Day One of seventy-four days of Argentine occupation was 2 April. John Smith kept a diary throughout this time:
By 10am, the fighting was over. By 10.30am, the Argentine flag is flying over Government House. Constant Argentine military band music being played over the radio; then within half an hour edicts or communiqués broadcast, each preceded by a barrage of Spanish and their national anthem. (Smith, 74 Days)
In several communiqués, Colonel Esteban Solis, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, greeted the Falkland Islanders to Argentina and assured them of their civil and freedom of movement rights – this from a country with an appalling human rights record. He confirmed that ‘colonial and military instructions of the British Government are effectively relieved of their charges’, and, introducing a curfew, residents were to place a white cloth outside the door should a problem arise, which the islanders found abhorrent for it implied surrender. Disobedience to the curfew, public order disturbances, insults to national symbols or any action against the Argentine Code of Law could lead to imprisonment. A forty-strong civil administration team, headed by Air Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve, a former Consul in Stanley, then arrived. He had been involved in the negotiations over the future of the Falklands and was considered to be the ideal choice to represent the islanders. Installing himself in the Secretariat, it was his responsibility to emphasize the justification of the Argentine cause. Next day, Bloomer-Reeve circulated a communication giving an assurance that civil rights would be acknowledged, although some liberties would be withheld because of the mainland anti-terrorist struggle. Then vital CB transmissions were banned with the threat of imprisonment.
Generally, the Falkland Islanders carried on ‘as usual’, although there was some suspicion about the loyalties of some Anglo-Argentines. On 13 April, several islanders seen to be a threat were repatriated to the UK, where most gave invaluable intelligence debriefs. When the Carrier Battle Group began lurking offshore on 27 April, the Argentines enforced a blackout and a curfew between 6.00 pm and 6.30 am; shops were to close by 4.00 pm. The military security authorities rounded up several islanders thought to be subversive, including Gerald Cheek, who ran the Falkland Islands Air Service and was one of the Falklands Islands Defence Force who responded to Governor Hunt’s mobilization:
On 27 April, I’ll never forget that date, they came for me one afternoon and said I was being taken away. I didn’t know where to. Four (military police) came in with pistols and threatened my family, saying to me ‘You’ve got to go, you’ve got ten minutes to pack’. I thought I was being taken to Argentina. They took me and several other people – fourteen in all – down to Stanley Airport. We were taken to Fox Bay and placed under house arrest (with the settlement manager, Richard Cockwell) for the remainder of the war.
The former RAMC doctor, Daniel Haines, the Senior Medical Officer, and his wife, were arrested because he opposed the Argentines using the hospital for Argentine troops. This left Dr Alison Bleaney and Mary Elphinstone to look after the medical needs of Stanley. The only serious confrontation happened on 1 May when a group of civilians sought shelter in a godown after rumours circulated that a British landing was imminent. Major Dowling customarily overreacted by ordering 181 Military Police Company and 601 Commando Company to arrest anyone leaving it. Next morning, Bloomer-Reeve ordered their immediate release, much to the disgust of Dowling. When the International Committee of the Red Cross published a report on 21 May, the day the British landed at San Carlos, Argentina claimed that only five Falklands Islanders had been detained and that three serious crimes by Argentine troops against private property had been dealt with by military tribunals. Argentina claimed that the imposition of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was obstructing the delivery of supplies to the civil population.
The subsequent frequent air raids and naval bombardments were unnerving for islanders born in the tranquillity of the Falklands. Both sides were careful to avoid civilian casualties. The Argentine authorities even formed a committee to identify robust houses suitable for air-raid shelters and at the end of the campaign, as the Argentines retreated to Stanley, the military government issued an instruction that all inhabitants to the west of the Battle Monument were to leave their houses because of British shelling, and to shelter in St Mary’s Church and the West Stores. Nevertheless, three people were killed when a British artillery shell hit a house on 12 June.
The Army, which now occupied the Falklands, had underpinned the struggle for independence. British commercial interests then supported the fledgling economy. Among the patriots who returned from the Napoleonic Wars was the Peninsula War veteran Jose de San Martin. In 1817, he led 5,000 Argentines on an epic march across the Andes and contributed massively to Chilean and Peruvian independence. In 1982, his largely ceremonial 1st ‘General Jose de San Martin’ Cavalry Regiment sent six machine-gun detachments to the Falklands, which were attached to 1st ‘Los Patricios’ Infantry Regiment, the oldest infantry unit of the Argentine Army. From 1880, the Army was actively involved in political power-broking and of the eighteen governments between 1930 and 1982, ten were military. When, in 1974, President Peron was succeeded by his widow, Isabel, this sparked two years of inter-faction fighting. Into the void stepped the left-wing revolutionary groups, which then provoked a junta headed by General Jorge Videla, deposing Isabel and ending the Dirty War, in which Argentina had achieved global isolation.
In 1982, the Argentine Army was divided into five corps, with tactical deployment built around two armoured brigades, three infantry brigades defending the Chilean border, plus a mountain brigade and a jungle infantry brigade. 4th Airborne Infantry Brigade was the National Strategic Reserve. Most formations, units and bases had an additional honorary nomenclature – for instance the 3rd ‘General Manuel Belgrano’ Mechanised Infantry Regiment, so named in honour of the eighteenth-century Argentine soldier and intellectual. Conscription began annually in February with selection based upon the year in which the conscript was born, thus those born in 1963 were conscripted in February 1982 as Soldado Clase 63. The Army served for a year and the Navy and Air Force two years. When training ceased in October, conscripts were progressively released to make way for the next annual induction. Most conscripts served near their homes. Most had a firm conviction that Malvinas es Argentina. Of an Army establishment in 1982 of 85,000 men, 65,000 were conscripts, about half of whom had only been inducted in February and had barely finished basic training. The only noncommissioned rank achievable to conscripts was Dragoneante, which equates roughly to the US Army Private First Class. Discipline tended to be unsophisticated. Potential regular NCOs attended the ‘Sergeant Cabrai’ School of NCOs, which was part of the School of Infantry ‘Lieutenant-General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu’ at Campo de Mayo, Buenos Aires. NCOs had little responsibility except for low-level tactics and administration of the conscripts. Even though there were sizeable class, cultural and philosophical distinctions, there was plenty of evidence of ‘hermandad’ (brother) between the Argentine officer and other ranks. Telegrams sent by Argentine servicemen to their families through Cable and Wireless from the Falklands were intercepted by HMS Fearless at Ascension Island and passed to 3rd Commando Brigade intelligence.
As throughout the rest of South America, most Argentine officers were Roman Catholic and middle to upper class. Cadets attended the National Army Academy, which was modelled on West Point. Officers selected for field rank attended Staff College followed by three years at the Senior Level War School; some attended foreign staff colleges and courses. Argentines were regularly seen in the United Kingdom. Peculiar to the Army was the logia (lodge), a sort of Masonic lodge, which had been founded by General San Martin and was designed to further the belief that the Army firmly believed in its motto ‘Nation con el pais en 1810’ (born with the nation in 1810) and were guardians of tradition. Political disagreement was rife. Brigadier General Jofre not only had to fight the British but also deal with Lieutenant Colonel Seineldin, the commando Major Aldo Rico and other right-wing officers, all of whom undermined his authority. This rivalry led to the 25th Infantry Regiment, arguably Argentina’s best infantry unit, defending Stanley Airport instead of being in the front line. Defeat in 1982 damaged the credibility of politico-officers.
Great Britain has a long military tradition of losing battles and winning wars. Now this conscript South American army was about to take on a regular army that had lost a soldier killed in action every year since 1945, except 1968. When Ruben Moro, a Canberra pilot who took part in the campaign, wrote: ‘Although British armed forces had not actually been engaged in a shooting war since the Suez crisis in 1956, Great Britain was nevertheless prepared to meet any contingency arising from its Atlantic Alliance obligations’, he had conveniently forgotten British military operations in Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Borneo and Northern Ireland.
Argentina’s euphoria was short-lived. At the UN debate on 3 April, Resolution 502 was passed, demanding the withdrawal of Argentine forces, cessation of hostilities and a political solution. The Junta had three choices:
Raise the crisis diplomatically and force negotiations.
Call Britain’s bluff and hope that international mediation would prevail.
Defend the Falklands.
9 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Americo Daher) continued to arrive as the 8th ‘General Bernardo O’Higgins’ Infantry Regiment deployed to Fox Bay on 6 April, where it remained until the Argentine surrender. Most of its soldiers were reservists. Next day, 5th Marine Infantry Battalion deployed straight to Mounts William and Tumbledown to cover the southern beaches – organic to 1st Fleet Marine Force in Rio Grande in Tierra del Fuego, it was well used to the cold of the approaching winter. The Malvinas Theatre of Operations was absorbed into the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations.
Brigadier General Mario Menendez arrived as Military Governor and Commander, Malvinas Joint Command. In a meeting with General Galtieri on 2 March, he had been given three main objectives of: respecting the traditions and property of the islanders; improving their living standards; and integrating them into Argentine life. By nature conciliatory, it was hoped that this personality would help him govern the Falklands during the early negotiations. Menendez:
My arrival on the islands at Stanley was a dream come true for the Argentines. The knowledge of our rights over the Malvinas is a very profound feeling; an ambition and, at the same time, a frustration … because the British Task Force had sailed. Above all there was a pride that I was the first Argentine governor of the Malvinas in 150 years. (Bitton and Kominsky, Speaking Out)
Told that invasion was not expected, he was tested when he found himself fighting battles after the British landings at San Carlos when a more aggressive military commander was needed. He carried the blame for the Argentine defeat.
In his first Land Forces Argentine Occupied Territories Operations Order, Brigadier General Daher calculated that the British had two options:
1. Special Forces operations to start no sooner than 18 April directed at Stanley, with secondary operations at Fox Bay and Darwin areas. A helicopter assault by about 500 troops in preparation for an amphibious assault by two marine battalions.
2. Special Forces operations, electronic warfare interference and attacks by small, lightly armed and equipped resistance groups in preparation for landings.
Outlining his Concept of Operations, Daher planned an Argentine military presence on the Falklands, even after the British had landed, to give his government a political lever. Stanley, the seat of government, was the centre of defence. Fox Bay and Goose Green were designated as strongpoints from which patrols would dominate the ground. Once ashore, he believed that the British had fourteen possible approach routes to Stanley. San Carlos Water is not mentioned. Daher was complimentary about British abilities: ‘Have an excellent standard of instruction … morale will be good … There will be severe restrictions on their logistics caused by the great distance between their probable bases … “high percentage of their personnel are under contract”.’ He refers to the professional nature of the British, compared to the conscript nature of the Argentine Armed Forces. Quite why the Argentines selected 18 April is not clear. Even sailing at full speed, ships capable of landing troops would take about three weeks to be offshore.
On 7 April, Great Britain posted her intention to impose a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands on 12 April with the threat of intercepting any Argentine warships and auxiliaries found inside the zone, the aim being to hinder the reinforcement of the Falklands. The Argentines believed that the Royal Navy would contact the local population either by radio or by landing small patrols. At a meeting on 9 April, Menendez and his security advisers decreed that anyone in Stanley with a 2-metre band CB radio was to hand it to the Security Warehouse in the Town Hall next day. Those outside Stanley were expected to disconnect their equipment. Owners were meant to receive £200 in compensation. On 12 April, Vice Admiral Lombardo, the newly appointed Commander, South Atlantic Theatre of Operations Command, issued Military Committee Outline Plan 1/82 and told Brigadier General Menendez, ‘I will give you freedom of action because you will be isolated.’ Reviewing possible British strategies, Lombardo listed naval options open to the British:
Blockade the islands using submarines and deny the use of the airfield.
Attempt total or partial recovery by an amphibious or helicopter assault launched from fifty to 250 miles to the east of the objective, i.e. South Georgia, supported by raids launched from submarines.
Wear down Argentine forces by using nuclear and attack submarines. Since the Beagle Channel conflict was unresolved, Great Britain’s actions could encourage Chile to take concurrent action and thereby stretch Argentine resources.
Lombardo recognized that the deployment of Argentine naval surface units would be restricted by nuclear submarines and arrangements were made to extend the Air Transport Command Operation Aries 82. The Command flew in 6,712 soldiers, 414 Navy and 863 Air Force personnel and 6,335 tons of Army, 200 tons of Navy and 1,171 tons of Air Force supplies from several Atlantic air bases. In contrast, the British were reliant upon shipping, some already in service but including forty-five merchantmen taken up from trade as transports, repair ships, tugs and hospital ships. They moved over 100,000 tons of war stores, 400,000 tons of fuel and 9,000 men.
When it became clear that UK was assembling a Task Force, General HQ (GHQ) instructed 10 ‘Lieutenant General Nicolas Levalle’ Mechanised Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Oscar Jofre), which was based at La Plata defending the Atlantic Littoral, to prepare to deploy to the Falklands. Jofre replaced most of the conscripts with reservists summoned by radio announcements, telegram and home visits. With equipment deficiencies made up from other units, the Brigade began arriving by air from 11 April. Because his artillery group was equipped with US 105mm field guns, which were unsuitable for the Falklands, Jofre was assigned the 3rd Artillery Group (Lieutenant Colonel Martin Balsa), although Balsa had not previously worked with the Brigade. The Group was equipped with Italian M56 105mm Pack Howitzers. With two brigades ashore, Menendez reorganized Malvinas Joint Command.
Brigadier General Jofre was appointed Commander, Land Forces.
Brigadier General Daher became Chief of Staff to Menendez.
10 Infantry Brigade assumed responsibility for the defence of Stanley as Army Group, Stanley.
9 Infantry Brigade took responsibility for the rest of the Falklands with orders to reinforce Stanley.
In his threat assessment, Menendez’s Chief Intelligence Officer, Colonel Francisco Cervo, identified eleven potential assault beaches; again San Carlos Water was not mentioned. A GHQ assessment gave a detailed organizational and equipment breakdown of the British order of battle, but made some basic errors, for instance that the SAS were based in Aldershot and the decommissioned HMS Blake was part of the Task Force and carrying eleven Sea Kings.
By 16 April, 10th Infantry Brigade was in defensive positions, although it would not be until 22 April that its heavy equipment arrived. Believing that the main threat was from Berkeley Sound, Jofre organized Army Group Stanley to face north:
Sector Oro (Gold). 3rd Infantry Regiment covered the southern beaches.
Sector Acero (Steel). 6th Infantry Regiment covered the approaches from the south-west and south. C Company was later assigned to Z Reserve and was replaced by A Company, 1st ‘Los Patricios’ Infantry Regiment, which was designated C Company.
Sector Plata (Silver). 7th Infantry Regiment on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge faced north.
Sector Cobre (Copper). Military Air Base, Stanley.
Sector Victoria (Victory). Airport area. Defended by 25th Infantry Regiment.
Sector Bronce (Bronze). 5th Marine Infantry Battalion on Mount Tumbledown and Mount William covered the south-west approaches.
General Galtieri visited Menendez on 22 April and agreed the British would land at or near Stanley. When Menendez asked for Special Forces and another regiment as his heliborne reserve, Galtieri, without consulting the Junta and the Chiefs of Staff, instructed Major General Garcia to send 3 Mechanised Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Omar Parada). Usually deployed along the Uruguayan border in the sub-tropical province of Corrientes and part of II Army Corps, when 9 and 10 Brigades left for the Falklands it had joined 11 Mechanised Infantry Brigade in Patagonia defending the Atlantic Littoral and the border with Chile. Although Parada mobilized his reservists, by the time the troop trains were en route to Puerto Deseado for embarkation, his units were under strength and the men mostly conscripts. To replace the 3rd Artillery Group, Parada was given the 4th Airborne Artillery Group from the National Strategic Reserve. At Puerto Deseado, equipment was loaded on board four Naval Transport Service ships, however the Ciudad de Cordoba, which was loaded with mortars, vehicles, reserve ammunition, field kitchens and war stores of the 12th ‘General Juan Arenales’ Mechanised Infantry Regiment, returned to port after hitting a rock. Its soldiers, travelling in light order, arrived in Stanley between 24 and 29 April and were despatched to Goose Green. Conferring with General Herrera at GHQ on 25 April, the day that South Georgia was recaptured, Menendez said that the reinforcements were impacting on his logistics and that more helicopters would ease his problems. Herrera said that heavy equipment would arrive by ship, however the imposition of the TEZ on 1 May proved final. Menendez re-emphasized his need for commandos: ‘so that they can become familiar with the islands and its geography in order to be able to operate with the greatest efficiency.’
With three brigades, two with full headquarters, Menendez again reorganized his command. Brigadier General Parada took command of Army Group, Littoral and was ordered to move to Goose Green. His command was:
Sector Plomo (Lead). Task Force Mercedes – HQ, A and C Companies, 12th Infantry Regiment at Goose Green.
Naval Air Base Calderon, Pebble Island. Task Force Marega (1st Platoon, H Company, 3rd Marine Infantry Battalion).
Mount Wall and Mount Challenger. Task Force Monte Caseros (HQ, B and C Companies, 4th Infantry Regiment).
Mount Kent. Combat Team Solari (B Company, 12th Infantry Regiment).
Port Howard. Task Force Reconquest (5th Infantry Regiment). Its commanding officer was traditionally a full colonel; in 1982 this being Juan Mabragana.
Sector Uranio (Uranium) – 8th Infantry Regiment at Fox Bay.
3 Infantry Brigade suffered from lack of acclimatization and a deficiency of the appropriate equipment, clothing and training, however this must be set against the Argentine belief that the British would land in the vicinity of Stanley.
By 2 May, it was clear to Argentina that unless a political settlement was reached, landings near Stanley were likely. Menendez issued his Preparatory Order for the Reserve to Brigadier General Parada to contain the landings around Stanley:
Task Force Reconquest at Fox Bay to transfer to East Falkland.
Task Force Mercedes at Goose Green to deploy to Two Sisters, Mount Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge and destroy enemy penetration.
Task Force Monte Caseros to occupy Mount Wall and Mount Challenger and prevent enemy penetration westwards.
Combat Team Solari, supported by a helicopter company, to block enemy advances from the north.
Nevertheless the question for Menendez was: where and what will the British do if they land? A document compiled in mid-May suggests the British strategy would be to defeat the Argentine forces and recapture as much of the Stanley peninsula as possible. Britain would manoeuvre into a favourable political bargaining position either by a high-risk direct assault against Stanley, or a low-risk amphibious assault north-east of Stanley with a view to recapturing the town once sufficient forces were ashore. San Carlos is mentioned as one of three possible landing zones, the others being at Fitzroy and the St Louis peninsula, however it was considered a disadvantageous option because of the length of time it would take to approach Stanley. It was felt that the British were reliant upon helicopters.