When news of the surrender of the Falklands was confirmed, there was national embarrassment and anger. Confusion reigned as Whitehall and Westminster limited the damage to the reputation of Great Britain. During the evening of 31 March, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, had read intelligence reports given to the Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, and found incompatibility with one document warning of an invasion and another suggesting that:
Further naval deployments were unnecessary and undesirable. Endurance would remain on station and be supplied. Here was a clear imminent threat to a British overseas territory … What the hell was the point of having a Navy if it was not used for this sort of thing? Even as I decided that the briefs were upside down. I learned that my Secretary of State was being briefed from that at the very moment. (Freedman, Official History, Vol 1)
In full uniform, Leach was famously barred from the House of Commons by a police officer until he was rescued by a Whip and taken to a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Nott was reluctant to escalate the crisis. Leach suggested that any response must be robust, however it would take three weeks to assemble a task force based around the Fleet, its two aircraft carriers and 3 Commando Brigade. Thatcher corrected him, ‘Three days, you mean.’ Leach’s opinions were greeted with scepticism by some Cabinet ministers, nevertheless, by 11.00 pm, he had stopped Easter leave and was assembling a task force, in particular from Exercise Springtrain, although a decision had yet to be made that it would sail. During the famous Saturday House of Commons debate on 3 April, Thatcher acted with characteristic decisiveness when she announced: ‘A large task force will sail as soon as preparations are complete.’
Since this was going to be a naval operation, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, was appointed Commander, Combined Task Force 317 (CTF 317), with his headquarters at Northwood. CTF 317 was broken down into Combined Task Groups (CTG):
CTG 317.0. Amphibious Task Group. Commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp RN, the in-post Commander Amphibious Warfare at Plymouth. It had three tasks: 1) plan the land; 2) direct inshore operations; 3) support the defeat of the enemy ground forces.
CTG 317.1. Landing Force Group. 3 Commando Brigade (Brigadier Julian Thompson RM) at Plymouth. It was reinforced by the Spearhead Battalion, 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, and several smaller Army and RAF units. It had three tasks: 1) Land; 2) Establish a beachhead; 3) Defeat the enemy’s ground forces.
CTG 317.8. Carrier Battle Group (Rear Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward RN). Woodward was Flag Officer, 1st Flotilla. Its tasks were: 1) Establish a naval and air blockade of the Falklands; 2) Defeat Argentine naval forces; 3) Secure British air superiority; 4) Ensure the Landing Group arrived at their destination in one piece.
CTG 324.3 – (Submarines).
18 Group RAF reporting direct to Fieldhouse.
Although Woodward had limited experience in amphibious warfare, he was appointed Combined Commander, Task Force 317, which included all surface units and ground and air forces. Confusion surfaced quickly when Brigadier Thompson and Commodore Clapp, both one-star officers were unsure whether they reported to Woodward, a two-star officer, or had equal responsibilities as commanders reporting direct to Fieldhouse. This tension emerged several times over the coming weeks. The preparations reinforced Britain’s intent and the occupied Falkland Islanders were grateful that a country which for decades had ignored them was at last taking an interest in them. In the meantime, international diplomacy mediated to identify common ground between Great Britain and Argentina.
3 Commando Brigade was a highly motivated formation, with some units still returning from the annual three-month winter warfare deployment to Norway. If it had a weakness, its isolation from the Army meant that it was not totally familiar with some aspects of warfare, for instance the all-arms battle. Within four days, elements of the 4,350 men, about 50,000 tons of war stores and sixty vehicles that would make up the Brigade embarked on ships for the passage to Ascension Island. Fears of mixing 1,400 commandos and 600 paras on Canberra to be a lethal cocktail proved unfounded. Thompson placed his headquarters on HMS Fearless. There was very little intelligence, in spite of the historical threat that Argentina posed to the Falklands.
The disputed territories were 6,700 miles to the south and essential to Great Britain was a forward operating base. 3,750 miles from the Falklands and 4,225 miles from the United Kingdom, Ascension Island was ideally placed to be that base. With a decent anchorage and Wideawake Airfield, it could be secured cheaply and was screened from the media. Its tranquillity changed overnight on 2 April when Sergeants Macelreavy and Keeping and five Royal Signals from 1st Signal Group at Tidworth arrived by air with Tactical Satellite Communications and Diplomatic Communications radios for Governor Hunt. However, when the surrender interrupted their journey, they embarked on RFA Fort Austin on its way to replenish HMS Endurance, eventually landing at Stanley on 19 June. Captain Robert McQueen RN was appointed Commander, British Support Unit:
This was to be the base for the forward logistic support of British Forces on Operation Corporate. There were two more or less distinct parts to our task. First, the support of ships in the South Atlantic involved the transhipment of people, stores, ammunition and helicopters from Support Command and chartered transported aircraft by helicopter and lighter to ships passing the island. Second, the RAF Operations mounted from the island had to be supported and the defence of the island had to be secured. Fitness and weapon training had to be provided for troops in ships which stopped over at the island. (McQueen, Naval Review)
The increasing use of Ascension impacted on its limited water supply, a problem solved with desalinators. The demand for aviation fuel discharged from US Sealift Command tankers was resolved when 1 Troop, 51 (Construction) Squadron RE laid a 4-mile aviation fuel pipeline from a storage fuel tank farm to Wideawake Airfield to replace bowsers unable to keep up with demand. The very limited accommodation was enhanced with the tented ‘Lunar Bay Holiday Camp’ at English Bay, and the loan by 4449 Mobile Support Squadron USAF of thirty-one twelve-man modules for ‘Concertina City’, which were particularly valuable for the RAF Vulcans and Victors flying their long-range sorties. The redoubtable Royal Engineers and a Cable and Wireless team renovated every disused building, so that by mid-April, about 1,500 people could be accommodated. With their Royal Navy and RAF colleagues, 29 Transport and Movement Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport installed a Movement Control Check through which men and material moved. It also provided ‘movers’ on ships as liaison officers to arrange the stowage of equipment and stores.
Supplying the ships fell to the Royal Naval Aircraft Servicing Unit (Naval Party 1222) which arrived on 6 April. McQueen:
Stores were unloaded from the transport aircraft by three RAF teams working twelve hours on and twenty-four off. They were then sorted into and moved into dumps by an assorted team of fork-lift truck drivers, naval supply ratings and soldiers. Luckily there was considerable space to the south and east of the dispersal because the stores dumps became very large. (McQueen, Naval Review)
Ships taken up from trade and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), moved an estimated 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tons of freight and ninety-five aircraft to the South Atlantic. RFA overseas agents were also responsible for arranging the supply of oil for warships, with an estimated 1,200 refuelling-at-sea resupplies. Wideawake Airport became the most stable aircraft carrier in the world and, on 18 April, with over 500 air movements, the busiest airport in the world. Its single runway and two PAN AM air traffic controllers handled 2,500 fixed-wing flights and 10,600 helicopter rotations during Operation Corporate. Commanded by Group Captain Jeremy Price, the RAF contingent handled 5,800 personnel and 6,600 tons of stores using C-130 Hercules, ex-military transport Belfasts chartered from Heavy Lift Cargo Airlines and VC-10 passenger and aero-medical. Ascension Island was defended from nosy Soviet Long Range Air Force Tu-95 Bear C/Ds, first by eight GR3 Harriers from 1 (Fighter) Squadron, a RAF Regiment Wing equipped with Rapier and an early warning radar system installed on Green Mountain; then, from 24 May, when the Harriers joined the Task Force, by 29 (Fighter) Squadron F-4 Phantoms.
While the Task Force was preparing to go south and the Landing Group was assembling at Ascension Island, the recapture of South Georgia was underway.
With her fuel and stocks running low, HMS Endurance was ordered on 5 April to rendezvous with the Fleet Replenishment Ship RFA Fort Austin (Commodore Sam Dunlop). Her departure from the region left the British blind to Argentine activities, however, the BAS formed themselves into coast watchers and sent their observations to the BAS station on Signy Island, 650 miles to the south-west. It was then relayed to RRS Bransfield, copied to the Maritime Communication Centre at Portishead, sent to Cambridge and made available to the Ministry of Defence. Other BAS reported on Argentine activity in Cumberland Bay, ski-patrolled looking for Argentine activity, covering a total of a third of the east coast of South Georgia, and provided valuable intelligence of where the Argentines were not.
By 1981, the SAS were thriving on fame after the Iranian Embassy siege in London and were known, by some, as ‘Maggie Thatcher’s Own’. One SAS sergeant later claimed the Regiment could have recaptured the Falklands without help! To some extent, the SAS operated in a bubble with their own communications to Director, SAS at the Ministry of Defence via Hereford. As soon as Brigadier Peter de la Billière, Director, SAS, heard that a Task Force was assembling, he lobbied Admiral Fieldhouse for a role and activated his contacts with the US Delta Force:
At the scent of battle our American colleagues were raring to join in the action, but, being prevented from doing so by political considerations, lent us some of their best equipment, including a Stinger, a hand-held, ground-to-air missile system which was just coming into use. It so happened we had an experienced non-commissioned officer in the United States, Corporal Paddy O’Connor; he was rapidly diverted to Delta Force, where he took a crash course on the Stinger. Mike Rose managed to jump the gun, very much as he had done at the start of the Iranian Embassy siege. Without any official permission, he took D Squadron to Brize Norton and got them on board an aircraft; before anyone in authority realised where they were, they had arrived at Ascension island, four thousand miles down into the South Atlantic and half-way to the target, (de la Billière, Looking for Trouble)
Lieutenant Colonel Rose was Commanding Officer, 22 SAS. D Squadron (Major Cedric Delves) consisted of a Headquarters, including fourteen 264 Signal Squadron, and 16 (Mobility), 17 (Boat), 18 (Air) and 19 (Mountain) Troops. Flying by a 10 Squadron RAF VC-10, the eighty-strong Squadron arrived at Ascension on 5 April with about 50,000 pounds of palleted equipment. Meanwhile de la Billière: ‘Was liaising and advising at the highest level, for some of our operations were highly sensitive, and needed not only military approval but political backing from the top’ (de la Billière, Looking for Trouble).
In London, the Cabinet view was that while South Georgia was of secondary importance, its occupation was not negotiable. Its recapture would demonstrate political resolve and raise public morale, which was becoming disenchanted with the protracted seesaw mediation by General Al Haig. The leeward coast offered relatively sheltered anchorages for a forward operating base, although the Falklands were 600 stormy miles to the west.
At about 5.00 pm on 6 April, Major General Jeremy Moore RM MC■, who was Major General, Royal Marines, told Brigadier Thompson, just as he was about to fly to HMS Fearless from HQ Commando Forces in Plymouth, that Northwood needed a commando company group for a classified mission and suggested the 45 Commando detachment on jungle warfare training in Brunei. When Thompson suggested 42 Commando, which had just returned from its annual Norwegian winter deployment, next day, Colonel Richard Preston, Chief-of-Staff, Commando Forces instructed Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux, who commanded 42 Commando, to set aside a company group equipped for winter warfare on six hours’ notice to move. Vaux:
First, I had to decide who should go … One of my rifle companies was to be despatched on an evidently hazardous mission, under someone else’s control. I was not happy with the circumstances, and it was then that I first considered putting Guy Sheridan in overall command … His qualifications were unique, and instinct also told me that an experienced major like Guy Sheridan was more likely to resolve dissension within a force drawn from several units than a younger company commander. That decision taken, it was easier to choose the company commander for the South Georgia party, since I could afford to retain the two most experienced for whatever awaited us elsewhere. As it happened, I had not the slightest doubt that Captain Chris Nunn, who had just successfully completed his first winter in command of M Company, was the right choice … We agreed upon a company group that included a precious section of the unit’s Reconnaisance Troop, who were all tried and trained specialists in mountain and arctic warfare. We decided to include two of the six 81mm from Support Company but also asked for a naval gunfire support team. (Vaux, March to the South Atlantic)
Major Sheridan, Vaux’s Second-in-Command, was an inspired choice. A former member of the British Olympic Biathlon Team, he was a very experienced mountaineer and had served in Aden, Borneo and Oman. Joining M Company were four Signals Troop and three medics, including Surgeon Lieutenant C. Swinhoe, giving a total of 132 all ranks. Confined to the gymnasium, M Company were forbidden to contact their families. Moore briefed Sheridan at HQ Commando Forces and told him that although a political solution to the crisis might preclude a landing, he, Sheridan, was Landing Force Commander for the recapture of South Georgia. It would be ‘quick, easy and attractive’. Sheridan wanted the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre, Royal Marines, but was told to expect Mountain Troop, D Squadron.
On the same day, Captain Brian Young, who commanded the County class destroyer HMS Antrim in Gibraltar, was ordered by Admiral Fieldhouse ‘to proceed with despatch’ to Ascension with the Type-12 frigate HMS Plymouth (Captain David Pentreath) and the Fleet Oiler RFA Tidespring, and join HMS Endurance to form CTG 317.9 (Task Force, South Georgia). Young was nominated as Task Force Commander, an appointment that was a touch surprising – whereas Captain Barker had a wealth of polar experience, Young was a naval aviator with no practical experience of the South Atlantic or working with amphibious forces.
On 8 April, RFA Fort Austin arrived at Ascension. M Company arrived next day and were met by Major Jonathan Thomson RM, who commanded the SBS and had been instructed to attach 2 SBS to the Landing Force; the Company embarked on RFA Tidespring (Captain Shane Redmond). Meanwhile Major Delves had persuaded Captain Young and Major Sheridan that in view of current intelligence about Argentine strength on South Georgia, D Squadron should join the Task Force and embark on RFA Fort Austin, a suggestion that was supported by Northwood. There was actually nothing to suggest that the Argentines had reinforced South Georgia since 3 April and Sheridan had not asked for the reinforcements. The SAS then lost some credibility when some doubted Major Sheridan’s expertise. They also placed a severe strain on the Royal Navy’s ability to administer the soldiers. In any event, D Squadron knew they had a boss lobbying on their behalf ‘at the highest political level’. More usefully, Sheridan was joined by Naval Gunfire Forward Observation Party 1 (NGFO 1) (Captain Willy McCracken) and NGF05 (Captain Chris Brown), 148 (Meiktila) Commando Observation Battery. In overall command of this unit was Lieutenant Colonel Keith Eve RA, a highly experienced commando and parachute gunner.
Admiral Fieldhouse regarded the recapture of South Georgia, named Operation Paraquet, after the long-tailed parrot, as an important statement on intent. Initially planned by HQ 3 Commando Brigade, it was renamed Operation Paraquat, after the industrial rat poison. As far as Thompson and Commodore Clapp were concerned, the operation was an opportunity to rehearse an amphibious assault. Intelligence on the Argentines was scarce but they were thought to be platoon strength. Organization, tactics and weapon configuration were not known. If armed, the scrap metal merchants, still assumed to be at Leith, would give the Argentines about two platoons. There was no evidence of interference with the BAS field parties or two wildlife photographers, Lucinda Buxton and Anne Price.
Task Force, South Georgia, with RFA Tidespring carrying two 845 NAS Wessex HU 5 assault helicopters and M Company, left Ascension on the 11 April. Next day, HMS Endurance replenished supplies from RFA Fort Austin and the remainder of the Task Force left Ascension. On the 13th, since it had become apparent in the early planning that D Squadron needed to be dispersed, there followed a long and complex operation, which was hampered by weather, with Squadron HQ, 16 (Mobility) and 18 (Air) Troops cross-decked to a very crowded HMS Antrim, while 19 (Mountain) and 17 (Boat) Troops joined HMS Plymouth, an event that took all morning. Sergeant Peter Ratcliffe, of Mountain Troop:
There was little for us to do aboard Plymouth except play cards and drink beers. Much smaller than Fort Austin, but with a larger crew, there simply wasn’t room for us to run round decks, and even less space below. The hardest problem was finding a bed. Since Plymouth had no room for us, we used the petty officers’ bunks while they were on watch; when they came off duty, they would tap us on the shoulder and say ‘Please can I have my bunk back’. We would then wander around until each of us had found another empty bed. (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
On 14 April, after Task Force Georgia had had an emotional reunion with HMS Endurance, Captain Barker joined the planning group, bringing with him a mass of knowledge and experience about South Georgia. He soon found the traditional secrecy of the SAS frustrating and allegedly commented, ‘It’s not exactly as busy as Brighton Front round here, you know.’ On the 15th, a No. 42 (Torpedo Bomber) Squadron Nimrod, flying from Ascension, dropped formal operational orders, dated 12 April, from Admiral Fieldhouse to Captain Young, ordering him to reoccupy South Georgia with 21 April set as D-Day. Captain Young then gave his orders to Major Sheridan:
Recapture Grytviken and Leith.
Neutralize Argentinean communications.
Capture or kill Argentinean military and arrest Argentinean civilians.
The plan was to insert SAS and SBS recce patrols north and south of Grytviken and then land M Company either as reinforcements or an assault group. No one seems to have suggested inviting the Argentines to capitulate. Major Sheridan felt operational difficulties were being underestimated by the SAS when Delves instructed that Mountain Troop (Captain John Hamilton) would be delivered by helicopter 20 miles south-east of Stromness:
1. To recce Leith, Stromness, Husvik and East Fortuna Bay for a Squadron-sized attack.
2. To find routes across Fortuna Glacier, Breakwind Ridge and Konig Glacier.
As soon as Argentine strengths and dispositions were known, the Troop would deal with the enemy in the knowledge that D Squadron could reinforce them. Barker was not convinced that Delves appreciated the risks of landing on Fortuna Glacier. The weather was unpredictable and experience counted for little. When Barker suggested that the SAS approach a few miles from north-east of Leith, Delves conceded that his plan was unwise but insisted the best place to land was on Fortuna Glacier. Virtually everyone disagreed. Major Sheridan: ‘I gave him the job and could not tell him how to do it. I advised against the Fortuna route but they thought they could do it.’
In a show of the tensions emerging within the planning group of ‘experts with influence’ versus local knowledge, Delves consulted with two SAS in UK who had climbed Mount Everest but had never been to South Georgia. Barker certainly felt that his information was undervalued and one BAS scientist later described the SAS attitude as ‘We’re the SAS, we can walk on water.’ With the spirit of de la Billière hovering in the background, a Royal Marines operation was fast becoming a SAS operation. The SBS plan was simple and the best option – land three patrols at Hound Bay, cross Cumberland Bay East by Gemini dropped by helicopter and find an OP on Brown Mountain to overlook Grytviken.
On 17 April, HMS Fearless anchored off Georgetown and when Brigadier Thompson and Commodore Clapp met with Admiral Fieldhouse on board HMS Hermes for a strategic conference, not only did he tell them to forget Operation Paraquet, but that 5 Infantry Brigade was also being mobilized. Thompson:
I was told that the Commando Brigade would be reinforced by a further Parachute Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (2 Para) … This was good news indeed. The addition of 2 Para to 3 Commando Brigade merely increased the feeling that existed already among all ranks in the Brigade that the team getting ready to go south was the First XI. Military common sense dictated that if pitched battles were to be fought against what was estimated to be a total of 10,000 Argentine soldiers in the Falklands, including a reinforced Brigade defending Stanley, at least another brigade’s worth of troops should be on hand. When asked, I said that five battalions or commandos was as much as I would wish to handle in battle. So 5 Infantry Brigade with another Brigade Headquarters would be needed. This would necessitate a Divisional Headquarters. (Thompson, No Picnic)
When Major General Moore was appointed as Commander, Land Forces, Falkland Islands (CLFFI), CTU 317.1 (Landing Group) was sub-divided into:
CTU 317.1.1. 3 Commando Brigade.
CTU 317.1.2. 5 Infantry Brigade.
This was the first time that a Royal Marine had commanded a division since the Second World War and although there were many army officers with divisional experience, Moore’s appointment reflected the amphibious nature of the campaign. Arriving from the Royal College of Defence Studies, as his deputy and spare brigade commander, was Brigadier John Waters (Gloucesters), who was described by one senior naval officer as ‘a total brick’ – steady, reliable and robust. Colonel Brian Pennicott RA, who had commanded 29 Commando Regiment when Moore had commanded 3 Commando Brigade, joined as Commander, Royal Artillery. Lieutenant General Sir Richard Trant, Commander, Southern District, took over as Military Deputy to Fieldhouse and took Colonel Christopher Dunphie MC from a tedious logistics appointment as his Chief-of-Staff. At the conference, the Task Force commanders presented their courses of action to Admiral Fieldhouse with Rear Admiral Woodward opting for a beachhead and airstrip on West Falkland, while Brigadier Thompson and Commodore Clapp favoured an amphibious landing on East Falkland and an advance against Stanley. The Woodward versus Thompson and Clapp camp would affect strategy throughout the war.
Rear Admiral Woodward’s ships began leaving Ascension on 14 April and the Landing Group spent the next three weeks restowing men and equipment, and training. Concern for her vulnerability to an increasing Argentine Navy and Air Force activity led to the RRS Bransfield leaving the region the same day. This was a crushing blow to the BAS field parties who had hoped the ship would collect them.
* * *
Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Al Haig failed to persuade Argentina to evacuate the captured territories and warned the Junta to expect military action against South Georgia within days. The planners were unaware that an early decision by the Junta was for the defence of South Georgia to be minimal. The Cabinet authorized approval for its recapture and operational command was passed to Captain Young, by now well inside the 200-mile South Georgia Maritime Exclusion Zone imposed by Great Britain in early April.
Early on 20 April, Squadron Leader John Elliot, carrying out a Maritime Radar Recce sortie in a Victor, covered 150,000 square miles of the South Atlantic, including South Georgia, in a 14 hours and 45 minutes flight that established the record for a long-range operational recce. Later, Young sent HMS Plymouth and HMS Endurance to the south-east of Cumberland Bay while HMS Antrim and RFA Tidespring loitered off Stromness. However, a Force 11 gale ‘left everyone wishing they had never left home’. Next day, HMS Endurance slipped into St Andrews Bay and Lieutenant Commander Ellerbeck flew ashore to warn the BAS field parties and two women of military action. They had not seen any Argentines. Peter Stark, whose knowledge was desperately needed, joined the planning team and was replaced ashore by Chief Petty Officer Tommy Scott, but his opportunity to share his knowledge disappeared when he was led away by an SAS model maker constructing a facsimile of Grytviken and Leith.
Next day at 5.30 am, 10 miles off Stromness Bay, Lieutenant Commander Ian Stanley RN, flying HMS Antrim’s anti-submarine warfare Wessex HAS-3, ‘Humphrey’, flew a weather recce, and in spite of driving sleet and a strong wind on Fortuna Glacier, Young decided to proceed with the operation at 7.00 am. Mountain Troop emplaned on ‘Humphrey’ and Stanley led the two Wessexes to the glacier, however deteriorating weather and ice forced him to abort. Two hours later, the helicopters again lifted off, and in spite of freezing squalls and whiteout whipping in from the Antarctic, landed Mountain Troop on Fortuna Glacier. At about 5.30 pm, four 2 SBS were landed by Wasp from HMS Endurance at Hound Bay. Two of them recced the area, during which one of them trod on the tail of a large sleeping elephant seal, before meeting two startled BAS in a hut where they were treated to a cup of tea. No Argentines had been seen.
As Barker and Stark had predicted, Mountain Troop found Fortuna Glacier a challenge.
I have seen some terrible weather during my service, but nothing as bad as that on South Georgia – I didn’t even go to the glacier. Three times the naval pilots flew between the ships and the shore, before finally succeeding in setting down on Fortuna Glacier. Within minutes, however, the whiteout was back as gale force winds whipped the glacier. Carrying their bergens, each weighing 77lbs and dragging four pulks (sledges), each weighing 200lbs, in five hours Mountain Troop covered about half a mile – and these men were the cream of mountain warfare experts. (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
The Royal Marines would probably not agree on Ratcliffe’s last assessment! Crevasses, frozen weapons and GPMG feed trays were blocked by spindrift and Hamilton sought sanctuary.
With light fading fast, they tried erecting two-man Arctic tents behind an outcrop of ice to provide some shelter. But savage winds, by now gusting in excess of 100 mph, blew away one tent like a paper handkerchief and snapped the tent poles of the others. Five men crawled into one tent while the rest huddled for shelter under pulks in sub-zero temperatures as winds that had now reached storm force clawed at the glacier. (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
An attempt by Ellerbeck to land another SBS patrol at 11.00 pm at Hound Bay failed when his Wasp was almost blown into the heaving seas. Captain Barker then took his ship to within 800 yards of the shore and, in a brief window of tranquillity, launched the SBS in two Geminis. Cold after landing through heavy, freezing surf, the SBS walked through packs of seals and penguins and contacted the patrol already ashore, before settling down for the night at Dartmouth Point. Meanwhile, Squadron Leader Seymour undertook a second radar search. As dawn broke, so did the storm.
On Fortuna Glacier, the condition of Mountain Troop was deteriorating and, when, at about 7.00 am, Captain Hamilton signalled ‘Unable to move. Environmental casualties imminent’, the HMS Antrim sick bay prepared to receive cold-weather casualties. Hindered by snowstorms gusting between 70 and 80 knots, at about 8.00 am, the helicopters left.
Three Wessex helicopters set out for the glacier, but couldn’t find the SAS patrol and returned to refuel. On their second attempt, they reached the men through a fifteen minute, clear weather window at 13.30 (9am) and embarked them and their equipment. But minutes after lift-off, one of them (piloted by Lieutenant Tidd) crashed in a blinding whiteout, although miraculously, of the seven on board, only one was injured. They and the crew of the crashed aircraft were split between the two remaining helicopters, but in whiteout conditions, one (Lieutenant Andy Pulford) hit an ice ridge and also crashed, luckily without serious injury. In one of the greatest single feats of the entire war the pilot of the third helicopter, Lieutenant Commander Ian Stanley, embarked all SAS and aircrew aboard his aircraft and managed to lift off the glacier, although most of the patrol’s equipment had to be abandoned with the two wrecked Wessex. With himself and fifteen men and their weapons aboard, Stanley’s helicopter was seriously overloaded. Because of the weight, he was unable to hover Antrim’s deck, and therefore decided to crash-land instead, slamming the aircraft down with the rotors at full power to slow the descent. Ian Stanley was awarded the DSO, the only one granted to a pilot in the campaign. (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
The remainder of the Troop was rescued later in the day. Lieutenant Parry was Stanley’s observer: ‘The SAS are a strange lot. Before the events of the last two days, they barely spoke to us. Just now, all of them, including the troopers invaded the wardroom and insisted that we had a drink with them. (Winton, Signals from the Falklands)
Meanwhile, the SBS had crossed Sorling Valley with the intention of launching the Geminis at the foot of Nordenskjold Glacier, but found Cumberland Bay East icebound. A Wasp helicopter flew in two Geminis but their outboards failed and then when severe weather set in, the SBS were stranded for the next three days. So far, Operation Paraquat had achieved nothing: the 21 April deadline had been missed; D Squadron had ignored local knowledge resulting in the loss of two valuable helicopters; Mountain Troop had lost most of its equipment. The SAS had potentially compromised the recovery of South Georgia.
Shortly after midnight on 22 April, in a second attempt to land the SAS, Captain Young nosed HMS Antrim to a mile east of Grass Island to disembark the fifteen-strong Boat Troop (Captain Tim Burls) in five Geminis and establish an OP on Grass Island to overlook.
The specially silenced outboard motors had been warmed up in a tank on board Antrim only half an hour before the boats were launched. Nevertheless, once in the water, two of the engines wouldn’t start. At the time, it didn’t seem any great setback, since the other boats could easily tow the unpowered craft to Grass Island – or so we thought. Once Antrim had departed, however, there was a swift and astonishing change in the weather. The wind that had, until then, been little more than a breeze rose to gale force in seconds. White-capped waves smashed over the Geminis and the Troop was scattered in the Antarctic darkness all over Stromness Bay. The two towed Geminis broke loose and were swept away. The crew of one (Gemini ‘Bravo’) paddled with their mess tins, but even so were in danger of being swept far out to sea, when next morning, Ian Stanley picked up the signal from the emergency beacons and winched them aboard his Wessex. The others made it to Grass Island, where they set up a camouflaged OP from which to watch the settlements. (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
With Gemini ‘Delta’ missing, Boat Troop reported little activity in Stromness Bay. Shortly before midnight on 22/23 May, the nine SAS on Green Island attempted to land near Stromness but again the outboards failed. Intercepted communications between an Argentine C-130 and an Argentine submarine then suggested that the latter was close to South Georgia.
Constructed during the Second World War specifically for Pacific Ocean operations against the Japanese, the Balao-class diesel submarine Santa Fe (formerly USS Catfish) (Lieutenant Commander Hugo Bircain) was underway to South Georgia from Mar Del Plate Naval Base with eleven naval technicians and nine 1st Marine Infantry Battalion anti-tank gunners with their Bantam anti-tank missile launchers. She was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Lagos, who had been sent by Vice Admiral Lombardo in response to a request for reinforcements by Captain Trombetta. As Captain Young and Major Sheridan were preparing to land, signal intercepts suggested the submarine was a threat and although his destroyer was trained to hunt nuclear submarines, at 11.00 pm on 23 April, Young was instructed by Northwood to disperse his ships out of the South Georgia Maritime Exclusion Zone, except for HMS Endurance, which remained near Hound Bay. Northwood then ordered the frigate HMS Brilliant and nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror (Chris Wrexford-Brown) to join Task Force Georgia and hunt the Argentine submarine.
During the night, after Boat Troop landed near Stromness, a SAS patrol followed the track taken by Lieutenant Mills and Sergeant Leach to Harbour Point to look down on Leith. Everything was quiet. At dawn, they plotted the two marine infantry sections during stand-to. When the Santa Fe tied up in the morning, the patrol plotted the marine infantry occupying the trenches dug by Mills’s Royal Marines. Observations by Lieutenant Commander Bircain confirmed Argentine suspicion that an attack was imminent.
The following morning, when a 1st Air Transport Group Boeing 707 flew over South Georgia searching for the Task Force, Argentina was informed that the British Rules of Engagement permitted the shooting down of any Argentine aircraft. A month earlier, a Boeing from the Group had been at Stanstead loading military stores from Royal Navy lorries. During the day, HMS Brilliant joined CTG 317.9 and gave Young two more Lynx helicopters.
The next morning, 25 April, Santa Fe left Grytviken and, at 8.55 am, was about 2 miles off Banff Point heading north-west when her radar signature was picked up by Lieutenant Commander Stanley, who was hunting for her. Bircain could not submerge because of a damaged hatch and in the first attack by the Royal Navy on an enemy submarine since April 1945, Stanley dropped two depth charges. The first damaged the aft ballast tanks and steering planes, while the second clanged off the deck into the sea. This attack was followed by a Lynx from HMS Brilliant dropping a Mark 46 torpedo and machine-gunning her. Still unable to submerge, Sante Fe reversed course and was attacked a third time with AS-12 missiles launched by the Wasps from HMS Endurance and Plymouth, the missile fired by Lieutenant Wells exploding inside the submarine’s distinctive fin. Ellerbeck made a second attack, his AS-12 flying through a fibre-glass section of the fin and exploding on contact with the sea. Commander Sandford in HMS Antrim:
We were very anxious, professionally, to ensure this submarine stayed on the surface; we didn’t want it to go to the bottom. War hadn’t even been declared, but, if we could force him to beach at Grytviken, it would be game, set and match. We came out of the mist and saw South Georgia, breathtaking in all its glory, for the first time. It was sheer exhilaration. We had hoisted the battle ensign and were thundering along at 30 knots. It was a sunny Sunday morning. The Padre came up and asked what time could we have church. (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
As Bircain shepherded his battle-damaged submarine back to Grytviken, the second Lynx from HMS Brilliant machine-gunned her. When Bircain tied up alongside the King Edward Harbour jetty, he unloaded his only casualty, a steward who had been badly wounded while feeding ammunition to a machine gun.
Meanwhile, Major Sheridan was instructed by Northwood to complete the recapture of South Georgia. Unfortunately, M Company was 50 miles away on RFA Tidespring and his naval gunfire support was out of position. Available, he had D Squadron, his Tactical HQ, two 81mm mortars and the two NGFO teams. Forced to wait three hours until 1.30 pm, while Captain Young and his officers dissected the attack on the Santa Fe, at 1.45 pm Sheridan gave orders and set H-Hour for 10.45 pm. Lieutenant Colonel Eve controlled the fire support provided by the 4.5-inch guns of the Royal Navy. Major Sheridan:
I had about seventy-five men – about half the opposition we expected; so it was a gamble! The three Troops of about twenty men were commanded by Major Delves, Captain Nunn and Lieutenant Clive Grant RM with Surgeon Lieutenant Crispin Swinhoe RN in my tactical headquarters. I had two 81mm tubes and each man carried two high explosive bombs.
At 10.00 am, HMS Antrim and Plymouth, reacting to Captain Brown’s observations from a Lynx, shelled the landing site at Hesterleten, a grassy patch 3 miles south of Grytviken. It was exactly sixty-seven years since the first aerial spotting for a naval bombardment at Gallipoli in 1915. At 10.30 am Lieutenant Commander Stanley led the two HMS Brilliant Lynxes, with eighteen D Squadron on board and, after being forced to orbit the north end of Cumberland Bay until the bombardment finished, landed the troops at 10.45 am. Stanley’s landing was unconventional – a commando assault from a geriatric ASW Wessex and two of the latest ASW Lynx flown by pilots untrained for amphibious warfare.
The traditional controlled rush from ‘Humphrey’ was prevented by the Anti-Submarine Warfare equipment, so the SAS squeezed out one at a time and waited while the loadmaster, Petty Officer Aircrewman David Fitzgerald, handed down their equipment. Over the next forty-five minutes, the Composite Company Group and the SBS, commanded by Captain Nunn, landed with the two mortars and started registering possible targets on Brown Ridge, much to the annoyance of Major Delves who wanted his intended route mortared. Major Sheridan landed and, annoyed about this disagreement, issued orders that ‘Everyone must sort themselves out and get on with it.’ The two destroyers meanwhile shifted their fire onto the track to Grytviken. When Sheridan then discovered that D Squadron had not seized Brown Mountain because the summit might be an Argentine position, he instructed the SAS to lead the advance to contact. A ‘main position’ that was machine-gunned turned out to be a cairn and a wooden spar masquerading as an antenna. Two Milan missiles destroyed another ‘position’ near Penguin River – several seals, relaxing on the banks.
When Captain Brown asked HMS Antrim to stand off the entrance of Cumberland Bay East to give close fire support – remembering what had happened to the Guerric – Young reluctantly agreed. By 1.00 pm, Sheridan was overlooking The Hummocks and the wrecked Argentine Puma. Two white flags were flying on the BAS buildings and an Argentine flag on a flagpole. Cancelling the third landing by the SBS and Mobility Troop at Bore Valley Pass, and to demonstrate future resistance was pointless, he radioed Young for the two warships to show themselves. As HMS Antrim entered Cumberland Bay with Young inviting the Argentines to surrender, a marine infantry signaller replied, ‘No shoot! No shoot!’ and mentioned a wounded man without legs. The post-Operation Paraquet report later stated: ‘Consider NGS effect devastating and surrender indicated before fire plan completed. Demoralisation by NGS absolute.’
More white flags appeared from the Argentine position at King Edward Point and about fifteen minutes later the defenders filed out of Discovery House and paraded underneath their flag. Sheridan ordered the advance to halt, but Delves’ radio had apparently become defective and he and three SAS advanced past the crashed Puma and into Grytviken. ‘There was then a mad dash to see who could be the first in to raise the flag. It was actually Mountain Troop.’ (Ratcliffe, Eye of the Storm)
Lieutenant Bircain then radioed HMS Antrim that the garrison was surrendering, they had wounded, one seriously, and that the helicopter pad and the track from Grytviken were mined. This information was passed to Delves, whose radio corrected itself. Frustrated by the SAS initiative, Sheridan left Mountain Troop on Brown Mountain and, after ordering Nunn’s Troop to advance into Grytviken, landed in an HMS Endurance Wasp on King Edward Point a few minutes after Delves had raised the Union flag. At about 1.15 pm, Sheridan accepted the surrender of Grytviken from Lieutenant Commander Lagos. At 1.30 pm, Captain Young radioed London: ‘Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Flag at Grytviken, South Georgia. God save the Queen.’
Without an exchange of fire, 129 captured sailors and marines were captured. The wounded Argentine steward, whose leg had already been amputated by Santa Fe’s surgeon, was flown on to RFA Tidespring for further treatment. One British soldier had slightly twisted his ankle. Bircain and Lagos signed the formal surrender on HMS Antrim, although Leith was still occupied. When Major Sheridan asked Bircain to persuade Astiz to agree terms, Bircain replied, ‘Astiz says he will not surrender. He will fight to the death.’
In a show of force, at 2.15 pm, Captain Pentreath took HMS Plymouth and HMS Endurance with Sheridan, 2 SBS and Air Troop to Leith. At about 6.45 pm, while Barker and Pentreath were discussing their options, Surgeon Lieutenant Neil Munro, HMS Antrim’s doctor, took a call from Astiz offering to surrender. Barker told Astiz to muster next morning. After dark, Air Troop landed on Harbour Point and met 2 SBS and Boat Troop. Next morning, the British watched the scrap metal workers assemble and marines parade. HMS Plymouth’s helicopter then collected Astiz to sign for the Argentine surrender of Leith. Lockett:
We returned to HMS Endurance with eight Argentine prisoners, the remainder came on board later. Their arrival caused consternation as members of the Troop were forced to leave Number One hold … and to add insult to injury then had to guard the prisoners who didn’t appreciate their new lodgings. The two SAS who were sharing the ship’s one man cell complained so bitterly about moving, they were allowed to stay. The refugees from Number One Hold moved upstairs to join the comparative luxury, thereby increasing the number in the First Lieutenant’s cabin to ten. (Lockett, HMS Endurance)
Soon after the surrender, the three SAS from Gemini ‘Delta’ strolled into Leith. Their outboard swamped, they had paddled ashore and sheltered in a cave at Cape Saunders, the last landfall before the vast grey mass of the South Atlantic; much to their credit they had not activated their rescue beacons, in case it compromised the British presence to the enemy. A disappointed M Company arrived the following day to garrison South Georgia and guard the 151 naval and marine prisoners and thirty-nine civilians held on HMS Endurance. Leith was littered with improvised devices and the prisoners agreed to dismantle them and mark out minefields.
The same day, three 2nd Air Brigade Canberras, led by a Boeing 707 guide, left Rio Grande Naval Air Base to attack Grytvikven but were prevented from doing so by bad weather. When the prisoners transferred to Tidespring, which was to return to Ascension, Astiz was kept separately on HMS Antrim. Argentina claimed that South Georgia had been subjected to a naval blockade and that a submarine landing provisions, mail and medical supplies had been attacked. Subjected to a sustained assault by armed helicopters, the small naval force had held out gallantly. The recapture of South Georgia was greeted with some relief in London with Prime Minister Thatcher fobbing off questions with: ‘Just rejoice at the news and congratulate our forces and the marines. Rejoice.’
On 27 April, the Santa Fe was moved from the jetty with the help of several Argentine sailors guarded by Royal Marines with instructions to ensure that the boat was not scuttled. As the submarine moved, it suddenly lurched, and under orders from an Argentine officer, Petty Officer Felix Artuso operated a switch, which had been listed as forbidden, however he ignored warnings and was shot dead. A court of inquiry chaired by Captain Young and attended by Bircain cleared the Royal Marine. The Santa Fe was immobilized by explosives and, after slowly flooding, she settled with only her fin showing above the freezing water. Artuso was buried with full honours in the cemetery at Grytviken. Unfortunately, his widow is unable to visit his grave.
On 2 May, RFA Tidespring left with the prisoners and the BAS for Ascension and was met by a Joint Forward Interrogation Team. The prisoners were repatriated to Argentina via Montevideo on 14 May. When Lieutenant Mills and his detachment arrived at Ascension Island, they had the satisfaction of guarding Astiz on the RFA Tidespring. Because of the allegations against him, Astiz was detained at the Royal Military Police barracks in Chichester until 10 June when he was repatriated. On 25 May, Mills and his detachment rejoined HMS Endurance at Grytviken.
Commanded by Brigadier Matthew Wilson OBE MC, with Brigade HQ at Aldershot, 5 Infantry Brigade was converted from a mixed Regular/Territorial Army home defence formation, in January 1982, into an all-Regular one with the Leading Parachute Battalion Group role, through 2 Para. It also took over several 6th Field Force units including 3 Para and 1st Battalion, 7th (Duke of Edinburgh’s Own) Gurkha Rifles (l/7th Gurkha Rifles). The Brigade lacked artillery. On 2 April, at a 10 Field Workshops parade, Major Brendan Lambe, the Chief-of-Staff, learnt that the Brigade was earmarked for the South Atlantic.
At a HQ United Kingdom Land Forces (HQ UKLF) conference at Wilton to juggle deployments for Northern Ireland and the Falklands, while maintaining its NATO Priority One commitment, to replace 3 Para, Major General Sir Desmond Langley KCVO MBE, General Officer Commanding, London District, offered one of his three Guards battalions, namely: 1st Welsh Guards, which had just handed over as Spearhead Battalion; 2nd Scots Guards, which was on Public Duties and providing a military presence in London to the Irish Republican threat; and 2nd Grenadier Guards, which had recently returned from West Germany and was mechanized warfare-minded. The controversy surrounding the deployment of the Guards was largely media inspired, and by others who felt that a 1 Infantry Brigade battalion, in particular 1st Queens Own Highlanders, should be earmarked for the Falklands and that the Guards should fill in the empty slots in the unlikely event of hostilities against the Warsaw Pact.
On 4 April, 1st Welsh Guards (Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Rickett) brought 5 Infantry Brigade back to three battalions. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Hubert ‘H’ Jones, the 2 Para Commanding Officer, was returning from skiing in France and was determined that his Battalion should join the Task Force, and not go to Belize as planned. Using his knowledge of unit tasking from a staff posting at HQ UKLF, he suggested his Battalion should join the Task Force so that 3 Commando Brigade would have two identically organized parachute battalions as opposed to an airborne and an infantry battalion. Coincidentally, Brigadier Thompson, on his way to Ascension, had calculated that he needed another battalion. When, on 15 April, 2 Para was placed on three days’ notice, Jones formed a battle group consisting of:
2 Para.
29 (Corunna) Field Battery from 4th Field Regiment RA.
Two Blowpipe detachments, 32nd Guided Weapon Regiment RA.
2 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron RE.
Advanced Detachment of three Scout helicopters from 656 Squadron AAC.
Parachute Casualty Clearing Troop, 16 Field Ambulance RAMC.
When it seemed that protocol would ensure that l/7th Gurkha Rifles (Lieutenant Colonel David Morgan MBE) would not be deployed, the King of Nepal gave permission for it to join the Task Force. Told about this, Prime Minister Thatcher is said to have commented, ‘Only one [Gurkha] battalion?’ Argentina then accused Nepal of supplying mercenaries to the British. It so happened that the UN Ad Hoc Committee was considering a draft definition that a mercenary would:
Not be a member of the regular armed forces of a country.
Be paid more than a member of the regular forces of that country.
Not be bound by treaties between two countries.
The Gurkhas had been part of the British Army since 1816 and although Argentina was instructed to quit her accusations, she continued to accuse the Gurkhas of barbaric warfare, of going into battle high on drugs, of eating their prisoners and using their kukris to chop up the enemy. Anxious Argentine conscripts compared their machete with the kukri.
On 7 April, when the Ministry of Defence reduced the notice to move from the standard seven days to three days, 5 Infantry Brigade cancelled Easter block leave. Two days later, as SS Canberra sailed with 40 and 42 Commando and 3 Para sailed from Southampton, Brigadier Wilson held a conference. Lieutenant Colonel Rickett:
5 Infantry Brigade’s role was never spelt out. We were just another brigade sent south probably with the intention of using it as a garrison in due course. However, it must have been obvious to anyone from the start that given the number of Argentine forces on the islands, one brigade would not have been enough to have won back control on its own. Our understanding was that we were going to fight from the outset and we carried out countless appreciations during the voyage south on what would be our initial tasks. Why spend an awful lot of money and time on exercising the brigade in South Wales prior to actual notice to move unless it wasn’t going to be used to fight?
When 2 Para was given notice to move on 15 April, this again left 5 Infantry Brigade a battalion short and London District was instructed to transfer one of the two remaining Guards battalions. Major General Langley selected 2nd Scots Guards (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott). Converting his Battalion into a wartime establishment, Scott instructed Major The Hon. Richard Bethell MBE, who, after about twelve years with the SAS, was commanding Headquarters Company, to reform Recce Platoon from the Drums Platoon and volunteers. Scott:
Interestingly, our role did, of course, change as the days went on, really up to the very last minute when it was ultimately decided that the Commando Brigade could not do it all entirely by themselves. However, I am convinced that, initially, we were going to be the garrison when the war was won. We would be there for a 4-month tour when everyone else had left for home and glory. But what a perfect role for Foot Guards – guarding things. You can almost see the Staff thinking how clever they had been. So it probably didn’t matter that we weren’t brilliantly trained, straight off the gravel of the Forecourt of Buckingham Palace. At the last conference down at Alder shot, Field Marshal Bramall came to give us words of encouragement and I asked him point-blank whether we were to be the garrison and, of course, wily old bird, he denied it. Naturally, I made absolutely no mention of my concerns to the Battalion. As far as they were concerned, they were going to get stuck in.
The HQ and Signals Squadron (Major Mike Forge) had the mammoth task of converting the Brigade from the Larkspur range of radios to Clansman, no mean task when some equipment never arrived, in particular drums of cables that enabled users to operate remotely from their radios. Stationed in Aldershot was 4th Field Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Tony Holt). Had it not been for the persistence of Holt, 5 Infantry Brigade might well have sailed south without artillery. Equipped with 105mm light guns and with 29 (Corunna) Field Battery supporting 2 Para and 88 (Arracan) Field Battery having just returned from Belize, only 97 (Lawson’s Company) Battery was available for deployment. To make up a shortfall of forward observation officers for the three battalions, Major Roger Gwyn, from 49th Field Regiment, and Major Fallon, of 132 (The Bengal Rocket Troop) Field Battery, Support Regiment, Royal Artillery at the School of Artillery, formed a third battery commander and two parties. Neither had ever worked with 5 Infantry Brigade. On 22 April, Holt formed 41 Battery of two Forward Observation Officer teams to support 3 Para. That an artillery regiment went to war with a hotchpotch of organizations must be unusual, as was its inability to train with 5 Infantry Brigade. Holt pointedly mentions that the Brigade was ‘unfamiliar with 4 Field Regiment but with regimental gunnery as a whole, having no precedent for a gunner Tac HQ and its services within the headquarters … The failure to train (with the infantry) was a disadvantage on operations. (4th Field Regiment post-operation report)
9 Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers was commanded by Major Chris Davies RE. 2 Troop with 2 Para was replaced by 20th Field Squadron (Captain David Foxley) as 4 Troop. For light helicopters, 5 Infantry Brigade was usually supported by 658 Squadron, which was below strength. When Lieutenant Colonel Jones asked for an advanced detachment from 656 Squadron – the 1 Infantry Brigade Air Squadron, with whom his Battalion had established a relationship on exercise in Kenya in 1981 – three Scouts were absorbed into 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron. The remainder of 656 Squadron and its Air Maintenance Group were transferred to 5 Infantry Brigade at the expense of 658 Squadron.
Major Lambe encountered entrenched Ministry of Defence bureaucracy when he was offered reversible white/brown winter warfare waterproofs until he reminded the Ministry that with summer approaching in Europe, the United Kingdom Mobile Force would not require their winter warfare clothing for several months. He acquired 4,000 pairs of overboots and consequently no one in 5 Infantry Brigade suffered trench foot, which is more than can be said of 3 Commando Brigade. The Brigade also unearthed several M2 .50 Brownings and 112,000 rounds of Korean War vintage ammunition and then persuaded several Royal Armoured Corps gunnery instructors from the Bovington armoured training school to train the battalions en route to Ascension. When l/7th Gurkha Rifles converted its MT Platoon to a Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, the drivers were delighted until they realized that the machine guns and ammunition had to be carried. Lambe doubled the number of GPMGs per platoon, which allowed the eight-man infantry sections to break down into two ‘fire teams’ each built around one machine gun.
With 5 Infantry Brigade hosting strange units, on the instructions of Lieutenant General Trant, Colonel Dunphie organized the two-week Exercise Welsh Falcon at Sennybridge. The first week honed basic military skills and the second week included a simulated landing with real timings from ‘ships’ (three Welsh barracks) using ‘landing’ craft (lorries) and helicopters (RAF Pumas). 1st Green Howards provided the enemy and casualties were practised, but not prisoners. Unfortunately, an unexpected heat wave wrecked conditioning. The Scots Guards found the exercise very useful. Tac HQ, let alone Main, had not exercised for several years. Lieutenant Colonel Scott:
We did not even have a current set of Standard Operating Procedures. Major Iain Mackay-Dick, the Second-in-Command wrote them overnight. This is no reflection on my predecessor, Johnny Clavering, who was a superb and much loved CO, and the Battalion was brilliant under him in Northern Ireland where the scene was entirely different. I do not think the Battalion had done a set piece night attack on its feet for years. Apart from the armoured version in Germany, my own experience was as a lieutenant in Kenya in 1963! But perhaps that is nothing to be proud of.
Shortly before the traditional final attack, Brigadier Wilson was told by HQ UKLF that his Brigade was to embark for the South Atlantic on 12 May. Exercise Welsh Falcon finished on 29 April with one observer commenting, ‘They’ve a hell of a way to go’, implying the Brigade was not yet ready for combat. If correct, this was hardly surprising – a home defence formation cobbled together with several units new to its order of battle and the first time that Brigadier Wilson had exercised the Brigade. Few British brigades in modern times have been so badly prepared. Blame should not be levelled at Wilson. Returning to barracks, the Brigade received lorries filled with supplies as peacetime constraints on stores issues were lifted on receipt of a telephone call. Several hundred bergens were purchased from Blacks of Reading. Jones then flew to Ascension Island to wait for the Royal Marines while his Battalion embarked on the P&O North Sea ferry MV Norland, which sailed from Portsmouth on 26 April.
