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Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from beyond Brain

Introduction

Mental Features—Extension beyond Ourselves to the World

Why are mental features so special? Mental features link and connect us to the world. For example, consciousness allows us to experience ourselves as part of the world. If we lose consciousness (chapters 4 and 5), we can no longer experience ourselves as part of the world and instead remain isolated from it—this, for instance, renders impossible communication with others as we can no longer participate in and share the world with others. The same applies to other mental features such as self, emotional feeling, agency and ownership, free will, and so forth that also allow us to participate in the world by becoming part of it. In a nutshell, consciousness and mental features are about the world and, more specifically, our relation to the world—mental features relate us to the world by means of which we can become part of the world.

How can mental features establish our relation to the world? They must make it possible for us to extend “beyond” our brain and body to the world—they reach beyond ourselves, as I will say in the following. I already pointed out that that very same “beyond ourselves” of our mental features can be traced to our brain’s empirical (chapters 7 and 8) and ontological (chapters 9–11) integration within the world, that is, world–brain relation—the world–brain relation is an ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC; chapter 10). In contrast, I left open how we can take into view that very same “beyond ourselves,” that is, the world–brain relation as OPC—that shall be the focus in this chapter.

Main Aim and Argument

The main aim in the present chapter is to complement the empirical (chapters 7 and 8) and ontological (chapters 9–11) account of “beyond ourselves” and thus of world–brain relation as OPC on the methodological and epistemological level. I argue that we methodologically need to radically shift our vantage point from within mind or brain to a vantage point from “beyond brain” to take into view the role of world–brain relation as OPC. Such vantage point from beyond brain will allow us to include the role of world–brain relation as OPC as a possible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge (chapter 12) while, at the same time, it excludes mind as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge.

I conclude that the exclusion of mind renders impossible the mind–body problem, which therefore can be completely replaced by the world–brain problem. As such ontological replacement of the mind–body problem by the world–brain problem is methodologically based on a radical shift in our vantage point, it amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy (see introduction in chapters 12 and 13 for the concept of Copernican revolution).

Part I: Post-Copernican Stance—Vantage Point from beyond Brain

Vantage Point from beyond Brain Ia: Ontic Origin and Ontic Location—Mental Features Reach beyond Ourselves to the World

How can we take into view our relation to the world? We discussed different vantage points such as those from within mind, brain, and body. None allowed us to take into view our relation to the world though. All three vantage points assumed that mind, brain, or body provide the ontic origin of mental features as well as our ontic location within the world (chapter 13). However, that only allows us to take into view mind, body, or brain while it excludes the world itself, including its relation to our body and brain. We thus require a different vantage point. That vantage point should allow us to take into view the world itself, including our relation to the world, and thus what extends beyond our brain and body, that is, beyond ourselves.

Copernicus encountered an analogous challenge. He searched for a vantage point that allowed him to take into view how we, as bound to the Earth, can reach and extend beyond the Earth to the universe, that is, beyond ourselves. Specifically, the pre-Copernican vantage point from within Earth did not allow us to take into view our relation to the universe (i.e., universe–Earth relation), which rendered it impossible to account for what extends beyond Earth, that is, beyond ourselves (chapter 12). Hence, like us with respect to mind, body, and brain, he was confronted with the challenge of developing a vantage point that allowed him to take into view the universe beyond ourselves, that is, beyond our ontic location on Earth.

What exactly extends beyond ourselves, that is, beyond Earth, in the case of Copernicus? Copernicus searched for the ontic origin of the movements that could be observed. As they take place within the universe, those movements reach and extend beyond Earth—they can be characterized by what I described as “beyond ourselves.” How could Copernicus take into view that very same “beyond ourselves”? By shifting the vantage point from within Earth to a vantage point from beyond Earth, Copernicus was able to take into view that very same “beyond ourselves,” that is, how the observed movements could extend and reach beyond ourselves and take place within the universe as a whole with the Earth as its part (chapter 12).

I now argue that we require an analogous shift in vantage point with respect to mental features. Like the movements in the case of Copernicus, mental features confront us with the problem of taking into view something that reaches beyond ourselves, that is, beyond our body and brain to the world. Learning from Copernicus, I therefore suggest shifting our vantage point from within mind, body, or brain to a vantage point from beyond brain (I owe the suggestion of the term “beyond” in the context of vantage point to Kathinka Evers in Uppsala, Sweden; see figure 14.1).

Figure 14.1 Post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain and its allo- and eco-centric view (the black line indicates that the brain “moves around” the world).

Vantage Point from beyond Brain Ib: Ontic Origin and Ontic Location—World–Brain Relation as beyond Ourselves

What do I mean by the vantage point from beyond brain? The vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view that which extends beyond our brain and body, that is, beyond ourselves. Specifically, it allows us to take into view that our brain relates us to the world (i.e., world–brain relation) by means of which we become part of the world. That can be compared to the vantage point from beyond Earth. Analogously, the vantage point from beyond Earth allowed us to take into view how we, as based ourselves on Earth, can become part of the universe. We were now able to take into view how the Earth, as on the basis of its movements, can relate us to the universe (i.e., universe–Earth relation; chapter 12).

How can the vantage point from beyond brain account for the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world? We recall, in the case of the vantage point from within mind, brain, or body, we could only take into view mind, brain, or body as both the ontic origin of mental features and the ontic location of ourselves within the world. That is different in the case of the vantage point from beyond brain. The vantage point from beyond brain renders impossible determining mind, brain, or body as the sole and single ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world.

As it extends our view beyond ourselves to the world, that is, beyond brain and body, the vantage point from beyond brain renders it impossible to determine both ontic origin and ontic location solely by mind, body, or brain alone, that is, independent of the world. Instead, as the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view that which is beyond ourselves, that is, the world, we can now include the world in our determination of both ontic origin and ontic location.

Let me detail that. The shift from a vantage point from within brain to a vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view that which extends and reaches beyond our brain, that is, beyond ourselves. What extends beyond ourselves, that is, beyond brain and body, is the world and how it relates to us including our brain (i.e., the world–brain relation). That, in turn, makes it possible for us to determine world–brain relation (rather than the brain itself or, alternatively, body or mind) as the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world.

Taken together, the vantage point from beyond brain allows for a wider view of both ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world. Rather than restricting both ontic origin and ontic location to mind, body, or brain alone, that is, independent of the world, we can now take into view the world itself and how it relates to, for instance, the brain (i.e., world–brain relation). The vantage point from beyond brain thus makes it possible to take into view that which lies beyond ourselves, namely, world and world–brain relation.

In a nutshell, the vantage point from beyond brain provides us with a wider view of ourselves that reaches beyond ourselves to the world. That, in turn, makes it possible for us to take into view how we are integrated within the world by means of our brain (i.e., world–brain relation) and can thereby become part of the world as a whole.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IIa: Vantage Point from beyond Mind—Beyond World

The proponents of mind or body may now want to argue that they fully share the need to go beyond ourselves, that is, beyond brain or body, when determining both the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world. However, that can best be done by employing a vantage point from beyond mind or a vantage point from beyond body rather than a vantage point from beyond brain: instead of world–brain relation, we can then take into view mind–world relation or body–world relation and how they serve as the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world. In short, mind–world relation or body–world relation replace world–brain relation.

I reject both suggestions though. Let us start with the vantage point from beyond mind. The vantage point from beyond mind does indeed allow for taking into view that which extends beyond the mind. However, that very same “beyond mind” targets a world that is different from the one we live in. Put into the terms of the logical spaces of nature and reason (chapter 15), one may say that the vantage point from beyond mind targets the logical space of reason as distinguished from the logical space of nature. This carries major implications for our determination of ontic origin and ontic location.

The ontic origin of mental features is now found in those features, that is, conceptual relations, that characterize the logical space of reason (McDowell, 1994; Sellars, 1963), while our ontic location, even if in the logical space of nature, may then be determined in the conceptual–logical terms of the logical space of reason (chapter 15). As it relies primarily on reason, the vantage point from beyond mind converges with (and, even stronger, may be identical with) what I described as the vantage point from within reason in chapter 13.

However, the determination of the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world in the conceptual–logical terms of reason must be rejected as it extends the “beyond ourselves” too far: it reaches not only beyond ourselves, that is, beyond brain and body, but also beyond the world within which brain and body are “located,” that is, “beyond world.” One is then confronted with the question of the relation between the two “beyonds,” that is, “beyond ourselves” and “beyond world.”

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IIb: Vantage Point from beyond Mind—Beyond Ourselves versus beyond World

How do the two “beyonds,” that is, “beyond ourselves” and “beyond world,” stand in relation to each other? The critic may want to argue that they are identical in their extension—beyond ourselves reaches as far as beyond world. That is not the case though. The concept of beyond world entails an extension beyond both ourselves and world. In contrast, the concept of beyond ourselves only includes an extension “beyond body and brain.” That very same “beyond body and brain” does not entail an extension beyond the world itself within which body and brain are located, though—beyond ourselves thus does not extend as far as beyond world. Therefore, we can easily reject the proponent’s argument of identical extension of beyond ourselves and beyond world.

Let me rephrase the distinction between beyond ourselves and beyond world in terms of the logical space of nature and reason (McDowell, 1994; Sellars, 1963). As it remains within the boundaries of world, beyond ourselves is quite compatible with the presupposition of the logical space of nature in a spatiotemporally extended version. In contrast, as it extends beyond the world itself and relies on conceptual relation and reason, beyond world requires us to presuppose the logical space of reason (rather than the logical space of nature). This opens the door for speculation with metaphysics and its “fictional forces” (Sacks, 2000, p. 312) including the intuition of mind.

Most important, the need of “beyond world” to presuppose the logical space of reason (rather than the logical space of nature) renders it distinctively non-Copernican rather than post-Copernican (chapters 12 and 13). Therefore, as it entails beyond world (rather than beyond ourselves), the supposition of a vantage from beyond mind simply misses its aim, namely, to provide a truly post-Copernican vantage point as alternative to the pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IIIa: Vantage Point from beyond Body—Beyond Observation versus beyond World

How about the vantage point from beyond body? The vantage point from beyond body allows us to extend our view beyond our body and thus beyond ourselves. In contrast, it does not allow us to extend our view beyond the world we live in, that is, beyond world. The view we can take when presupposing the vantage point from beyond body thus remains within the bounds of the world without reaching beyond world. Therefore, unlike the vantage point from beyond mind, the vantage point from beyond body is not confronted with the problem of the discrepancy between beyond ourselves and beyond world.

What does this imply for our determination of the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world? As the vantage point from beyond body does not extend our view beyond world, we can determine both ontic origin and ontic location in the terms of the world. This raises the question of what such determination looks like in methodological terms.

The vantage point from beyond body allows us to take into view that which is beyond ourselves in the world. As beyond ourselves also includes extending beyond our own methodological tools such as observation, the vantage point from beyond body allows us to go beyond our own observation (i.e., “beyond observation”). More specifically, we can now take into view that which we cannot observe (i.e., that which is beyond observation) but which is nevertheless part of the world (i.e., beyond ourselves), as distinguished from that which extends beyond the world itself (i.e., beyond world).

Put into the terms of the concept of the logical space of nature (McDowell, 1994; Sellars, 1963), the vantage point from beyond body allows us to take into view a conception of the logical space of nature that extends beyond observation. This makes it possible for us to distinguish a spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature as in ontic structural realism (chapter 9) from the traditional observationally restricted logical space of nature as in science (Sellars, 1963). Most importantly, as beyond observation only implies beyond ourselves but not beyond world, that very same distinction can be made without the need to reach beyond the logical space of nature itself and thus beyond the world to the logical space of reason.

In sum, the vantage point from beyond body allows us to take a view that extends beyond ourselves without extending too far, that is, beyond the world we live in (i.e., beyond world). This renders the vantage point from beyond body distinctively post-Copernican as distinguished from both the pre-Copernican vantage point from within body and the non-Copernican vantage point from beyond mind. Because it is truly post-Copernican (rather than either pre- or non-Copernican), I consider the vantage point from beyond body superior to both the vantage point from beyond mind and the vantage point from within body.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IIIb: Vantage Point from beyond Body—Scope of View

How does the vantage point from beyond body stand in relation to the vantage point from beyond brain? Its truly post-Copernican stance puts the vantage point from beyond body on the same par or ground as the vantage point from beyond brain. Both allow for extending our view beyond ourselves and beyond observation without reaching beyond the world itself (i.e., beyond world). That distinguishes both the vantage point from beyond body and brain from the vantage point from beyond mind, which extends our view not only beyond ourselves and beyond observation but also beyond world.

This raises yet another question though, namely, that of the distinction between the vantage point from beyond body and the vantage point from beyond brain. How can we distinguish these two vantage points? This is especially important given that I opt for the vantage point from beyond brain (rather than the vantage point from beyond body). On a purely conceptual–logical level, both vantage points can indeed not be distinguished from each other as both allow for taking into view the same world, that is, the world we live in as characterized by spatiotemporal features, as well as one and the same conception of the logical space, that is, the spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature.

In contrast to the conceptual–logical realm, both vantage points lead to differences on the ontological level when it comes to determining ontic origin and ontic location. The vantage point from beyond body will determine world–body relation as the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world, whereas the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view the brain, including its relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation), as the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world.

Why do both vantage points lead to different ontological determinations? I argue that the scope of their respective view is different. The vantage point from beyond body can only take into view all that which is beyond the body—this includes the body’s relation to the world (i.e., world–body relation). In contrast, the vantage point from beyond brain can include all that which lies beyond the brain—this includes the brain’s relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation), as well as how that impacts the body and its relation to the world, that is, “beyond body.” I will specify that difference in the scope of their views in the following section.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IIIc: Vantage Point from beyond Body—Beyond Body versus beyond Brain

The proponent of the vantage point from beyond body may now want to argue that there is indeed a difference in scope but that this speaks in favor of the vantage point from beyond body. The vantage point from beyond body can well take into view the brain as the brain is included as part of the body as a whole—beyond body thus entails beyond brain. Therefore, as it includes both beyond brain and beyond body, the vantage point from beyond body shows a wider scope than the vantage point from beyond brain that only includes beyond brain but not beyond body. I reject that argument, though, and suggest instead the reverse, namely, that beyond brain includes beyond body for which reason the scope of the vantage point from beyond brain is wider than that of the vantage point from beyond body.

True indeed, the vantage point from beyond body allows us to take into view the brain. However, the brain can be taken into view only as part of the body and thus in dependence on the body, including its relation to the world (i.e., world–body relation). In contrast, the brain itself, with its own relation to the world (i.e., the world–brain relation) does not come into view at all. In short, the vantage point from beyond body excludes world–brain relation from its view.

This is obviously different in the vantage point from beyond brain. The vantage point from beyond brain can take into view all that which is beyond the brain. However, the exact meaning of “beyond brain” remains unclear, as we need to define the scope of what “beyond” refers to. That shall be discussed in the following. Beyond brain includes the brain’s relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation), as well as the body’s relation to the world (i.e., world–body relation). I thus argue that beyond brain includes beyond body. As it includes beyond body, beyond brain shows a wider scope and extension when compared to those of beyond body that are limited to the body while excluding the brain.

How can beyond brain include beyond body? Put into empirical terms, I demonstrated that the brain’s spontaneous activity receives inputs from both body, that is, interoceptive stimuli, and world, that is, exteroceptive stimuli. Most importantly, both inputs are integrated within the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure, which, in turn, makes it possible to align brain and subsequently the body to the world (chapter 8). The same holds, analogously, on the ontological level: the brain constitutes the relational time and space by means of which brain itself and subsequently body can be integrated within and thus related to the world (chapter 10)—the world–body relation can thus be traced to the world–brain relation (chapter 10).

What does this imply for the relationship between beyond brain and beyond body? Beyond body, that is, the extension of the body to the world, is empirically and ontologically dependent upon beyond brain. Therefore, beyond brain implies or entails beyond body. In contrast, beyond body only focuses on the body’s relation to the world (i.e., world–body relation) while neglecting the brain’s own relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation). As beyond body does not consider the brain’s own relation to the world, the scope of the world–body relation remains limited. For instance, it remains unable to account for why and how the objective body is transformed into the lived body—for that, the world–brain relation is central as it allows for the brain’s spatiotemporal alignment to the world, which, in turn, transforms the objective into the lived body (chapter 8).

In sum, I argue that the vantage point from beyond brain provides us with a wider scope, that is, including both beyond brain and beyond body, in our view of the beyond ourselves when compared to the scope of the vantage point from beyond body that is limited to beyond body. Thus, the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view that which extends beyond both brain and body whereas we can only take into view that which reaches beyond body in the vantage point from beyond body.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IVa: Ontic Center of the World—Three Criteria

We have so far focused on the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world. That leaves aside yet another feature of a vantage point, namely, that it allows us to make assumptions about the “ontic center” (chapters 12 and 13). For that, I again turn back briefly to Copernicus.

Copernicus shifted the vantage point from within Earth to a vantage point from beyond Earth. This allowed him to determine the sun rather than the Earth as the ontic center of the universe and thus to replace the geocentric view with a heliocentric one (chapter 12). This strongly affected the supposed ontic center of the universe. The geocentric view is rather ego- and anthropocentric, as it puts us (i.e., humans) right into the ontic center of the universe (chapter 12). That changed though with the shift from the geo- to heliocentric view. This made it possible to establish an “allocentric view” rather than egocentric view, which considered the sun as the ontic center of the universe (chapter 12). I now claim that the same holds analogously in the case of the vantage point from beyond brain. We recall from the previous chapter (chapter 13) that, analogous to the geocentric view, the vantage point from within mind, body, or brain puts us as humans right into the ontic center of the universe—this amounts to an ego- and anthropocentric view of the world. That changes when shifting the vantage point from within mind, body, or brain to a vantage point from beyond brain.

As it reaches and extends beyond brain and body (see above), the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view the world itself, that is, beyond ourselves. We therefore no longer need to identify our own ontic location within the world with the ontic center of the world itself. Specifically, we can now determine the ontic center of the world in a way that is different and somewhat independent of ourselves, that is, body and brain. We can thus take into view that which is beyond ourselves which may define the ontic center of the world by itself (i.e., as it remains independent of us).

What is the ontic center of the world? Let us consider some criteria that must be fulfilled for determining the ontic center of the world. First, the ontic center of the world must allow for determining the world independent of us: it should remain independent of body, brain, world–brain relation, and, most importantly, also of our mental features (such as consciousness). Second, the ontic center of the world must allow for including its relation to brain and body (i.e., world–brain and world–body relation) as they provide the ontic origin of mental features and our ontic location within the world. Third, the ontic center must be a necessary condition of the existence and reality of the world as such: without the ontic center, the world could not exist in the same way the universe could not exist without the sun as the ontic center.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IVb: Ontic Center of the World—Time and Space

What is now the ontic center of the world? I suppose that space and time constitute the ontic center of the world as they fulfill all three criteria. Let us start with the third condition. Time and space are the ontic center of the world as without them the world as such would no longer exist—time and space are thus a necessary condition of the existence and reality of the world itself. This fulfills the third criterion.

Moreover, time and space in this sense can include the relation of the world to ourselves like the world–brain relation—one would then assume time and space to exist in terms of what I described as relational time and space (chapters 9 and 11). More specifically, world–brain relation is an intrinsically spatiotemporal relation as it links the different spatiotemporal scales of world and brain to each other (chapters 9–11). Time and space as the ontic center of the world thus make possible our relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation) as our ontic location within that very same world. This is very much analogous to Copernicus’s cosmological assumption: the sun as the ontic center of the universe makes possible our ontic location, that is, universe–Earth relation, within that very same universe. Thus, the requirement of the second criterion, the relation between the ontic center and us, is well met.

Finally, time and space themselves remain completely independent of us and our existence and reality. Whether we, as humans, including our brain and body, exist or not does not matter for time and space, whose existence and reality are more encompassing and thus beyond ourselves. This meets the first criterion, the independence of time and space from us. Taken together, as time and space meet all three criteria, I consider them ideal candidates for being the ontic center of the world.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain IVc: Ontic Center of the World—Ego- and Anthropocentric View versus Allo- and Eco-centric View

What does the assumption of time and space as the ontic center of the world imply for our view of the world and ourselves? We recall that the vantage point from within brain resulted in an ego- and anthropocentric view, as it identified our ontic location within the world with the ontic center of the world itself. Such an ego- and anthropocentric view was manifest in a neuro-centric view of the world (which replaced the mento-centric view of the vantage point from within mind; chapter 13).

How about the vantage point from beyond brain? Unlike the vantage points from within mind, brain, or body, the vantage point from beyond brain allows for divergence between ontic location and ontic center: the world–brain relation is our ontic location within the world, while time and space constitute the ontic center of the world. This makes it possible for the vantage point from beyond brain to escape any kind of ego- and anthropocentric view of the world including neuro- and mento-centric views. Specifically, by taking the world beyond ourselves into view, the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to conceive ourselves as part of the wider world—the egocentric view is replaced by an allocentric view. Moreover, the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to detach ourselves from the view that we as humans are the center of the world—the anthropocentric view is replaced by an eco-centric view.

Let me summarize. The vantage point from beyond brain allows for divergent determination of both our ontic location within the world and the ontic center of the world. The ontic center of the world can now be determined as independent of us and our ontic location within the world. That makes it possible to abandon an ego- and anthropocentric view of the world and replace it with an allo- and eco-centric view. Rather than inferring the ontic center of the world from our own ontic location within the world, we can now make an inference in the opposite direction from, ontic center to ontic location: we can determine our ontic location within the world in dependence on the ontic center of the world. This allows us to replace neuro- and mento-centric views with a novel view of the world.

What does such novel view of the world look like? We recall that time and space were determined as the ontic center of the world. Our view of the world is consequently spatiotemporal, entailing a spatiotemporal view, as I say. I therefore suppose that our current neuro- and mento-centric view of the world must be replaced by a spatiotemporal view of the world. Specifically, the spatiotemporal view determines the world in terms of relational time and space: the latter constitute spatiotemporal relation and structure as the ontic center of the world itself, which includes world–brain relation as our ontic location within that very same world.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain Va: Ontic Center of the World—Spatiotemporal and Mereological Confusion

The critic may now want to argue that the characterization of both ontic center and ontic location by space and time leads to mereological and spatiotemporal confusion. Let us return briefly to Copernicus. The vantage point from within Earth could be characterized by mereological and spatiotemporal confusion in that it locates the universe as a spatiotemporally larger whole within Earth as its spatiotemporally smaller part (chapter 13).

An analogous argument may now be put forward against the vantage point from beyond brain: it locates the spatiotemporally more extended world as a whole in the brain as its spatiotemporally smaller part. The vantage point from beyond brain thus suffers from mereological and spatiotemporal confusion, for which reason it must be rejected as conceptually incoherent. However, that argument confuses the vantage point from beyond brain with a vantage point from within brain. The vantage point from within brain does indeed locate the spatiotemporally more extended world as a whole within the brain as its spatiotemporally more restricted part—this amounts to spatiotemporal and mereological confusion (see chapter 13 for details).

That does not apply to the vantage point from beyond brain though. By extending the view beyond the brain itself, the vantage point from beyond brain can take into view how the brain as a spatiotemporally smaller part is related to and integrated within the spatiotemporally larger world as a whole. Rather than locating the spatiotemporally larger world as a whole within the brain as a spatiotemporally smaller part, the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view the reverse, namely, to consider how the brain, as a less spatiotemporally extended part, is related to and integrated within the spatiotemporally more extended world as a whole.

Vantage Point from beyond Brain Vb: Ontic Center of the World—Spatiotemporal Boxing versus Spatiotemporal Nestedness

Let us consider the relation between brain and world in a slightly different way. Instead of locating or “boxing” the world within the brain (i.e., “spatiotemporal boxing”), the brain is integrated or nested within the world—we can thus account for what ontologically I described as spatiotemporal nestedness (chapter 11. Importantly, spatiotemporal boxing and spatiotemporal nestedness entail different relationships between world and brain. In the case of spatiotemporal boxing, the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale must relate to the larger one of the world in order to include the latter—this amounts to what I describe as brain–world relation. That entails indeed spatiotemporal and mereological confusion as the spatiotemporally larger world is boxed within the spatiotemporally smaller brain.

The converse holds in the case of spatiotemporal nestedness. In that case, the world and its larger spatiotemporal scale must relate to the smaller one of the brain in order to contain and nest the latter—this amounts to what I describe as world–brain relation. There is no spatiotemporal and mereological confusion in this case as something larger (the world) can well contain and nest something smaller (the brain).

We are now ready to reject the argument of mereological and spatiotemporal confusion against the vantage point from beyond brain. I claim that the argument itself is based on the confusion between spatiotemporal boxing (of the world within the brain) through brain–world relation on the one hand and spatiotemporal nestedness (of the brain within the world) through world–brain relation on the other. Only spatiotemporal boxing with brain–world relation suffers from mereological and spatiotemporal confusion whereas that is not the case in spatiotemporal nestedness as featured in the world–brain relation.

Taken together, the argument of mereological and spatiotemporal confusion must be rejected. Moreover, I return the favor of confusion. I claim that the proponent of this argument herself or himself suffers from confusion as she or he confuses different spatiotemporal relations, that is, spatiotemporal boxing versus spatiotemporal nestedness, and consecutively different relationships between world and brain (i.e., brain–world relation vs. world–brain relation).

Part II: Post-Copernican Stance—Exclusion of Mind

Post-Copernican Stance Ia: Epistemic Reference—Mind/Body/Brain versus World

Copernicus was confronted with the problem of determining the ontic origin of the different types of movements that could be observed in the universe (chapter 12). More specifically, the pre-Copernican cosmologists remained unable to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the movements and the Earth. Therefore, they attributed the movements to the universe as their ontic origin when they assumed that the universe supposedly circulates around Earth as the ontic center of the universe. That changed with Copernicus though. By shifting his vantage point, he, unlike the pre-Copernican cosmologists, was able to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the movements and the Earth. Why did the shift in vantage point made it possible for him to take into view the necessary ontological connection between the movements and the Earth?

I postulate that this was made possible by a change in “epistemic reference,” that is, the standard or baseline against which he compared or set his knowledge (see chapter 12 for details). Instead of the Earth’s serving as the epistemic reference, the observed movements could now be set and compared against the universe itself as the epistemic reference. This, in turn, made it possible to draw the necessary ontological connection between the Earth and the movements and thus to attribute the ontic origin of the movements to the Earth rather than to the universe (chapter 12).

We are now confronted with a problem analogous to that of the pre-Copernican cosmologists when it comes to mental features. Like Copernicus’s predecessors in their search for the ontic origin of movements, we are confronted with the question of the ontic origin of mental features. Moreover, as in their case of the relation between the Earth and the movements, we remain unable to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness.

How can we change that? We can do in our case of mental features exactly what Copernicus did in his case of the movements. We can change our epistemic reference. Analogous to Copernicus’s shift of his epistemic reference from the Earth to the universe, we may want to shift our epistemic reference from mind/body/brain to the world: instead of mind, body, or brain serving as the epistemic reference, we can now set and compare our knowledge against the world itself as the epistemic reference. That, in turn, should allow us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features.

Post-Copernican Stance Ib: Epistemic Reference—Partial Dependence between Ontic Location and Epistemic Reference

How can we change our epistemic reference from mind, body, or brain to the world itself though? For that, we require a vantage point that allows us to take into view the world. Let me explicate that in more detail. The world is that which is beyond ourselves (see above). That very same “beyond ourselves” concerns what is beyond our own body and brain (i.e., beyond brain and body)—this amounts to nothing but the world itself as it remains independent of us including our brain and body. Accordingly, by conceiving “beyond brain and body,” we can take into view the world itself which, in turn, makes it possible to compare and set our knowledge against the world (rather than brain or body) as the epistemic reference.

How does the world as the epistemic reference stand in relation to our ontic location within that very same world? The pre-Copernican cosmologists took the Earth as both ontic location and epistemic reference—this amounted to what I described as complete dependence (chapter 12). In contrast, Copernicus’s shift in vantage point allowed him to take an epistemic reference, that is, the universe, that remained partially independent of our own ontic location on Earth within the universe (i.e., partial independence; chapter 12).

The same holds analogously in our case of the vantage point from beyond brain. The world as an epistemic reference remains partially independent of world–brain relation as our ontic location within that very same world (see above). Let me explicate such partial independence between world and world–brain relation. The world itself can well be conceived without the brain whereas it remains impossible to conceive the world without relation and structure—the brain itself is not necessary for the world to exist and be real in terms of relation and structure (chapter 11). The world thus remains independent of the brain while it remains dependent upon relation and structure as signified in world–brain relation.

Taken together, this amounts to partial independence between world–brain relation as ontic location and world as epistemic reference, which must be distinguished from both complete dependence and complete independence (chapters 12 and 13). Moreover, such partial independence can be characterized as post-Copernican rather than pre-Copernican or non-Copernican (chapters 12 and 13). Accordingly, the change in epistemic reference from mind, body, or brain to world, as engineered by the shift in vantage point from beyond brain, allows us to take a true post-Copernican stance. More radically put, changing our epistemic reference to the world amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in our investigation of mental features in neuroscience and philosophy.

Post-Copernican Stance Ic: Epistemic Reference—Necessary Ontological Connection between Brain and Mental Features

How does the world as the epistemic reference allow us to take into view the necessary ontological connection of mental features to their ontic origin? Presupposing the world as the epistemic reference makes it possible to set, compare, and match mental features, including their spatiotemporal range, against the world and its larger spatiotemporal range. We can then take into view that the “beyond ourselves” that characterizes mental features (see above) consists in exactly that, namely, the degree to which the spatiotemporal range of the world extends beyond ourselves, including our brain and body (see above).

As that spatiotemporal difference, that is, “beyond brain and body,” can be ontologically traced to world–brain relation (chapter 10), we can now match, set, and compare mental features against world–brain relation and, ultimately, the world and its larger spatiotemporal range as the epistemic reference. This, in turn, allows us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between world–brain relation and mental features as it consists in spatiotemporal relation and structure (chapter 10). More specifically, we can now determine world–brain relation as the ontic origin of mental features, that is, as OPC (chapter 10); that, in turn, allows us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness (chapter 10).

The critic may now want to argue that all this can already be achieved by a vantage point from within brain. The vantage point from within brain allows us to take the brain as an epistemic reference (chapter 13). That, in turn, makes it possible to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness. We therefore need to change neither our vantage point, that is, the vantage point from within brain, nor our epistemic reference, that is, the brain itself, to account for the necessary ontological connection of mental features to the brain as their ontic origin.

I reject that argument as it confuses different origins, that is, empirical origin and ontic origin. True, the vantage point from within brain allows drawing a connection between brain and mental features: this is possible by taking the brain as the epistemic reference for our empirical observations. The brain may thus be determined as the empirical origin of mental features. However, as we remain completely within the empirical realm of the brain while neglecting the ontological domain of the world, we cannot take into view any ontological connection between brain and mental features, let alone their necessary ontological connection. That is required though if one wants to determine the brain as ontic origin rather than mere empirical origin of mental features.

Post-Copernican Stance Id: Epistemic Reference—Ontic Origin versus Empirical Origin

We are now ready to reject the critic’s argument. She or he confuses the empirical origin—that is, brain—and the ontic origin—that is, world–brain relation—of mental features: she or he falsely assumes that we can determine the ontic origin of mental features (as in world–brain relation) solely on the basis of their empirical origin (as in the brain). I suppose that such confusion is due to the fact that the presupposed vantage point from within brain only allows us to take into view the latter (i.e., the empirical origin) but not the former (i.e., the ontic origin). The only way to escape such confusion is thus to shift the vantage point from within brain to beyond brain. As this undermines, if not contradicts, the critic’s presupposition, her or his argument must be rejected.

In sum, I argue that we need to change our epistemic reference from mind, body, or brain to the world to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and mental features. Such change in epistemic reference can be engineered by shifting our vantage point from within mind, brain, or body to a vantage point from beyond brain—this allows us to take into view that which is beyond ourselves, that is, the world.

Once we can take into view the world as the epistemic reference, we can set and compare mental features as characterized by “beyond ourselves” against the larger spatiotemporal range of the world, including its relation to the brain (i.e., world–brain relation). We can subsequently determine world–brain relation as the ontic origin of mental features, that is, as OPC; this, in turn, makes it possible for us to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness.

Post-Copernican Stance IIa: Intuition of Mind—Exclusion of Mind from Our View

Our initial starting point was the intuition of mind (chapter 12). To avoid the pulling force of the intuition of mind, we require a logical space of knowledge that no longer includes the mind as a possible epistemic option. As the logical space of knowledge, including its possible and impossible epistemic options, depends upon our vantage point (chapter 15), we need to develop a vantage point that no longer allows us to take into view the mind at all.

I claim that the vantage point from beyond brain is such vantage point. Specifically, I argue that the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to exclude the mind as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge. This makes it impossible to sustain the concept of mind, including its pulling forces, that lets us suppose the mind as the ontic origin of mental features. However, we did not yet demonstrate any of that. I only showed how the vantage point from beyond brain allows us to change our epistemic reference to the world; that, in turn, makes it possible to take into view the necessary ontological connection between brain and consciousness. In contrast, I have not yet shown how we can abolish the intuition of mind—that shall be the focus in the reminder of this chapter.

Can the vantage point from beyond brain exclude the intuition of mind as a possible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge? We recall the fourfold intuition of mind (chapter 13). The mind was intuited as the ontic origin of mental features as well as our ontic location within the world. Moreover, we intuited the mind as the ontic center of the world and the epistemic reference for our knowledge about that very same world. All four intuitions of mind are, as I propose, based on the vantage point from within mind that allows for including the mind as a possible epistemic option within the respective logical space of knowledge.

Does the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from beyond brain still include the intuition of mind as a possible epistemic option? I argue that this is not the case—the intuition of mind is no longer included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge as entailed by the vantage point from beyond brain. Let me specify this in the following.

First, the mind, that is, the possible existence and reality of mind, does not come into view at all in the vantage point from beyond brain: all we can see and take into view beyond ourselves (see above) is the world itself and how it relates to us, including our brain and body (i.e., world–brain relation). Moreover, we can take into view just how such world–brain relation provides the ontic origin of mental features as, for instance, in terms of OPC.

The advocate of mind may now want to argue that which is beyond ourselves is not just the world itself but includes the mind. That is to confuse beyond ourselves and beyond world though. The vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view that which is beyond ourselves within the world—we can now take into view what else there is in the world beyond our brain and body.

However, that very same world does not include the mind: to take into view the mind requires one to take into view that which is beyond our world rather than just that which is beyond ourselves, including our brain and body. In short, beyond ourselves does not entail beyond world. Therefore, the vantage point from beyond brain does not include the mind as a possible epistemic option in its logical space of knowledge.

Post-Copernican Stance IIb: Intuition of Mind—Spatiotemporal Exclusion of Mind

The critic may not want to relent yet though. We cannot know whether the mind is really excluded from the view beyond ourselves and thus from our world. Therefore, the vantage point from beyond brain remains unable to exclude the mind as an impossible epistemic option in its logical space of knowledge. I again reject that argument. That which is beyond ourselves in the world and thus the world itself must be as spatial and temporal as we are since otherwise we would not be part of that world. The world itself, including beyond ourselves, must thus be spatiotemporal.

This is different in the case of mind. The mind is intrinsically aspatial and atemporal (chapters 10 and 13). Therefore, the mind can only be taken into view by a vantage point that extends beyond our spatiotemporal world, that is, beyond world that can thus be specified as beyond time and space. As it is still related to the brain (and its spatiotemporal features), the vantage point from beyond brain cannot but remain within the boundaries of time and space of the spatiotemporal world. Therefore, the vantage point from beyond brain only allows us to take into view that which is spatiotemporal and beyond ourselves whereas it cannot take into view that which is aspatial and atemporal, that is, beyond time and space, as it specifies the mind as being beyond world.

In sum, the vantage point from beyond brain necessarily excludes mind as an impossible epistemic option from its logical space of knowledge. As the mind is excluded as an impossible epistemic option on spatiotemporal grounds, I speak of “spatiotemporal exclusion” of mind from the logical space of knowledge that is associated with a vantage point from beyond brain.

Post-Copernican Stance IIc: Intuition of Mind—Exclusion of Mind as Impossible Epistemic Option

How is the exclusion of mind as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge related to the intuition of mind? What is no longer included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge can no longer be assumed at all—the intuition of mind is simply no longer a possible epistemic option. That carries far-reaching consequences in that it renders impossible all four intuitions of mind. The main argument is that the aspatial and atemporal nature of mind that is beyond time and space and thus beyond world conflicts with the spatiotemporal nature of ontic origin, ontic location, ontic center, and epistemic reference as they all remain within the spatiotemporal bounds of the world. Let me explicate that.

We can no longer conceive the mind as the ontic origin of mental features. Assuming the ontic origin of mental features as characterized in spatiotemporal terms requires one to conceive above something that is spatiotemporal rather than aspatial and atemporal since otherwise it could not serve as their ontic origin. Moreover, this also makes it impossible to intuit the mind as the ontic location of ourselves within the world: if that which is beyond ourselves remains within the spatiotemporal bounds of the world (see above), we can no longer take into view and thus assume the mind as our aspatial and atemporal ontic location within a spatiotemporal world.

Moreover, the vantage point from beyond brain no longer allows taking into view the mind as the ontic center of the world—how can something that is aspatial and atemporal be the ontic center of something, that is, the world, that is inherently spatiotemporal? The vantage point from beyond brain can only view the world in terms of space and time, that is, spatiotemporal world, and therefore can only take into view an ontic center that shares time and space with the world—time and space themselves are then the ontic center of the world, which excludes the assumption of the aspatial and atemporal mind as a possible epistemic option.

Finally, the same holds for the fourth intuition of mind, that is, the mind as the epistemic reference. True, the vantage point from beyond brain reaches and extends our view beyond both brain and body. However, that does not imply that the vantage point from beyond brain also reaches and extends beyond world, including its time and space (i.e., beyond time and space). The distinction between both extensions, that is, beyond brain/body and beyond world, is important. Once one claims to reach and extend beyond the world, one abandons the vantage point from beyond brain and replaces it with a completely different vantage point such as a vantage point from within or beyond mind. This brings us back to the intuition of mind and the mind–body problem, however. Therefore, we need to distinguish carefully between the extension beyond brain/body as related to the vantage point from beyond brain and the extension beyond world that is associated with a vantage point from within or beyond mind. In sum, the logical space of knowledge entailed by the vantage point from beyond brain excludes the mind as an impossible epistemic option for all four intuitions of mind, the ontic origin of mental features, our ontic location in the world, the ontic center of world, and the epistemic reference of our knowledge about the world. As it is no longer included as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge, any intuition of mind remains impossible too, right from the very beginning. Something, that is, the mind, that is no longer included as a possible epistemic option within our logical space of knowledge cannot be conceived anymore nor can it exert any pulling forces on us in our ontological assumptions.

Post-Copernican Stance IIIa: Intuition of Relation—Spatiotemporal Discrepancy versus Spatiotemporal Relation

The critic may now want to argue in the following way. True, the vantage point from beyond brain does indeed render impossible the intuition of mind for ontic origin, ontic location, ontic center, and epistemic reference. That indeed puts the vantage point from beyond brain in a superior position when compared to the vantage point from within mind.

However, the vantage point from beyond brain seems to equally rely on intuition when it determines (i) world–brain relation as the ontic origin of mental features, (ii) world–brain relation as our ontic location within the world, (iii) time and space with spatiotemporal relation as the ontic center of the world, and (iv) the world with its spatiotemporal relation as the epistemic reference for our knowledge about the world.

While spatiotemporal features themselves and, more generally, time and space as such do not require intuition, the notion of relation itself seems to be based on intuition as it amounts to mere apprehension of the world without concepts or schema as well as without empirical support. We cannot but conceive relation including world–brain relation. Hence, though admittedly we no longer assume mind, we nevertheless are still assuming something, namely, relation—the intuition of mind is thus replaced by the “intuition of relation.” Let me explicate such intuition of relation in more detail.

We can well take into view the spatiotemporal features of body and world when presupposing a vantage point from beyond brain. We can, for example, take into view that the spatiotemporal scale or range of the world is much larger than that of both body and brain as well as that the body exhibits a larger spatial and temporal scale than the brain. We can thus take into view what I described as spatiotemporal discrepancy as, for instance, the spatiotemporal discrepancy between world and brain (chapter 10).

However, that very same spatiotemporal discrepancy does not entail spatiotemporal relation. When taking into view spatiotemporal discrepancy between world, body, and brain, we do not view anything about their relation, that is, spatiotemporal relation. All we can view are spatiotemporal discrepancies that extend beyond ourselves, that is, beyond brain and body. In contrast, we do not take into view how world, body, and brain are related to each other—spatiotemporal relation, like world–brain relation, thus remains beyond that which we can take into view when presupposing a vantage point from beyond brain.

We must thus distinguish between spatiotemporal discrepancy and spatiotemporal relation as only the former but not the latter can be taken into view by the vantage point from beyond brain. The critic may want to argue that I simply confused both. I falsely assumed that the vantage point from beyond brain can take into view spatiotemporal relation whereas, in truth, it allows only for spatiotemporal discrepancy. This carries major consequences, which shall be detailed in the following.

The critic’s claim amounts to the assumption that the vantage point from beyond brain only allows taking into view spatiotemporal discrepancy but not spatiotemporal relation. Any claim for being able to take into view spatiotemporal relation consequently reaches and extends beyond the epistemic options that are associated with the vantage point from beyond brain. Therefore, the claim for spatiotemporal relation ultimately rests on intuition, that is, an “intuition of relation.” Since the vantage point from beyond brain only allows to take into view spatiotemporal relation on the basis of an intuition of relation, the critic may want to discard and reject the vantage point itself as insufficient.

Post-Copernican Stance IIIb: Intuition of Relation—Does the Vantage Point Matter at All?

The critic may now want to further strengthen her or his point by arguing that world–brain relation and spatiotemporal relation do not remain within the bounds of our world, that is, beyond ourselves, but that they extend beyond our world, that is, beyond world. As they extend beyond world, they cannot be taken into view by the vantage point from beyond brain as its view remains within the spatiotemporal bounds of the world. How then can we account for relation as in world–brain relation? Since we cannot take world–brain relation and spatiotemporal relation into view in our vantage point from beyond brain, we can only intuit them—this amounts to an intuition of relation.

The critic may extend her or his argument even further though. The fact that the vantage point from beyond brain can account for relation only by intuition (i.e., intuition of relation) puts it ultimately on the same ground as the vantage points from within mind and brain that also suffer from intuition (i.e., intuition of mind and intuition of brain; chapter 12). Therefore, as it still relies on intuition, there is no reason to abandon the vantage point from within mind in favor of the vantage point from beyond brain.

That is especially so as it seems that there is no escape from intuition at all. No matter which vantage point one presupposes, we are apparently always confronted with some intuition including intuition of mind, intuition of brain, and intuition of relation (or some other possible forms of intuition not yet discussed). Hence, it may not really matter which vantage point one presupposes as none provides an escape from intuition.

Post-Copernican Stance IIIc: Intuition of Relation—Different Conceptions of the Logical Space of Nature

I reject the argument of intuition of relation. Why? I argue that the proponent of that argument confuses different conceptions of the logical space of nature, that is, an observationally restricted versus spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature. Let me detail my reply.

True indeed, we cannot directly observe spatiotemporal relation between world and brain in the same way we can observe the apple in front of us. Spatiotemporal relation is not subject to observation. Therefore, spatiotemporal relation in world–brain relation is not included as a possible epistemic option in the logical space of knowledge of the vantage point from within brain (or body) as it does not extend beyond observation (chapter 13).

The vantage point from within brain presupposes a rather restricted logical space of nature though, that is, an observationally restricted logical space of nature (see above and chapter 13). As the restriction to observation renders it impossible to take into view spatiotemporal relation, we cannot but intuit world–brain relation and spatiotemporal relation. The charge of intuition of relation is consequently well justified when presupposing a vantage point from within brain (or body) and its observationally restricted logical space of nature.

We need to be careful though. The fact that we cannot observe relation, that is, world–brain relation, in a direct way by ourselves does not mean that we, in principle, cannot take into view spatiotemporal relation, including world–brain relation, when presupposing a different concept of the logical space of nature. The vantage point from beyond brain, for instance, presupposes a spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature rather than an observationally restricted logical space of nature (see above).

As the spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature is by itself characterized by spatiotemporal relation (see above), we can now include world–brain relation and spatiotemporal relation as possible epistemic options within our logical space of knowledge. This, in turn, makes it possible for us to take into view spatiotemporal relation like world–brain relation: we can, for instance, see that the world with its larger spatiotemporal scale is related to the brain with its smaller spatiotemporal scale by containing and nesting it (i.e., spatiotemporal nestedness; see above and chapter 11).

Most importantly, we do not require any intuition to account for such spatiotemporal nestedness as we can take it into view by itself in the same way we can take into view the various Russian dolls with their spatiotemporal nestedness. Thus, we only need to presuppose the “right” vantage point with the “right” logical space of nature, that is, spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature, to take into view world–brain relation and spatiotemporal relation.

We are now ready to reject the critic’s argument. What the critic describes as intuition of relation may simply be related to the “wrong” logical space of nature, that is, observationally restricted logical space, as distinguished from the “right” one, that is, spatiotemporally extended logical space of nature. The critic thus confuses different conceptions of the logical space of nature when she or he charges the vantage point from beyond brain with intuition of relation. Moreover, this also shows that the vantage point strongly matters and, contrary to the critic’s claim, is thus far from being irrelevant.

Post-Copernican Stance IVa: Intuition of Relation—Phenomenal versus Noumenal?

The critic may now want to argue that even if we claim that we can take into view spatiotemporal relation as in world–brain relation, it nevertheless remains rather abstract and may therefore border on, if not transgress into, the realm of the unknowable. Opting for a Kantian-like formulation, the critic may want to argue that spatiotemporal relation as in world–brain relation remains unknowable for us and thus noumenal. I will designate such noumenal meaning of relation in the following by designating it as relation.

Therefore, any claim of being able to take into view relation must be rejected as noumenal as it remains beyond our epistemic reach. The only way to account for relation as in world–brain relation is consequently to intuit relation, resulting in intuition of relation. I reject that argument chiefly for two reasons. First, the critic infers from the abstract nature of spatiotemporal relation to its noumenal character—this is fallacious though. Second, the critic confuses abstraction and intuition.

True, relation in world–brain relation is rather abstract as it is not as concrete as something that can be directly observed as the apple in front of us. Instead of being directly observable, relation in world–brain relation can, at best, only be postulated and thus accounted for in an indirect way in both empirical (chapter 8) and epistemic (chapter 10) domains. Specifically, we can only indirectly observe world–brain relation in the empirical realm by inferring it from the direct observation of, for instance, entrainment and phase shifting as in spatiotemporal alignment of the brain to the world (chapter 8). The same holds in the epistemic domain. We required a rather abstract line of transcendental reasoning to take into view world–brain relation and thus to justify its ontological rather than merely epistemic nature (chapter 11).

However, the abstract nature of spatiotemporal relation, including world–brain relation, does not justify our inferring its noumenal character. The distinction between abstract and concrete is a methodological distinction in that it tells us about how we can or cannot access features like spatiotemporal relation. In contrast, the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal concerns the relationship between epistemic and ontological domains, that is, whether spatiotemporal relation like world–brain relation concerns just our knowledge (i.e., epistemic) or existence and reality itself (i.e., ontological) as spatiotemporal relation (including world–brain relation) remain independent of us and our knowledge of them.

To infer from the abstract nature of spatiotemporal relation like world–brain relation to the relation’s noumenal character (i.e., relation) is consequently to confuse the two distinctions and thus methodological and epistemic–ontological domains. The fact that something is abstract in terms of our methodological access does not imply anything about how our knowledge of it stands in relation to its existence and reality, that is, whether it is mind-dependent or mind-independent, and thus whether it is phenomenal or noumenal.

The critic thus confuses the question of methodological access to spatiotemporal relation like world–brain relation with the question of its phenomenal or noumenal nature. The critic fallaciously infers from the first question of methodological access to the second one of phenomenal–noumenal distinction. As such inference is fallacious, her or his argument of intuition of relation must be rejected as it is based on that very same inference.

Post-Copernican Stance IVb: Intuition of Relation—Existence versus Intuition

How can we make sure that abstract features like spatiotemporal relation reflect and thus correspond to existence and reality in the world? Let us compare the situation to Copernicus. He extended the logical space of knowledge by including a heliocentric view as an epistemic option. This was possible by shifting the vantage point from within Earth to a vantage point from beyond Earth. However, in his time, he did not know whether the heliocentric view was true or not, that is, existent and real. He could only rely on abstract mathematical evidence but was missing concrete empirical evidence. That was provided later by his successors such as Kepler, Bruni, Galileo and Newton—based on empirical evidence, they could show that the heliocentric view corresponds to the existence and reality of the universe.

We are encountering an analogous situation in the case of the spatiotemporal relation suggested here including world–brain relation. We currently do not know whether world–brain relation is existent and real and, most importantly, we do not know whether it is indeed the OPC. However, based on the different lines of empirical evidence (chapters 4–8) and ontological argumentation (chapters 9–11), I argue that world–brain relation, including its ontological predisposition of mental features, is existent and real by itself, independent of us and our brains.

In sum, the different lines of empirical and ontological evidence discussed in the previous parts suggest that spatiotemporal relation, including world–brain relation, is beyond ourselves but not beyond world. Moreover, as pointed out above, the post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain can well take into view that very same “beyond ourselves” including world–brain relation. This makes it rather unlikely that my assumption of spatiotemporal relation including world–brain relation does not correspond to existence and reality as it is by itself independent of me and my brain. Most importantly, this makes it rather unlikely that my assumption of world–brain relation by itself, including its role as OPC, is just based on intuition, that is, intuition of relation. Accordingly, the various lines of evidence speak in favor of the existence and reality of world–brain relation rather than mere intuition. In short, I assume “existence” rather than “intuition” of world–brain relation.

Post-Copernican Stance IVc: Intuition of Relation—Need for Mathematical Formalization

However, as in the case of Copernicus, I will have to wait for the ultimate proof. That proof, as in the case of Copernicus, may be rather abstract. We cannot expect that something directly observable and concrete provides the ontic origin of something as complex as mental features. The history of science shows that the ontic origins of phenomena (such as genes as well as space and time themselves) that cannot be directly accessed in our observation is usually highly abstract (as in DNA and relativity theory) rather than concrete and can therefore often only be captured by mathematical formalization.

I suppose that exactly that will also hold in the case of world–brain relation. To prove and demonstrate the rather abstract nature of world–brain relation and especially its central role in mental features as ontological predisposition will require mathematical formalization. That is, for instance, possible in the mathematical terms of category theory that strongly emphasizes and formalizes relational features.

The assumption of such abstract nature of the ontic origin of mental features, including the need for mathematical formalization, is well expressed by Thomas Nagel:

There is a sense in which the progress of science depends on the development of a common point of view. However, this development involves moving progressively away from the natural viewpoint of human perception, toward a mathematical description of a world which is increasingly not just not perceptible, but even not perceptually imaginable. In any case, such a view has no special connection with the way things look or feel to a particular organism. (Nagel, 1993, p. 4)

Conclusion

Copernicus shifted the vantage point from within Earth to a vantage point from beyond Earth—this made it possible to free us from and abandon the intuition of Earth as the ontic center of the universe. Analogously, I suggest shifting our pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind (or from within brain) to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. That frees and unchains us from the pulling forces of our intuitive assumptions of the concept of mind as it excludes the mind as an impossible epistemic option from our logical space of knowledge.

Importantly, the shift in vantage point allows us to replace the “old” theory of mind and mind–body relation by a novel one, that is, world–brain relation. Unlike the old theory, the novel one enables us to take into view how the brain, as ontologically determined by its relation to the world (i.e., world–brain relation), shows a necessary ontological connection with mental features such as consciousness. That makes it possible for us to replace mind with world–brain relation, which, as the underlying ontic origin, can now account for the necessary ontological connection to mental features. That, in turn, shifts the focus from mind and the mind–body problem to world–brain relation and the world–brain problem.

Is the world–brain problem a plausible problem for addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features? I argued that the world–brain problem is more plausible than the mind–body problem on empirical (chapters 1–8), phenomenal (chapters 7 and 8; see also Northoff, 2014b), epistemic, and ontological (chapters 9–11) grounds. The mind–body problem as the old theory becomes consequently superfluous and can therefore be replaced by the more plausible novel theory, the world–brain problem. Following the subtitle of my book, I therefore suggest moving on from the mind–body problem to the world–brain problem (see figure 14.2).

Figure 14.2 Shift in vantage point—Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy.

How can we engineer such shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem? I argued that the shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem is ultimately possible only by shifting our vantage point from within mind (or brain or body) to a vantage point from beyond brain. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy. However, like Copernicus in his time, I will need to wait and be patient. My spatiotemporal theory of world–brain relation as the ontic origin of mental features will need to wait for future empirical and mathematical evidence to render fully transparent how world–brain relation can predispose mental features. Anticipating the future, I expect such evidence to speak in favor of the world–brain problem rather than the mind–body problem.