In May, 1863, the enemy, under General Hooker, occupied his former position before Fredericksburg in great strength, the force present being 136,704. His objective point was Richmond.
General Lee’s forces had been reorganized into the First, Second, and Third Army Corps, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.
In view of the enemy’s great superiority in numbers, it was considered inadvisable to allow him to choose his own time for attacking us, and it was therefore decided, by a bold movement, to attempt to transfer hostilities to the north side of the Potomac, by crossing the river into Maryland and Pennsylvania; simultaneously driving the foe out of the Shenandoah Valley, which he occupied in considerable force.
With this view our forces, on June 3, 1863, advanced to Culpeper Court-House, leaving Hill to occupy the lines in front of Fredericksburg.
On the 5th Hooker, having discovered our movement, crossed an army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock; but, as this manoeuvre was apparently for observation, it was not thought necessary to oppose it. On the 9th a large force of the enemy’s cavalry crossed at Beverly’s and Kelly’s Fords and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued. Stuart forced his assailant to recross the river, with heavy loss, leaving 400 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several stands of colors in our hands.
On June 13th General Ewell advanced directly upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town. Next day he stormed the works, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or put to flight. Most of those who attempted to escape were made prisoners.
General Rhodes captured Martinsburg on the 14th, with 700 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. Thus the valley was cleared of the enemy. Our loss was small.
On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the enemy at Fredericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock, and disappeared behind the hills of Stafford.
Hooker, in retreating, pursued the roads near the Potomac, and offered no favorable opportunity for attack. On the 17th, near Aldie, Stuart encountered and drove back the enemy’s cavalry. The engagement was renewed on the 18th. Finding that the Federal cavalry was now strongly supported by infantry, Stuart retired, having taken in these engagements about 400 prisoners and a considerable number of horses and arms.
Meanwhile General Ewell had entered Maryland, and Jenkins, with his cavalry, had penetrated as far as Chambersburg, Pa. Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac, to be within supporting distance of Ewell, and, advancing into Pennsylvania, encamped near Chambersburg on June 27th. On the same day it was ascertained that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was marching northward, thus menacing our communications. It was determined therefore to arrest his further progress by concentrating our army at Gettysburg.
Heth’s, the leading division of Hill’s corps, met the enemy in front of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1st, driving him back within a short distance of the town. There the advance encountered a larger force, with which two of Hill’s divisions became engaged. Ewell came up, with two of his divisions, and took part in the engagements. The Federals were driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery.
Our troops bivouacked on the ground they had won.
The position at Gettysburg was not the choice of either side. South of the town an irregular, interrupted line of hills runs, which is sometimes called the “Gettysburg Ridge.” This ridge, at the town, runs eastward and then southward.
At the turn eastward is Cemetery Hill, and at the turn southward, Culp’s Hill. From Cemetery Hill the line runs southward about three miles in a well-defined ridge, called Cemetery Ridge since the battle, and terminates in a high, rocky, and wooded peak named Round-Top, which was the key of the enemy’s position, as it flanked their line. The less elevated position, near where the crest rises into Round-Top, is termed Little Round-Top, a rough and bold spur of the former. Thus, while Cemetery and Culp’s Hills require the formation of a line of battle to face northward, the direction of Cemetery Ridge requires the line to face westward. The crest has a good slope to the rear, while to the west it falls off in a cultivated and undulating valley, which it commands. About a mile distant is a parallel crest, known as Seminary Ridge, which our forces occupied during the battle. Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and McLaws, faced Round-Top and a good part of Cemetery Ridge; Hill’s three divisions continued the line from the left of Longstreet, fronting the remainder of Cemetery Ridge; while Ewell with his three divisions held a line through the town, and sweeping round the base of Cemetery Hill terminated the left in front of Culp’s Hill.
These were the positions of the three corps after the arrival of General Longstreet’s troops.
The main purpose of the movement across the Potomac was to free Virginia from the presence of the enemy. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base as Gettysburg; but, being unexpectedly confronted by the opposing army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, in the presence of the main army of the enemy, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies.
Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the Federal army, General Lee decided to renew the attack on the next day, July 2d.
General Meade held the high ridge above described, along which he had moved a large amount of artillery. Ewell held our left, Hill the centre, Longstreet the right. In front of Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could gain Round-Top beyond, and thus enable our guns to rake the crest of the ridge. Longstreet was ordered to try to carry this position, while Ewell should attack the high grounds on the enemy’s right, which had already been partially fortified. Hill was instructed to threaten the centre, to prevent reinforcements to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack.
After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of the ground in his immediate front and holding it. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions he assailed; and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the force in his front. The battle ceased at dark.
These partial successes determined Lee to continue the assault on the next day, July 3d. Pickett with three brigades joined Longstreet next morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions gained by him on the day before.
In the meantime General Meade had strengthened his line with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle reopened in the afternoon and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy; but, our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy force of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish the advantage and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.
Owing to the strength of the enemy’s position and the exhaustion of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as could be removed were ordered to Williamsport.
The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had been previously paroled; but the numerous wounded who had fallen into our hands after the first and second day’s engagements were left behind.
Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th. The march was continued during the day without interruption by the enemy, except one unimportant demonstration upon our rear, which was easily checked.
After a tedious march, rendered more difficult by the rains, our army reached Hagerstown on the 6th and the morning of the 7th of July.
The Potomac was unfordable. It had been swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our army entered Maryland. The pontoon-train sent from Richmond was inadequate. By the 13th a good bridge was thrown over at Falling Waters. On the 12th Meade’s army approached. An attack was awaited during that and the following day, yet, although the two armies were in close proximity, no collision occurred, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines.
On the night of the 13th, our preparations being completed, the army commenced to cross the Potomac. The crossing was not completed until 1 P.M. on the 14th, when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with the loss of only a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud.
The strength of our army at Gettysburg is stated at 62,000 of all arms. The report of the Army of the Potomac under Meade, on June 30th, states the force present at 112,988 men. General Meade stated to a Congressional Committee that, “including all arms of the service, my strength [at Gettysburg] was a little under 100,000 men — about 95,000.”
If the strength of Lee’s forces, according to the last accessible report before his movement northward, be compared with that made after his return to Virginia, there is a decrease of 19,000 of the brave men who had set the seal of invincibility on the Army of Northern Virginia.
Thus closed the campaign in Pennsylvania. The wisdom of the strategy was justified by the result. The battle of Gettysburg was unfortunate; though the loss sustained by the enemy was greater than our own, theirs could be repaired, ours could not.
The battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of an unusual amount of discussion, and the enemy has made it a matter of extraordinary exultation. As an affair of arms it was marked by mighty feats of valor to which both combatants may point with military pride. It was a graceful thing in President Lincoln, as reported, when, on being shown the steeps which the Northern men persistently held, he answered, “I am proud to be the countryman of the men who assailed those heights.”
The consequences of the battle have justified the amount of attention it has received. It may be regarded as the most eventful struggle of the war. By it the drooping spirit of the North was revived. Had their army been there defeated, those having better opportunities to judge than I or anyone who was not among them, have believed it would have ended the war. On the other hand, a drawn battle, where the Army of Northern Virginia made an attack, impaired the confidence of the Southern people so far as to give the malcontents a power to represent the government as neglecting for Virginia the safety of the more southern States.
In all free governments the ability of its executive branch to prosecute a war must depend largely upon public opinion; in an infant republic this is peculiarly the case. The volume given to the voice of disaffection was therefore most seriously felt by us.