The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s

4. Allen, New Delhi, to McConaughy, July 16, 1953, CA Records, Box 38, file: 112.1 W. P. McConaughy, RG 59, NA; Rankin to Allen, July 29, 1953, Rankin Papers, Box 20, file: Allen, George V. 1953, Mudd; David Allan Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 130; Makins, Washington, January 16, 1954, FO371/110222 (FC 10345/3), PRO; M. G. L. Joy, Washington, January 25, 1954, FO371/110222 (FC 10345/5), PRO.

5. Foreign Documents Division and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Propaganda Evidence Concerning Sino-Soviet Relations,” April 30, 1952, and Philip Bridgham, Arthur Cohen, and Leonard Jaffe, “Chinese and Soviet Views on Mao as a Marxist Theorist and on the Significance of the Chinese Revolution for the Asian Revolutionary Movement,” September 6, 1953, discussed in Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology.” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998–1999): 57–71, online at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html (accessed October 21, 2011).

10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–56 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 471.

11. Allen S. Whiting, “Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis,” Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science (January 1959), 101.

12. Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, “After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War.” Manuscript in author’s possession.

13. William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 337.

14. FE-158, “Joint Sino-Soviet Agreements of October 12,” October 25, 1954, found in British records, FO371/110221 (FC 10338/47) PRO; 661.93/10–1354, Memo, Edwin W. Martin (CA) to Drumright (FE), Box 2949, RG 59, NA. The British independently saw indications that Moscow did not want to be drawn into the Taiwan imbroglio. Minutes by A. E. Donald, September 14, 1954, and Crowe, September 11, 1954, in FO371/110258 (FC 1094/25 and FC 1094/29, respectively), PRO. On Soviet contributions, see Steven I. Levine, “Breakthrough to the East: Soviet Asian Policy in the 1950s,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 308.

15. On the Soviet reluctance to commit to support Chinese intervention, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 190–92. Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly 121 (March 1990), 111–12. Jia Qingguo states that China expended some $10 billion in the war effort and received only $1.43 billion from Moscow. Jia, “Searching for Peaceful Coexistence and Territorial Integrity,” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 268.

16. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 208–9.

17. Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Chengtu Conference,” March 10, 1958, in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People; Talks and Letters: 1956–1971 (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 98–99; Record of Conversation, Mao Zedong with Soviet Ambassador P. F. Yudin, March 31, 1956, P. F. Yudin Journal, CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 164–67; Memcon, Mao Zedong with Yugoslavian Communist Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), 251–62, translated in ibid., 148–51.

18. 661.93/3–2553, Memo, A. S. Chase (DRF) to Harald W. Jacobson (DRF), March 20, 1953, Box 2949, RG 59, NA; Memo, J. L. Barnard to Paul Nitze (S/P), “Vulnerabilities of the Sino-Soviet Entente,” April 3, 1953, Records of the U.S. Presidential Committee on International Information Activities (Jackson Committee) Records, Box 13: Misc. File, Material M-P (2), DDEL; 661.93/4–153, Despatch 1988, John M. Steeves, Tokyo, Box 2949, RG 59, NA. Regarding Asian speculation on Stalin’s death, see 661.93/4–153, Despatch 1988, John M. Steeves, Tokyo, Box 2949, RG59, NA.

19. For the Khrushchev speech, see “On Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” Renmin ribao, April 5, 1956; Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 45–46.

20. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 229–30.

21. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 54–70.

22. John Gaddis, We Now Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 213.

23. Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rong zhen] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1986), 800–4; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 60–63. Americans guessed at the time that Beijing would use its position on Communist solidarity to wrest economic aid from Moscow. William O. Anderson, Berlin, to Clough, November 26, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 6, file: 350.1 Communism, RG 59, NA.

24. Staff Notes ﹟125, June 5, 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Box 25, file: June 1957 Diary—Staff memos, DDEL; 301st NSC Meeting, October 26, 1956, DDEL; Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 54–65. A story retailed to journalist Joseph Harsch suggested that the Chinese had hoped that Nehru, during his December 1956 trip to Washington, could fashion a deal with the United States to reduce Chinese dependency on the USSR by promising trade and a UN seat. Only after that effort failed did the Chinese publicly support the intervention in Hungary. “Chinese-Soviet Relations,” February 1957, FO 371/127287 (FC 10338/10), PRO.

25. Whiting, “Dynamics,” 105. Polish Communist liberals had hoped that China would support them against the Soviets, and although disappointed by Beijing’s avowal of solidarity with Moscow in December 1956, they welcomed the Hundred Flowers Movement, still hoping it foreshadowed the possibility of a Warsaw-Beijing axis to curtail Soviet domination. Lutkins to Drumright, May 7, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 7, file: 362 Chinese Communist Government, May–August, RG 59, NA; G. F. Hudson, “New Phase of Mao’s Revolution,” Problems of Communism 7 (November–December 1958), 14.

26. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 420–27; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 270–86.

27. Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 115–16; Foot, Practice of Power, 122. Americans were surprised to discover that the Chinese had to buy weapons from the Soviets and saw it as a propaganda opportunity. 661.93/3–453 ﹟2311, Harrington, Hong Kong, Box 2949, RG 59, NA.

28. 793.00/1–1254, Despatch 1250, Harrington, Hong Kong, Box 4207, RG 59, NA; Mayers, Cracking the Monolith, 144.

29. David Wolff, “‘One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events’: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959,” Cold War International History Project Working Papers, ﹟30, August 2000, 9.

30. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), 461, 466; William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao,” CWIHP Bulletin 8–9 (Winter 1996–97), 243.

31. Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao,” 243.

32. Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 34–35, 38–42.

33. Lüthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 64.

34. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161–63.

35. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 159 and 152–65.

36. Constantine Pleshakov, “Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19980, 233; Lüthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 96. But Sergey Radchenko argues that Mao had no choice but peaceful coexistence since he did not want war or reconciliation. H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, vol. 9, no. 25 (2008), 16, available from http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-IX-25.pdf (accessed July 26, 2009).

37. Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 148–150, 152–155.

38. Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao,” 245.

39. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: The U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 149.

40. Memo, Bacon to McConaughy, May 20, 1953, CA Records, Box 40, file: 312.2 Chinese representation at UN, RG 59, NA; Bacon to Drumright, April 6, 1954 (quotes from 611.61/4–254 ﹟571 of April 2), FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 726.

41. The Far Eastern bureau’s UN adviser, on the other hand, called Chinese efforts to enter “half-hearted,” suggesting that recognition of Ho Chi Minh just as the French were about to support giving the seat to China indicated a lack of interest in joining. Of course, this ignores lots of other contributing factors. “UN Aspects of the Problem of Chinese Representation in the Event of an Armistice,” Memo, Bacon (FE) to McConaughy (CA) May 26, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 647.

42. Foot, Practice of Power, 24–27, 30–31.

43. Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 51–58, 72, 81; 310.2/5–2553, Memo by Bacon, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 652.

44. Matthew Woll to Hubert Humphrey, January 28, 1954, Humphrey Papers, 23 L10 5B, Box 106, file: Foreign Policy: China, MHS; Matthew Woll, “Why Communist China Should Not Be Admitted to the United Nations,” Free Trade Union News, September 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files, Official File, Box 332, file: 85-DD Admission of CC into UN, Ike; Speech by George Meany, AFL to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 22, 1955, Freda Utley Papers, Box 3, file: American China Policy Association, Hoover; “Answering Prime Minister U Nu’s Statements of July 6, 1955 at a United Nations News Conference,” July 7, 1955, Emmet Papers, Box 23, file: Committee—Press Releases, Hoover.

45. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949–1979 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984), 68–69. There were also activists in favor of seating China in the UN, for example, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Letter, Mrs. Alexander Stewart to Humphrey, July 30, 1954, 23L 10 5B, Box 106, file: Foreign Policy: China, MHS.

46. “American Press Opinion, May 1–15, 1957,” Chinese News Service, Freda Utley Papers, Box 74, file: Taiwan 74–3, Hoover.

47. De la Mare to Dalton, March 21, 1957, FO 371/127289 (FC 10345/18), PRO.

48. Humphrey to Glenn Arter, Michigan, April 12, 1957, Humphrey Papers, 23 K3 6FBox 137, MHS.

49. Special Legislative Conference, June 2, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 654.

50. Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz in Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles’ Command of American Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), 29, argued that Eisenhower was privately flexible on China before 1954 but thereafter he became “intensely emotional” on the subject and “the British found it impossible to reason with him calmly,” whereas Dulles was firm but dispassionate and evinced understanding of British views.

51. Memo, Bacon (FE) to Johnson (FE), May 15, 1953, CA Records, Box 40, file: 312.2 Chi Rep at UN, RG 59, NA.

52. Dulles to Luce, April 24, 1950, file: Luce, Henry, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Mudd.

53. Memcon, Dulles with Eden et al., July 2, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 734; William P. Snyder, “Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May–June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China,” Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983), 85–86.

54. Wang Jisi, “The Origins of America’s ‘Two China’ Policy,” in Harding and Yuan, eds., Sino-American Relations, 205.

55. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., China Confidential (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 148–49.

56. Bechhoefer, “Chinese Representation in the United Nations,” July 8, 1953, Box 40, file: 312.2: Chinese Representation at the UN, RG 59, NA. Dulles explained this point to reporters on November 9, 1953, Dulles Papers, Press Conference 20, Box 68, file: “China, People’s Republic of,” Mudd.

57. 795.00/6–953 ﹟786, Lodge, USUN, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 661–62; 310.2/6–1153, Lodge to Dulles, in ibid., 667, and reply, 310.2/6–1153, Dulles to Lodge, June 19, 1953, in ibid., 679–80; Telcon, June 10, 1953, Koo Papers, Box 187, Columbia.

58. 310.2/8–2453 ﹟96, Rankin, Taipei, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 686–89; Rankin to Robert Aura Smith, Editorial Council, New York Times, November 24, 1953, Rankin Papers, Box 20, file: “China, People’s Republic of,” Mudd; Karl Lott Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 185.

59. 310.2/8–3054, Cowles to O’Connor, transmitting “Communist China in the United Nations,” FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 767–72.

60. NSC 48/5, “United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” May 17, 1951, U.S. Department of State, FRUS 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1: Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 33; NSC 166/1, “U.S. Policy towards Communist China,” November 6, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 282; NSC 146/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government,” November 6, 1953, in ibid., 317.

61. CAB 129/62, c.(53)247, Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, Cabinet Minutes, September 4, 1953, PRO.

62. T. Clifton Webb, New Zealand Commissioner of External Affairs, Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State for External Affairs, ﹟36 and ﹟37, July 8, 1954, Record Group 25/86–87/160, Box 118, file: 10464-A-40, pt. 3, External Affairs Department Records, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (hereafter Canada);310.2/7–1454 ﹟10, Scotten, Wellington, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 741.

63. 310.2/3–254, Memo, Lodge, USUN, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 719–20; Judd to Hammarskjöld, March 3, 1954, Papers of Walter Judd, Box 172, MHS.

64. 310.2/9–353 ﹟154, Wadsworth, USUN, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 698; Memcon, Wellington Koo with Robert D. Murphy, September 9, 1953, Koo Papers, Box 187, Columbia.

65. CAB 128/26 Pt. II, c.c.(53)51, 1953, Cabinet Minutes, PRO. Churchill to Eisenhower, July 8, 1954, Anthony Eden Papers, FO 800/786, PRO. Canadians believed that China’s exclusion was “not consistent with the contemporary facts of life” but that nothing could be done till the United States changed its mind. R. A. MacKay to the Minister, July 14, 1954, Record Group 25/86–87/160, Box 118, file: 10464-A40, pt. 3, Canada.

66. ﹟1532 Makins, Washington to London, July 2, 1955, FO 371/115054 (FC 1041/94), and ﹟1572 Makins, Washington to London, FO 371/115054 (FC 1041/954), PRO. U. Alexis Johnson called Menon an “international meddler” both vain and “truly sinister.” Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 222, 241. U Nu of Burma also tried to play intermediary. 611.93/8–455﹟368, State to Johnson, Geneva, FRUS 1955–1957, supplement, fiche 2.

67. 793.02/7–654, Memcon, M. G. L. Joy, British Embassy, with H. B. Day (PSA), Box 4217, RG 59, NA; ﹟6181, Eden to Nutting, December 14, 1954, FO 371/ 110241 (FC 1042/252), PRO.

68. Michael Dockrill, “Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954–55,” in Michael Dockrill and John W. Young, eds., British Foreign Policy, 1945–1956(London: Macmillan, 1989), 173–96 (quotes on 175 and 190).

69. Koo Diary, January 22, 1955, Box 220, Koo Papers; Crowe Minutes, August 20, 1954, FO 371/110257 (FC 1094/21), PRO.

70. Eisenhower to Churchill, February 10, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Box 9, file: DDE Diary February 1955 (2), Ike; FO 800/787, ﹟697, Churchill to Eisenhower, February 15, 1955, Eden Papers, PRO.

71. Memcon, Dulles with Eden et al., July 2, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 734.

72. Transcript, Press and Radio News Conference, ﹟8, July 8, 1954, Dulles Papers, Box 79, file: “China, People’s Republic of,” Mudd.

73. “China’s Veto of Outer Mongolia for United Nations Membership,” drafted by Embassy Taipei, December 23, 1955, Rankin Papers, Box 26, file: Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, Mudd.

74. John Garver, “China’s Wartime Diplomacy,” in James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 26–27; Letter, Chiang Kai-shek to Eisenhower, November26, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 9, file: Formosa (China) 1952–1954 (4), Ike; Memcon, Robertson and Bacon with Koo, November 17, 1955, Lot 60D648, Box 1, file: 4P Inner and Outer Mongolia, RG 59, NA; Memo, Osborn to McConaughy, November 19, 1955, in ibid.

75. Taipei was angered when USIA made U.S.-Taiwan contention public by calling Taipei’s proposed act suicidal. “China’s Veto of Outer Mongolia for United Nations Membership.” The Nationalist foreign minister, however, argued the new members would dilute support in the UN, with only Spain of the eighteen proposed free and Communist countries offering a reliable vote. Rankin, Taipei, November 28, 1955, Rankin Papers, Box 26, file: Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, Mudd.

76. Eisenhower to Chiang, November 22, 1955, John F. Kennedy Papers, President’s Office Files, Box 113a, file: China Security 1961, JFKL. ﹟305, Dulles to Rankin, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman Files, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 5, file: Dulles, November 1955 (1), Ike; ﹟317, Eisenhower to Chiang, November 28, 1955, in ibid.

77. Memo, Bacon to Robertson, December 6, 1955, Lot 56D679, Box 11, file: United Nations, RG 59, NA.

78. Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 137.

79. Drumright to McConaughy, June 22, 1956, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030.2a Invitations to American Correspondents to Visit Mainland China, RG 59, NA.

80. Murphy to Sebald, August 6, 1956, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030.2a Invitations to American Correspondents to Visit Mainland China, RG 59, NA.

81. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 116.

82. McConaughy to Johnson, September 30, 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, supplement, fiche 7.

83. De la Mare to Crowe, August 9, 1956, FO 371/120896 (FC 10345/97), PRO; de la Mare to Dalton, April 15, 1957, FO 371/127412 (FC 1671/15), PRO, refers to a Washington Post editorial of April 8, 1957.

84. AP news clipping, August 20, 1956, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030.2a Invitations to American Correspondents to Visit Mainland China, RG 59, NA.

85. John Hightower, Associated Press, to Carl McCardle, Dulles’s press secretary, August 14, 1956, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030.2a; de la Mare to Crowe, August 21, 1956, FO 371/120896 (FC 10345/102), PRO.

86. David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 251; R. A. Aylward (CA) to McConaughy (CA), March 5, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030 William Worthy Trip, RG 59, NA. British comment on the issue appears in FO 371/127264 (FC1013), PRO; “3 Newsmen in Red China Face Action,” Washington Post and Times-Herald (1954–1959), December29, 1956, A2, Pro Quest Historical Newspapers; Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 160–61.

87. Sebald to Acting Secretary, August 17, 1956, Lot 60D648, Box 2, file: 030.2a Invitations to American Correspondents to Visit Mainland China, RG 59, NA. Lawrence’s views were generally quite conservative.

88. 611.93/8–1655 ﹟526, Dulles to Johnson, Geneva, FRUS 1955–1957, supplement, fiche 4.

89. McConaughy to Robertson, April 10, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 3, file: 220.2 Passport Policy for Visits to CC, January–July, RG 59, NA; Youde to Mayall, February 13, 1957, FO 71/127412 (FC 1671/9), PRO.

90. Within the State Department, the September 19, 1957, remarks by Lu Dingyi, director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, asserting that “journalism is a tool for class struggle,” was circulated. Clough to Robertson, September 26, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 7, file: 350.1a Chinese Communism, July–September, RG 59, NA.

91. Allen W. Dulles to Shepard Stone, Ford Foundation, November 9, 1958, Allen W. Dulles Papers, Box 76, file: “Re China, People’s Republic of, 1958,” Mudd.

92. Young, Negotiating, 116–29. For many who opposed the journalist exchange, this had been the sticking point. Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) to Dulles, September 24, 1957, Dulles Papers, Box 114, file: Bridges, Styles 1957, Mudd.

93. Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Prespective,” in Ross and Jiang, Re-Examining the Cold War, 187.

94. “A Clumsy Deception,” People’s Daily, August 26, 1957, Lot 60D648, Box 3, file: 220.2 Passport Policy for Visits to CC, August–December, RG 59, NA; Young, Negotiating, 130.

95. Memo, Roberston to Herter, 8/1/58, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 36–37.

96. Tucker, China Confidential, 149.

2. The participating countries included the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. Later adherents included Japan, West Germany, Canada, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. Cooperative agreements were reached with Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland. Ultimately, they established three categories of restrictions: (1) list IL/I entailed a strict embargo; (2) list IL/II imposed quantitative controls, and (3) IL/III consisted of a watch list of goods that although saleable had to be reported to COCOM.

3. The Hong Kong Consulate General calculated that in 1950 the United States provided 29 percent of China’s total imports, which meant that it was the single largest supplier of the year. As for exports, China sent 36 percent of its goods to the United States and 36.4 percent to the Soviet Union. 493.00/8–1053, Despatch 339, David H. McKillop, Hong Kong, Box 2204, RG 59, NA.

6. CHINCOM included the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan. All the members of COCOM served provisionally. On the struggle to establish CHINCOM, see Yoko Yasuhara, “Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, 1948–52,” Diplomatic History 10 (Winter 1986), 85–87. On the bilateral agreement, see 400.949/9–1952 ﹟321, circular from Acheson, Box 1791, RG 59, NA; and NSC 104/2, 6th progress report, January 19, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 1: General and Political Matters (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), pt. 2, 918–19. See also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years: Politics and Prosperity,” Diplomatic History (Summer 1984), 183–208. The CHINCOM list included some 200 items not restricted for the European Soviet bloc and another 89 embargoed for China but simply watched in European trade. “Multilateral Trade Controls against Communist China: U.S. Position and Statement in Support,” December 30, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 2, file: 500.002 General U.S. Economic Policy, RG 59, NA.

10. OIR 6335, October 5, 1953, RG 59, NA; 169th NSC Meeting, November 5, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 268; 228th NSC Meeting, December 9, 1954, in ibid., pt 2, 1797.

11. Sayuri Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety: Japan-U.S. Controversy over Recognition of the PRC, 1952–1958,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 4 (Fall 1995), 228–32.

12. Decision confirmed at 188th NSC Meeting, March 11, 1954, and incorporated as a new addition into NSC 152/3, “Economic Defense,” of November 6, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 387–88; 493.949/4–354 ﹟2410, Allison, Tokyo, Box 2218, RG59, NA. And see 187th NSC Meeting, March 4, 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5, Ike; 493.949/4–154 ﹟2378, Allison, Tokyo, Box 2218, RG 59, NA; 493.949/4–154 ﹟2229, Dulles to Tokyo, in ibid.

13. IR 7445, “Japan’s Expanding Trade with Communist China,” 11, March 21, 1957, State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, NA. Of course, each country seemed to see itself as most disadvantaged. See China Association Bulletin ﹟84, London, May 20, 1953, FO 371/105238 (FC 1106/4), PRO. The British even suspected that American merchants were using the Japanese to front for illicit trade with China. Robert Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1974 (London: Macmillan, 1976), 100.

14. The Japanese believed that British companies like Jardine Matheson were doing well in China, and the British ambassador concluded that the Japanese prime minister didn’t believe his denials. Moreover, he lamented, Americans thought that London wanted to deflect Chinese trade to China so as to protect British trade in Southeast Asia. William Dening, Embassy, Tokyo to W. D. Allen, London, September 29, 1953, FO 371/105266 (FC 1151/141) PRO.

15. C. T. Crowe to Trevelyan, Peking, November 2, 1953, FO 371/105228 (FC 1072/2), PRO; 493.639/4–154, Despatch 1439, Woodbury Willoughby, Vienna, RG 59, NA.

16. Problems with maintaining controls were reported in NSC 104/2, 6th progress report, January 19, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 1, pt. 2, 915–16; 493.009/6–1553, Hemmendinger (NA) to Young (NA) Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 150th NSC Meeting, June 18, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 204–5; NSC 154/1, “U.S. Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea,” July 7, 1953, in ibid., 238–39; 169th NSC Meeting, November 5, 1953, in ibid., 265–77.

17. 460.509/1–2953 ﹟793, Dulles to Office of the Special Representative in Europe, ibid., 130–31; 202nd NSC Meeting, June 17, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 1, pt. 2, 1203. European annoyance was aggravated in February 1953 when, without warning, the United States temporarily embargoed shipments of antibiotics to Western Europe to force limits on sales to China. 493.419/3–653, Vernon (EDT) to General Smith (U), Box 2211, RG 59, NA; 411.9331/11–2253, Hope to Drumright, Box 1859, RG 59, NA; Hope to McConaughy, October 12, 1953, and Kalijarvi (E) to Acting Secretary, October 19, 1953, Box 43, file: 500.007.1 CHINCOM, CA Records, RG59, NA.

18. CIA/RR IM-452, Intelligence Memorandum, “The Economic Importance of the Abolition of Multilateral Differential Trade Controls against Communist China,” 2, June 17, 1957, Dulles Papers, Box 114, file: “China, People’s Republic of,” Mudd.

19. 493.009/4–2353 ﹟937, Roswell H. Whitman, Oslo, and 490.009/5–753, Despatch980, Whitman, Oslo, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 493.009/4–2353 ﹟1113, John O. Bell, Copenhagen, in ibid.; 493.009/4–2453, Despatch 2453, Lloyd A. Free, Rome, in ibid.; FO 371/105254 (FC 1122/3), Minutes on trade with China, May 29–June 30, 1953, PRO; 493.009/5–2153, Despatch 1189, Albert E. Pappano, Ottawa, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 746G.00 (W)/5–853 ﹟2941, Joint Weeka 19 from SANA, Harrington, Hong Kong, Box 3599, RG 59, NA; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 167–68; 493.009/3–3053, Byroade (NEA) to Dulles, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 493.009/4–2353 ﹟937, Roswell H. Whitman, Oslo, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 493.009/4–2353 ﹟1113, John O. Bell, Copenhagen, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 493.009/4–2453, Despatch 2255, Lloyd A. Free, Rome, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 746G.00(W)/5–853, Joint Weeka 19, Harrington, Hong Kong, Box 3599, RG 59, NA.

20. 493.419/9–154, Despatch 649, Dwight E. Scarbrough, London, Box 2211, RG 59, NA.

21. Robertson to Secretary, on NSC-152 Economic Defense Policy, June 2, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 202.

22. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., China Confidential (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 110.

23. Richard E. Johnson, Hong Kong economic officer, in Tucker, China Confidential, 109.

24. Bacon to Robertson, August 25, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 3, 764–65.

25. “Giant Panda Barred Here by Red Taint Is Booked in Europe at $2, 000 a Week,” New York Times, July 11, 1958, 12.

26. Council on Foreign Economic Policy Staff Study ﹟6 Economic Defense Policy Review, June 1955, U.S. Council on Foreign Economic Policy Records, Reports Series, Box 2: Economy Policy Review (5), Ike.

27. 693.94/6–954, Despatch 1651, Samuel D. Berger, Tokyo, Box 3004, RG 59, NA.

28. Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, 108.

29. ﹟124 Shanghai summary, May 16–31, 1957, FO 371/127264 (FC 1015/12), PRO.

30. Memcon, Eisenhower and Dulles with Eden, Lloyd, and Makins, January 31, 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 10: Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 309–12. The U.S. government put intense pressure on Indonesia and Ceylon for violating the Battle Act. Memcon, July 9, 1954, Lot 60D171, Box 1, file: 543.1010(.1) French Vessels Trading with Communist China and Bunkering Thereof, 1954, RG 59, NA; Memcon, November 1, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 3, file: 511.13 Trade with Ceylon, RG 59, NA; Robertson to Acting Secretary, November 4, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 2, file: U.S. Trade Policy: Export Control Policy; Administration Actions Program 1955, RG 59, NA.

31. Eisenhower was referring to NSC 104/2, U.S. Policies and Programs in the Economic Field Which May Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc, April 1951. 137th NSC Meeting, March 19, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, file: 137th Meeting, Ike.

32. 193rd NSC Meeting, April 13, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 409–10. He had made similar statements at the 169th NSC Meeting, November 5, 1953, in ibid., 268.

33. 194th NSC Meeting, April 29, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 1, 1155.

34. Intelligence analysts estimated costs annually reaching $110 million, whereas Robertson told Dulles that the loss to China went as high as $300 million annually, or a reduction of some 24 percent in strategic goods that China could acquire. He also estimated a 3- to 5-month delay in securing goods. W. Park Armstrong to Kalijarvi (E), September 20, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 9, file: 500.021 Embargo Effects on Communist China, RG 59, NA; Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, February 14, 1956, DDRS (1990), fiche 34, no. 409; Robertson to Dulles, September 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 7, file: 500.002 General Economic Policy including Trade and Export Control, Je–December 1956, RG 59, NA.

35. James Hagerty Diary as quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 202.

36. 193rd NSC Meeting, April 13, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 409–12. Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks favored trade but worried about strengthening China’s war-making capabilities. 460.6031/6–754, Weeks to Cutler, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 1, pt. 2, 1181.

37. 493.009/4–554, Robertson to Secretary, Box 2206, RG 59, NA; Eisenhower to Churchill, March 19, 1954, in Peter G. Boyle, ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 127–28. In fact, at Geneva the British and Chinese agreed to strength trade relations. Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, 87–88.

38. 493.009/9–1654, L. W. Goodkind (EDS) to Samuel Waugh (E), Box 2206, RG 59, NA; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to Dulles, November 29, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 958; NSC 5429/5, “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” December 22, 1954, Records of the National Security Council, RG 273, NA.

39. Edwin Layton, deputy director for intelligence, Joint Staff to Radford, June 29, 1955, and Layton to Radford, June 21, 1956, Radford Files, Box 6, 091 China (1956), April–December 1955, RG 218, NA. Layton’s intelligence group also estimated that West Germany, for one, transacted roughly $100 million in business with the Chinese during 1955 through “concealed” routes. Edwin Layton, deputy director for intelligence, Joint Staff to Radford, February 16, 1956, Radford Files, Box 6, 091 China (1956), 1956, RG 218, NA.

40. Hosoya Chihiro, “From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The United States and Japan in the Postwar World (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989), 28; Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety,” 233–36.

41. NSC 5516/1, “U.S. Policy toward Japan,” April 9, 1955, 6, DDRS (1987), fiche 177, no. 2887.

42. Dulles to Eisenhower, January 1956, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 5, November 1955 (2), Ike; 271st NSC Meeting, December 22, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7, Ike.

43. Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, 109.

44. Richard Collins, Brig. General, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, to Radford, September 26, 1956, JCS Records, Radford Files, Box 6, 091 China (1956), file: 1956, RG 218, NA.

45. Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, to Radford, December 7, 1955, Radford Files, Box 6, 091 China (1956), file: April–December 1955, RG 218, NA; CM-242–55, Radford to Wilson, December 12, 1955, in ibid.; CM-242–55, Radford to Dulles, December 12, 1955, in ibid. Radford’s condemnation notwithstanding, the United States itself on occasion purchased specific items from China to enhance its own stockpile. CFEP Staff Study ﹟4, Ike. The British were angered that Washington had done little to protect London from McCarthy. Commercial Relations and Export Department, Board of Trade to Economic Relations Department, Foreign Office, June 16, 1953, FO 371/105254 (FC 1122/14), PRO; Minutes by Alastair G. Maitland, August 14, 1953, FO 371/105254 (FC 1122/18), PRO.

46. I-15167/5, Charles K. Nichols, Defense member to Chairman, Executive Committee, EDAC, September 27, 1955, 60D171, Box 2, file: 500.007 East-West Controls, COCOM 1955, RG 59, NA.

47. Robertson to Secretary, December 7, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 2, file: East-West Controls with Communist China, China Communist (CHINCOM) 1955, RG 59, NA. Regarding the damage the United States had already done to the Hong Kong economy with trade controls, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992 (New York: Twayne/Macmillan, 1994), 200–6.

48. 271st NSC Meeting, December 22, 1955; 308th NSC Meeting, January 3, 1957, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman Files, NSC Series, Box 7, Ike; Totten to Radford, May 22, 1956, Radford File, Box 6, 091 China (1956), 1956, RG 218, NA.

49. Ferrell, Eisenhower Diaries, March 30, 1956, 325.

50. For example, see 274th NSC Meeting, January 27, 1956, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7, file: NSC Summaries of Discussion, Ike.

51. Hodge (CA) to Jones (FE) and McConaughy (CA), March 8, 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 8, file: 500.007.1 Multilateral Controls with China—CHINCOM January–June 1956, RG 59, NA. Warren I. Cohen, “China in Japanese-American Relations,” in Cohen and Iriye, eds., United States and Japan, 47.

52. 230th NSC Meeting, January 5, 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 2, 4; Dulles to Eisenhower, December 8, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 2, file: 500.002 General U.S. Economic Policy, RG 59, NA; Prochnow to Dulles, December 20, 1955, Lot 58D209, Box 2, file: CHINCOM (East-West Trade) 1955, RG 59, NA; 493.419/12–1055 ﹟3258, Dulles to Macmillan, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 10, 277. On trade, see 611.93/10–1255﹟870, Dulles to Johnson, FRUS 1955–1957, supplement, fiche 7; and McConaughy to Johnson, October 14, 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, supplement, fiche 9.

53. “Strengthening the Economic Embargo on China,” February 12, 1953, draft report from United Nations Affairs, CA Records, Box 43, file: 500.008 Economic Sanctions, RG 59, NA.

54. 493.509/3–253, White on Special Estimate-37, “Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain Courses of Action Directed at the Internal and External Commerce of Communist China,” Box 2213, RG 59, NA; Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 174.

55. CFEP 36th Meeting Minutes, January 12, 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 10, 286–88; Joseph M. Loage to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 13, 1956, DDRS (1985), fiche 11 ﹟118.

56. “The U.S. Position on China Trade Controls,” April 14, 1956, JCS Records, Radford Files, 1953–5197, 091 China (1956), Box 6, file: 1956, RG 218, NA.

57. Qing, From Allies to Enemies, 194.

58. 281st NSC Meeting, April 5, 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 10, 332–34; 419.6–2256, Wilson to Dulles, in ibid., 372; “Think-Piece on China Trade Control Dilemma,” Howard Jones to Robertson, June 5, 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 7, file: 500.002 General U.S. Economic Policy including Trade and Export Control, June–December 1956, RG 59, NA; Qing, From Allies to Enemies, 180–83.

59. L. Tyson (FE) to Sebald and Robertson, August 24, 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 7, file: 500.002 General U.S. Economic Policy including Trade and Export Control, June–December 1956, RG 59, NA.

60. Qing Simei, “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China, 1954–1958,” in Cohen and Iriye, eds., Great Powers, 131–32; ﹟161 Eisenhower to Harold Macmillan, May 17, 1957, Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Macmillan, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 18: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Part I: A New Beginning, Old Problems; January 1957to May 1957, chap. 2: Foreign Aid, note, available from http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/161.cfm (accessed January 16, 2010).

61. Burton I. Kaufman, “Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy with Respect to East Asia,” in Cohen and Iriye, eds., Great Powers, 109.

62. NSC Progress Report on “Multilateral Export Controls on Trade with Communist China,” September 27, 1956, DDRS (1989), fiche 86, no. 1568. In striking contrast, officials in the Far East bureau and in the Joint Chiefs concluded that anger over Suez motivated London and Paris to be intransigent. Marshall Brement (FE)to Robertson, May 31, 1957, Lot 59D19, Box 1, file: Far East—General, January–December 1957, RG 59, NA; Joint Staff to Radford, October 5, 1956, JCS Records, Radford Files, 1953–1957, Box 6, 091 China (1956), file: 1956, RG 218, NA.

63. Ralph Clough (though actually drafted by Hodge) to Robertson, May 23, 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 7, file: 500.002 General U.S. Economic Policy including Trade and Export Control, March–May 1956, RG 59, NA.

64. ﹟161, Eisenhower to Macmillan, May 17, 1957, Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Macmillan, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 18: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Part I: A New Beginning, Old Problems; January 1957to May 1957, chap. 2: Foreign Aid, available from http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/161.cfm.

65. Zhang Shu Guang, Economic Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 186–89 (quote 188–89); Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949–1979 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984), 77.

66. Tracy Lee Steele, “Allied and Interdependent: British Policy during the Chinese Offshore Islands Crisis of 1958,” in Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman, and W. Scott Lucas, eds., Contemporary British History, 1931–1961 (New York: Pinter, 1991), 232.

67. Philip J. Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade in the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 107.

68. The Japanese in turn argued that growing protectionism in the United States and Europe necessitated trade with China. Visit of Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, September 1957, Lot 60D514, Box 2, file: Fujiyama, FM Aiichiro Visit, September 1957, RG 59, NA.

69. Eisenhower to Macmillan, May 24, 1957, DDRS (1986), fiche 126, no. 1672; Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (London: Macmillan, 1971), 317–18. Chinese officials welcomed the British announcement, believing it signified an Anglo-American split, according to Con O’Neill, British charge in Beijing. Shao Wenguang. China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and Commercial Relations, 1949–57 (London: Macmillan, 1991), 171, 231n94.

70. Memo to Radford, July 20, 1956, JCS Records, Radford Files, 1953–1957, Box 6, 091 China (1956), file: 1956, RG 218, NA; Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade, 107.

71. Memcon Shima, Japanese Embassy with Parsons, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Lot 60D171, Box 8, file: 500.007.1 Multilateral Controls with China—CHINCOM, January–June 1956, RG 59, NA; Warren I. Cohen, “China in Japanese-American Relations,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The United States and Japan in the Postwar World. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989), 48.

72. 493.9441/2–1458 ﹟2116, MacArthur, Tokyo, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 17: Japan; Korea, microfiche supplement 1994, ﹟430; 493.9441/3–1258 ﹟2357, MacArthur, Tokyo, in ibid., ﹟433.

73. Shimizu, “Perennial Anxiety,” 235–48; 493.9441/3–1458 ﹟574, Parsons to Robertson in Taipei, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 17, microfiche ﹟434; 493.9441/3–2558 ﹟2476, MacArthur, Tokyo, in ibid., ﹟436; 493.9441/3–2658 ﹟615, Dulles/Robertson to Tokyo, in ibid., ﹟437; 493.9441/3–2858 ﹟2521, MacArthur, Tokyo, in ibid., ﹟438; 493.9441/4–458﹟2596, MacArthur, Tokyo, in ibid., ﹟442.

74. FUJ D-2/3 Position Paper, “Chinese Communist Economic Warfare against Japan,” September 4, 1958, Fujiyama Visit, September 10–14, 1958, Lot 60D514, Box 6, file: Fujiyama Visit, WSR Briefing Book, September 1958, RG 59, NA.

75. Telcon, Eisenhower with Humphrey, April 19, 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 10, 339n2;356th NSC Meeting, February 27, 1958, NSC Action 1865, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 4:Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 709.

76. Memcon, 356th NSC Meeting, February 27, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 4, 704–6.

77. Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, eds., Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the PRC, 1949–1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 4–5.

78. H. J. Sceats, leader of the opposition, to Lester Pearson, May 1, 1958, and editorial from Maclean’s magazine, Lester Pearson Papers, MG26N2, vol. 46, file: ﹟722 Trade with Communist China, Canada.

79. Qing, “Changes in Western Embargo Policy,” 135; Memcon, Eisenhower with John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister, July 10, 1958, Records of the White House Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, Box 6: DDE Trip to Canada, Chronology 7/10/58 (1), Ike.

80. Memcon, 393rd NSC Meeting, January 15, 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 4, 754–58.

81. 611.93231/5–459 ﹟867, Wigglesworth, Ottawa, Reel 9, Confidential Central Files, RG59, NA; 611.93231/2–2659, Despatch 880, Willis C. Armstrong, Ottawa, in ibid.;611.93231/3–2159 ﹟681, Herter to Embassy Ottawa, in ibid.

82. 611.93231/5–759 ﹟887, Wigglesworth, Ottawa, in ibid.; 611.93231/5–1459, Despatch1229, Edward J. Thrasher, Ottawa (press summary), in ibid; 611.93231/6–159, Despatch 1309, Thrasher, Ottawa, in ibid; E. W. Kenworthy, “U.S. to Look Away as Shrimps Go By,” New York Times, May 23, 1959, Pro Quest Historical Newspapers (accessed January 16, 2010).

83. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 112–33; CFEP Staff Study ﹟5 Economic Defense Policy Review, June 30, 1955, U.S. Council on Foreign Economic Policy Records, Reports Series, Box 2: Economy Policy Review (5), DDEL.

84. 411.936/7–1652, Philip H. Thayer, Hanlon, and Goodman Co., New Jersey, Box 1859, RG 59, NA. In fact, Foreign Assets Control Regulations did not keep all brushes made with Chinese bristles out of the U.S. market. 611.93231/3–155, A. Guy Hope (CA) to McConaughy (CA), Confidential Central Files, Reel 8, RG 59, NA.

85. 411.9331/11–1653, Harrison Lewis (CA) to McConaughy, Box 1859, RG 59, NA; 493.119/11–2053, Despatch 1360, Dallas L. Jones, Paris, Box 2209, RG 59, NA; Arthur de la Mare, Washington Embassy to Oscar Morland, Foreign Office, February 8, 1957, FO 371/ 127239 (FC 1071/5), PRO; de la Mare to Peter G. F. Dalton, Foreign Office, March 15, 1957, FO 371/127289 (FC 100345/15), PRO; Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 77.

86. OIR, “Political Impact of Holding the Present CHINCOM Embargo Line or of Downward Modified Controls,” November 15, 1955, Lot 60D171, Box 2, file: East-West Controls with Communist China, China Communist (CHINCOM) 1955, RG 59, NA.

87. 411.9331/1–3154, Despatch 764, Peter J. Peterson, Manila, Box 1859, RG 59, NA; 493.009/6–1053, Memcon, Morris Shriro, Shriro Trading Company, with Arthur J. Smith (EE), Box 2206, RG 59, NA; 493.119/6–2653, Jack Burby, Honolulu Advertiser, to John Leddy, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Box 2209, RG 59, NA; 411.93/9–1653, Norma Wyatt to Henry Cabot Lodge, USUN, Box 1859, RG 59, NA; International Longshoremen’s Association, “Resolution on Relations with Red China,” July 15, 1957, John Foster Dulles Papers, Mudd.

88. A. J. de la Mare to P. G. F. Dalton, Foreign Office, July 18, 1957, FO 371/127340 (FC 11345/4), PRO; Letter, Alfred Kohlberg to Senators Theodore F. Green and James O. Eastland and Representative Francis Walker, June 27, 1957, Stanley Hornbeck Papers, Box 268, file: “Kohlberg, Alfred,” Hoover.

1. Eisenhower authorized preparation for escorting of supply ships on August 25, although actual convoys did not begin until September 7. Morton H. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Documented History,” RM-4900-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December 1966), 112–14.

3. Zhang Shu Guang suggests that Mao began planning for a new bombardment of Jinmen toward the end of 1957 but waited for the most opportune moment. Zhang Shu Guang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 235–36. Michael Szonyi notes the many different motivations analysts have proposed for the 1958 crisis. Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 65–66.

6. According to Wu Lengxi, a Central Committee member, director of Xinhua, and editor in chief of People’s Daily, Mao told the Poliburo on August 26 that he had not yet determined his goal regarding Jinmen’s future. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 100; Wu Lenxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen,” Zhuanji wenxue 1 (1994), translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 209–10.

7. Wang Bingnan Interview, Beijing, 1988; N. F. Twining, chairman of the JCS, shared Mao’s perception that U.S. forces were being stretched “dangerously thin.” Twining to Secretary of Defense, n.d., Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (2), DDEL.

9. On fear of Lebanon-style action, see Xue Mouhong et al., eds., Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 131; Li Xiaobing, “Making of Mao’s Cold War: The Taiwan Crises Revised,” in Li Xiaobing and Li Hongshan, eds., China and the United States (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1998), 49.

10. Mao’s speech to the Eighth Party Congress, May 23, 1958, as quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 229.

11. Bird to Radford, February 3, 1956, Chairman’s Files, Adm. Radford, Box 6, file: 091 China (1956), RG 218, NA; Lawrence Weiss, “American Policy during the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis of 1958: The Bureaucratic Politics of Policy Change,” MA thesis, Columbia University, 1975, 8.

12. DM-104–57, B. L. Austin, Vice Adm, Director Joint Staff, to Chm JCS, March 20, 1957, CCS 381 Formosa (11-28-50), sec. 30, RG 218, NA; A. A. E. Franklin to Peter Dalton, May 21, 1957, FO 371/127494 (FCN 1193/17), PRO; People’s Daily, May 8, 1957, SCMP, ﹟1528, 26.

13. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 226; Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1975), 178–95; Weiss, “American Policy,” 26.

14. Rankin to Radford, January 3, 1956, sent to Clough, January 9, 1956, Lot 60D171, Box 18, file: 430.1 U.S. Aid to Nat. China (MAAG) 1956, RG 59, AII; ﹟193, Embassy to Washington, November 6, 1956, Rankin Papers, Box 29, file: “China, Republic of,” Mudd; Rankin to Frank Nash (President’s Special Consultant), June17, 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 3, 542–44; Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China (Bethesda, Md.: Dacor, 1994), 44; Mei Wen-li, “The Intellectuals on Formosa,” China Quarterly (July–September 1963), 73.

15. Wu Lengxi, Memoir in Zhuangji wenxue (Biographical Literature, Beijing) ﹟1, 1994, in Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson, trans., “Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” CWIHP Bulletin 6–7 (Washington, D.C.: WWICS, Winter 1995/96), 214.

16. Mao subsequently told Soviet diplomat and Sinologist S. F. Antonov that the riot had been orchestrated by Chiang Ching-kuo and that Chiang’s minions had seized documents establishing the existence of a plot to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Summary of conversation with Mao Zedong from the Journal of S. F. Antonov, October 14, 1959, CWHIP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 58.

17. Arthur C. O’Neill, “Fifth Air Force in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958,” Pacific Air Force, Fifth Air Force, Office of Information Services, Director of Historical Services, December 31, 1958, 32–33, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/index.htm (accessed July 7, 2009).

18. Jacob Van Staaveren, “Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958,” 13, Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, November 1962, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/index.htm (accessed July 7, 2009); Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 33, 41–42.

19. Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 11, 1958, and August 12, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 35, file: August 1958 Staff Notes (2), DDEL; Green, Holdridge, and Stokes, War and Peace, 45–46; Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 58–59.

20. Herter to Dulles, August 15, 1958, Christian Herter Papers, Box 9, file: Misc. Memoranda 1958 (1), DDEL.

21. E. W. Kenworthy, “U.S. Warns Peiping after Red Threat to Invade Quemoy,” New York Times, August 29, 1958, 1, 3.

22. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?,” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 188–91.

23. Robert Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace’ The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 116.

24. Memcon with the President, August 25, 1958, dated August 29, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Box 35, file: August 1958 Staff Notes (1), DDEL.

25. Chiang Kai-shek demonstrated his extreme xenophobia in his China’s Destiny, published in China in 1943. The English-language version, with far less anti-foreign passion, was released by Macmillan in 1947.

26. Editorial Note on 375th NSC Meeting, August 7, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 42–43.

27. ﹟421, A Special Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, August29, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (3), DDEL; Memcon with the President, August 25, 1958, in ibid. Subsequent reports noted that additional troops could be moved into place in 3–4 days, but even then the numbers would only match those on the offshore islands. Memcon, State with Defense and White House, September 3, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (2), DDEL.

28. SNIE 100–11–58, “Probable Chinese Communist and Soviet Intentions in the Taiwan Area,” September 16, 1958, in John K. Allen, John Carver, and Tom Elmore, eds., Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 182–83.

29. JCS 947046, Telegram, JCS to CINPAC Felt, August 25, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 76.

30. Memo from Smith to Dulles, August 15, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 58.

31. ﹟273, Drumright, Taipei, September 1, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (3), DDEL. Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, reported to Dulles that, lacking a naval tradition and having taken most of its officers from among the lesser lights of the army, Taiwan’s navy was poorly led and its shortage of ships made it reluctant to risk any. Memcon, September 2, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (2), DDEL.

32. Robert Suettinger, “Introduction,” in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, xviii; NIE 13–58, “Communist China,” May 13, 1958, paragraph 90, in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, 143; Memcon, State with Defense and White House, September 3, 1958, DDEL.

33. “Summary” estimate by Dulles, September 4, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: Staff Notes, September 1958, DDEL. Halperin notes that the extreme views expressed in this document contrasted sharply with those of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 276n. It is also important to note that the September 4 statement was immediately translated and passed around at the Supreme State Council meeting and finally was published in China. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 250.

34. Memcon, Dulles with the President, September 11, 1958, DDRS (1985), fiche 177 ﹟2551.

35. Memo of Meeting, August 29, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 98.

36. Memcon, Dulles with George Yeh, ambassador-designate, September 13, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 181.

37. Memcon, September 21, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 251.

38. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States and World Affairs (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 322; Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 185; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Vintage, 1990), 673n107; Robert W. Barnett, Quemoy: The Use and Consequence of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1960), 77.

39. Memcon with the President, August 25, 1958, dated August 29, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Box 35, file: August 1958 Staff Notes (1), DDEL.

40. ﹟JCS 947046, JCS to CINCPAC, August 25, 1958, JCS Records, Box 147 CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 37, RG 218, NA, or Whitman Files, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (3) DDEL; ﹟282358z, CINCPAC to JCS, August 29, 1958, JCS Records, Box 147 CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 37, RG 218, NA; “The Case for U.S. Intervention,” September 2, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Records of the White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Subseries, Box 3: State Department September 1958–January 1951 (1), DDEL; JCS 2118/110, Appendix “The Taiwan Situation,” September 3, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (2), DDEL. On Kuter, see Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 143–44; Hans M. Kristensen, “Nukes in the Taiwan Crisis,” Federation of Atomic Scientists, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/nukes-in-the-taiwan-crisis.php (accessed July 7, 2009); Bernard C. Nalty, “The Air Force Role in Five Crises, 1958–1965,” 19, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, June 1968, in William Burr, ed., Special Collection: Some Key Documents on Nuclear Policy Issues, 1945–1990, Nuclear Vault, NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/index.htm (accessed July 7, 2009).

41. Gerard Smith to Christian Herter, August 13, 1958, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/DOCUMENT/DOC-PIC/950809_1.gif (accessed July 29, 2009).

42. William Chafe, The Rise and Fall of the American Century (New York: Oxford, University Press, 2009), 161. Eisenhower repeatedly asserted his ultimate control of nuclear weapons, for instance, at a White House meeting on August 25, 1958; FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 74.

43. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 248.

44. Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 14, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, file: State Department—1958 (May–August) (5), DDEL; ﹟6481/6483, CINCPAC to JCS, August 26, 1958, JCS Records, Box 147 CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 37, RG 218, NA.

45. Van Staaveren, “Air Operations,” 13, 28, 50–51; Nalty, “Air Force Role,” 27.

46. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 189.

48. Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace,’” 119.

49. Memorandum for the File, “Discussion with the Secretary,” by Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy, March 16, 1955, Top Secret, in Burr, Some Key Documents, http://www.gwu.edu/!nsarchiv/nukevault/special/index.htm (accessed July 8, 2009).

50. March Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 266–67.

51. H. W. Brands Jr., “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” American Historical Review 94 (October 1989), 981.

52. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 146.

53. Memcon, Dulles with Defense Secretary McElroy et al., April 7, 1958, in Burr, Some Key Documents, http://www.gwu.edu/!nsarchiv/nukevault/special/index.htm (accessed July 8, 2009).

54. Appu K. Soman, “‘Who’s Daddy’ in the Taiwan Strait? The Offshore Islands Crisis of 1958,” Journal of American East Asian Relations 3 (Winter 1994), 396.

55. Allen Dulles reported to the NSC on August 27 that the Soviets had not mentioned the Taiwan Straits in their broadcasts. 378th NSC Meeting, August 27, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 10: NSC Summaries of Discussion, DDEL. At a September 11 White House meeting, Ike mentioned a letter from Cyrus Eaton saying that the USSR was prepared to support Beijing on the Taiwan issue and that the Soviet people backed their government. Ike said that he had had other such reports, including one from Edward Ryerson. Memcon, Dulles with the President, September 11, 1958, DDRS.

56. Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 119. Zagoria points out that Khrushchev hedged his support for China in his letters. Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 214.

57. Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace,’” 122.

58. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 470; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 148; Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 217–21.

59. Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 251–52. Gromyko arrived in Beijing on September 5 with China specialist M. S. Kapitsa. Gordon Chang suggests that Gromyko’s story was a fabrication since Mao did not anticipate an American invasion. He also notes the Chinese denial of the story in 1988. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 190, 339n37; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-CHI-88–041, March 2, 1988, 1. On the other hand, a recently released document suggests that Gromyko might have been inaccurate regarding a possible American invasion and that he did not misrepresent China’s declaration that Moscow could watch a tactical nuclear assault on China and stand by passively. Letter, CPSU Central Committee to the CCP Central Committee, September 27, 1958, translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 226–27.

60. Mao Zedong’s remarks on the June 5, 1958, report by Peng Dehuai, June 7, 1958, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 316–17, translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 155; Xue et al., Diplomacy, 140–41.

61. He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 243.

62. Memcon, Mao Zedong with P. F. Yudin, July 22, 1958, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 322–33, translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 155, 157. Li Zhisui suggests in his memoir that Mao so disliked that he treated him insultingly like a barbarian come to pay tribute during Khrushchev’s brief 1958 visit and insisted on going forward with his own policies despite Soviet objections. Li, Private Life, 261–62.

63. Lüthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 97.

64. Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and “Two Chinas” Plot (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), 73–74. China claimed a 12-mile limit, whereas the United States recognized only a 3-mile standard.

65. He, “Evolution of the PRC’s Policy,” 236–38; Xue, Diplomacy, 132; Mao Zedong, “Talk at the Supreme State Conference,” September 8, 1958, in Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348–52, translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 218–21.

66. Memcon with the President, September 8, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: Staff Notes, September 1958, DDEL.

67. ﹟5705, CINCPAC to JCS, September 22, 1958, JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (118-48), sec. 40, Box 148, RG 218, NA.

68. Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace,’” 130.

69. Telcon, Eisenhower and Dulles, September 1, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 113.

70. Lüthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 99.

71. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945–1970 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 154–55. Borisov is the pseudonym of Oleg Borisovich Rakhmanin, a China specialists and senior staff official of the CPSU Central Committee.

72. Li, Private Life, 270.

73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 293; Green, Holdridge, and Stokes, War and Peace, 52.

74. Memo, Goodpaster to Aurand, “Recent Political Aspects of Taiwan Straits Developments,” August 31, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman Files, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (3), DDEL.

75. SNIE 100–4-59, “Chinese Communist Intentions and Probable Courses of Action in the Taiwan Strait Area,” March 13, 1959, paragraph 14, in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, 197.

76. Sources disagree about whether Mao told Khrushchev. Liu Xiao, China’s ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1962, wrote in his memoirs that China did not inform the Soviets during Khrushchev’s visit of the planned shelling of Jinmen. Cited in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 254. On the other hand, Xue’s official history asserts that Soviet leaders were told and “were apprehensive that this action … would jeopardize their plan of Soviet-U.S. cooperation for world domination.” Xue, Diplomacy 143. Khrushchev later claimed that he was told in general terms of an operation against Chiang and that he supported it generously. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 220. On the other hand, Allen S. Whiting notes in his article “Quemoy 1958: Mao’s Miscalculations,” China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 611, that interviews with M. S. Kapitsa and others in Moscow convinced him that the Soviets did not know. Older analyses assumed that Khrushchev knew; see, for example, Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 200–206, 430n21.

77. Sharing this interpretation were Herter, Burke, Quarles, and Twining. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 84n, 203.

78. JCS 9447931, JCS to Admiral Felt, September 12, 1958, JCS Records, CCS 381Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 39, RG 218, NA. Eisenhower also questioned whether the Nationalists were willing to take as many risks as U.S. forces were taking. Memcon, Dulles with the President, September 11, 1958, DDRS.

79. ﹟8835 COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG TAIWAN to CINCPAC, September 2, 1958, JCS Records, Box 147 CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 38, RG 218, NA.

80. Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History, 22, MUDD; “China Reds Shell Quemoy Outpost,” New York Times, August 28, 1958, 1. There is evidence that Admirals Radford and Felix Stump, of CINCPAC, encouraged Chiang. Tang Tsou, “The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-Shek and the United States,” Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959), 1080.

81. 611.93/9–1758, Memcon, Chinese Ambassador Designate George Yeh with Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons, RG 59, NA.

82. JCS 2118/110, Appendix, “The Taiwan Situation,” September 3, 1958, DDEL.

83. ﹟220741z, CINCPAC to JCS, September 22, 1958, JCS Records CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 40, RG 218, NA.

84. Memo, Dulles to Herter and Robertson, August 23, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 69. According to a State Department memcon cited by Halperin, Dulles told Chiang on October 21 that he did not share the view that Chiang was trying to involve the United States. in war. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 521.

85. Memcon, September 8, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 157.

86. ﹟267, Drumright, Taipei, August 31, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (3), DDEL.

87. ﹟2335z/31 COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG TAIWAN to JCS, August 31, 1958, JCS Records, Box 147 CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 38, RG 218, NA.

88. Memo, Dulles to Herter and Robertson, August 23, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol.19, 69.

89. Accinelli, “‘A Thorn in the Side of Peace,’” 129–30; Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 414n.

90. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., China Confidential (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 128. Green claims both to have mustered the opposition in the bureau to the UN move and then to have traveled to New York to stop Dulles’s initiative at the UN. Green, Holdridge, and Stokes, War and Peace, 48, 50.

91. Op-00 memo 000416–58, September 7, 1958, Burke to Twining, JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 38a, RG 218, NA.

92. Memo, Robertson to Dulles, August 20, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 62–65, (quote 63).

93. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 105–6, 186, 254–55, 270. Dulles nevertheless continued to discuss the idea of intermediaries with the British, even if they proved useful only in explaining the American position. ﹟2717 Caccia, Washington, October 10, 1958, FO 371/133538 (FCN 1193/418), PRO.

94. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 434.

95. ﹟2717 Caccia, Washington, October 10, 1958, FO 371/133538 (FCN 1193/418), PRO; Memcon, September 8, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 156–57.

96. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 504.

97. Memcon, McElroy with the President, September 11, 1958, summarized by Goodpaster, September 15, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: Staff Notes, September 1958, DDEL. McElroy, president of Procter & Gamble, took Charlie Wilson’s place as defense secretary in October 1957.

98. ﹟1071, Sir Pierson Dixon, September 21, 1958, UKUN mission, New York, FO371/133532 (FCN 1193/256G), PRO; and the U.S. version at Memcon, September 21, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 249–52; ﹟2796 Caccia, Washington, October 17, 1958, FO 371/133544 (FCN 1193/465G), PRO.

99. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 300; Memcon, Twining with the President, September 30, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: Staff Notes, September 1958, DDEL; Memo for the Secretary of State, October 7, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: DDE Dictation, October 1958, DDEL.

101. Eisenhower to Dulles, October 7, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles/Herter Series, Box 8, file: Dulles, October 1958, DDEL. If Yeh actually did express interest in the plan, that would have been a striking reversal of his views of September 12 and 13, when he met with Ike and Dulles and rejected withdrawal, neutralization, or demilitarization. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 343–44.

103. Barnett, Quemoy, 81; The White House tally came to 470 against involvement in war, 89 for going to the UN, 39 in support of the president regardless of his course of action, and 9 for negotiations. Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, file: Formosa (1958) (1), DDEL. Letters to the State Department ran 80 percent opposed to the administration’s policy.

106. Joseph Alsop, “Quemoy: We Asked for It,” New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1958, 18. The British were wont to see Alsop as “calamity Joe,” a prophet of gloom. Alexander Grantham, Hong Kong Governor to T. V. Soong, February 10, 1954, T. V. Soong Papers, Box 4, file: Grantham, Sir Alexander, 1948–1960, Hoover; and ﹟235, Makins, Washington, January 26, 1955, FO 371/115027 (FC 1041/113), PRO.

116. Letter, Green to Eisenhower, September 29, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, DDE Diary, Box 36, file: DDE Dictation, October 1958, DDEL. Green, 90 years old and forgetful, was generally not an active committee head. Carl M. Marcy Oral History, AFMC, 96–97.

117. Memcon, Johnson with Felt (CINCPAC), Brocker (Cmdr, Honolulu), William B. Macomber (AS for Congressional Relations), and George Reedy, October 3, 1958, Notes and Transcripts of Johnson Conversations, Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL). Soman, “‘Who’s Daddy,’” 390.

126. Memcon, Zhou with Antonov, October 5, 1958, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), 262–67, translated in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 222.

130. Wu Lengxi suggests that Mao revealed this view to the Politburo at meetings on October 3 and 4. Wu, “Inside Story,” 212–13. Zhou Enlai mentioned having expressed the view to the Soviet charge on September 30. Memcon, Zhou with Antonov, October 5, 1958, CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 222.

131. Although the message was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, it was drafted by Mao. He, “Evolution of the PRC’s Policy,” 242. Krishna Menon told the UN General Assembly that secret negotiations had been under way between Beijing and Taipei before August 23. According to the Chicago Sun-Times, an emissary from the PRC in Hong Kong offered to make Taiwan an autonomous region under Chiang’s rule and with its own army. Tsou, “Quemoy Imbroglio,” 1082, 1088.

132. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001), 199-202. Halperin suggested another motive for the change in shelling. He believed that Beijing was trying to keep other countries from seeing that Chinese power had been bested by Nationalist-American convoying. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” 485.

148. A March 1955 Gallup Poll revealed that only 77 percent of respondents had heard about the Strait crisis and that of those only 14 percent gave acceptable answers regarding location of the offshore islands. George Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–71 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1319–20.

5. “The 3 States: A Time for Governors,” Time, August 17, 1953, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,858152–1,00.html (accessed July 28, 2009); John R. Gibson, “Herter’s Appointment Means Larger Foreign Policy Role for Ike,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1959, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

10. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949–1979 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984), 81, 94n142.

11. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 495.

12. Noble, Herter, 233.

13. Marshall Green, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China (Bethesda, Md.: Dacor, 1994), 53.

14. Kenneth T. Young, “American Dealings with Peking,” Foreign Affairs 45 (October 1966), 82–83.

15. Gray to Herter, January 14, 1959, DDRS (1987), fiche 69, ﹟1065.

16. Ernest H. Fisk (FE/P) to Robertson, January 16, 1959, Lot 61D6, Box 4, file: American Travel to China 1959, RG 59, NA.

17. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 449.

19. Frederick W. Marks III, Power and Peace (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 145–47.

20. Letter, Drumright to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, July 5, 1989.

21. Parsons Papers, Box 2, folder 53, Edwin Reischauer, letters June–December 1959, Georgetown University.

22. Henry D. Owen Oral History, ADST, Frontline Diplomacy, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:3:./temp/~ammem_WFDp (accessed March 11, 2010).

23. Kai Bird, The Chairman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 478.

24. Carroll Kilpatrick, “Engle Says It’s High Time for U.S. to Begin Talk of Trade with Peking,” Washington Post, May 22, 1959, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

25. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 81, 94n143.

26. “Porter Sues for China Visa, Citing Duty as Congressman,” Washington Post, August 28, 1959, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

27. Humphrey to Mary Schneider, Washington, D.C., July 24, 1957, Humphrey Papers, Senatorial Files, 23 K3 6F Box 137, MHS; Franklin to Lloyd, September24, 1957, FO371/127472 (FCN 10345/48), PRO; Porter, August 4, 1959, Reel 7, RG59, NA; 611.93/11–2459, Despatch 273, Memcon, President Ch’en Ch’eng with Joseph Yager, Taipei, Reel 7, RG 59, NA.

28. 611.93/8–759, Fulbright to C. Douglas Dillon, Acting Secretary of State, Reel 7, RG 59, NA.

29. “Study Unit Urges New China Policy,” New York Times, November 1, 1959, 27.

30. Green to Scalapino, April 9, 1959, Lot 61D6, Box 5, file: G, RG 59, NA; Memo, Parsons, drafted by Green, to Acting Secretary, August 11, 1959, in ibid.

31. Letter, Scalapino to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, June 16, 1995, 2.

32. 611.93/11–659 ﹟406, Yager, Taipei, Reel 7, RG 59, NA; 611.93/11–359, Memcon, Yeh with Parsons and Martin, Reel 7, RG 59, NA.

33. Minute by R.H.V. Benson, December 16, 1959, FO371/141216 (FC 10345/10), PRO.

34. Bruce Weber, “William J. Lederer, Co-Author of the ‘Ugly American’ Dies at 97,” New York Times, January 14, 2010.

35. Robert D. Schulzinger. The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 177–78, 237.

36. E. Youde, British Embassy, Washington to Mayall, Foreign Office, July 14, 1956, FO371/120896 (FC 10345/88), PRO.

37. “A Threat to National Security: Communist China’s Admission into the United Nations,” Washington Report, June 1961, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Papers, Box: W4, file: China Reports, JFKL.

38. Hornbeck to Kohlberg, May 26, 1958, Hornbeck Papers, Box 268, file: “Kohlberg, Alfred,” Hoover.

39. Kohlberg to Liebman, March 18, 1960, Marvin Liebman Associates Records, Box 29, file: “Alfred Kohlberg,” Hoover.

40. Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953–1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 167–72; David Rowe to Marvin Liebman, March 23, 1960, Liebman Records, Box 29, file: “Alfred Kohlberg,” Hoover.

41. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 82–83; “Builder of the Wall,” Washington Post, June 10, 1959, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

42. “Our Long Term Policy toward Red China,” September 15, 1958, and Memo, Eisenhower to Dulles, September 30, 1958, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 8, file: Dulles, September 1958 (1), Ike.

43. Minute by O’Neill, March 9, 1959, FO 371/141365 (FC 2251/9), PRO.

44. The Sino-Soviet Studies Group began immediately to generate reports on frictions. Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998–1999), 59.

45. ﹟734 Owen, Moscow, June 26, 1959, with Memcon of Khrushchev-Harriman talks, June 23, 1959, Box 126, file: USSR-Vienna Meeting Background Documents, 1953–1961 (D), President’s Office Files, Country Files, JFKL; Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 212.

46. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 223.

47. Halperin makes clear that this possible initiative was not pursued and was too vague for Washington to act on. Morton H. Halperin, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Documented History,” RM-4900-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December 1966), 28.

48. The policy was controversial and the Policy Planning Staff objected to portions of it. 661.93/9–160, Martin to Parsons, Box 1367, file: 661.93/9–160, CDF 1960–1963, RG 59, NARA; Memo, Parsons to Herter, December 1, 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 637.

49. Qiang Zhai, “Mao Zedong and Dulles’s ‘Peaceful Evolution’ Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo’s Memoirs,” and Bo Yibo, “To Prevent ‘Peaceful Evolution’ and Train Successors to the Revolutionary Cause,” Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of certain major decisions and events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993), in CWIHP Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, 228–30.

50. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 137–38.

51. Memcon, Camp David, September 26 and 27, 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 596–98; Wang Dong, “The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1962,” CWIHP Working Paper ﹟49, 22.

52. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 201. Zubok and Pleshakov raise doubt over whether Khrushchev explicitly broached the Two Chinas issue. See p. 230; Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 266.

53. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 202.

54. Lorenz Lüthi argues that another motive was concern that Washington would retaliate by transferring nuclear weapons to West Germany. Lüthi, Sino-Soviet Split, 138, 252. Vojtech Mastney rejects this, arguing that Khrushchev was not so worried about Germany. H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, vol. 9, no. 25 (2008), 10, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-IX-25.pdf (accessed July 26, 2009).

55. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb (New York: Norton, 2006), 141; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 228. Moscow promised a prototype atomic bomb, a medium-range ballistic missile, fighter aircraft, a ballistic missile submarine, and technical support data along with machinery to process and enrich uranium. Soviet nuclear physicists and geologists went to China to render assistance. Constantine Pleshakov, “Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 233.

56. NIE 13–2–60, “The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program,” December13, 1960, paragraph 59, in John K. Allen, John Carver, and Tom Elmore, eds., Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 307.

57. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 142–44; McCone quoted on 607n29.

58. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 209.

59. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 153.

60. NIE 13–60, December 6, 1960, in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, 255.

61. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 72, 267n144; Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1986), 805–6.

62. Steven I. Levine, “Breakthrough to the East,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 311.

63. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 233.

64. Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After (New York: Free Press, 1986), 249; ﹟724Thompson, Moscow, September 11, 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 11, file: Herter, September 1960, DDEL.

65. ﹟724 Thompson, Moscow, September 10, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 721–23.

66. 661.93/11–260, Memcon, Lho Shin Yong, Korean Embassy, with William O. Anderson (Soviet Affairs) and John H. Holdridge (Chinese Affairs), Box 1367, file: 661.93/9–160, RG 59 NA.

67. 661.93/10–660 ﹟1694, Witney, London, Box 1367, file: 661.93/9–160, RG 59, NA.

68. 661.93/11–1760, Despatch 523, Coburn Kidd, Tokyo, Box 1367, file: 661.93/9–160, RG 59, NA.

69. 661.93/11–260, Despatch 233, Osborn, Taipei, Box 1367, file: 661.93/9–160, RG 59, NA.

70. 398th NSC Meeting, March 5, 1959, DDRS (1990), fiche 82, ﹟1014; Editorial note on 399th NSC Meeting, March 12, 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 546–47.

71. Bowles to Kohlberg, May 31, 1956, Chester Bowles Papers, Yale.

72. Zhai Qiang, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994), 199.

73. Notes on Mikoyan dinner with Vice President, January 17, 1959, Livingston Merchant Papers, Box 5, file: Nixon, Richard M. 1959, Mudd.

74. 661.93/5–1360, J. Graham Parsons to Hare (G), Box 1367, file: 661.93/1–860, RG 59, NA.

75. US/MC/4, Memcon, Eisenhower with Chiang et al., June 18, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 676–79.

76. 448th NSC Meeting, June 22, 1960, DDRS (1991), fiche 300, ﹟3354.

77. 661.93/6–1460, Hugh S. Cumming Jr. (INR) to Acting Secretary, RG 59, NA; NIE100–3-60, “Sino-Soviet Relations,” August 9, 1960, DDRS (1990), fiche 55, ﹟633, quotes from 2. Harold Ford argues that this NIE lagged behind awareness of the seriousness of the spilt within the CIA. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” 61.

78. NIE 13–60, “Communist China,” December 6, 1960, paragraphs 6–7, 70–73, in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, 253, 270.

79. Notes on Pre-Press Briefing, August 17, 1960, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Box 51, file: Staff Notes, August 1960 (2), DDEL

80. 448th NSC Meeting, June 22, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 690; Editorial note, in ibid., 724; Memcon, Taipei, June 18, 1960, in ibid., 680.

81. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143–54.

82. Robert Suettinger, “Introduction,” in Allen, Carver, and Elmore, Tracking the Dragon, xxiv.

83. Bowles to Alfred Kohlberg, May 31, 1956, Bowles Papers, Series 1, pt. 4: Correspondence, Box 142, file: 376, Yale.

84. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 58.

85. Robertson memo on NSC 152, June 2, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, 202.

86. Rankin to Harold C. Vedeler, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, October 3, 1960, Rankin Papers, Box 38, file: “China, People’s Republic of,” Mudd.

87. NIE 100–3-60, 2; 464th NSC Meeting, October 20, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, vol.19, 730.

88. Edwin M. Martin Oral History Interview II, ADST, Frontline Diplomacy, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field%28DOCID+mfdip2004mar12%29.

89. 419th NSC Meeting, September 17, 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 19, 589.

90. Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral History, OH-3, October 11, 1977, 80, 85.

91. George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 375.

92. Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: The U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 2.

93. Christopher Matthews, Kennedy & Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 159–61.

94. Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 180.

95. Chiang turned out crowds of 300, 000 to celebrate Ike’s visit. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 508; Letter, Herter to Bowles, July 20, 1960, FRUS1958–1960, vol. 19, 700.

1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 13.

2. Richard Nixon, RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 379.

4. Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 25. Kochavi’s is a complex and nuanced analysis of a complicated president whose China policy remained rigid during his short tenure. See his conclusions, 243–52.

5. John L. Gaddis called this the wedge strategy. Gaddis, “The American ‘Wedge’ Strategy, 1949–1955,” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 157–83.

10. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143–54; Richard H. Immerman, “Psychology,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 116–17.

11. Dorothy Borg, “Notes on Roosevelt’s ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Political Science Quarterly 75 (September 1957), 405, 425–33.

12. Memo of Discussion, 364th NSC Meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 3: National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 91.

13. Michael R. Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World,” in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 47–72.