Glossary

Brain: Concept of brain in different domains (empirical, epistemological, ontological, methodological): Typically identified as the gray mass observable once the skull is opened. Such direct observation is complemented by indirect observation by various technologies including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Both direct and indirect observation yield testable hypotheses that can be verified (or falsified) by experiments. Investigating the brain in such a way presupposes an empirical approach to the brain. Taken in this way, the brain’s neuronal activity can be characterized by both spontaneous activity and stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity (chap. 1). Taken together, the various empirical data, suggest models of the brain’s neural activity (chaps. 1–3, on the spectrum model, interaction model, and prediction model of brain).; One can also investigate the brain in other domains such as ontology (concerning existence and reality), epistemology (concerning knowledge), and methodology (as in our vantage point or viewpoint). This requires a theoretical approach to the brain rather than empirical as in science. The theoretical approach is often neglected in traditional philosophy, where the brain is considered merely empirical. However, recent empirical advances in neuroscience suggest that the brain is also theoretically relevant in the ontological and epistemological domains (chap. 9).; Ontologically, the brain’s existence and reality cannot be inferred from (and thus accounted for) by observation and verifiable empirical evidence (see chap. 9 for the empirical-ontological fallacy). Different kinds of ontology, including property-based ontology or relation-based ontology, may characterize the brain’s existence and reality (chaps. 9–11). The ontological determination of the brain may concern either its mere anatomical features, that is, its gray matter, or, alternatively, the brain’s neuronal activity and its spatiotemporal structure (see Structural realism). Finally, we can also consider the brain in a methodological context. One can, for instance, take the brain as center of one’s viewpoint as in a vantage point from within the brain (chap. 13). Alternatively, one may take a vantage point from beyond the brain (rather than from within the brain) (chap. 14).
Brain–world relation: See World–brain relation.
Calibration: The act of measuring or referencing something against something else so that the second serves as baseline or default for the first. Calibration is relevant for yielding consciousness on both empirical and ontological grounds. Empirically, the default-mode network (DMN) serves as baseline or default for the brain’s neural activity against which any neural activity changes within the rest of the brain are set, compared, and matched, which is highly relevant for yielding consciousness (chaps. 1–2, 4–8). I therefore speak of “neuronal calibration” (chap. 11). Ontologically, the world and its large spatiotemporal scale serves as baseline or reference and thus as default for the brain’s neuronal activity and its smaller spatiotemporal scale. I therefore speak of “spatiotemporal calibration,” an ontological correlate of consciousness (OCC) as it is central for yielding the phenomenal features of consciousness (chap. 11).
Capacity- vs. law-driven: The concept of capacity, as used in the present context, is based on Nancy Cartwright (1989), who takes it to be central to scientific models. Capacity-driven models are characterized by causal powers and causal structures that serve as necessary conditions of the possible realization of the target phenomenon (consciousness, in our case; chap. 5). By contrast, law-driven models focus on the causes underlying the actual (rather than possible) realization and manifestation of the target phenomenon. However, without capacities as the necessary conditions of the possible (rather than actual) realization of the target phenomenon, that target phenomenon cannot be understood. Based on empirical evidence, I argue that consciousness requires a capacity- rather than law-driven model of brain. Empirically, the capacities of the brain are specified as the neural predispositions of consciousness (NPC) (chap. 4) that signify the necessary conditions of possible (rather than actual) consciousness as distinguished from the sufficient conditions of actual (rather than possible) consciousness, that is, the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) (chaps. 5, 7–8). Note that the concept of capacity is here meant in an empirical and ontological context, that is, within the context of the brain’s neuronal activity and its existence and reality. For that reason, the concept of capacity needs to be distinguished from the more metaphysical concept of disposition that is understood in a more logical rather than naturalistic context.
Consciousness: A pervasive and ever-present phenomenon, typically taken for granted and as a result difficult to define. The concept of consciousness has long been investigated in philosophy in mainly ontological, metaphysical, phenomenological, and epistemological terms. This has changed recently in the last 30 to 40 years where consciousness has also begun to be investigated empirically and experimentally in psychology and neuroscience. The investigation of consciousness in empirical, ontological, phenomenological, and epistemological domains leads to different definitions. Empirically, consciousness is characterized by neuroscientists by the two dimensions of state/level (chap. 4) and content (chap. 6) to which I add a third, namely its form (chap. 7). Philosophers often characterize consciousness with property-based ontology and, specifically, physical or mental properties (chaps. 9–10). In contrast, I determine the existence and reality of consciousness by relation and structure (chaps. 10–11) thus presupposing structural realism (chaps. 9–11). Based on structural realism and the empirical data, I propose a spatiotemporal and relational model of consciousness in both empirical (chaps. 7–8) and ontological (chaps. 9–11) contexts or domains. Phenomenologically, consciousness is characterized by experiences as manifest in various features such as qualia (“What it is like”), intentionality, self-perspectival organization, ipseity, etc. (chap. 11). Finally, consciousness can also be determined epistemologically as related to our knowledge. Consciousness may, for instance, demarcate the boundaries of our possible knowledge, that is, the logical space of knowledge (chap. 12).
Copernican revolution (and pre- and post-Copernican stance): The concept of the Copernican revolution is used to describe the change in viewpoint that physicist, mathematician, and cosmologist Nicolaus Copernicus proposed to account for the movement of the Earth: Copernicus suggested replacing the geocentric view of the universe with a heliocentric view (chap. 12). Kant attempted an analogous revolution in philosophy that, according to commentators, remained insufficient at best and failed at worst (chap. 12). I propose that we require an analogous change in vantage point in current neuroscience and philosophy. I base my analogy on different criteria that are based on the Copernican revolution in physics and cosmology (chap. 12) and apply, analogously, to the proposed Copernican revolution in neuroscience and philosophy (chap. 14). Applying these criteria allows me to distinguish between pre-Copernican vantage points (e.g., vantage points from within mind or within brain; chap. 13) and post-Copernican vantage points (e.g., vantage points from beyond brain; chap. 14). Most important, the shift from a pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind or brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain excludes the intuition of mind as a possible epistemic option in the associated logical space of knowledge (chap. 14). At the same time, the post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain makes it possible, and thus transparent, for us to take the view that the world–brain relation can serve as ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC; chap. 14). The vantage point from beyond brain should not be confused with a vantage point from beyond world that leads us back into metaphysics with the intuition of mind and subsequently the mind–body problem. Rather than being post-Copernican, such a metaphysical stance is distinctively non-Copernican.
Default-mode network (DMN): A neuronal network located in the middle of the brain. The DMN shows specific features that distinguishes it from other networks in the brain. For instance, the DMN shows extremely stronger and slower frequencies and extensive connections to almost all other regions in the brain (chapter 1); this may account for the default-mode functionality of the DMN for the rest of the brain (chapter 1 and 11). Empirical evidence shows that the DMN has a central yet unclear role for consciousness (chaps. 4–5) and, as I claim, for its phenomenal features (chap. 11).
Difference-based coding (vs. stimulus-based coding): First and foremost, an empirical concept that describes a specific coding strategy in the biological world and thus in nature. I raise the question for the brain’s neural code, that is, the format in which the brain processes stimuli and information. As its name suggests, difference-based coding describes how the brain uses the format of difference to encode and process stimuli and information. More specifically, what the brain encodes and processes in its neural activity are not single stimuli independent of each other (as in stimulus-based coding) but rather the relative (stochastically or probability-based) differences between different stimuli (chaps. 2–3). Taken in such a way, difference-based coding may be regarded a fundamental principle of the brain’s neural activity. Though primarily empirical, difference-based coding carries major ontological implications for how we should characterize the existence and reality of the brain in an empirically plausible way. To mark the distinction between the concept of difference in empirical and ontological contexts, I speak of difference per se in the empirical context and difference de re in the ontological context (chap. 9). This allows me to ontologically characterize the brain by difference, i.e., difference de re, and consequently by relation and structure (as they are based on and intrinsically connected to difference). I therefore speak of relational brain (chap. 9).
Embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactment (Four E’s): Embodiment states that mental features are dependent not only on the brain but also on the body (“consciousness is embodied”) while embeddedness refers to the relevance of the environment for mental features (“consciousness is embedded”) (chap. 8). Extendedness claims that consciousness and other mental features extend beyond ourselves to the world that scaffolds consciousness (“consciousness is extended”) (chap. 8). Finally, enactment refers to the fact that we rely on our motor functions and actions to constitute consciousness, that is, we enact consciousness (chap. 8) (“consciousness is enacted”). I argue that all four concepts, that is, embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, and enactment, must be put in a larger and more basic foundational framework, a spatiotemporal framework that ultimately can be traced to the spatiotemporal features of the world—brain relation (chap. 8).
Global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT): A neuroscientific theory of consciousness that considers the extension or globalization of neuronal activity to specific brain regions (e.g., prefrontal and parietal cortex) and event-related potentials (e.g., P300) with access to various cognitive functions (as related to prefrontal cortex) central to consciousness (chaps. 4–5). Based on empirical evidence, I argue that the GNWT must be considered in a wider spatiotemporal framework (chap. 7).
Integrated information theory (IIT): A neuroscientific theory of consciousness that postulates integration by the brain’s neuronal activity to be central to consciousness. Integration itself is defined as a “sum that is more than the addition of its parts.” I discuss the IIT (chaps. 4 and 5) but argue that it needs to be put into a wider spatiotemporal context to account for the phenomenal features of consciousness (chap. 7).
Interaction model of brain: A theoretical model of the empirical relationship between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activities within the brain that can modulate each other in what can be described as rest-stimulus and stimulus-rest interaction (chap. 2). The interaction model must be distinguished from segregation and parallelism between spontaneous and stimulus-induced activity in which case there is no rest-stimulus or stimulus-rest interaction. There can be different forms of interaction, that is, additive and nonadditive, between spontaneous activity and stimulus-induced activity. Importantly, empirical evidence shows that the nonadditive nature of rest-stimulus interaction is central to consciousness: loss of consciousness is characterized by loss of nonadditive rest-stimulus interaction, which becomes merely additive when consciousness is lost (chap. 5).
Intuition of mind: An intuition that the mind exists, even despite contrary empirical evidence that only the brain exists. How is this intuition possible? I argue that we intuit the mind, that is, we have an “intuition of mind” (chap. 12), and that such intuition is pervasive in our thinking about the ontological determination of mental features. That intuition of mind is included as possible option in a logical space of knowledge that presupposes a pre-Copernican vantage point from within mind (chap. 13); the replacement of such a vantage point by a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain makes it possible for us to abandon the intuition of mind as the concept of mind is then no longer included as possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge (chap. 14). Once we abandon the intuition of mind, we no longer need to connect mental features to the mind as underlying ontological substrate in a necessary way, which, in turn, opens the door to discarding the mind—body problem (chap. 14).
Logical space of knowledge: An operational background space, that demarcates the possible knowledge options. Taken in this sense, the logical space of knowledge is an epistemological concept that is somewhat analogous to the concepts of logical space of nature and logical space of reason as introduced by Sellars (1963) and McDowell (1994). Specifically, the concept of the logical space of knowledge refers to possible epistemic options, that is, what we can possibly know and what we cannot know within our presupposed methodological framework (chap. 12). Depending on the methodological framework, the logical space of knowledge may include different epistemic options. One such methodological presupposition concerns the vantage point; I argue that different vantage points demarcate the logical space of knowledge in different ways with different possible epistemic options (chaps. 12–14). For instance, the vantage point from within mind includes the intuition of mind as one possible epistemic option (chap. 13), whereas the vantage point from beyond brain no longer includes the intuition of mind as a possible epistemic option (chap. 14).
Mental features: Phenomena such as consciousness, self, free will, emotional feeling, and the like. I take consciousness as paradigmatic for mental features in general. Despite their differences, mental features are usually marked by first-person perspective as distinguished from third-person observation. Mental features have long been discussed in philosophy in ontological and epistemological contexts but have recently also been investigated empirically in neuroscience. Therefore, we can define the concept of mental features in different ways according to the respective context or domains, that is, in empirical, phenomenological, and ontological ways. Empirically, mental features refer to all those features that, unlike physical features, cannot be observed by a third-person perspective as in scientific investigation. Instead, mental features are characterized by experience in a first-person perspective (which does not imply that they cannot be investigated scientifically by a third-person perspective; chaps. 7–8). Ontologically, mental features have typically been associated with the mind: the mind is assumed to provide the existence and reality that supposedly underlies mental features. Mental features are thus assumed to be necessarily connected to the mind (chaps. 10, 13–14). I argue that the assumption of a necessary connection between mind and mental features is related to a specific viewpoint, that is, a vantage point from within mind (chap. 13). Once one takes a different viewpoint, say, a vantage point from beyond brain, one can no longer take into view the necessary connection between mental features and mind (chap. 13). I consequently postulate that we need to detach mental features from the mind to account for their existence and reality in an empirically, ontologically, and epistemic-methodologically plausible way (chap. 14, conclusion). The vantage point from beyond brain allows us to take into view the world–brain relation including its necessary connection to mental features. This, in turn, makes the assumption of mind superfluous; therefore, I propose to replace the traditional mind–body problem with the world–brain problem (chaps. 10–14).
Mind: Typically considered in ontological or metaphysical domains or contexts in terms of existence and reality (see Ontology) and/or being (metaphysics) that underlies mental features (introduction). This establishes a necessary connection between mind and mental features in ontological and/or metaphysical contexts or domains (chap. 10), which, in turn, renders it possible for us to conceive the question for the relationship between mind and body, the mind–body problem (introduction, chap. 10). I argue that the necessary connection between mind and mental features is not plausible, given empirical (chaps. 7–8), ontological (chaps. 9–10), conceptual-logical (chap. 10), and epistemic-methodological (chaps. 13–14) evidence. I therefore argue that we need to reject the assumption of the necessary connection of mental features to the mind as their underlying ontological basis and foundation. As mental features are now detached from the mind, the mind–body problem including its various solutions (e.g., dualism, monism, panpsychism) become nonsensical.; The rejection of mind (and the mind–body problem) as the ontological substrate of mental features opens the door for considering another ontological substrate that is supported by stronger empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological evidence. Based on empirical (chaps. 4–8), ontological (chaps. 9–11), and epistemic-methodological (chaps. 12–14) evidence, I postulate that the world–brain relation provides the ontological substrate of mental features, as both are necessarily connected with each other (chap. 10). We can consequently replace the mind–body problem with a different more plausible problem, the world–brain problem (chaps. 10–14).
Mind–body problem: The question of how the existence and reality of the body, including the brain, can be related to the existence and reality of mind. Taken in this way, the mind–body problem is an ontological (and metaphysical) problem. However, some authors consider it to be an epistemic or empirical problem. I here consider the mind–body problem an ontological problem as it concerns the existence and reality of mind and body. Importantly, I focus my discussion on the presuppositions of the mind–body problem rather than on arguing for and against specific solutions to the mind–body problem itself.; The question of the mind’s relationship to the body rests on the assumption of the possible existence and reality of mind: without presupposing this, one cannot even raise the question of the mind’s possible relationship to the body anymore. The main argument in this book is that the presuppositions of the possible existence and reality of mind are not plausible on empirical (chaps. 4–8), ontological (chaps. 10–11), and epistemic-methodological (chaps. 13–14) grounds. Therefore, I argue that we can discard the assumption of the possible existence and reality of mind and, consequently, the mind–body problem: the question of the mind–body relationship is nonsensical as it rests on an assumption that by itself is implausible on various grounds (introduction, chaps. 10–14, conclusion). All possible answers or solutions to the mind–body problem, such as dualism, monism, physicalism, supervenience, panpsychism, and the like, must consequently be discarded as nonsensical too as they are answers to a nonsensical question.
Neural correlate and predisposition of consciousness (NCC, NPC): The concept of the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) refers to the sufficient neural conditions underlying the actual realization and manifestation of consciousness (chaps. 4–5). The concept of the neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC) describes the necessary neural conditions of the possible (rather than actual) realization and manifestation of consciousness (chaps. 4–8). Both NPC and NCC are empirical concepts and therefore belong to neuroscience. I designate NCC and NPC as strictly empirical. It therefore must be distinguished from what I describe as ontological correlates and predispositions of consciousness (chaps. 10–11), as these are ontological rather than empirical concepts. The distinction between neural and ontological correlates/predispositions is new in the current discussion about consciousness. Note that the concept of predisposition is here meant in a purely empirical context, that is, within the context of the brain’s neuronal activity. For that reason, the concept of neural predisposition needs to be distinguished from the more metaphysical (and ontological) concept of disposition.
Neuro-ecological continuum: An empirical concept that describes how the brain’s neuronal activity is continuous with the activity in its respective ecological context (chap. 8). The neuro-ecological continuum is based on space and time: there is a continuum between the spatiotemporal structure of the brain’s spontaneous activity and the spatiotemporal structure of the ecological context, the world (chap. 8). This spatiotemporally based neuro-ecological continuum between world and brain is based empirically on the mechanisms of spatiotemporal alignment that are central for consciousness (chap. 8). Together, spatiotemporal alignment and the neuro-ecological continuum provide the empirical ground, that is, the necessary empirical conditions, of what on a more conceptual and ontological level can be described as the world—brain relation (chaps. 8–9).
Neuronal-phenomenal correspondence: An empirical concept that describes similarities between the brain’s neuronal states and phenomenal features of consciousness (chap. 7). Based on empirical evidence, I argue that such similarities do not concern specific contents that are represented in the brain’s neuronal activity (chap. 6). Instead, I propose that the similarities between neuronal states and phenomenal features consist in spatiotemporal features: neuronal states and phenomenal features show similar and corresponding spatiotemporal features as in their “inner extension and duration” (see Time and space; chap. 7). The concept of correspondence could be understood in either a weak or a strong sense: spatiotemporal features in neuronal and phenomenal states could correspond in a weak sense as in certain forms of isomorphism or, taken in a strong sense, could be identical as assumed in integrated information theory. Future investigation is thus needed to specify the concept of neuronal-phenomenal correspondence in more empirical and conceptual detail.
Neurophilosophy (narrow/reductive vs. wide/nonreductive): A philosophical investigation of the brain that focuses on the role of the brain in addressing traditional philosophical questions. The concept of neurophilosophy can be understood in both a narrow and a wide sense. Neurophilosophy taken narrowly is characterized by a strongly reductive if not eliminative tendency, as ontological and epistemological concepts, originating in philosophy, are supposed to be reduced to and replaced by empirical concepts from neuroscience (chap. 13). Methodologically, such a narrow and reductive concept of neurophilosophy presupposes a specific viewpoint, a vantage point from within brain (chap. 13). In neurophilosophy, taken in a wide sense, the reduction and/or elimination of philosophical, i.e., ontological and epistemological concepts, to empirical concepts of neuroscience is replaced by testing these concepts’ empirical plausibility: one then tests, for instance, which ontological concept, relation, or property is better compatible with the empirical data and thus empirically more plausible, entailing what I call empirical-ontological plausibility (chap. 9 and Northoff 2014c, 2016). Methodologically, the notion of reduction/elimination is here replaced by plausibility/compatibility between philosophical and neuroscientific concepts (introduction, chaps. 9, 13). This nonreductive methodological strategy presupposes a different vantage point. The vantage point from within brain in the reductive/eliminative approach (chap. 13) is here replaced by a vantage point from beyond brain that allows for a nonreductive methodological strategy (chap. 14). The investigation in this book can be understood as neurophilosophy in the wide sense, that is, nonreductive.
Ontological correlate and predisposition of consciousness (OCC, OPC): The concept of the ontological correlate of consciousness (OCC) refers to the sufficient ontological conditions underlying the actual realization and manifestation of consciousness (chapter 11). The concept of the ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC) describes the necessary ontological conditions of the possible (rather than actual) realization and manifestation of consciousness (chapter 10). Both OPC and OCC are ontological concepts. As such, they must be distinguished from the neural correlates and predispositions of consciousness (NCC, NPC) (chaps. 4–8), which are strictly empirical rather than ontological. Note that the concept of predisposition is here meant in a purely ontological context, that is, within the context of the natural world, i.e., the logical space of nature. This distinguishes the concept of ontological predisposition from the more metaphysical concept of disposition that presupposes the logical world, i.e., the logical space of reason, rather than the natural world, i.e., the logical space of nature.
Ontology (vs. metaphysics): Ontology refers to the discipline within philosophy that concerns the question of existence and reality, usually considered to be a subset of the larger and more comprehensive question of being as dealt with in metaphysics. Metaphysics, such as analytic metaphysics and metametaphysics, is characterized by a theoretical rather than empirical approach and more specifically by a priori, analytic, and conceptual methodological strategy (chap. 9). This, as in my view, is different from ontology, which can also include and use a posteriori, synthetic, and empirical elements; this is apparent when I compare ontological assumptions for their concordance with empirical data, i.e., empirical plausibility. Therefore, contrary to the current usage of ontology as subset of metaphysics in current philosophy, I sharply distinguish ontology and metaphysics (chap. 9); my focus in this book is only on ontology, not metaphysics. For instance, I consider the world—brain problem an ontological problem but not a metaphysical problem (chaps. 9–11). Distinguishing ontology from metaphysics allows me to develop a “spatiotemporal ontology” (chaps. 9 and 11) that features the logical space of nature and, as suggested by its name, is intrinsically spatiotemporal as distinguished from metaphysics that, as it presupposes the logical world and the logical space of reason, is intrinsically a-temporal and a-spatial (chap. 9).
Phenomenal vs. noumenal: I use the terms phenomenal and noumenal in an epistemological sense (as suggested by Kant), to demarcate the epistemological boundary between what we can possibly know and what we remain unable to know in principle. Taken in this way, the concepts of the phenomenal vs. noumenal mirror the epistemic options that are included and excluded within the presupposed logical space of knowledge. I argue that the boundary of demarcation between phenomenal and noumenal is closely related to the vantage point one takes (chap. 12). Different vantage points presuppose different boundaries and subsequently different epistemic options in the logical space of knowledge, as for instance with regard to the intuition of mind (chaps. 13–14).
Prediction model of brain: A theoretical model about the brain’s neuronal activity in empirical terms. Specifically, the prediction model proposes that the brain’s neuronal activity anticipates or predicts its own neuronal activity related to stimuli or contents of cognition. This is the theory of predictive coding (chap. 3). Predictive coding is characterized by predicted input and prediction error: the degree to which predicted input and actual input match each other determines the degree of actual stimulus-induced activity, the prediction error. If predicted and actual input do not match, prediction error is high, which leads to high amplitude in stimulus-induced activity. If, in contrast, the match between predicted and actual input is high, prediction error is low with low amplitude in stimulus-induced activity. Predictive coding is well supported by the empirical data and can be considered a well-established theory of the brain’s neuronal activity (chaps. 3, 6). Predictive coding can well account for the contents of consciousness, whereas it remains unable to account for the phenomenal features that are associated with the contents of consciousness (chap. 6). Therefore, I propose to complement predictive coding with the spatiotemporal model of consciousness that allows us to bridge the gap between neuronal and phenomenal features (chaps. 7–8).
Relation and structure: The concepts of relation and structure can be considered in both empirical and ontological domains. Empirically, relation refers to observable relations that can be measured; for instance, we can measure how the ongoing phases of the brain’s spontaneous activity align and thus relate to the rhythm of music (chaps. 3, 8). The term structure in the empirical context refers to specific ways or forms of how spatial and temporal features are organized; the brain’s spontaneous activity, for instance, shows an elaborate well-observable spatiotemporal structure with cross-frequency coupling, scale-free activity, etc. (chaps. 1–2). Such spatiotemporal structure amounts to what, empirically, I describe as form of consciousness (chaps. 7–8).; Ontologically, relation and structure can be understood in two ways. They may characterize the relationship between ontological properties: for instance, there may be a relation between physical and mental properties as discussed in the mind—body problem (chap. 9). In that case, properties are ontologically prior to relation and structure. Alternatively, relation and structure can by themselves be considered the most basic units of existence and reality; relations are then ontologically prior to properties, which is the central claim of structural realism (chap. 9). I here understand relation and structure in this latter sense. Moreover, extending structural realism, I specify relation and structure in spatiotemporal terms, that is, spatiotemporal relation and structure (chaps. 9, 11).
Spatiotemporal alignment, nestedness, and expansion: Empirical concepts that describe neuronal mechanisms that, based on empirical evidence, are relevant to bringing about consciousness (chaps. 4–5, 7–8). Spatiotemporal alignment describes a neuronal mechanism that allows the brain and its spontaneous activity’s spatiotemporal structure to follow, that is, to align to the spatiotemporal structure in its respective environmental context (chap. 8). Spatiotemporal nestedness is here understood in an empirical sense that refers to the scale-free nature of neuronal activity with stronger power in slower frequencies than faster frequencies (chaps. 4, 7). Moreover, spatiotemporal nestedness in this scale-free sense includes fractal features as characterized by self-affinity or self-similarity; that is, the structure of spatiotemporal features is manifest and thus self-similar or self-affine in and across different spatiotemporal scales (chaps. 4, 7). Finally, spatiotemporal expansion refers to integration, i.e., expansion, of stimuli of limited and small spatiotemporal scale beyond itself to a larger spatiotemporal scale by the brain’s spontaneous activity—this, as based on empirical evidence, is considered central for associating consciousness to the stimulus (chaps. 4–5, 7–8). Taking all neuronal mechanisms together amounts to a spatiotemporal theory of consciousness in neuroscience, i.e., temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) that extends and complements other neuroscientific theories such as the Integrated information theory (IIT) and the Global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT).
Spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness: Ontological concepts that describe ontological relations with regard to time and space (chap. 11). Spatiotemporal nestedness refers to the containment of a smaller spatiotemporal scale within a larger one: for instance, the brain and its relatively smaller spatiotemporal scale are nested or contained within the larger spatiotemporal scale of the world. Spatiotemporal directedness refers to the relationship between different spatiotemporal scales where the larger spatiotemporal scale, e.g., the one of the world, is directed toward the smaller one, e.g., the one of the brain; thus I speak of world–brain relation as distinguished from brain–world relation (with the latter entailing reversed directedness as from the smaller to the larger spatiotemporal scale) (chap. 11).
Spectrum model of brain: A theoretical model of the brain that describes the brain’s neural activity empirically with regard to its dependence on either internally or externally generated activity. Externally generated activity is associated with specific stimuli such as sensory stimuli resulting in stimulus-induced activity that has been described by a passive model and can be featured as a Humean-like model of brain (chap. 1). By contrast, internally generated activity in the brain is described as spontaneous activity (or resting state activity), which, philosophically, can be described by an active model and features as a Kantian like model of brain (introduction, chap. 1). The spectrum model of brain now postulates that, based on empirical evidence, the brain’s neural activity is neither purely active, i.e., internally generated, nor purely passive, i.e., externally generated. Instead, the brain’s neuronal activity can be characterized by a neuronal continuum between passive and active components and thus between internally and externally generated activity (chap. 1). Specifically, stimulus-induced activity is not purely passive and thus externally generated as it is impacted and modulated by the internally generated brain’s spontaneous activity; this is manifest in what I describe as rest-stimulus interaction (chap. 1). Conversely, the internally generated spontaneous activity is not purely active, as it is modulated by the externally generated stimulus-induced activity; this is manifest empirically in what I describe as stimulus-rest interaction (chap. 1). The spectrum of different active-passive constellations in the brain’s neuronal activity is extremely reduced during the loss of consciousness (chap. 4): neuronal activity is merely passive, i.e., externally generated, rather than active, i.e., internally generated.
Spontaneity and spontaneous activity: The concept of spontaneity can be understood in the sense of Kant who characterized it as intrinsic and independent of any extrinsic activity (as, for instance, related to sensory input). Taken in this context, the concept of spontaneity has been closely associated with the concept of active as distinguished from passive (chap. 1). Since the brain also shows neuronal activity that remains independent of any specific externally applied sensory input or cognitive task, that very same neuronal activity has been described as spontaneous activity (or intrinsic activity or resting state activity) (introduction, chap. 1). Based on empirical evidence, I postulate that the brain’s spontaneous activity can be characterized by a spatiotemporal structure that is central for yielding mental features like consciousness. I postulate that the empirical features of the brain’s spontaneous activity carry major ontological implications for ontology in general (chap. 9) and the question of the ontological basis of mental features like world-brain relation vs mind (chaps. 10–11) as well as for methodological-epistemological issues like the vantage point (chaps. 13–14).
Structure and spatiotemporal structure: See Relation and structure.
Structural realism (SR): A theory of a given phenomenon that highlights the central role of relations and structure. Either relata are included in conjunction with relations (moderate SR) or relata are eliminated completely in favor of relations (eliminativist SR). SR has been discussed mainly in the context of physics but has also recently been applied to information, cognitive science, the brain, and secondary qualities. Finally, SR comes in an epistemic and ontological version. The epistemic version of structural realism (ESR) is the more modest one, claiming that all we can know are structures and relations. Importantly, such an epistemic claim is not accompanied by ontological assumptions. ESR remains agnostic regarding the question of whether what we know really corresponds to ontological existence and a reality independent of ourselves (i.e., ontic structural realism; OSR).; I here use the ontological version of SR to characterize the existence and reality of the brain. As the brain’s existence and reality is based on structure and reality, the brain must ontologically be determined by world–brain relation. The relation to the world and its structure is an intrinsic ontological feature of the brain without which the brain would not exist. I define the brain’s existence and reality here by its neuronal activity as featured by a particular spatiotemporal structure. That must be distinguished from the definition of the brain’s existence and reality by its anatomical structure, i.e., its gray matter that remains more or less independent of the brain’s neuronal activity and its spatiotemporal structure. The mere presence of the brain’s gray matter consequently remains insufficient to define the brain’s existence and reality. Therefore, any property-based ontology that defines the brain in terms of its gray matter and anatomical structure by either mental or physical properties remains insufficient for determining the brain’s spatiotemporal structure.
Time and space: Notions much discussed in philosophy but usually taken for granted in the sciences, including neuroscience. I here emphasize that one cannot take time and space for granted in neuroscience as it strongly affects how we conceive the brain and its relationship to consciousness. Time and space must be considered separate and distinct in empirical and ontological contexts or domains. Empirically, we can observe discrete points in time and space—as such this view on time and space is based on observation, I speak of observational time and space (chap. 9). Observational time and space are related to us as observers and how we perceive and cognize time and space. Such observational time and space needs to be distinguished from the time and space the brain itself constructs in its own neuronal activity that characterizes the brain’s existence and reality (chap. 7). We thus need to distinguish between perception/observation/cognition of time and space in the brain on the one and construction of time and space by the brain itself. I postulate that the latter, i.e., construction of time and space by the brain, is central for consciousness (chap. 7).; As we cannot infer directly from the empirical to the ontological domain (chap. 9), the existence and reality of time and space need not conform to the way we observe time and space, that is, in terms of discrete points in time and space. Based on empirical and ontological evidence, I postulate that the existence and reality of time and space consists in relation and structure. I therefore speak of relational time and space (chap. 9). The existence and reality of such relational time and space can, for instance, be characterized by inner duration and extension (chapters 7 and 9), which characterizes both world (chap. 11) and brain (chap. 7). Ontologically, inner duration and extension can be specified by spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness and complex location rather than simple location (chap. 11).
Vantage point: Here understood as point of view or viewpoint, which needs to be distinguished from the notion of perspective including first-, second-, and third-person perspective as well as God’s eye view (chap. 12). The chosen vantage point may provide a specific view that includes a wide range of phenomena. For instance, being on the top of a mountain at the edge of the city provides us with a vantage point from beyond the city. We can then perceive and ultimately know the city as a whole, which thereby is rendered transparent to us. The vantage point thus allows us to include the whole city as a possible epistemic option in our logical space of knowledge. If, in contrast, one stands in the midst of the city itself, one remains unable to perceive the city as whole. Accordingly, the vantage point determines the possible epistemic options in our logical space of knowledge by rendering certain epistemic options transparent and others opaque (chap. 12 for details, chaps. 13–14 for application). Thus I consider the concept of vantage point in an epistemic-methodological way. That allows me to distinguish different vantage points like the more pre-Copernican vantage points from within mind or brain (chap. 13), the post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain (chap. 14), and the metaphysical non-Copernican vantage point from beyond world (see Copernican revolution as well as chaps. 12–14).
World: A concept that is usually taken for granted and often not explicitly discussed and defined. I postulate, however, that we need to define and determine the concept of world in a detailed way in order to avoid fallacious inferences between the conception of world in different domains; therefore, I determine the concept of world differently in empirical, phenomenological, ontological, metaphysical, and epistemic-methodological contexts or domains. Empirically, the concept of world refers to what we can observe as in scientific investigation. Taken in this empirical sense, the world is characterized by discrete points in time and space (chap. 9). Phenomenologically, the concept of world refers to the way we experience the world as conscious beings. The world in this phenomenological sense is then characterized by temporal continuity as described in the concepts of “inner time consciousness” by E. Husserl and “stream of consciousness” by W. James (chaps. 4–7). Ontologically, the concept of world can be understood in different ways in terms of properties or relations (chap. 9). For instance, based on empirical plausibility, I characterize the world’s existence and reality in a spatiotemporal way, that is, by relational time and space for which reason I speak of spatiotemporal ontology (chap. 9). The world as spatiotemporal in an ontological sense must be distinguished from the world in a metaphysical sense that requires the world to be strictly a-temporal and a-spatial (chap. 9). Finally, the term world can be understood in an epistemic-methodological context as different concepts of world are related to different vantage points (chaps. 12–14).
World–brain problem: The question of the relationship between world and brain that can be considered in empirical, ontological, and epistemic-methodological domains, where it replaces the mind–body problem. Empirically, there is strong evidence that the brain and its spontaneous activity align and thus relate to their respective environmental context (chaps. 3, 8) which, as the data show, is relevant for consciousness (chap. 8). Ontologically, the world—brain problem raises the question for the existence and reality underlying the relation between world and brain; this can be answered by, for instance, properties or, alternatively, relation and structure: the existence and realty of world and brain including their relationship is characterized by relation or structure as the most basic unit of existence and reality in the world including the brain (chap. 9). Taken by itself, the world—brain problem is a separate ontological (and also empirical) problem and therefore not necessarily connected to the question for the existence and reality of mental features like consciousness (chap. 9). However, I propose that the world—brain problem provides an empirically (chaps. 7–8) and ontologically (chaps. 10–11) plausible approach to address the question for the existence and reality of mental features. Therefore, I argue that the world—brain problem can replace the mind—body problem in our quest for the existence and reality of mental features such as consciousness (chaps. 10–11, 13–14). Finally, one may also consider the world-brain problem in an epistemic-methodological context from a vantage point beyond brain (chap. 14).
World–brain relation (vs. brain–world relation): A relation between world and brain that can be understood in a bi-directional way as well as in both empirical and ontological domains. Empirically, the brain can relate to the world on the basis of its task- or stimulus-induced activity that is related to the brain’s cognitive, sensory, motor, social, and affective functions—this can be described as brain–world relation (chaps. 8–11). However, the brain can relate to the world also by its spontaneous activity that shows strong spatiotemporal alignment to the environmental context (chap. 8). As the brain adapts and aligns to the world as the primary origin of the world’s relation to the brain, I speak of world–brain relation rather than brain–world relation (chaps. 8–11).; Ontologically, the brain’s adaptation and alignment to the world is accounted for by the concepts of spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness: the spatiotemporally smaller brain is nested and contained within the spatiotemporally larger world (chap. 11). I therefore characterize the concept of world–brain relation in an ontological sense which, as in the empirical context (chap. 8), must be distinguished from brain–world relation (chaps. 9–11). Finally, both brain–world and world–brain relation must also be distinguished on methodological grounds: brain–world relation presupposes a vantage point from within brain (chap. 13), whereas world–brain relation can only be taken into view by presupposing a vantage point from beyond brain (chap. 14).