Operations in the West now claim attention. General Bragg occupied Chattanooga; General E. K. Smith held Knoxville, in East Tennessee. In August, 1862, he entered Kentucky, and after several small and successful affairs reached Richmond on August 30th, routing a force of the enemy that had collected there to check his progress. The enemy lost several hundred killed and several thousand prisoners, with a large number of small arms, artillery, and wagons. He then advanced on Lexington and Frankfort, and occupied both, creating great alarm for the safety of Cincinnati, which he could have captured had his command been an independent one. As he was but the advance of General Bragg’s command, his duty was to co-operate with it, and therefore he could not cross the Ohio.
General Bragg marched from Chattanooga on September 5th without serious opposition, entered Kentucky by the eastern route, compelling General Buell to collect all his forces and retreat rapidly to Louisville, and thus restoring to the Confederacy a large and important territory. By this brilliant piece of strategy, North Alabama and Middle Tennessee were relieved from the presence of the enemy without necessitating a single engagement.
On September 18th General Bragg issued an address to the people of Kentucky. Some recruits joined him, and an immense amount of supplies was obtained. As soon as our army began to retire, the enemy, having received reinforcements, moved out, and pressed so heavily on our rear, under Hardee, that he halted and checked them near Perryville. Bragg then determined to give battle there. Three of the divisions of his old command were concentrated under General Volk, who was ordered to attack on the morning of October 8th. The two armies were formed on opposite sides of the town. The enemy was assailed vigorously, the engagement soon became general, and was continued furiously until dark. Although greatly outnumbered, and although the battle waged with varying success, our men eventually carried every position, and drove the Federals about two miles. Night ended the action. We captured 15 pieces of artillery, killed one and wounded two brigadier-generals, and a very large number of inferior officers and men, estimated at no less than 4,000, and captured 400 prisoners. Our loss was 2,500 killed, wounded, and missing.
The enemy was heavily reinforced during the night. Next morning, therefore, General Bragg withdrew his troops to Harrodsburg. General Smith, with most of his forces, arrived next day, and the whole were then withdrawn to Bryantsville, the enemy following slowly and not closely. General Bragg finally took position at Murfreesboro, and the enemy concentrated at Nashville, General Buell having been superseded by General Rosecrans.
Meanwhile, on November 30th, General Morgan, with 1,300 men, made an attack on a brigade of the enemy at Hartsville. It was found strongly posted on a hill, in line of battle. Our line was formed under fire, and the advance was made with great steadiness. The enemy was driven from his position, losing a battery of Parrott guns. Finally, hemmed in on the river bank, he surrendered. The contest was severe, and lasted an hour and a half. The prisoners numbered 2,100.
Late in the month of December General Rosecrans commenced his advance from Nashville upon the position of General Bragg at Murfreesboro. His movement began on December 26th, by various routes, but such was the activity of our cavalry as to delay him four days in reaching the battle-field, a distance of twenty-six miles. On the 29th General Wheeler, with his cavalry brigade, gained the rear of Rosecrans’s army, and destroyed several hundreds of wagons loaded with supplies and baggage. After clearing the road, he made the circuit of the enemy and joined our left. Their strength was 65,000 men. The number of fighting men we had on the field on December 31st was 35,000, of which 30,000 were infantry and artillery.
Our line was formed about two miles from Murfreesboro, and stretched transversely across Stone River, which was fordable from the Lebanon pike, on the right, to the Franklin road, on the left. As Rosecrans made no demonstration on the 30th, General Bragg determined to begin the conflict early on the next morning by the advance of his left. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and his right was steadily driven until his line was thrown entirely back at a right angle to his first position and near the railroad, along which he had massed reserves. After the first surprise the resistance of the enemy was most gallant and obstinate. At night he had been forced from every position except the one on his extreme left, which rested on Stone River, and was strengthened by a concentration of artillery too formidable for assault.
Early next morning (January 1st, 1863) the cannonading opened on the right centre, and was kept up for a short time. The enemy had withdrawn from the advanced position occupied by his left flank. One or two short contests occurred on the 3d, but his line was unchanged. Our forces had now been in line of battle five days and nights, with little rest, as there were no reserves. Their tents, packed in wagons, were four miles in the rear. The rain was continuous, and the cold severe. News came that heavy reinforcements were marching rapidly to the enemy. General Bragg therefore decided to fall back to Tullahoma, which he did in good order.
In the series of engagements near Murfreesboro we captured over 6,000 prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, 6,000 small-arms, a large number of ambulances, horses, and mules, and a large amount of other property. Our losses exceeded 10,000. Those of the enemy were estimated at over 25,000.
After the battle of Shiloh, West Tennessee and North Mississippi were occupied by a force under General Grant. Subsequently this force was increased, and Rosecrans assigned to its command. Many positions were held in West Tennessee and North Mississippi, with garrisons aggregating 42,000 men. The most important of these positions was the fortified town of Corinth.
As part of the plan to subjugate the Southwestern States extensive preparations were made for an advance through Mississippi, and a combined land and naval attack on Vicksburg. A large number of troops occupied Middle Tennessee and North Alabama. To defeat the general plan General Bragg moved his army into Kentucky, which by this time the Federal Government thought it needless to overawe by the presence of garrisons. Van Dorn and Price commanded the Confederate troops then in North Mississippi. General Bragg, when he advanced into Kentucky, had left them with instructions to operate against the Federals in that region, and especially to guard against their junction with Buell in Middle Tennessee.
In September, 1862, General Price learned that Rosecrans was moving to join Buell. He therefore marched to Iuka, which he reached on the 19th. His advance cavalry found the place occupied by a force, which retreated toward Corinth, abandoning a considerable amount of stores. On the 24th General Price received a letter from General Ord stating that “Lee’s army had been destroyed at Antietam; that therefore the rebellion must soon terminate; and that, in order to spare the further effusion of blood, he gave him this opportunity to lay down his arms.” Price replied, thanking Ord for his kind feeling, but correcting the rumor about Lee, and promising “to lay down his arms whenever Mr. Lincoln should acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy, and not sooner.” On that night Price held a council of war, at which it was agreed to fall back next morning and make a junction with Van Dorn, it being now satisfactorily shown that the enemy was holding the line on our left instead of moving to reinforce Buell. The cavalry pickets had reported that a heavy force of the enemy was moving from the south toward Iuka. It proved to be a force commanded by Rosecrans in person. General Little advanced to meet him. A bloody contest ensued. Rosecrans was driven back with a loss of nine guns. Our own loss was very serious. It included General Little, an officer of extraordinary merit, greatly beloved by his troops. The Third Louisiana lost half its men, and every regiment suffered severely. It was afterward ascertained that this movement of Rosecrans was intended to be made in concert with one by Grant moving from the west; but Rosecrans had been beaten before Grant arrived.
The Confederate force at this time was 22,000. Rosecrans had at Corinth 15,000 men, with 8,000 at various outposts from twelve to fifteen miles distant. In addition to this force the enemy had at Memphis, about 6,000; at Bolivar, about 8,000; at Jackson, Tenn., about 3,000; at other points, from 2,000 to 3,000, making an aggregate of 42,000 in West Tennessee and North Mississippi.
Corinth, although the strongest, was, from its salient position, the most feasible point to attack, and in the circumstances the most important to gain. Van Dorn, therefore, determined to try to take it by surprise.
Our army moved rapidly from Ripley, its point of juncture, cut the railroad between Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., and at daybreak on the 3d of October was deployed for attack. By ten o’clock our force confronted the enemy inside his intrenchments. In half an hour the whole line of outer works was carried, the obstructions were passed, and the battle opened in earnest. The enemy, obstinately disputing every point, was finally driven from his second line of detached works, and at sunset had retreated to the innermost lines.
The battle had been mainly fought by Price’s division, on our left. The troops had made a quick march of ten miles over dusty roads, without water; the line of battle had been formed in forests with undergrowth; the combats of the day had been so severe that General Price thought his troops unequal to further exertion on that day, and it was decided to wait until morning. “One hour more of daylight,” said General Van Dorn, “and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field.”
During the night batteries were put in position to open on the town at daybreak. The action was to begin on the left, to be immediately followed by an advance on the extreme right. The order was not executed. The commander of the wing which was to make the attack failed to do so, and another officer was sent to take his place. In the meantime the centre became engaged, and the action extended to the left. The plan had been disarranged; nevertheless the centre and left pushed forward and planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy. “His heavy guns were silenced and all seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh troops that had succeeded in reaching Corinth was poured into our thin ranks.” With this combined assault on Price’s exhausted corps, which had sustained the whole conflict, those gallant troops were driven back. The day was lost. Our army retired to Chewalla during the day, without pursuit, and rested during the night without molestation. Our loss both of officers and men was very heavy.
General Van Dorn then moved to near Holly Springs, Miss. In the meantime General Grant massed a heavy force, estimated at 80,000 men, with which he moved through the interior of Mississippi until he encamped near Water Valley. The country was teeming with large quantities of breadstuffs and forage, and he accumulated an immense depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and hastened every preparation necessary to continue his advance southward.
Unless his progress were arrested, the interior of the State, its capital, Jackson, Vicksburg, and its railroads would fall into his hands. As we had no force sufficient to offer battle, our only alternative was to attack his communications. For this purpose Van Dorn (December 15th) quietly withdrew our cavalry — numbering less than 2,500 men — from the enemy’s front, and marched for Holly Springs, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry and the Seventh Illinois cavalry. Van Dorn surprised and captured the garrison, and before eight o’clock was in quiet possession of the town. The captured property, amounting to millions of dollars, was burned before sunset. Grant was thus forced to abandon his campaign, and to retreat hastily from the State.