About the middle of October, 1862, General McClellan crossed the Potomac, east of the Blue Ridge, and advanced southward, seizing the passes of the mountains as he progressed. In the latter part of the month he began to incline eastwardly from the mountains, moving in the direction of Warrenton, about which he finally concentrated.
On November 15th the enemy was in motion, and on the 21st it became apparent that the whole army — now under Burnside, who had superseded McClellan — was concentrating on the north side of the Rappahannock. About November 26th Jackson was directed to advance toward Fredericksburg, and as some of the enemy’s gunboats had appeared in the river at Port Royal, and it was possible that an attempt might be made to cross in that vicinity, D. H. Hill’s division was stationed near that place, and the rest of Jackson’s corps so disposed as to support Hill or Longstreet, as occasion might require. The fords of the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg were closely guarded by our cavalry, and the river above and below Port Royal was watched by W. H. F. Lee’s brigade. The interval before the advance of the enemy was employed in strengthening our lines, which extended from the river about a mile and a half above Fredericksburg, along the range of hills in the rear of the city to the Richmond railroad.
As these hills were commanded by the opposite heights, in possession of Burnside’s force, earthworks were constructed on their crest at the most eligible positions for artillery. To prevent gunboats from ascending the river, a battery was placed four miles below the city. The plain of Fredericksburg is so completely commanded by the Stafford Heights that no effectual opposition could be made to the passage of the river without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of the numerous batteries on the opposite heights. At the same time the narrowness of the Rappahannock and its winding course presented opportunities for laying down pontoon bridges at points secure from the fire of our artillery. Our position was therefore selected with a view to resist an advance after crossing, and the river was guarded by detachments of sharpshooters to impede the laying of pontoons until our army could be prepared for action.
Before dawn, December 11th, Burnside was in motion. About 2 P.M. he began preparations to throw two bridges over the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and one about a mile and a quarter below, near the mouth of the Deep Run. From daybreak until 4 P.M. the troops, sheltered behind the houses on the river-bank, repelled his repeated efforts to lay bridges opposite the town, driving back his working parties and their supports with great slaughter. At the lower point, where there was no such protection, he was successfully resisted until nearly noon, when, being exposed to the severe fire of the batteries on the opposite heights, our troops were withdrawn and the bridge was completed. Soon afterward 150 pieces of artillery opened a furious fire on the city, causing our troops to retire from the river-bank about 4 P.M. The enemy then crossed in boats, and proceeded rapidly to lay down the bridges. His advance into the town was bravely contested until dark, when our troops were recalled, the necessary time for concentration having been gained.
The enemy was prevented from constructing bridges, and his attempts to cross by boats, under the cover of artillery and musketry fire, were repelled until late in the afternoon, when General Barksdale, who commanded our force in Fredericksburg, was ordered to retire. During the night of the succeeding day the enemy crossed in large numbers at and below the town, secured from material interruption by a dense fog.
Shortly after 9 A.M. the partial rising of the mist disclosed a large force moving in line of battle against Jackson. Dense masses appeared in front of A. P. Hill, stretching far up the river in the direction of Fredericksburg. As they advanced, Major Pellham, of Stuart’s horse-artillery, opened a rapid and well-directed enfilade fire, which arrested their progress.
Four batteries were immediately turned upon him, and upon his withdrawal the enemy extended his left down the Port Royal road, and his numerous batteries opened with vigor upon Jackson’s line. Eliciting no response, his infantry moved forward to seize the position occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, who, reserving the fire of his fourteen pieces until their line had approached within less than eight hundred yards, opened fire upon it with such destructive effect as to cause it to waver and soon retreat in confusion.
About 1 P.M. the main attack on the right began by a furious cannonade, under cover of which three compact lines of infantry advanced against Hill’s front. The contest soon became fierce and bloody. Archer and Lane, who occupied the edge of a wood, repulsed those portions of the line immediately in front of them; but, before the interval between these commands could be closed, the assailants pressed through in overwhelming numbers and turned the left of Archer and the right of Lane. Attacked in front and flank, two regiments of Archer and a brigade of Lane, after a brave resistance, gave way. Archer held his line until the arrival of reinforcements. Thomas came to the relief of Lane, repulsed the column that had broken his line, and drove it back to the railroad. In the meantime a large force had penetrated the wood as far as Hill’s reserve, where it was met by a fire for which it was not prepared. The Federals were allowed to approach quite near, when Gregg’s South Carolina brigade poured a withering fire into the faces of Meade’s men, and Early’s division from the second line swept forward. The contest in the woods was short and decisive. The enemy was quickly routed and driven out with very heavy loss, and, though largely reinforced, was pressed back and pursued to the shelter of the railroad embankment. Here he was gallantly charged by the brigades of Hoke and Atkinson, and driven across the plain to his batteries. The attack on Hill’s left was repulsed by the artillery on that part of the line, against which a hot fire from twenty-four guns was directed. The repulse of the foe on our right was decisive, and the attack was not renewed, but his batteries kept up an active fire at intervals, and sharpshooters skirmished along the front during the afternoon.
While these events were occurring on our right, the enemy, in formidable numbers, made repeated and desperate assaults upon the left of our line. About 11 A.M., having massed his troops under cover of the houses of Fredericksburg, he moved forward in strong columns to seize Marye’s and Willis’s Hills. All his batteries on the Stafford Heights directed their fire upon the positions occupied by our artillery, with a view to silence it, and cover the movement of the infantry. Without replying to this furious cannonade, our batteries poured a rapid and destructive fire into the dense lines of the infantry as they advanced to the attack, frequently breaking their ranks, and forcing them to retreat to the shelter of the houses. Notwithstanding the havoc inflicted by our batteries, six times did he press on with great determination to within one hundred yards of the foot of the hill; but here, encountering the deadly fire of our infantry, his columns were broken, and fled in confusion to the town. The last assault was made shortly before dark. This effort met the fate of those that preceded it, and, when night closed in, his shattered masses had disappeared into the town, leaving the field covered with his dead and wounded.
During the night our lines were strengthened by the construction of earthworks at exposed points, and preparations made to receive the enemy on the next day. The 14th passed without a renewal of the attack. The hostile batteries on both sides of the river played upon our lines at intervals, our own firing but little. On the 15th Burnside still retained his position, apparently ready for battle, but the day passed as the preceding. But, on the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that he had availed himself of the darkness of the night and the prevalence of a violent storm of wind and rain to recross the river. The town was immediately reoccupied, and our positions on the river bank were resumed.
In the engagement we captured more than 900 prisoners and 9,000 stand of arms. A large quantity of ammunition was found in Fredericksburg. On our side 458 were killed and 3,743 wounded; total, 4,201. The loss of the enemy was 1,152 killed, 9,101 wounded, and 3,234 missing; total, 13,487.
General Burnside subsequently testified that he “had about 100,000 men on the south side of the river, and every single man of them was under artillery fire, and about half of them were at different times formed in columns of attack.”
Less than 20,000 Confederate troops were actively engaged. This number composed about one-fourth of the army under General Lee. The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia show that on December 10, 1862, General Lee had present for duty 78,228, and, on December 20th, 75,524 of all arms.
After the battle of Fredericksburg the Army of Northern Virginia remained encamped on the south side of the Rappahannock until the latter part of April, 1863. The Federal army occupied the north side of the river opposite Fredericksburg, extending to the Potomac. Two brigades of Anderson’s division were stationed near United States Mine or Bank Mill Ford. The cavalry was distributed on both flanks. Longstreet, with two divisions, had been detached for service south of James River in February, and did not rejoin the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville.
Excepting a cavalry engagement near Kelly’s Ford, on March 17th, nothing of interest occurred during this period of inactivity. But the cavalry movements indicated that the army, now commanded by Hooker, was about to resume active operations.
On the 28th, early in the morning, the enemy crossed the river in boats near Fredericksburg, laid a pontoon-bridge, and built another about a mile below. A considerable force crossed on these bridges during the day, and was massed under the high banks of the river, which afforded protection from our artillery, while the batteries on the opposite heights completely commanded the wide plain between our lines and the narrow river. On the 29th it was reported that he had crossed in force near Kelly’s Ford, and that a heavy column was moving from Kelly’s toward Germania Ford on the Rapidan, and another toward Ely’s Ford. The routes they were pursuing, after crossing the Rapidan, converged near Chancellorsville, whence several roads led to the rear of our position at Fredericksburg. General Anderson proceeded to cover these roads on the 29th, but, learning that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan and was approaching in strong force, he retired early on the next morning to the intersection of the Mine and plank roads near Tabernacle Church, and began to intrench himself. His rear-guard, as he left Chancellorsville, was attacked by cavalry, but, being vigorously repulsed, they offered no further opposition to his march.
The enemy on our front near Fredericksburg continued inactive, and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank and rear. It was therefore determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines, and with the main body of the army to give battle to the approaching column. Early’s division and Barksdale’s brigade, with part of the reserve artillery under Pendleton, were intrusted with the defence of our position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight on the 30th McLaws marched with the rest of his command toward Chancellorsville. Jackson followed at dawn next morning with the remaining divisions of his corps, reached the position occupied by General Anderson at 8 A.M., and immediately began to make preparations to advance. At 11 A.M. the troops moved forward on the plank and old turnpike roads. The enemy was soon encountered on both roads, and heavy skirmishing with infantry and artillery ensued, our troops pressing steadily forward. A strong attack upon McLaws was repulsed with spirit by Semmes’s brigade; and General Wright, diverging to the left of the plank road, marched by way of the unfinished railroad from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville and turned the Federal right. His whole line thereupon retreated rapidly, vigorously pursued by our troops until they arrived within about one mile of Chancellorsville. Here the enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left of his line extended from Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, covering the Bank Mill Ford, where he communicated with the north bank of the river by a pontoon-bridge. His right stretched westward along the Germania Ford road more than two miles. Darkness was approaching before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained; and, as the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front of Chancellorsville, at right angles to the plank road, extending on the right to the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the “Furnace.”
It was evident that a direct attack would be attended with great difficulty and loss, in view of the strength of the enemy’s position and his superiority of numbers. It was therefore resolved to endeavor to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted to Jackson with his three divisions. The commands of McLaws and Anderson remained in front of the enemy. Early on the morning of the 2d, Jackson marched by the Furnace and Brock roads, his movement being effectually covered by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry under General Stuart. As the rear of his train was passing the Furnace a large force of the enemy advanced from Chancellorsville and attempted its capture, but this advance was arrested. After a long and fatiguing march General Jackson’s leading division, under General Rodes, reached the old turnpike about three miles in rear of Chancellorsville at 4 P.M. As the different divisions arrived they were formed at right angles to the road. At 6 P.M. the advance was ordered. The enemy was taken by surprise, and fled after a brief resistance. Position after position was carried, the guns were captured, and every effort of the foe to rally was defeated by the impetuous rush of our troops. In the ardor of pursuit through the thick and tangled woods, the first and second lines at last became mingled and moved on together as one. The fugitives made a stand at a line of breastworks across the road, but the troops of Rodes and Colston dashed over the intrenchments together, and the flight and pursuit were resumed and continued until our advance was arrested by the abatis in front of the line of works near the central position at Chancellorsville. It was now dark. Jackson ordered the third line, under Hill, to relieve the troops of Rodes and Colston, who were completely blended and in such disorder from their advance through intricate woods and over broken ground that it was necessary to reform them. As Hill’s men moved forward, Jackson, with his staff and escort, returning from the extreme front, met the skirmishers advancing, and in the obscurity of the night were mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. Captain Boswell and several others were killed, and a number wounded, among whom was General Jackson, who was borne from the field. The command now devolved upon General Hill, whose division, under General Heth, was advanced to the line of intrenchments which had been reached by Rodes and Colston. A furious fire of artillery was opened upon them, under cover of which infantry advanced to the attack, but were handsomely repulsed. Hill was soon afterward disabled, and the command was turned over to Stuart. He immediately proceeded to reconnoitre the ground and make himself acquainted with the disposition of the troops. The darkness of the night and the difficulty of moving through the woods and undergrowth rendered it advisable to defer further operations until morning, and the troops rested on their arms in line of battle.
As soon as the sound of cannon gave notice of Jackson’s attack on the enemy’s right, the troops in front began to press strongly on the left to prevent reinforcements being sent to the point assailed. They advanced up to the intrenchments, while several batteries played with good effect until prevented by the increasing darkness.
Early on the morning of May 3d Stuart renewed the attack upon Hooker, who had strengthened his right wing during the night with additional breastworks, while a large number of guns, protected by intrenchments, were posted so as to sweep the woods through which our troops had to advance. Hill’s division was in front, with Colston in the second line, and Rodes in the third. The second and third lines soon advanced to the support of the first, and the whole became hotly engaged. The breastworks, at which the attack was suspended on the preceding evening, were carried by assault, under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery. In rear of these breastworks was a barricade, from which the enemy was quickly driven. The troops on the left of the plank road, pressing through the woods, attacked and broke the next line, while those on the right bravely assailed the extensive earthworks behind which General Hooker’s artillery was posted. Three times were these works carried, and as often were the brave assailants compelled to abandon them — twice by the retirement of the troops on their left, who fell back after a gallant struggle with superior numbers, and once by a movement of the enemy on their right caused by the advance of General Anderson. The left, being reinforced, finally succeeded in driving back the enemy, and the artillery began to play with great precision and effect. In the meantime, Anderson pressed forward upon Chancellorsville, his right resting upon the plank road and his left extending around the Furnace, while McLaws made a strong demonstration to the right of the road. As the troops advancing upon the enemy’s front and right converged upon his central position, Anderson effected a junction with Jackson’s corps, and the whole line pressed irresistibly. Hooker’s army was driven from all its fortified positions with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and retreated toward the Rappahannock. By 10 A.M. we were in full possession of the field.
The troops, having become somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of the contest, were immediately reformed, preparatory to renewing the attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the Rappahannock, which he had fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops, after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our operations were just completed when further movements were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg.
Before dawn, on the morning of the 3d, it was known that the enemy had occupied Fredericksburg in large force, and laid down a bridge at the town. He made a demonstration against the extreme right of the force left to hold our lines, which was easily repulsed by General Early. Soon afterward a column moved from Fredericksburg along the river banks, as if to gain the heights on the extreme left which commanded those immediately in rear of the town. This attempt was foiled. Very soon the enemy advanced in large force against Marye’s, and the hills to the right and left of it. Two assaults were gallantly repulsed. After the second, a flag of truce was sent from the town to obtain permission to provide for the wounded. Three heavy lines advanced immediately upon the return of the flag and renewed the attack. They were bravely repulsed on the right and left, but the small force at the foot of Marye’s Hill, overpowered by more than ten times their number, was captured after an heroic resistance, and the hill carried. The success of the enemy enabled him to threaten our communications by moving down the Telegraph road, or to come upon our rear at Chancellorsville by the plank road. He began to advance on the plank road, his progress being gallantly disputed by the brigade of General Wilcox, who fell back slowly until he reached Salem Church, on the plank road, about five miles from Fredericksburg.
In this state of affairs in our rear, General Lee led General McLaws with his three brigades to reinforce General Wilcox. He arrived at Salem Church early in the afternoon, where he found General Wilcox in line of battle, with a large force of the enemy — consisting, as was reported, of one army corps and part of another — in his front. The enemy’s artillery played vigorously upon our position for some time, when his infantry advanced in three strong lines, the attack being directed mainly against General Wilcox, but partially involving the brigades on his left. After a fierce struggle the first line was repulsed with great slaughter. The second then came forward, but immediately broke under the close and deadly fire which it encountered, and the whole mass fled in confusion to the rear. They were pursued by the brigades of Wilcox and Semmes, which advanced nearly a mile, when they were halted to reform in the presence of the hostile reserve, which now appeared in large force. It being quite dark, General Wilcox deemed it imprudent to push the attack with his small numbers, and retired to his original position, the enemy making no attempt to follow. The next morning General Early advanced along the Telegraph road, and recaptured Marye’s and the adjacent hills without difficulty, thus gaining the rear of the enemy’s left. In the meantime General Hooker had so strengthened his position near Chancellorsville, that it was deemed inexpedient to assail it with less than our whole force, which had been reduced by the detachment led to Fredericksburg to relieve us from the danger that menaced our rear.
Longstreet had previously been sent with two divisions of Lee’s army to co-operate with French in the capture of Suffolk, the occupation of which by the enemy interrupted our collection of supplies in the eastern counties of North Carolina and Virginia. When the advance of Hooker threatened Lee’s front, instructions were sent to Longstreet to hasten his return to the army. These instructions were repeated with urgent insistence, yet his movements were so delayed that, though the battle of Chancellorsville did not occur until many days after he was expected to join, his force was absent when it occurred. Had he rejoined his command in due time, Lee need not have diminished his force in front of Hooker, so as to delay the renewal of the attack and force him to a precipitate retreat, involving the loss of his artillery and trains. It was accordingly resolved still further to reinforce the troops in front, in order, if possible, to drive Hooker across the Rappahannock.
Some delay occurred in getting the troops into position, owing to the broken and irregular nature of the ground, and the difficulty of ascertaining the disposition of the opposing forces. The attack did not begin until 6 P.M., when the enemy’s troops were rapidly driven across the plank road in the direction of the Rappahannock. The speedy approach of darkness prevented McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack, until the foe began to recross the river a short distance below Banks’s Ford, where he had laid one of his pontoon-bridges. His right brigades advanced through the woods in the direction of the firing, but the retreat was so rapid that they could only join in the pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our own troops. Their movements were consequently slow.
The next morning it was found that the enemy had made good his escape and removed his bridges. Fredericksburg was evacuated, and our rear no longer threatened. But, as Hooker had it in his power to recross, it was deemed best to leave a force to hold our lines as before. McLaws and Anderson, directed to return to Chancellorsville, reached their destination during the afternoon, in the midst of a violent storm, which continued throughout the night and most of the following day. Preparations were made to assail the enemy’s works at daylight on the 6th, but, on advancing our skirmishers, it was found that, under cover of the storm and darkness of the night, he had retreated over the river. A detachment was left to guard the battle-field, while the wounded were removed and the captured property was collected. The rest of the army returned to its former position.
The loss of the enemy was 1,512 killed and 9,518 wounded; total, 11,030. His dead and a large number of wounded were left on the field. About 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of the wounded, were taken; and 13 pieces of artillery, 19,500 stand of arms, 17 colors, and a large quantity of ammunition fell into our hands.
Our loss was much less in killed and wounded than that of the enemy, but of the number was one — a host in himself — Lieutenant-General Jackson — who was wounded, and died on May 10th.
Of this great captain General Lee, in his anguish, justly said, “I have lost my right arm.” As an executive officer he had no superior, and war has seldom shown an equal. Too devoted to the cause he served to have any selfishness, he shared the toils, privations, and dangers of his troops when in chief command; and in subordinate positions his aim was to understand the purpose of his commander and faithfully to promote its success. He was the complement of Lee; united, they had achieved such results that the public felt secure under their shield. To us his place was never filled.
The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on March 31, 1863, shows as present for duty 57,112, of which 6,509 were cavalry and 1,621 reserve artillery. On May 20th, two weeks after the battle, and when Pickett’s and Hood’s divisions had rejoined the army, the total infantry force numbered but 35,261 effective men, from which, if the strength of Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions is deducted, there would remain 41,358 as the strength of the commands that participated in the battles of Chancellorsville.
The Army of the Potomac numbered 120,000 men, infantry and artillery, with a body of 12,000 well-equipped cavalry and an artillery force of 400 guns.