Capacities, 113–126
Cartwright, Nancy, 113–116
causal structure, 113–116
consciousness, 113–120
laws, 113, 120–123
neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC), 113–126
nonadditive rest–stimulus interaction, 123–126
spatiotemporal capacities, 123–126
Chalmers, David, 346–348, 392
Clark, Andy, 55–56, 70–71, 127–128, 144–150
Consciousness
attention schema theory (Graziano), 215–219
argument of calibration, 316–331
argument of triviality, 89–90, 188–192, 308–310
body and consciousness, 197–206
body–brain relation, 202–206, 229–233, 235–236
capacities, 113–126
content of consciousness, 127–150
contingency problem, 278–293
disorders of consciousness, 80–82, 106–107
embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, enactment, 202–206, 229–235
experience or qualia, 321–331
form of consciousness, 151–152, 195–236
Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT), 84–85, 181–183
hard problem of consciousness, 346–348
integrated information theory (IIT), 82–84, 177–179
interaction model of consciousness, 106–125
level or state of consciousness, 105–125
neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), 102–103, 105–106, 112–113
neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC), 102–103, 105–106, 112–113, 113–126, 151–152, 195–236
neuro-ecological continuum, 219–223
ontological correlates of consciousness (OCC), 315–348
ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC), xviii–xix, 269–270, 278–293
ontology of consciousness, 271–276, 269–313
prediction model of consciousness, 127–150
relation and structure, 271–276
spatiotemporal baseline vs. spatiotemporal frame, 318–321
spatiotemporal calibration, 326–331
spatiotemporal framing of IIT and GNWT, 88–89
spatiotemporal model of consciousness, 269–313, 315–348
spatiotemporal theory of consciousness (STC), 151–193, 195–236
spectrum model of consciousness, 90–91, 97–102
structural realism of consciousness, 269–313
Copernican revolution, xxii–xxiii, 351–376, 377–401, 403–434, 435–437
allo- and ecocentric view, 415–416
“beyond ourselves” and world–brain relation, 403–404
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 351–354, 364–376
definition and concept of Copernican revolution, 377–378
epistemic reference, 370–375, 383–388, 418–426
exclusion of mind as impossible epistemic option, 418–426
“fictional forces” and the rejection of metaphysics, 374–375
geo- vs. heliocentric view, 364–367
God’s-eye view, 390–391
intuition of body, 399–400
intuition of brain, 396–399
intuition of mind, 351–364, 375–376, 388–390, 422–426
intuition of relation, 426–433
logical space of knowledge, 353–364
mento- and ego- and anthropocentric view, 382–383, 415–416
mind as possible or impossible epistemic option, 357–359
neurocentric view, 396–399
ontic location vs. ontic center vs. ontic origin, 369–375, 379–382, 404–407, 413–418, 421–422
physics and cosmology, 364–376
post-Copernican stance in philosophy and neuroscience, 403–434, 435–437
pre-Copernican stance in philosophy and neuroscience, 377–401
spatiotemporal and mereological confusion, 367–369, 381–382, 416–417
vantage point, definition and distinction, 360–364
vantage point from beyond body, 409–413
vantage point from beyond brain, 403–434
vantage point from beyond mind, 407–409
vantage point from within body, 399–400
vantage point from within brain, 396–399
vantage point from within consciousness, 393–396
vantage point from within mind, 379–390
vantage point from within reason, 392–393
vantage point from within vs. beyond earth, 364–376
world–brain problem, 433–434
world–brain relation as possible or impossible epistemic option, 359–360
Default mode network (DMN), 4–5, 31–33, 34–35
Descartes, René, 55, 71–75
Difference-based coding, 42–53
fundamental principle, 42–43, 48–51
Giere, Roland, 48–51
natural statistics, 43–44
stimulus-based coding, 43–48
structural realism, 244–246, 248–253
Fallacies
empirical-ontological fallacy, 248–255, 341–342
empirical-ontological fallacy vs. empirical-ontological plausibility, 248–255
mereological fallacy, 338–339
phenomenological-ontological fallacy, 395–396
Hohwy, J., 5, 55–56, 62–64, 127–128, 144–150
Hume, David, 5
Interaction model of brain, 27–30, 35–42, 51–53, 105–125
additive interaction, 36–38
consciousness, 108–113, 125
nonadditive interaction, 38–41, 45–48, 51–53, 109–112, 123–126
parallelism, 31–35
rest–stimulus interaction, 40–41, 60–62, 108–110
stimulus–rest interaction, 41–42
Intuition
of body, 399–400
of brain, 396–399
of mind, 351–364, 375–376
of relation, 426–433
Kant, Immanuel, viii, xiv, 5, 355–357, 377–378, 392–393, 429–431
Logical space of knowledge, 353–364
Logical space of nature, 428–429
McDowell, J., 353–356, 392, 428–429
Mind and mind–body problem, vii–viii, xi–xxiv, 276–313, 303–304, 351–353, 435–437
exclusion of mind as impossible epistemic option, 418–426
intuition of body, 399–400
intuition of brain, 396–399
intuition of mind, 351–364, 375–376, 388–390, 401, 422–426
intuition of relation, 426–433
mental features vs. mind, vii–viii, 276–278
mind–body problem vs. world–brain problem, 278–293, 293–313
Nagel, Thomas, 278–295, 330–331, 356, 375–376, 400, 432–433
Ontology of brain, 239–240, 242–267
Philosophy of brain vs. philosophy of mind, 239–240
Prediction model of brain, 55–75, 127–150
actual input, 58–60
association of contents with consciousness, 136
brain as closed and self-evidencing system, 62–64
brain as open system, 71–74
contents of consciousness, 127–150
interoceptive sensitivity vs. awareness, 140–146
predicted input, 58–60, 62–64, 136–140
prediction error, 58–60
prediction inference vs. prediction fallacy, 144–148
predictive coding, 55–75, 127–150
rest–stimulus interaction, 60–62
selection of contents in consciousness, 128–136
stimulus-induced activity, 131–132
unconscious processing, 136–140
Spatiotemporal model of consciousness, 269–313, 315–348
argument of calibration, 316–331
argument of location, 339–348
argument of structure, 331–339
complex location, 342–346
experience or qualia, 321–331
mereological fallacy, 338–339
relation and structure, 270–276
simple location, 339–342
spatiotemporal baseline vs. spatiotemporal frame, 318–321
spatiotemporal calibration, 326–331
spatiotemporal directedness, 334–335
spatiotemporal nestedness, 331–334, 417–418
Spatiotemporal theory of consciousness (SIC), 151–193, 195–236
argument of inclusion, 204–206, 234–235
argument of nonspecificity, 171–174
argument of triviality, 89–90, 188–192
body and consciousness, 197–206
body–brain relation, 202–206, 229–233, 235–236
brain’s construction of time and space, 152–153, 154–158
embodiment, embeddedness, extendedness, enactment, 202–206, 229–235
form of consciousness, 151–152
global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT), 181–183
integrated information theory (IIT), 177–179
neural predisposition of consciousness, 158–166, 195–236
neuro-ecological continuum, 219–223
neuronal-phenomenal correspondence, 174–188
report vs. no-report paradigms, 179–181
spatiotemporal alignment of brain to body, 195–206
spatiotemporal alignment of brain to social world, 211–215
spatiotemporal alignment of brain to temporal world, 206–211
spatiotemporal construction vs. expansion, 85–88
spatiotemporal expansion, 174–188, 225–228
spatiotemporal globalization, 181–183
spatiotemporal integration vs. content-based integration, 166–171, 177–179
spatiotemporal mechanisms, 153–155
spatiotemporal nestedness, 158–166, 223–225
world–brain relation, 223–228
world–brain relation vs. brain–world relation, 228–229
Spectrum model of brain, 2–5, 20–24, 100–102, 102–103, 79–103
active model of brain, 4, 16–20, 99–102
consciousness, 90–91, 97–102
definition, 20–21
middle and extreme cases in the spectrum, 21–24
passive model of brain, 3, 7–16, 97–99
Spontaneous activity of brain, xiii–xv
cross-frequency coupling, 91–94, 158–166
definition, 4–5, 6–7, 30–31
game changer in neuroscience and philosophy, 435–437
resting state, 4–5, 6–7, 30–31
scale-free activity (power law exponent), 91–94, 158–166
spatial relation and integration, 95–97
spatial structure, 16–17
spatiotemporal structure, xiii–xvi, 18–20
task-evoked or stimulus-induced activity, 6–7
temporal relation and integration, 94–95
temporal structure, 17–18
Structural realism, 242–267, 269–313, 315–348
argument of individuation, 255–259
argument of time and space, 259–266
difference-based coding, 244–246, 248–253
empirical-ontological fallacy vs. empirical-ontological plausibility, 248–255
moderate structural realism, 243–246
observational time and space, 260–261
relational time and space, 261–263
relation- vs. element-based ontology, 242–243
spatiotemporal spectrum model, 263–264
structural realism and brain, 242–267
structural realism and consciousness, 269–313
threat of logical circularity, 246–248
Time and space, 152–153
argument of, 259–266
construction by the brain, 152–153, 154–158
observational, 260–261
relational, 261–263
spatiotemporal nestedness and directedness, 339–346
spatiotemporal spectrum model, 263–264
Vantage point. See under Copernican revolution
definition and distinction, 360–364
from beyond body, 409–413
from beyond brain, 403–434
from beyond mind, 407–409
from within body, 399–400
from within brain, 396–399
from within consciousness, 393–396
from within mind, 379–390
from within reason, 392–393
from within vs. beyond Earth, 364–376
World–brain problem, vii–viii, xi–xiii, xxiii–xxiv, 293–313, 425–437
argument of triviality, 308–310
brain as subjective or objective, 298–299
brain paradox, 299–300
vs. brain problem and world problem, 346–348
vs. brain–world problem, 304–306
Copernican revolution, 433–434
eliminative materialism, xx–xxi
identity theory, xx–xxi
vs. mind–body problem, 303–304, 351–353
ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC), 300–301, 311–313
panpsychism or neutral monism, xxi–xxii, 301–303
spatiotemporal vs. mental subjectivity, 293–298
two halves, 306
vs. world–body problem, 307–308
vs. world–brain relation, 310–311
World–brain relation, vii–viii, xvi–xviii, 45, 55, 223–228
brain as open system, 71–74
brain as world-evidencing system, 67–71
brain–world relation, 228–229, 235–236, 331–334
difference-based coding, 45
experience-dependence of spontaneous activity, 64–65
neuro-ecological continuum, 219–223
ontological predisposition of consciousness, 269–313
skepticism, 55, 71–75
statistically based alignment of spontaneous activity to the world, 65–67
stochastically based world–brain relation, 67–71
structural realism, xvii–xviii, 242–267
time and space, 259–266
world–body relation as subset of world–brain relation, 235–236
world–brain problem, 293–313