary ontological connection between the Earth and the movements as a possible epistemic option.

The same holds, in a more or less analogous way, in the case of the vantage point from within mind. In the same way that the Earth is taken as the epistemic reference in the vantage point from within Earth, the mind also serves as the epistemic reference for our possible knowledge about the world in the vantage point from within mind. We set, match, and compare and thus calibrate our knowledge about the world, including ourselves, against the mind as a baseline, reference, or standard (i.e., epistemic reference). However, this excludes a necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world as a possible epistemic option: something that serves as reference (i.e., mind) cannot be taken into view to show a necessary connection to something else (i.e., world) for which it serves as an epistemic reference for our knowledge about their ontological relationship.

Accordingly, the choice of mind as the epistemic reference is comparable to the situation in which the pre-Copernican cosmologists set and calibrated their knowledge (i.e., the observed movements) against the Earth as an epistemic reference. However, such choice of epistemic reference confronts both pre-Copernican cosmologists and current philosophers with a problem, namely, a conflict between epistemic reference and ontological necessity—that is, epistemic–ontological conflict—that shall be explicated in the following.

Vantage Point from within Mind IIb: Mind as Epistemic Reference—Epistemic–Ontological Conflict

What do I mean by epistemic–ontological conflict? I claim that something like mind or Earth that serves as epistemic reference cannot be ontologically related or connected to something like body or world for which it serves as reference. The role of mind or Earth serving as epistemic reference is not compatible with their ontological characterization—this amounts to an epistemic-ontological conflict. Such a conflict can be avoided only by keeping the epistemic reference ontologically independent of that for which it serves as reference. The need for independence of the epistemic reference makes it impossible to include its (i.e., the epistemic reference) necessary ontological connection (to what for which it serves as reference) as a possible epistemic option in the respective logical space of knowledge.

How does that apply to the mind as an epistemic reference? Specifically, as the mind serves as an epistemic reference, the mind’s necessary ontological connection to what it serves as reference or standard, that is, body and world, remains impossible. A necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world is simply excluded as an impossible epistemic option from the logical space of knowledge when presupposing mind as an epistemic reference.

Taken altogether, we are confronted with a conflict: on the one hand, the choice of mind as the epistemic reference renders impossible a necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world while, on the other hand, we are searching for exactly that, namely, the necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world. As this conflict plays out between epistemic reference and ontological necessity, I speak of an epistemic–ontological conflict.

The concept of epistemic-ontological conflict means that epistemic and ontological assumptions are incompatible with each other. It describes contradiction with mutual exclusion between epistemic requirement, that is, no possible necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world, and ontological demand, that is, the need for a necessary ontological connection between mind and body/world. I postulate that our current discussion of mind and the mind–body problem suffers deeply from that very same epistemic–ontological conflict.

The epistemic–ontological conflict renders it impossible for us take into view the possible necessary (a posteriori) connection between mind and body as it is excluded as an impossible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. This is analogous to the way in which it remained impossible for the early cosmologists to take into view the necessary connection between the Earth and the movements as it was excluded as an impossible epistemic option from their logical space of knowledge.

Vantage Point from within Mind IIc: Mind as Epistemic Reference—Shift in Vantage Point

What does the epistemic–ontological conflict tell us about our choice of epistemic reference? We cannot take into view the necessary ontological connection between mind and body as long as we take the mind itself as the epistemic reference. To take into view the ontologically necessary (a posteriori) connection between mind and body as a possible epistemic option, we require an epistemic reference that is different from, and at least partially independent of, mind (as well as, conversely, different from the body). As soon as we take (either) mind (or body) as the epistemic reference, we remain unable to take into view any necessary ontological connection between mind and body as this is simply not a possible epistemic option within the respectively presupposed logical space of knowledge.

How did Copernicus solve the problem? We saw that, by shifting his vantage point from within to beyond the Earth, he could change his epistemic reference from the Earth to the universe (chapter 15). This allowed him to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and movement as a possible epistemic option in his now modified logical space of knowledge—that made it possible for him to attribute the origin of the latter to the Earth rather than the universe (chapter 15). His shift in vantage point thus allowed him to include (rather than exclude) the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and movement as a possible (rather than impossible) epistemic option into his now modified logical space of knowledge.

This is analogously so in our case. We will see in the next chapter that the shift in vantage point from within mind to beyond brain allows for exactly that, namely, a shift in epistemic reference from mind to world (chapter 14). This allows us to take into view as a possible epistemic option the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness through world–brain relation (chapter 10). Accordingly, presupposing a vantage point from beyond brain allows us to include the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness as a possible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge.

Vantage Point from within Mind IIIa: Necessary Ontological Connection between Mind and Mental Features—Inclusion but Superfluous?

The proponent of mind may now want to argue that such radical changes in both vantage point and our logical space of knowledge are not necessary. The logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within mind includes the necessary ontological connection of mind to mental features as an epistemic option. We want to explain mental features such as consciousness as we observe them in the world. By attributing them to the mind, we establish the necessary ontological connection between mind and mental features—the mental features are necessarily (a priori) connected ontologically to the mind, which accounts for their origin, that is, ontic origin (see above).

Accordingly, the mind provides the answer to the question of the ontological origin of mental features. As the necessary connection between mind and mental features is an epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within mind, we do not need to change either our vantage point or our logical space of knowledge. More generally, unlike in the case of the vantage point from within Earth, we do not require a Copernican revolution of our vantage point from within mind.

True, the mind is indeed necessarily connected ontologically to mental features. The necessary ontological connection between mind and mental features is indeed an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within mind. However, the necessary ontological connection between mind and body (as well as the one between mind and world) is not included as an epistemic option in that very same logical space of knowledge.

This carries major implications. Because the necessary ontological connection between mind and body is excluded as an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge, the mind–body problem remains completely unsolvable: its possible solution, that is, the necessary ontological connection between mind and body, is not included as an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within mind. We therefore can develop all kinds of possible answers to the mind–body problem—none of them will include the necessary ontological connection between mind and body, however, as that is not included by itself as an epistemic option within our presupposed logical space of knowledge.

Taken together, the mind–body problem does indeed include a necessary ontological connection of mental features to their ontic origin as an epistemic option in its logical space of knowledge. However, that necessary ontological connection is the wrong one: instead of including the necessary ontological connection between mind and body as an epistemic option, it only includes the one between mind and mental features in the logical space of knowledge of the vantage point from within mind. As the necessary ontological connection between mind and mental features cannot account for the one between mind and body, inclusion of the former as an epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge is basically useless if not superfluous.

Vantage Point from within Mind IIIb: Intuition of Mind—Four Different Intuitions

The proponent of mind may want to argue that I did not really explain the intuition of mind. I, at best, demonstrated the analogy between the vantage point from within mind and the vantage point from within Earth, which marks both as pre-Copernican. In contrast, I did not demonstrate why, where, and how the intuition of mind comes into play. I reject that claim as it neglects four intuitions of mind as ontic origin, ontic location, ontic center, and epistemic reference.

The first time we intuit the mind is when we assume the mind as the ontic origin of our mental features such as consciousness, self, and so forth (see above)—we suppose that the mind provides the ontic origin, that is, existence and reality, that underlies our mental features. That is based on an inference from our observation of mental features to the existence and reality of a mind on purely intuitive grounds—this is the first intuition of mind. That is the most basic and fundamental intuition of mind as it provides the ground for all other intuitions of mind.

We are often not even aware of this very first intuition of mind—we take it for granted that we need to address the existence and reality of mental features in terms of mind. Though it seems as if the assumption of mind is a given, this is not the case. Instead, the assumption of mind as ontic origin of mental features is related to us and, more specifically, our choice of our vantage point and its logical space of knowledge.

The second intuition of mind occurs when we assume that that very same mind also provides our ontic location within the world (see above). The third intuition of mind happens when we assume that the mind as our ontic location within the world also provides the ontic center of that very same world. Finally, the fourth intuition of mind occurs when we take the mind as the epistemic reference for our knowledge of the world—the mind thus shapes our logical space of knowledge.

Despite being distinct, all four intuitions of mind share that they are all based on one and the same vantage point, that is, the vantage point from within mind. Because of the vantage point from within mind, we intuit the mind as ontic origin and location, which, in turn, pulls us toward intuiting the mind as both the ontic center of the world and the epistemic reference of our knowledge of that very same world. Accordingly, it is the vantage point itself, the vantage point from within mind, that exerts a pulling force to intuit the mind in all four instances.

Why does the vantage point from within mind exert such pulling force toward intuition of mind? As it is taken from within mind and presupposes mind as the epistemic reference, the vantage point from within mind does not allow us to take anything into view independent of the mind. This allows us to view both body and world as well as mental features only and solely in terms of mind as they are compared and set and thus referenced against mind as the epistemic reference. We are consequently pulled toward intuiting mind as ontic origin, ontic location, ontic center, and epistemic reference.

What can liberate and free us from the chains of mind? The only way to be freed from the chains of the intuition of mind is to detach ourselves from the vantage point from within mind and to replace it with a vantage point that no longer exerts such pulling forces toward intuition of mind. This is exactly what Copernicus did when he shifted the vantage point from within Earth to beyond Earth—this freed him from the intuition of Earth as center and allowed him to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and movements as an epistemic option within his then modified logical space of knowledge. We thus need to do the same and shift our vantage point, which will allow us to presuppose an epistemic reference that is different from the mind—that will be explained further below. First, however, we need to discuss some other escape strategies.

Part II: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within God, Reason, Consciousness, or Brain

Vantage Point from within Brain Ia: Escape Strategies—God’s-Eye View

One of the main problems in the vantage point from within mind consists in the fact that the mind itself is taken as the epistemic reference and ontic location at the same time—this amounts to complete dependence (see above and chapter 12): the mind is not only a necessary condition of our epistemic reference (as related to its role as ontic location) but also, at the same time, a sufficient condition of our epistemic reference. Such complete dependence renders it impossible to include the necessary connection between mind and body as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge.

Why not claim the opposite, namely, complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference (chapter 12)? In that case, one would choose an epistemic reference that remains completely independent of our ontic location, that is, of our mind. This opens up two different options, first, we could take God as the epistemic reference and, alternatively, we could take reason as the epistemic reference. Let us start with the first option, that is, God as the epistemic reference.

Taking God as the epistemic reference presupposes a vantage point from within God. We have to be careful, though. As God is almighty, his view cannot be described by a vantage point or point of view anymore—he “stands everywhere” and “views everything” at the same time; a vantage point is thus no longer appropriate or needed. Therefore, I speak of a God’s-eye view rather than a vantage point from within God (see chapter 12 for details on this point).

How can we describe the God’s-eye view in more detail? The God’s-eye view renders opaque for us the necessary connection between mind and body and consequently the one between brain and consciousness. Anything, including mind, body, and consciousness, remains contingently connected when compared to and calibrated against God as the epistemic reference: for us, when compared to God, the necessary connection between mind and body as well as between brain and consciousness remains (necessarily) opaque and thus contingent—it is not a possible epistemic option that is included within our logical space of knowledge. Only God herself or himself can take into view the necessary connection between mind and body and consequently the one between brain and consciousness—it is only a possible epistemic option in her or his logical space of knowledge, whereas it remains an impossible epistemic option for us that is excluded from our logical space of knowledge.

Moreover, presupposing God as the epistemic reference reaches beyond the universe and our world (including world–brain relation) and thus exceeds the boundaries of our ontic location and the world itself. The presupposition of a God’s-eye view amounts to complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference: the mind as our ontic location remains completely independent of God as the epistemic reference. Such complete independence, however, renders the God’s-eye view non-Copernican rather than pre- or post-Copernican (chapter 12).

Accordingly, the vantage point from within God (i.e., God’s-eye view) does not solve our problem, namely, to include the necessary connection between mind and body (and also the one between brain and consciousness) as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. Instead of solving the problem, it rather accentuates it in that it leads us beyond the world—this opens the door for metaphysics with its “fictional forces” toward speculation (Sacks, 2000). We therefore need to search for yet another vantage point. One such vantage point could consist in reason, amounting to a vantage point from within reason, as I call it.

Vantage Point from within Brain Ib: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Reason I

What do I mean by vantage point from within reason? The vantage point from within reason presupposes reason as the epistemic reference for our knowledge about that very same world. Such vantage point from within reason combines both mind as ontic location and reason as the epistemic reference, which allows for complete independence between ontic location and epistemic reference.

Such vantage point from within reason is, for instance, paradigmatically presupposed by McDowell (1994, 2009). Without going into the details, he presupposes mind as our ontic location in the world and, at the same time, sets, compares, and thus references the mind against reason (and concepts) as the epistemic reference. However, many other approaches in current mind–body discussion (such as the one by David Chalmers and others) and past philosophy (including Kant) also presuppose such vantage point from within reason as for many philosophers it is almost evident or natural to consider reason as an epistemic reference.

Can such vantage point from within reason account for the necessary connection between mind and body as well as between brain and consciousness? No. When taking reason as the epistemic reference, mind is located in the logical space of reason while the body is associated with the logical space of nature (see McDowell, 1994, 2009; Sellars, 1963, for the distinction between these two logical spaces). As mind and body are different in principle, the vantage point from within reason remains unable to include the necessary ontological connection between mind and body as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge (chapter 12).

Vantage Point from within Brain Ic: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Reason II

What is the role of the world in the vantage point from within reason? Reason as an epistemic reference remains completely outside and thus beyond the boundaries of both mind as our ontic location and the world within which it locates us. Because of the “location” of the epistemic reference outside or beyond the boundaries of both our mind as ontic location and the world itself, the necessary ontological connection between mind and body cannot be included as a possible epistemic option in the respective logical space of knowledge.

The relation between brain and consciousness is set and compared against something as the epistemic reference that lies completely outside and beyond the world in which both brain and consciousness are located; this renders impossible the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness, which is thus no longer included as a possible epistemic option in the respective logical space of knowledge. In short, the vantage point from within reason cannot but fail by default (i.e., necessarily) and therefore cannot solve our problem either.

Why can the vantage point from within reason not include the necessary ontological connection between mind and body as a possible epistemic option in its logical space of knowledge? This is so because here, as in the case of the God’s-eye view, the epistemic reference remains completely independent of our ontic location: reason as the epistemic reference remains independent of the mind as our supposed ontic location within the world (chapter 12).

This puts the vantage point from within reason on somewhat the same par or ground as the vantage point from God that also remains completely independent and thus outside or beyond our ontic location and the world within which we are located (see above). Therefore, as with the vantage point from within God, the vantage point from within reason must also be characterized as non-Copernican rather than pre- or post-Copernican. One may now speculate that Kant’s attempted Copernican revolution failed for exactly that reason: he may have presupposed the wrong vantage point, namely, a vantage point from within reason that is non-Copernican rather than post-Copernican—I leave that open for future discussion.

Vantage Point from within Brain IIa: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Consciousness I

One may now reject the vantage point from within reason and shift the vantage point to consciousness. One may then want to take the view from experience, that is, from within consciousness. Such vantage point from within consciousness is, for example, presupposed in phenomenology. By conceiving the world as it appears through consciousness, phenomenology presupposes a vantage point from within consciousness. For instance, the body is conceived in the way it is experienced, that is, as lived body, rather than as it is observed, that is, as objective body (chapters 8 and 10). Moreover, everything that is experienced and surfaces in our consciousness may be considered real and existent whereas this may not hold for that which is not accessible in consciousness.

The vantage point from within consciousness puts consciousness in the center of philosophical investigation. Once we understand consciousness, we will know the world—experience and ultimately consciousness is presupposed as our epistemic reference for our knowledge about the world. Our ontic location within the world is closely related to consciousness and thus falls somewhat together with the choice of consciousness as the epistemic reference. Such vantage point from within consciousness amounts ultimately to a consciousness-centric and thus rather ego- and anthropocentric view of the world. This marks the vantage point from within consciousness as distinctively pre-Copernican rather than post-Copernican.

What about ontological assumptions? Presupposing the vantage point from within consciousness leaves us no choice but to frame those ontological assumptions in mental terms. One example is the body: since the vantage point from within consciousness only allows us to take into view mental or conscious features, the body can only be considered as the body of our experience, the lived body. The body as lived body is then considered as the phenomenological (and ultimately ontological) basis of mental features—this entails the phenomenological and ontological primacy of the world–body problem over the world–brain problem (chapters 10 and 11).

I reject that claim. The claim presupposes inference from the phenomenal realm of our experience of the body as lived body to the ontological realm of the body as an ontological basis of consciousness and mental features. However, nothing in our experience precludes that something more basic and foundational such as the world–brain relation that cannot be experienced as such can nevertheless serve as an ontological predisposition of that very same experience (i.e., as an ontological predisposition of consciousness; OPC). Therefore, the inference from phenomenal features of experience to their ontological basis remains problematic at best and fallacious at worst, amounting to what I called the phenomenal–ontological fallacy (see chapter 10).

The vantage point from within consciousness is very much prone to the phenomenal–ontological fallacy as, by its very nature, the vantage point from within consciousness remains unable to go beyond consciousness and its phenomenal realm to their underlying neuronal and neuro-ecological conditions and ultimately to their underlying ontological substrates (that, by themselves, may not be accessible to consciousness). Therefore, the vantage point from within consciousness cannot, for instance, take into view the role of world–brain relation as OPC (chapter 10). This renders the vantage point from within consciousness problematic and insufficient.

Vantage Point from within Brain IIb: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Consciousness II

The phenomenologist may now want to defend her or his vantage point from within consciousness. Because we can approach and know the world, including ourselves, only in terms of experience, that is, consciousness, we remain unable to go beyond the boundaries of consciousness. We are enclosed in our consciousness without any escape from it. Therefore, as we cannot go beyond the boundaries of our own consciousness, we cannot but presuppose a vantage point from within consciousness. As the argument is based on our enclosure within consciousness, I speak of an argument of enclosure (see, e.g., Dietrich & Gray-Hardcastle, 2010).

How can we escape the argument of enclosure? The proponent of the argument of enclosure is certainly right when we consider the phenomenal domain alone. Because of its very nature as phenomenal, the phenomenal domain, including the vantage point from within consciousness, is closed by default with us being enclosed by it. When presupposing a vantage point from within consciousness, we are indeed enclosed within consciousness and remain unable to go beyond the boundaries of our consciousness.

However, the argument of enclosure is a phenomenal or phenomenological (I here use both terms synonymously for the sake of simplicity) argument that only pertains to the phenomenal realm of consciousness. In contrast, it does not apply to the underlying ontological realm that can go beyond consciousness itself. For instance, consciousness in general and, more specifically, the experience of the lived body may be traced to their underlying ontological conditions, that is, the OPC, which by themselves may not be accessible to consciousness (chapter 10).

Let us consider some of the conceptual distinctions we made between phenomenal and ontological realms in previous chapters (chapters 9–11). First, there is the distinction between phenomenal and ontological realms, which is important as we cannot directly infer from the former to the latter since otherwise we commit a phenomenal–ontological fallacy (chapter 10). Second, there is the distinction between prephenomenal and phenomenal levels (chapter 11). The world–brain relation may well be prephenomenal (chapter 11) in that it serves as an OPC even if it is by itself not accessible to experience and thus the phenomenal realm. Third, we need to distinguish OPC and ontological correlates of consciousness (OCC; chapters 10 and 11). While OCC are open to experience, that is, consciousness, OPC are not directly accessible in consciousness.

In sum, the vantage point from within consciousness can only take into view phenomenal features while remaining somewhat blind to their underlying ontological features, including prephenomenal features and OPC. To take into view these ontological features, we require a vantage point that is different from and goes beyond the vantage point from within consciousness. That, as I suggest, is possible only by shifting from the pre-Copernican vantage point from within consciousness to a truly post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain (chapter 14).

Vantage Point from within Brain IIIa: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Brain and Intuition of Brain

One may now want to suggest that we simply resist the pulling forces of our intuition of mind and no longer intuit the mind as the ontic origin and location of our mental features and existence in the world. Instead, we can replace the mind with the brain: the brain provides the ontic origin of our mental features and our ontic location within the world. Going even more extreme, one may then also assume the brain as ontic center of the world as well as the epistemic reference for our knowledge about the world. In short, the brain takes over the role of the mind (see figure 13.2).

Figure 13.2 Pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain and its neuro-centric view (the black arrows indicate that the world is supposed to “move around” the brain as center).

Does the vantage point from within brain really abolish the intuition of mind? True, the vantage point from within brain resists the intuition of mind. However, that does not imply that it also resists intuition as such. I claim that the intuition of mind is simply replaced by yet another intuition, an “intuition of brain.” Only the content of our intuition changes, from mind to brain, whereas the intuition itself, independent of any content, remains. Specifically, I suggest that the brain takes over the role of the mind in the above-described four intuitions—let me explicate that in the following.

Let us assume that the brain as ontic origin of mental features is purely intuitive as there is no necessary connection between both included as an epistemic option in the respective logical space of knowledge entailed by the vantage point from within brain. This leads ontologically to what is described as materialism and/or physicalism. Moreover, taking the brain as our ontic location in the world is again purely intuitive as there is no necessary connection between world and brain either (as a possible epistemic option as included in our logical space of knowledge).

The intuitive component becomes even stronger when supposing that the brain provides the ontic center of the world and an epistemic reference for our knowledge of the world. Accordingly, taken together, the vantage point from within brain simply replaces one intuition, the intuition of mind, with another one, the intuition of brain. Therefore, the vantage point from within brain and subsequently physicalism/materialism stand on more or less the same ground as those approaches they aim at escaping from, that is, those that are based on a vantage point from within mind.

Vantage Point from within Brain IIIb: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Brain and Its Neuro-centric View

How about the necessary ontological connection between mind and body? Once one presupposes the vantage point from within brain, the mind is no longer included as a possible epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge. That renders impossible the question of the necessary ontological connection between mind and body. However, the question of the necessary ontological connection of mental features to their underlying ontological origin remains. That question now resurfaces in the question of the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness (and mental features in general): does the vantage point from within brain allow for including the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness as a possible epistemic option in its logical space of knowledge?

The answer to that question is clear: No. The vantage point from within brain renders impossible and thus opaque the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness—it is simply not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge (see also chapter 12). There is nothing in the brain itself and its merely physical features that could provide the necessary ontological connection to mental features such as consciousness—the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness is simply not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge for which reason it remains opaque (rather than transparent).

How can we take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features? Only when one assumes mental features within the brain itself, as McGinn (1991) does, can the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness be taken into view and thus be included as a possible epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge. As the brain itself is now conceived in mental terms, such vantage point from within brain can no longer be properly distinguished from the vantage point from mind, however. We are thus confronted with more or less the same problems as when presupposing a vantage point from within mind—characterizing the brain by mental properties thus amounts to nothing more than a “pseudo-solution.”

How about the brain as the ontic center of the world? As the brain is now considered the ontic origin of mental features as well as the ontic location of our existence within the world, the vantage point from within brain also predisposes us toward assuming the brain as the ontic center of the world. This amounts to a neuro-centric view that then replaces the mento-centric view. Replacing our mind with our brain as the ontic center of the world renders the neuro-centric view as ego- and anthropocentric as the mento-centric view.

That puts the vantage point from within brain on the same par and ground as the geocentric view of the pre-Copernican cosmologists—the vantage point from within brain and its neuro-centric view of the world are as much pre-Copernican as the vantage point from within Earth with its geocentric view of the universe. Like its geocentric sibling, the neuro-centric view makes it impossible for us to take into view and thus render transparent the necessary ontological connection of the brain to something that extends beyond the brain itself, that is, mental features such as consciousness.

Vantage Point from within Brain IIIc: Escape Strategies—Vantage Point from within Body and Intuition of Body

How we can escape such neuro-centric view? The proponent of embodiment (see chapter 8 for more details on that) may want to argue that we need to presuppose a vantage point from within body rather than from within brain. The body rather than the brain provides the ontic origin of mental features, and it is the body (and not the brain) that anchors us within the world as our ontic location. Moreover, the body may be the ontic center of the world and thus also provide the epistemic reference for our knowledge about the world.

However, without going into detail, the assumption of body as ontic origin, ontic location, ontic center, and epistemic reference remains as intuitive as when intuiting either mind or brain. As in the case of the vantage point from within brain, the vantage point from within body simply replaces one intuition, that is, intuition of brain, with yet another one, that is, intuition of body. The neuro-centric view is simply replaced by a body-centric view. This puts the vantage point from within body on the same par or ground as the vantage point it aims to escape from, that is, the vantage point from within brain.

Moreover, without going into detail, the vantage point from within body still does not allow us to include the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. Why? Because, as in the case of the brain, there is simply no necessary conceptual connection between the physical features of the body and mental features such as consciousness. Therefore, the necessary ontological connection between body and consciousness is still not included as a possible epistemic option within the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from within body.

How can we include the necessary ontological connection between brain or body and consciousness as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge? Thomas Nagel already pointed out well that neither a vantage point from within mind (i.e., mental point of view) nor a vantage point from within brain or body (i.e., physical point of view) will render transparent the necessary ontological connection between brain/body and consciousness:

Neither the mental nor the physical point of view will do for this purpose. The mental will not do because it simply leaves out the physiology, and has no room for it. The physical will not do, because while it includes the behavioral and functional manifestations of the mental, this doesn’t enable it, in view of the falsity of conceptual reductionism, to reach to the mental concepts themselves. (Nagel, 2000, p. 45)

What does Thomas Nagel tell us with regard to the vantage point? We require a vantage point that allows us to take into view that which extends or reaches beyond both mental and physical, that is, “something that extends beyond its grounds of application” (Nagel, 2000, p. 46). How is that possible? That is the moment we can turn to Copernicus and learn from his revolution in physics and cosmology. He shifted the vantage point from within to beyond Earth. This allowed him to include the universe as an epistemic reference which, reaching beyond Earth as our ontic location, rendered transparent the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and movements.

Analogously, we can shift our vantage point from within mind (or brain or body) to a vantage point from beyond brain. This, as I hope, allows us to reach beyond our own brain as ontic location within the world and to subsequently include the world itself in our epistemic reference. That, in turn, should render transparent the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness—this will be the focus in the next chapter.

Conclusion

I demonstrated that our intuition of mind and its pulling forces toward the assumption of the mind as ontic origin of mental features can be traced to our vantage point. Specifically, by presupposing a vantage point from within mind, we include mind as an epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. This amounts to a pre-Copernican stance in neuroscience and philosophy as it is comparable to the vantage point from within Earth in physics and cosmology prior to Copernicus.

How can we escape our intuition of mind and its pulling forces toward assuming the mind as ontic origin of mental features? We first and foremost need to escape the vantage point from within mind. I demonstrated various escape strategies, including the vantage point from within reason and from brain (or body). However, they all failed in their endeavor to overcome our intuition of mind, which, as in the case of the vantage point from within brain, was simply replaced by yet another intuition, the intuition of brain.

I postulate that we require a much more radical shift in our vantage point to render the intuition of mind impossible to sustain. Analogous to Copernicus in physics and cosmology, we require a radically different vantage point, a vantage point from beyond brain, that is analogous to his vantage point from beyond Earth (chapter 15). Such a vantage point from beyond brain will render it impossible for us to sustain the concept of mind. That, in turn, will open the door for replacing mind and the mind–body problem with world–brain relation and the world–brain problem. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy—that will be the focus in the next chapter.