Are the brain and its spontaneous activity a “game changer” in our pursuit of the question of the existence and reality of mental features? A game changer is something that allows to take something into view that hitherto remained invisible and was not yet discovered. That, for instance, makes it possible to raise a novel question or problem replacing the previous one. I argue that the brain’s spontaneous activity is indeed a game changer in this sense, an “empirical and ontological game changer” in that it allows us to replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem.
Let us start with the empirical domain. The discovery of the brain’s spontaneous activity leads us to different views or models of the brain in neuroscience (chapters 1–3 as well as Northoff, 2014a). Even more important, the brain’s spontaneous activity, due to its spatiotemporal structure, also provides a novel empirical approach to mental features such as consciousness. Though not yet fully conclusive, empirical data do indeed suggest that the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure are central, if not indispensable, for yielding mental features such as consciousness (chapters 4–8 as well as Northoff, 2014b).
This allows for a spatiotemporal model of consciousness that is based on the brain’s relation to the world, the world–brain relation (chapters 7–8; Northoff & Huang, 2017; Northoff, 2014b). Taken together, the brain and its spontaneous activity can be regarded as a gamer changer in neuroscience, that is, an empirical game changer: it allows for a spatiotemporal (rather than cognitive) model of brain and consciousness with a central role for world–brain relation (rather than the brain alone independent of the world or, alternatively, the brain being the center as in brain–world relation).
What about the ontological characterization of brain and mental features? I argued that the spontaneous activity’s characterization by an elaborate spatiotemporal structure is most compatible with an ontological definition by relation and structure—this presupposes structural realism (SR) rather than property-based ontology (chapters 9–11). Importantly, SR defines the brain no longer by intrinsic properties like physical or mental properties that are supposedly “located” within the brain itself. Instead, SR defines the brain through its relation to the world, the world–brain relation, as I say.
That very same world–brain relation is a necessary condition of possible mental features such as consciousness, an ontological predisposition of consciousness (chapters 10 and 11). Taken together, the brain’s spontaneous activity proves to be an ontological game changer for both brain and mental features: it allows us determining the existence and reality of brain and consciousness by relation and structure, that is, world–brain relation, rather than physical or mental properties.
Even more dramatically, the shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem requires a novel methodological or epistemological approach in both neuroscience and philosophy. Presupposing a vantage point from within mind or brain, we could not but understand ourselves in a rather ego- and mento- or neuro-centric way—our mind or brain defines mental features, ourselves, and our position within the world. I refer to this view as “pre-Copernican” because it is analogous to the pre-Copernican geocentric view that considered the Earth as the center of the universe (chapters 12 and 13).
Such pre-Copernican mento- or neuro-centric view can now be abolished when shifting the vantage point from within mind or brain to a vantage point from beyond brain (chapter 14). That allows us to take into view how our brain is part of the world by being related to it (i.e., world–brain relation) and thus how we are part of the world rather than being its center. Even more important, such novel viewpoint renders transparent how that very same relation (i.e., world–brain relation) can account for the existence and reality of mental features. Our traditional rather ego- and mento- or neuro-centric view can thus be replaced by an allo- and eco-centric view of mental features, ourselves, and our position within the world (chapter 14). The brain’s spontaneous activity is thus not only an empirical and ontological but also an epistemic gamer changer in our view of ourselves, mental features, and the world.
Taken together, the shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem is much more than just a shift from one problem to another. In the same way that Copernicus shifted our view of the Earth and the universe in a major way, the shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem shifts the framework within which we view ourselves, our mental features, and the world. Therefore, I conclude that the shift from mind–body problem to world–brain problem amounts to nothing less than a Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy (chapter 14).
We need to be careful, though. The revolution initiated by Copernicus in physics and cosmology had to wait for subsequent empirical discoveries by Galileo, Kepler, Bruno, and Newton to be confirmed as a true revolution. This is analogously so in neuroscience and philosophy. The Copernicus revolution suggested here, including the world–brain problem, needs to be confirmed by future generations of both neuroscientists and philosophers. They will know whether I am right or wrong in my claim of the brain’s spontaneous activity as an empirical, epistemological-methodological, and ontological game changer. Accordingly, they will be able to tell whether the world–brain problem (rather than the mind–body problem) is the the most plausible and thus the “right” problem for addressing the question of the existence and reality of mental features.