New Orleans was the most important commercial port in the Confederacy, being the natural outlet of the Mississippi Valley, as well to the ports of Europe as to those of Central and Southern America. It had become before 1861 the chief cotton-mart of the United States, and its defence attracted the early attention of the Confederate Government. The approaches for an attacking party were numerous. They could through several channels enter Lake Pontchartrain, to approach the city in rear for land attack, could ascend the Mississippi from the Gulf or descend it from the northwest, where it was known that the enemy was preparing a formidable fleet of iron-clad gunboats.
At the mouth of the Mississippi there is a bar, the greatest depth of water on which seldom exceeded eighteen feet, and it was supposed that heavy vessels of war, with their armament and supplies, would not be able to cross it. Such proved to be the fact, and the vessels of that class had to be lightened to enable them to enter the river. In that condition of affairs an inferior fleet might have engaged them with a prospect of success. Captain Hollins, who was in command of the squadron at New Orleans, had been sent with the greater part of his fleet up the river to join in the defence there being made. Two powerful vessels were under construction — the Louisiana and the Mississippi — but neither of them was finished. A volunteer fleet of transport-vessels had been fitted up by some river men, but it was in the unfortunate condition of not being placed under the orders of the naval commander. A number of fire-rafts had been also provided, which were to serve the double purpose of lighting up the river in the event of the hostile fleet attempting to pass the forts under cover of the night, and of setting fire to any vessel with which they might come in contact.
After passing the bar there was nothing to prevent the ascent of the river until Forts Jackson and St. Philip were reached. These works were on opposite banks of the river. Their armament, December 5, 1861, consisted of — Fort Jackson: six 42-pounders, twenty-six 24-pounders, two 32-pounders (rifles), sixteen 32-pounders, three 8-inch columbiads, one 10-inch columbiad, two 8-inch mortars, one 10-inch mortar, two 40-pounder howitzers, and ten 24-pounder howitzers; Fort St. Philip: six 42-pounders, nine 32-pounders, twenty-two 24-pounders, four 8-inch columbiads, one 8-inch mortar, one 10-inch mortar, and three field-guns.
General Duncan reported that on March 27th he was informed that the enemy’s fleet was crossing the bars and entering the Mississippi River in force; whereupon he repaired to Fort Jackson.
The garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip were about one thousand men on December 5, 1861; afterward, so far as I know, the number was not materially changed.
The prevailing belief that vessels of war, in a straight, smooth channel, could pass batteries, led to the construction of a raft between the two forts, which, it was supposed, would detain the ships under fire of the forts long enough for the guns to sink them, or at least to compel them to retire. The power of the river when in flood, and the drift-wood it bore upon it, broke the raft; another was constructed, which, when the drift-wood accumulated upon it, met a like fate.
The general plan for the defence of New Orleans consisted of two lines of works; an exterior one, passing through the forts near the mouth of the river, and the positions taken to defend the various water approaches. Nearer to the city was the interior line, embracing New Orleans and Algiers, which was intended principally to repel an attack by land, but also, by its batteries on the river-bank, to resist approach by water. The total length of the intrenchments on this interior line was more than eight miles. When completed, it formed, in connection with impassable swamps, a very strong line of defence. At the then high stage of the river all the land between it and the swamps was so saturated with water that regular approaches could not have been made. The city, therefore, was at the time supposed to be doubly secure from a land attack.
In the winter of 1861-62 I sent one of my aides-de-camp to New Orleans to make a general inspection, and hold free conference with the commanding general. Upon his return he reported that General Lovell was quite satisfied with the condition of the land defences.
The interior lines of defence mounted more than sixty guns of various calibre, and were surrounded by wide and deep ditches. On the various water approaches, including bays and bayous on both sides of the river, there were sixteen different forts, and these, together with those on the river, and the batteries of the interior line, had in position about three hundred guns.
One ironclad, the Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns of heavy calibre, though she was not quite completed, was sent down to co-operate with the forts. Her defective steam-power and imperfect steering apparatus prevented her from rendering active co-operation. The steamship Mississippi, then under construction at New Orleans, was in such an unfinished condition as to be wholly unavailable when the enemy arrived. There were also several small river-steamers which were lightly armed, and their bows were protected so that they could act as rams, and otherwise aid in the defence of the river; but, from the reports received, they seem, with a few honorable exceptions, to have rendered little service.
The means of defence, therefore, mainly relied on were the two heavy-armed forts, Jackson and St. Philip, with the obstruction placed between them: this was a raft consisting of cypress-trees, forty feet long, and averaging four or five feet at the larger end. They were placed longitudinally in the river, about three feet apart, and held together by gunwales on top, and strung upon two two-and-a-half-inch chain-cables fastened to their lower sides. This raft was anchored in the river, abreast of the forts.
The fleet of the enemy below the forts consisted of seven steam sloops-of-war, twelve gunboats, and several armed steamers, under Commodore Farragut; also, a mortar fleet consisting of twenty sloops and some steam-vessels. The whole force was forty-odd vessels of different kinds, with an armament of three hundred guns of heavy calibre, of improved models.
The bombardment of the forts by the mortar fleet commenced on April 18th. After six days of vigorous and constant shelling the resisting power of the forts was not diminished in any perceptible degree. On the 23d there were manifest preparations by the enemy to attempt the passage of the forts. The sloops-of-war and the gunboats were each formed in two divisions, and, selecting the darkest hour of the night, between 3 and 4 A.M. of the 24th, moved up the river in two columns. The commanders of the forts had vainly endeavored to have the river lighted up in anticipation of an attack by the fleet.
In the meantime, while the fleet moved up the river, there was kept up from the mortars a steady bombardment on the forts, and these replied by a fire on the ascending columns of ships and gunboats; but, from the failure to send down the fire-rafts to light up the river, the fire was less effective than it otherwise would have been. The straight, deep channel enabled the vessels to move at their greatest speed, and thus the forts were passed.
Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the coast defences, says, in his report of the passing of Forts Jackson and St. Philip by the enemy’s fleet:
“Finding that the only resistance offered to his passage was the anticipated fire of the forts — the broken and scattered raft being no obstacle — I am satisfied that he was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gauntlet at all hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be that as it may, a rapid rush was made by him in columns of twos in echelon, so as not to interfere with each other’s broadsides. The mortar fire was furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and, in dashing by, each of the vessels delivered broadside after broadside, of shot, shell, grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.
“Both the officers and men stood up gallantly under this galling and fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape, and most gallantly and rapidly fought until the enemy succeeded in getting above and beyond the range. The absence of light on the river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and in consequence the gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by flashes of the enemy’s guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy’s dash was successful mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass or to reconnoitre when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy and effect.”
The vessels which passed the forts anchored at the quarantine station about six miles above, and in the forenoon proceeded up the river. Batteries had been constructed where the interior line of defence touched both the right and the left bank of the river. The high stage of the river gave to its surface an elevation above that of the natural bank; but a continuous levee to protect the land from inundation existed on both sides of the river. When the ascending fleet approached these batteries, a cross fire, which drove two of the vessels back, was opened upon it, and continued until the useful ammunition was exhausted. The garrisons were then withdrawn — casualties, one killed and one wounded.
General Duncan, whose protracted, skilful, and gallant defence of the forts is above all praise, closes his official report with the following sentence: “Except for the cover afforded by the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip.” The darkness to which he referred was not only that of night, but also the failure to utilize the means prepared to light up the river. As further proof of the intensity of the darkness, and the absence of that intelligent design and execution which had been expected, I will quote a sentence from the report of Commodore Farragut: “At length the fire slackened, the smoke cleared off, and we saw to our surprise that we were above the forts.”
On the 25th of April the enemy’s gunboats and ships of war anchored in front of the city and demanded its surrender. Major-General M. Lovell, in command, refused to comply, but, believing himself unable to make a successful defence, and in order to avoid a bombardment, agreed to withdraw his forces, and turn the city over to the civil authorities. It was evacuated on the same day. The forts still continued defiantly to hold their position. By assiduous exertion the damage done to the works was repaired, and the garrisons valiantly responded to the resolute determination of General Duncan and Colonel Higgins to defend the forts against the fleet still below, as well as against that which had passed and was now above.
During the 25th, 26th, and 27th there was an abatement of fire on the forts. A rumor became current that the city had surrendered, and no reply had been received to inquiries sent on the 24th and 25th. About midnight on the 27th the garrison of Fort Jackson revolted en masse, seized upon the guard, and commenced to spike the guns. Captain S. O. Comay’s company, the Louisiana Cannoneers of St. Mary’s Parish, and a few others remained true to their cause and country. The mutiny was so general that the officers were powerless to control it, and they therefore decided to let those go who wished to leave, and after daybreak to communicate with the fleet below and negotiate for the terms which had been previously offered and declined.
Under the incessant fire to which the forts had been exposed, and the rise of the water in the casemates and lower part of the works, the men had been not only deprived of sleep, but of the opportunity to prepare their food. Heroically they had braved alike dangers and discomfort; had labored constantly to repair damages; to extinguish fires caused by exploding shells; to preserve their ammunition by bailing out the water which threatened to submerge the magazine; yet, in a period of comparative repose, these men, who had been cheerful and obedient, as suddenly as unexpectedly broke out into mutiny. Under the circumstances which surrounded him, General Duncan had no alternative. It only remained for him to accept the proposition which had been made for a surrender of the forts. As this mutiny became known about midnight of the 27th, soon after daylight of the 28th a small boat was procured, and notice of the event was sent to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana, and also to Fort St. Philip. The officers of that fort concurred in the propriety of the surrender, though none of their men had openly revolted.
A flag of truce was sent to Commodore Porter to notify him of a willingness to negotiate for the surrender of the forts. The gallantry with which the defence had been conducted was recognized by the enemy, and the terms were as liberal as had been offered on former occasions.
The garrisons were paroled, the officers were to retain their side-arms, and the Confederate flags were left flying over the forts until after our forces had withdrawn. If this was done as a generous recognition of the gallantry with which the forts had been defended, it claims acknowledgment as an instance of martial courtesy — the flower that blooms fairest amid the desolations of war.
Captain Mitchell, commanding the Confederate States naval forces, had been notified by General Duncan of the mutiny in the forts, and of the fact that the enemy had passed through a channel in rear of Fort St. Philip and had landed a force at the quarantine, some six miles above, and that, under the circumstances, it was deemed necessary to surrender the forts. As the naval forces were not under the orders of the general commanding the coast defences, it was optional with the naval commander to do likewise, or not, as to his fleet. After consultation with his officers, Captain Mitchell decided to destroy his flagship, the Louisiana, the only formidable vessel he had, rather than allow her to fall into the hands of the enemy. The crew was accordingly withdrawn, and the vessel set on fire.
Commodore Porter, commanding the fleet below, came up under a flag of truce to Fort Jackson, and, while negotiations were progressing for the surrender, the Louisiana, in flames, drifted down the river, and, when close under Fort St. Philip, exploded and sank.
The confusion which prevailed in the city, when the news arrived that the forts had been passed by the enemy’s fleet, shows how little it was expected. There was nothing to obstruct the ascent of the river between Forts Jackson and St. Philip, up to the batteries on the river where the interior line of defence rested on its right and left banks, about four miles below the city. The guns were not sufficiently numerous in these batteries to inspire much confidence; they were nevertheless well served until the available ammunition was exhausted, after which the garrisons withdrew, and made their way by different routes to join the forces withdrawn from New Orleans.
Under the supposition entertained by the generals nearest to the operations, the greatest danger to New Orleans was from above, not below the city; therefore, most of the troops had been sent from the city to Tennessee, and Captain Hollins, with the greater part of the river-fleet, had gone up to check the descent of the enemy’s gunboats.
Batteries like those immediately below the city had been constructed where the interior line touched the river above, and armed to resist an attack from that direction. Doubtful as to the direction from which, and the manner in which, an attempt might be made to capture the city, such preparations as circumstances suggested were made against many supposable dangers by the many possible routes of approach. To defend the city from the land, against a bombardment by a powerful fleet in the river before it, had not been contemplated. All the defensive preparations were, properly, I think, directed to the prevention of a near approach by the enemy. To have subjected the city to bombardment by a direct or plunging fire, as the surface of the river was then higher than the land, would have been exceptionally destructive. Had the city been filled with soldiers whose families had been sent to a place of safety, instead of being filled with women and children whose natural protectors were generally in the army and far away, the attempt might have been justified to line the levee with all the effective guns and open fire on the fleet, at the expense of whatever property might be destroyed before the enemy should be driven away. The case was the reverse of the hypothesis, and nothing could have been more unjust than to censure the commanding general for withdrawing a force large enough to induce a bombardment, but insufficient to repel it. His answer to the demand for the surrender showed clearly enough the motives by which he was influenced. His refusal enabled him to withdraw the troops and most of the public property, and to use them, with the ordnance stores thus saved, in providing for the defence of Vicksburg; but especially it deprived the enemy of any pretext for bombarding the town and sacrificing the lives of women and children. It has been stated that General Lovell called for ten thousand volunteers from the citizens, but failed to get them.
The fall of New Orleans was a great disaster, over which there was general lamentation, mingled with no little indignation. The excited feeling demanded a victim, and the conflicting testimony of many witnesses most nearly concerned made it convenient to select for censure those most removed and least active in their own justification. Thus the naval constructors of the Mississippi and the Secretary of the Navy became the special objects of attack. The selection of these had little of justice in it, and could not serve to relieve others of their responsibility, as did the old-time doom of the scapegoat. New Orleans had never been a ship-building port, and when the Messrs. Tift, the agents to build the iron-clad steamer Mississippi, arrived there, they had to prepare a ship-yard, procure lumber from a distance, have the foundries and rolling-mills adapted to such iron-work as could be done in the city, and contract elsewhere for the balance. They were ingenious, well informed in matters of ship-building, and were held in high esteem in Georgia and Florida, where they had long resided. They submitted a proposition to the Secretary of the Navy to build a vessel on a new model. The proposition was accepted after full examination of the plan proposed, the novelty of which made it necessary that they should have full control of the work of construction. To the embarrassments above mentioned were added interruptions by calling off the workmen occasionally for exercise and instruction as militiamen, the city being threatened by the enemy. From these causes unexpected delay in the completion of the ship resulted, regret for which increased as her most formidable character was realized.
These constructors — the brothers Tift — hoped to gain much reputation by the ship which they designed, and, from this motive, agreed to give their full service and unremitted attention in its construction without compensation or other allowance than their current expenses. It would, therefore, on the face of it, seem to have been a most absurd suspicion that they willingly delayed the completion of the vessel, and at last wantonly destroyed it.
Mr. E. C. Murray, who was the contractor for building the Louisiana, in his testimony before a committee of the Confederate Congress, testified that he had been a practical shipbuilder for twenty years, and a contractor for the preceding eighteen years, having built about a hundred and twenty boats, steamers, and sailing-vessels. There was only a fence between his ship-yard and that where the Mississippi was constructed. Of this latter vessel he said: “I think the vessel was built in less time than any vessel of her tonnage, character, and requiring the same amount of work and materials, on this continent. … They worked on nights and Sundays upon her, as I did upon the Louisiana, at least for a large portion of the time.”
On March 22d the Secretary, by telegraph, directed the constructors to “strain every nerve to finish the ship,” and added, “work day and night.” April 5th he wrote again: “Spare neither men nor money to complete her at the earliest moment. Can you not hire night-gangs for triple wages?” April 10th the Secretary again says: “Enemy’s boats have passed Island 10. Work day and night, with all the force you can command, to get the Mississippi ready. Spare neither men nor money.” April 11th he asks, “When will you launch, and when will she be ready for action?” These inquiries indicate the prevalent opinion, at that time, that the danger to New Orleans was from the iron-clad fleet above, and not from the vessels at the mouth of the river; but the anxiety of the Secretary of the Navy, and the efforts made by him, were of a character applicable to either or both sources of danger. Thus we find, as early as the 24th of February, 1862, that he instructed Commander Mitchell to make all proper exertions to have guns and carriages ready for both the iron-clad vessels, the Mississippi and Louisiana. Reports having reached him that the work on the latter vessel was not pushed with sufficient energy, on the 15th of March he authorized Commander Mitchell to consult with General Lovell, and, if the contractors were not doing everything practicable to complete her at the earliest moment, that he should take her out of their hands, and, with the aid of General Lovell, go on to complete her himself. On the 5th of April, 1862, Secretary Mallory instructed Commander Sinclair, who had been assigned to the command of the Mississippi, to urge on by night and day the completion of the ship. In March, 1861, the Navy Department sent from Montgomery officers to New Orleans, with instructions to purchase steamers and fit them for war purposes. Officers were also sent to the North to purchase vessels suited to such uses, and another to Europe for like objects; and in April, 1861, contracts were made with foundries at Richmond and New Orleans to make guns for the defence of New Orleans. On the 8th of May, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy communicated at some length to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Confederate Congress his views in favor of iron-clad vessels, arguing as well for their efficiency as the economy in building them, believing that one such vessel could successfully engage a fleet of the wooden vessels which constituted the enemy’s navy.