The Argentine Navy saw an opportunity to expand its regional ambitions during negotiations between the Argentine scrap metal merchant, Constantino Davidoff, and Christian Salveson of Leith, South Georgia, to dismantle the derelict whaling buildings on South Georgia. This developed into Project Alpha.
The idea was to mingle military personel with Davidoff’s workforce so that they would be part of a ‘legal’ landing party on South Georgia. Later they would be joined by a group of Marines who would set up a permanent military base of some 14 men from April – after Endurance was scheduled to depart the South Atlantic. By the time the British realised what had happened, it would be too late for them to respond. Thereafter the Argentine presence would be assisted by broadcasts of weather and navigational reports. (Freedman, Official History, Vol 1)
The icebreaker Almirante Irizar (Captain Cesar Trombetta, Commander, Antarctic Squadron) was contracted on 20 December 1981 to support Davidoff, and arrived off Leith after a four-day passage in which Trombetta maintained radio silence. He then flouted international convention by not reporting to the Magistrate and British Antarctic Survey (BAS) Base Commander. On 4 January 1982, Argentina rejected Britain’s protest of the violation of its sovereignty. That ‘Las Malvinas es Argentina’ had been chalked on a wall was reported to Governor Rex Hunt in Stanley, as were observations by BAS scientists on 21 January that the Panamanian-registered yacht Caiman, which had tied up at Leith, had three powerful radios of types not normally associated with business trips. It was skippered by an Argentine, Adrian Machessi, who claimed to be an employee of the bank funding Davidoff’s contract.
A broadcast was picked up from the ‘Caiman’ to Buenos Airies in which the Master provided details of the BAS base and its administration, and advised the quick confirmation of the contract. (Freedman, Official History, Vol 1)
However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) were inclined not to provoke matters which could have an unforseeable outcome. Meanwhile, scrap prices were falling and there were good commercial reasons for Davidoff to begin work.
By early January, Vice Admiral Lombardo, Major General Osvaldo Garcia, Commander V Corps, which covered the Atlantic Littoral, including the Falklands and its Dependencies, and Brigadier General Siegfriedo Plessl of the Air Force, had formed a working party to plan Operation Rosario. They envisaged military operations beginning about September 1982, after the southern hemisphere winter, and to allow the annual February conscription to be more fully trained. Rear Admiral Carlos Busser, who commanded the Marine Corps and was a keen ‘Malvinist’, was instructed to plan the seizure of the Falklands and South Georgia on the same day. In a classic example of effective operational security, details remained with those only who needed to know.
On 29 January, Commander Alfredo Weinstabl, who commanded the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion at Puerto Belgrano Naval Base, was summoned from leave to see Busser. Weinstabl:
‘Mission: To recover the Falkland Islands and to restore it in perpetuity to the sovereignty of the Nation’.
Admiral Busser explained to me that because of the poor progress in the negotiations over the Falklands, plans had to be drawn up for an operation to retake the islands by means of an amphibious operation in which, if it should happen, the No. 2 Marine Battalion, my Battalion, would be the nucleus of the landing Force. (Operacion Rosario)
Three days later, Weinstabl confirmed that his Battalion should be ready by 15 April and next day he briefed his Operations Officer, Captain Nestor Carballido. At HQ Marine Corps, they analysed the latest topographical, social and military intelligence and by the end of the month Weinstabl had agreed courses of action with Naval Air and Maritime staffs. On 1 March, after his Battalion returned from leave, Weinstabl briefed his second-in-command, Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Santillan, that with the Battalion only half amphibious trained after an exercise with the US Marine Corps in 1981, he was to develop amphibious training.
Meanwhile, HMS Endurance (Captain Nick Barker), which had slipped out of Chatham on her last voyage in October 1981, was preparing to return home. Barker, an experienced polar seaman with, to the annoyance of the FCO, a good rapport with the Argentine Navy, had reported tension amongst Argentine officers. Captain Russo, the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base Deputy Base Commander, told him, ‘There is to be a war against the Malvinas. I don’t know when, but I think quite soon.’ Chilean naval officers also told Barker that they suspected that Argentina was planning something, all of which he passed to London. Diplomacy continued but by March the Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, had become so impatient that he declared, ‘Argentina reserves the right to put an end to this process and freely elect whatever path may serve her interests.’
On 7 March, Lieutenant Veal RN, a member of a Joint Services expedition on South Georgia, watched an Argentine Air Force C-130 Hercules actually on a photo reconnaissance mission cross the island. Several weeks earlier, an Argentine C-130 made a genuine forced landing at Stanley Airport, but such was the tension among the Argentines that the Air Force was accused of alerting the British. Although the Dependencies were often overflown by Argentine aircraft, the frequency of flights in March was not seen to be unusual.
Meanwhile, Davidoff had returned to Buenos Aires and was given permission from the British Embassy on 10 March to land forty-one workmen at Leith for four months. They embarked on the naval transport Bahia Buen Suceso, which he had chartered from the Argentine Navy and whose commander, Captain Briatore, would supervise the work. Davidoff was reminded that he had to complete immigration formalities at Grytviken. On 15 March, HMS Endurance collected the Joint Services expedition and four days later was in Stanley preparing for the long voyage back to Chatham. Three days later, the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion embarked on a former US Landing Craft Tank (LCT), the Cabo San Antonio, and four days later carried out several landings and advances to contact on San Roman beach in the Gulf of San Jose.
When the Bahia Buen Suceso arrived at Leith on 19 March, Captain Briatore failed to report to Grytviken, so the BAS Base Commander, Steve Martin, signalled Governor Hunt:
BAS Field Party observed Argentine vessel Bahia Buen Suceso in Leith Harbour and a sizeable party of civilian and military personnel ashore. Field Party reported shots fired, Argentine flag hoisted, notices in English changed to Spanish. They have been told that they should have reported to Grytviken first. The Party have been instructed to inform the Argentines that they have entered illegally and they must report to Grytviken.
A reindeer, a protected species, was also being barbecued. Next morning, Trevor Edwards, the BAS team leader, read a message from London to Briatore:
You have landed at Leith without obtaining proper clearance. You and your party must go back on board the Bahia Buen Suceso immediately and report to the Base Commander at Grytviken for further instructions. You must remove the Argentine flag from Leith. You must not interfere with the British Antarctic Survey depot at Leith. You must not alter or deface the notices at Leith. No military personnel are allowed to land on South Georgia. No firearms are to be taken ashore.
When Argentina denied all knowledge of the Bahia Buen Suceso’s military activities, Governor Hunt persuaded London to send HMS Endurance back to South Georgia and evict the Argentines. Lieutenant Keith Mills RM commanded Endurance’s ship’s detachment. Soon after landing with his Royal Marines at Stanley for ground training and a ‘run ashore’, he was called to Moody Brook Barracks where he was briefed by Major Gary Noott RM, Officer Commanding NP 8901, on the situation. He was then reinforced with a NCO and eight Royal Marines, which brought his detachment to nearly troop strength, and was instructed to return to HMS Endurance. To accommodate the enlarged detachment, Barker put ashore Lieutenant Richard Ball, another officer and nine sailors to complete scientific records gathered during the summer. Early next day, HMS Endurance left Stanley.
When Major Noott arrived in March 1981, he had inherited a concept of operations not markedly different from that used by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour RM, when he commanded NP 8901 from 1977 to 1979. This envisaged:
Disruption of landings.
Conduct a withdrawal to Stanley through three defensive lines at Hookers Point, in the town and the third around Government House.
Government House would be a stronghold.
Moody Brook to be abandoned.
A section on Cortley Ridge had a secondary role to move to a hide stocked with pre-dumped supplies overlooking Port Salvador and provide a point of contact for relief forces.
During the counter-intelligence operation after the Argentine surrender, a Falkland Islander said the plan was well known to the islanders and, most probably, to the LADE (Lineas Aereas del Estado) office, the centre of Argentine intelligence operations.
Although the BAS agreed to pass information to Barker, Steve Martin was careful not to jeopardize their civilian status, nevertheless on 21 March, several scientists established an observation post (OP) on Jason Peak, which overlooked Stromness Bay. They watched Bahia Buen Suceso leave on 21 March, apparantly with the shore party, but in fact leaving several Argentines behind. London thought the crisis over until the OP reported their continued presence at Leith.
When HMS Endurance arrived unexpectedly at South Georgia on the 24th, Foreign Minister Mendez advised London that attempts to evict the Argentines would not be tolerated. South Georgia had therefore now become a convenient vehicle from which to escalate the crisis. For the next week, HMS Endurance, on reduced rations, continued hydrographic and chart work. The Royal Marines took over the Jason Peak OP and reported next day that the naval transport Bahia Paraiso had entered Stromness Bay during the night and had disembarked ten marines. It later emerged that they were commanded by Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, who was wanted by Sweden and France for the murder of a girl and three nuns at a naval interrogation centre during the Dirty War. Also on board the ship was an Army 601 Combat Aviation Battalion Puma and a 1st Helicopter Squadron Alouette. Because of the difficulty of seeing into Leith, the OP was moved next day to Grass Island, but even this gave only marginal improvement. Mindful of the need for information, Mills and his experienced Detachment Sergeant Major, Sergeant Peter Leach, landed at the foot of Olsen Valley and scouted the abandoned whaling stations of Husvik and Stromness before concealing themselves on Harbour Point, about 600 metres from Leith, to watch the activity.
Meanwhile, Captain Barker joined Lieutenant Commander Tony Ellerbeck and his observer, Lieutenant David Wells, in one of the two 829 Naval Air Squadron (NAS) Wasp helicopters, and landed on Tonsberg Point to observe Leith. Buzzing around the harbour was the Alouette piloted by Lieutenant Remo Busson with orders to shadow HMS Endurance. Shortly after the two Royal Marines met Barker’s party, Busson, with Captain Trombetta on board, hovered above the five Britons. When Busson then found the Grass Island OP, surveillance was transferred to Busen Peninsula.
Argentina’s sabre-rattling was failing to prompt Great Britain to negotiate and her Chiefs of Staff advised the Junta that they did not favour a protracted engagement, particularly as reports from London were indicating British escalation. The naval Exercise Springtrain had been cancelled and the nuclear submarine HMS Spartan was despatched to the South Atlantic from Gibraltar. British public opinion was hardening. On 26 March, the Junta decided to invade the Falklands and set D-Day for 2 or 3 April, with the option of bringing it forward to 31 March. During the afternoon, First Lieutenant Oscar Outlon, who commanded A Company, 1st Marine Infantry Battalion, attended a briefing at 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion for an exercise in Tierra del Fuego:
I knew nothing about Operation Rosario. The only thing I did know was that our Commanding Officer, the Second-in-Command and the Logistics Officer had, for several days, been leaving the Battalion and only returning from time to time. Something unusual was afoot, but I did not even begin to imagine that an operation was imminent. When I arrived at 2nd Marine Infantry, there were a great number of senior ranks in the Command Building. Guards were at the entrance to the first floor and occasionally someone would come down and invite one of us to go upstairs. I realised that something serious was happening and no one was making any comments. Captain Carbajal took me into the planning room of Amphibious Operations. There I was given operational orders in which my Company was to be the Landing Force Reserve and that I would embark on the Almirante Irizar and would, when instructed, land by helicopter. I was not at all clear about the reasoning behind the operation and the mission that my Company had to accomplish. My Commanding Officer took me to one side and clarified all my queries. In short, he told me that I had to prepare a Company platoon of sixty-one men composed of Company HQ, a rifle section, a support platoon of a 81mm mortar group, a medium machine-gun group and a detachment of rocket launchers. I was also instructed to raise two groups of riflemen and a 60mm group and place them under command of Lieutenant Luna.
The Argentine plan depended on preventing NP 8901 entering Stanley from Moody Brook Barracks and from withdrawing into the ‘camp’ to carry out a guerrilla campaign. The main assault was to land on Red Beach at Yorke Bay, seize the airport and occupy Stanley. The emphatic order was ‘Fight without shedding blood’ and the defenders had to be convinced that the odds were overwhelming. The Argentine force was divided into five separate elements:
Commanded by Captain Sarcona on the aircraft carrier Veinticino de Mayo (former Centaur class HMS Venerable). On board were the Sea Kings of 2nd Helicopter Squadron. Major General Garcia, who was in command of the newly created Malvinas Theatre of Operations and in overall command, had his HQ on the ex-British Type 42 destroyer Santisima Trinidad to co-ordinate the landings and act as air traffic control once the airport had been seized.
Commanded by Rear Admiral Gualter Allara, Chief of Fleet Operations. To transport, protect and provide naval gunfire support for the 874-strong Landing Force.
904 Marines and Army divided between ARA Cabo San Antonio and ARA Almirante Iriza, Commanded by Rear Admiral Busser.
D and E Companies, 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion (TU.40.1.1) – 387 all ranks. To enter Stanley.
1st Platoon, C Company, 25th Infantry Regiment – 39 all ranks. To seize the airport.
A Company, 1st Marine Infantry Battalion (TU.40.1.7) – 65 all ranks. Landing reserve.
1st Amphibious Commando Group (TU.0.1.3) – 92 all ranks. Seize Government House and Moody Brook Barracks. A year earlier, Hunt had given a set of plans of Government House to an Argentine visitor, who, he thought, was an architect.
A Battery, Marine Field Artillery Battalion – 41 gunners manning 4 x 105mm M-56 Pack Howitzers.
1st Marine 105mm Rocket Battery.
1st Amphibious Engineer Company.
1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Battery – 4 x Tigercat missile launchers.
1st Amphibious Vehicle Company –101 all ranks operating 20 x LTVP-7 and 5 x LARC-5 amphibious tracked vehicles.
HQ and Communications Unit – 42 all ranks.
Logistic support services (TU.40.1.8) – 84 all ranks.
Civil affairs – 41 all ranks.
Beach recce and obstacle clearance.
Submarine Sante Fe (Baloa-class former USS Catfish).
Detachment of twelve tactical divers.
Naval transport Bahia Paraiso.
A69 corvette Guerrico. Commanded by Commander Carlos Alfonso, it was hurriedly withdrawn from dry dock and prepared for sea.
1st Marine Infantry Battalion platoon commanded by Lieutenant Luna.
601 Combat Aviation Battalion Puma helicopter.
1st Helicopter Squadron Alouette helicopter.
Once the intervention force had completed its mission, an Air Force team would prepare the airport for the fly-in of the garrison, 25th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Seineldin). Its 1st Platoon would be helicoptered to Goose Green. Seineldin was a fervent Malvinist with a Lebanese background; 25th Infantry Regiment was based at Colonia Sarmiento in the sparsely populated southern province of Chubut and was part of 9 Infantry Brigade, of V Army Corps. When warned for deployment to the Falklands, Seineldin renamed it the 25th ‘Special’ Infantry Regiment; Argentine journalists later christened it the ‘Seineldin Commando Regiment’. In Stanley, he enlarged it to five companies each of about 100 men, mostly commandos and paras, by adding D and E Companies. The regimental shoulder flash, which was designed by his wife Marta, depicted an armed Argentine soldier astride the Falklands Islands.
On 27 March, after Garcia and Busser had approved of his plan, Weinstabl summoned his battalion to barracks. Next day, he attended a briefing in his operations room:
Captain Gaffoglio gave a full breakdown of information received about Port Stanley, its population’s daily routine, details of the selected objectives for its taking at H-Hour, general characteristics about the area around it and information on the general character of the place. This information was extraordinarily useful for all the officers.
Adolpho Gaffoglio was the Argentine representative in Stanley and worked from the LADE offices. On 31 March, he returned to Stanley.
During the morning, the battalion embarked on the assaults ships and joined Task Force 40 assembling in the Rio de la Plata estuary, with the cover story of an exercise with Uruguay. Next day, it departed for the 780-mile passage to Stanley, as Air Transport Command made its final preparations. When, during the day, the Bahia Paraiso left Leith and vanished into the South Atlantic, HMS Endurance searched for her in atrocious weather amongst the islands, inlets, coves and icebergs of South Georgia, Barker struggling to maintain contact under dogged surveillance from Lieuteant Busson. Barker’s attempts to radio Trombetta were unsuccessful.
On 23 March, the British Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires, Captain Mitchell, flew to Montevideo to meet the incoming 1982/83 NP 8901 (Major Mike Norman RM), who were expecting to be taken to Stanley on HMS Endurance. When it looked as though the Royal Marines would be stranded, Mitchell recognized their value as reinforcements and arranged for them to be ferried to Stanley on the RRS John Biscoe. The use of this research ship gave Argentina the opportunity to claim that she and her sister ship, the Bransfield, were engaged in military activities. On 29 March, Norman’s men moved into Moody Brook Barracks, while Major Noott’s outgoing detachment was billeted in private accommodation, as was the custom.
On 31 March, the British Government deduced from an Argentine newspaper reporting on naval and military preparations that Argentina intended to invade the Falklands and South Georgia on 2 April, but shrank from escalating the dispute. Early in the afternoon, Captain Barker was instructed by Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Northwood to reinforce sovereignty of South Georgia by landing his Royal Marines. Steve Martin was less than happy, however as Magistrate he agreed to a compromise that he would remain in charge as long as diplomacy lasted; if hostilities broke out, Lieutenant Mills would take over.
Initially, London ordered Mills to fight to the end, but as the day wore on, orders became diplomatically phrased emphasizing that if Grytviken was occupied by Argentina, it would be shown to have done so by force. Barker confirmed that the Rules of Engagement were to be based on the Yellow Card used in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, detailing making an arrest, searches and opening fire. Fortunately, Mills and several Royal Marines had completed tours in Ulster and were familiar with the conditions–not that they necessarily agreed. When the Royal Marines moved into Shackleton House and dumped stores in Quigley’s House, they disrupted the routine of some BAS scientists yet to grasp the seriousness of the situation. They were reminded of their predicament, however, when they heard Governor Hunt announce on the radio the imminent invasion of the Falklands by Argentina.
Admiral Busser intended that Task Force 40 would approach the Falkland Islands from the south and land early on 1 April, but when a gale blew throughout the 29th and 30th, Garcia and Allara postponed the landing for twenty-four hours and approached from the north. Many of the embarked force were badly seasick. Only Weinstabl and Santillan were privy to the operation:
The rest of my Staff and my Company officers, even if they imagined, they knew what it was all about, knew nothing of the mission and no details of the plan in particular. I was itching to inform the Company Officers – who were my tools for the success of the operation – in the picture so they might begin the planning of their respective tasks. (Operation Rosario)
As the day wore on, London realized that the Falkland Islands and South Georgia were under immediate threat of invasion. At 10.30 am, Governor Hunt told Majors Norman and Noott that the FCO believed that an Argentine submarine had landed a recce party to survey beaches around Stanley. This was something of a shock to Norman because, on 18 March at the FCO, he had been briefed that although negotiations were difficult, Argentina would ‘not dare to use force of any kind’. Norman later said: ‘We believed that the Argentineans were simply in the niggling game and the submarine was nothing for us to worry about.’
Major Noott sent Corporal David Carr and two Royal Marines to the Cape Pembroke lighthouse, and Lance Corporal Steve Black to an OP on Sapper Hill with orders that if they saw a submarine, they were to alert the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This consisted of Corporal Steve Johnson and five Royal Marines in two Land Rovers. It was intended to arrest any invaders. At 9.00 pm on 1 April, Major Norman assumed command of NP 8901 in the belief that the submarine was, like the presence of the scrap metal merchants on South Georgia, just another example of Argentina raising the stakes. The force now consisted of 3 Royal Marine officers, 2 Royal Navy officers, 66 Royal Marines, 43 of whom had just arrived, and 9 sailors. Noott became military adviser to Governor Hunt.
The same day, Weinstabl broke the news of the invasion to his officers and shared the intelligence that NP 8901 had been reinforced by Norman’s detachment. With Red Beach at Yorke Bay and the airport now believed to be defended, General Garcia and Admiral Busser amended the orders:
Amphibious Commandos – to land at Mullet Creek, move north across Stanley Common and simultaneously capture Government House and Moody Brook.
The Army platoon – to seize the airport. Its deployment to Goose Green was cancelled.
Crossing the line of departure was timed for 5.30 am on 2 April. Busser then sent a message to the Landing Force:
I am the Commander of the Landing Forces, made up of the Argentinean Marines and Army on this ship, of units aboard the destroyer Santisima Trinidad and the icebreaker Almirante Irizar and the divers on board the submarine Santa Fe. Our mission is to disembark on the Falklands and to dislodge the British military forces and authorities installed there. That is what we are going to do. Destiny has wished us to be the instigators of making good the 150 or so years of illegal occupation. In those islands we are going to come across a population with whom we must develop a special relationship. They live on Argentine territory and consequently they must be treated as though they are living on the mainland. You must be punctilious in respecting the property and integrity of each of the inhabitants. You will not enter into any private residence unless it is necessary for reasons of combat. You will respect women, children, old people and men. You will be hard on the enemy, but courteous, respectful and pleasant in your dealings with the population of our territory and with those we have to protect. If anyone commits rape, robbery or pillage, I shall impose the maximum penalty. And now, with the authorization of the Commander of the Transport Division, I am sure the Landing Force will be the culmination of the brilliant planning other members of the group have already achieved. Thank you for bringing us this far and thank you for landing us tomorrow on the beach. I have no doubts that your courage, honour and capability will bring us victory. For a long time we have been training our muscles and our hearts for the supreme moment when we shall come face to face with the enemy. That moment has now arrived. Tomorrow you will be conquerors. Tomorrow we shall show the world an Argentine force valorous in war and generous in peace. May God protect you! Now say with me Long live the Fatherland! (Operacion Rosario)
During the day, the US tried to persuade Argentina to step back, but it was clear that Galtieri did not want to stop Operation Rosario. Governor Hunt then received a signal from the FCO which stated rather quaintly: ‘We have apparently reliable information that an Argentine task force could be assembling off Cape Pembroke by dawn tomorrow. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.’
He was somewhat taken aback for he believed that South Georgia was the centre of tension, and had not been told that a large amphibious force was bound for the Falklands. Hunt was offered virtually no advice on likely Argentine strategy, probably because it did not exist at the Ministry of Defence. Hunt then told the two majors that the FCO believed that an Argentine invasion force would be off Cape Pembroke by first light next day. He said, ‘It looks as though the silly buggers mean it,’ and ordered the mobilization of 123-strong Falklands Islands Defence Force.
In assessing Argentine intentions, the Royal Marine officers decided on two possible landing sites: Yorke Bay, which they named Orange Beach, and a beach to the immediate east, Purple Beach. They believed that Orange Beach was the most likely and defended it with a few reels of barbed wire. The airport runway was obstructed with abandoned vehicles, but there was no time to block the approaches to Stanley Harbour. The single 2-inch mortar was cracked.
Chief Secretary Baker, Police Constable Lamb and the nine sailors, commanded by Colour Sergeant John Noone, detained thirty Argentines in the Town Hall, most of whom were employees and their wives of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, the Argentine State Oil Company, as potential fifth columnists. Leaving Lieutenant Ball RN to guard the prisoners, the sailors returned to Government House where they ran an information service. There was no time to interrogate the Argentines. At 8.15 pm, Hunt broadcast the imminent invasion to the people of the Falklands. At 11.00 pm at Moody Brook, Norman briefed NP 8901 that his aim was to inflict casualties, delay progress and buy time for negotiation:
It was the most difficult set of orders in my life. I made it clear that an invasion force was definitely coming; it was likely to be big and we were likely to be killed. I thought they would be depressed and I would have to gee them up a bit but that was a bad estimation because, at the end, they were raring to go – mainly, I think, because it was a slight to their professionalism. Their attitude was that they knew they were going to lose but the Argentineans would know all about it before they did. (Parker, Commando)
Corporal Stefan York recalled that although his manner raised morale, everyone knew the odds were stacked against the defenders. 5 Section (Corporal ‘Figgy’ Duff) defended Stanley Airport. A GPMG with about 1,000 rounds manned by Marines Leslie Milne and Rod Wilcox covered Orange Beach. They had motorcycles for a quick getaway to two canoes, which they would use to paddle to Stanley. Strung out in defensive positions along the road to Stanley were three sections: 1 Section (Corporal Lou Armour) was at Hookers Point; to his west were Lieutenant Bill Trollope and 2 Section, with a Carl Gustav and 66mm Light Anti Tank Weapon (LAW) near the old airstrip; a kilometre to the west was 3 Section, forming the nucleus for a stronghold. The idea was to delay and retire, delay and retire finally to Government House. 4 Section (Corporal Carr) was on Murrell Heights covering the southern approaches. At the Sapper Hill OP was Marine Mike Berry. Across Stanley Harbour on Navy Point was 6 Section (Corporal York) of six Royal Marines defending The Narrows and with the best chance of melting into the camp to ‘go covert’ until the arrival of reinforcements, or the political situation had been resolved. However, like Corporal Armour’s section, they were NP 8901 (1982/83). Norman set up his Tactical HQ on Look Out Rocks, with the remainder of the Royal Marines Defending Government House. The Falkland Islands Defence Force response was disappointing and of the twenty-three who mobilized, most were assigned to a series of OPs. The Canadian Bill Curtis, a former air traffic controller, deactivated the directional beacon at Stanley Airport; Jack Sollis, who skippered the coaster MV Forrest, used its radar to scan Port William; the Cape Pembroke lighthouse keeper Basil Biggs switched off the lamp and watched for shipping; Patrick Watts kept the radio station open. The night was calm with a full moon peeping from scudding clouds. By 2.00 am on 2 April, everyone was in position.
After dark, off South Georgia, under orders to return to Stanley, Captain Barker landed his Royal Marines at Grytviken as instructed. Determined to dispense with the attentions of the Argentines, he then darkened ship, slipped the cover of the Bahia Paraiso and, keeping close to the coast on radio silence, steamed at best speed toward the Falklands, into an uncomfortable fresh, westerly swell.