On 2 June, forty Argentine sappers from 2 Section, 601 Combat Engineer Company (Lieutenant Horacio Blanco) blew up Fitzroy Bridge with 80lb of Trotyl. When the smoke cleared, about 40 per cent of the 150-foot bridge had collapsed into Fitzroy Inlet. Destroying the bridge meant a 14-mile march around its head at River Camp.
Reverted back to 5 Infantry Brigade after Goose Green, 2 Para had not been idle. Major Crosland had hatched a plan to telephone Bluff Cove settlement to find out what was happening in the Fitzroy/Bluff Cove area by advancing to Swan Inlet House by helicopter.
Following the briefing at San Carlos, Brigadier Wilson arrived at 2 Para to brief them about his plans to advance along the southern flank. Things did not go well. During an exercise in February, the Battalion had lost confidence in his methods of handling parachute troops and this was further eroded when Wilson arrived wearing a red beret and green Wellington boots, a dress code that offended Parachute Regiment sensitivities. Wilson rejected the Swan Inlet plan and explained that he wanted the Battalion to secure his left flank by picketing the snow-covered Mount Usborne and Wickham Heights. Etiquette cast aside, his proposal drew the response from one company commander, ‘Brigadier, are you pissed?’ When the briefing broke up, Wilson and 2 Para were both angry.
Assured by Major General Moore that his Brigade would have parity with 3 Commando Brigade, Wilson lobbied hard without much success. While 3 Commando Brigade had BV 202s for transporting heavy equipment and for Brigade Headquarters, Wilson’s request for some was rejected. Throughout the campaign, his HQ was either man-packed or relied upon the Royal Navy or helicopters to move its Land Rovers. The Royal Navy had the ability to move 5 Infantry Brigade, however Commodore Clapp’s preference was that the Army brigade should march. With two LCUs supporting the 3 Commando BMA at Teal Inlet, the remaining six were under his command unloading men, equipment and stores at San Carlos. Clapp did not assign any landing craft to Wilson because, quite naturally, he felt that 5 Infantry Brigade lacked amphibious experience and would not use them ‘sensibly’. A Royal Marine officer was attached to the Brigade but he was not supported by an amphibious warfare liaison team.
Determined not to miss the opportunity of attacking Stanley and with everything conspiring against a simple move, Brigadier Wilson reappeared at 2 Para and told Major Keeble to ‘Do it’, referring to the Swan Inlet scheme. Major Crosland alerted 6 Platoon and Colour Sergeant Alan Morris from the Intelligence Section. Captain Greenhalgh arrived with five Scouts, two fitted with SS-11 wire-guided anti-tank missiles. At about 11.00 am, the SS-11 Scouts softened up Swan Inlet. Covered by a para armed with a Sterling submachine gun in both helicopters, the assault helicopters then landed with four men in each. The paras found the settlement uninhabited. Crosland and Morris found a telephone and when Crosland cranked it, twelve-year-old Michelle Binney answered and summoned her father, Ron, the Fitzroy settlement manager. Frost:
Explaining who they were, they asked if there were any enemy in Fitzroy or Bluff Cove; the answer was negative, although the bridge at Fitzroy had been tampered with. ‘We’ll be seeing you shortly,’ said John and rang off. The news was radioed to Major Keeble back at Goose Green: ‘Fleet and Balham are clear.’ (The choice of nickname was fairly typical. John Crosland lived in Fleet, Hampshire and Balham, according to a famous comic monologue is ‘gateway to the south’! (Frost, 2 Para in the Falklands)
When Keeble advised Brigadier Wilson, he abandoned his plan of marching to Fitzroy in preference for a coup de grâce.
Meanwhile, 2 Para greeted a new Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel David Chaundler. Posted to the Ministry of Defence, he was earmarked to take over from Jones, anyway. With little time to prepare and after a long flight from the UK, he parachuted from a C-130 Hercules into the sea near the Carrier Battle Group and was picked up by HMS Penelope. He knew Brigadier Wilson and told him that any difficulties he encountered were his problem. Scrounging a lift in a Sea King to Darwin, he then walked across the Goose Green battlefield to Battalion HQ. Since most had expected Keeble to command for the duration, his arrival was greeted with something of a shock. After being briefed on the Fitzroy and Bluff Cove operation, Chaundler told Keeble to execute it. He would assume command next day.
Helicopters were much in demand. Pressures from the International Committee of the Red Cross meant the surviving Chinook was being used to ferry Goose Green prisoners of war to San Carlos and for most, repatriation. The move of an artillery battery, 100 rounds per gun and gunners required at least forty-five lifts. ‘Cadging lifts’ and ‘informal retasking’ were not unknown and part of the ‘can do, must do’ culture on which the military thrives. With the fear that the telephone conversation with Binney and her father might have been intercepted, the Chinook was ‘retasked’ at Goose Green by A Company HQ and two platoons, B Company HQ and a platoon and Mortar and Anti-Tank Platoons detachments. Two 656 Squadron Scouts took two Patrols Platoon sections to mark out landing sites between Fitzroy and Bluff Cove.
ZA 718 (Flight Lieutenant NJ Grose and Flying officer C Miller) was used to advance men from 2 Para forward from Goose Green. With seats folded against the side, 81 fully-armed paratroops were crammed into the helicopter for its first mission. That was well above the manufacturer’s advertised troop-carrying capability (of forty). The second mission involved 74 fully-armed paratroops and both were conducted in poor visibility with a low cloud base over an area that had not been fully confirmed as clear of enemy troops. (Burden et al., Falklands: The Air War)
However, no one had advised 3 Commando Brigade, or indeed HQ LFFI. Lance Corporal Steve Nicholls was with Lieutenant Murray’s Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre patrol:
Our team was due to be tasked again and we were ready and impatient to be deployed this time watching the area of Fitzroy. The outline tasking was deliberately vague – ‘Watch the road/track for any evidence of troop movement and activity. In particular a large wooden bridge which would be vital to any flanking movement by friendly forces if they were to advance towards Stanley. On arrival, we positioned ourselves on Smoko Mount in a fairly bleak, windswept position but it was the only possible vantage point that offered cover from view and an escape route. Near us was a flagpole, complete with slapping halyards, which helped to confirm where we were in the low and poor visibility on the walk-in. It was also used to elevate the radio antenna. Our main focus of attention was the wooden bridge and the immediate area either side of it. Whenever the mist cleared, we could see the Argentineans scrambling over the struts. It had all the hallmarks of being prepared for demolition and this we reported. By now our routine was much smoother and we continued to work radio schedules, reporting at fixed time but always with the ability to report in if needed. Visibility proved difficult with a wet clinging mist frequently enveloping the position for several hours at a time obscuring the bridge and approaches. We could hear vehicles and voices but it was all routine. As at Teal Inlet, the Argentineans were not alert, no sign of sentries being posted or any attempts to position a fire team on high ground. They did not have the appearance of being particularly well disciplined or tactically aware, nor were they bivvying in the immediate area. Our pattern of life in the OP was dull, damp and uneventful.
The sound of helicopters on 2nd June was unusual, as none had been previously sighted. Mist and low cloud cover prevented us from seeing anything. It then became apparent that there were several helicopters, including the distinctive deep ‘swish, swish’ of the twin rotors of a Chinook. Our intelligence suggested that only one had survived the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor. The activity below us suggested a fairly large troop deployment but without a clear view, we could only guess at their identity. Occasionally the mist lifted for a few seconds and we were able to identify heavily laden troops moving around but never long enough for a positive identification. Calculating co-ordinates for a fire mission on the troops, who were bunched and in the open, I opened up communications in clear seeking confirmation of friendly forces movement to prevent any loss of reporting time. Cadre HQ at Teal Inlet, who were co-located with HQ 3rd Commando Brigade, confirmed there should be no friendly troops to our front. After several questions and answers to confirm details, the fire mission was accepted. We originally planned for a small-scale fire mission but as the size of the target grew, we requested that more guns be made available. The cloud cover continued to mask most of the area to our front but the helicopter activity continued and increasing numbers of troops could be seen out in the open. We received confirmation that the guns were prepared.
29 Commando Regiment accepted Murray’s report and gave the fire mission to 7 (Sphinx) Commando Battery, just 8 miles to the north of the target. In his command post, the Battery Commander, Major David Brown, completed his fire orders and soon everything was ready – guns loaded, range and bearing calculated, Number Ones waiting. Fire mission confirmation was then sought. Nicholls continues:
We were waiting for the executive order of ‘Three rounds fire for effect,’ which would initiate a salvo of three rounds from each gun to target the area. These were zeroing rounds that would be adjusted by us to hit the target. Once the guns were ‘on’ they would commence the full fire mission. The gap between final confirmation and opening fire is usually a very short one. Our checks and controls were complete and delays could allow the target to escape. Precisely at this point the cloud cover opened a ‘window’ and we saw the easily recognized figure of a Scout helicopter with British markings. We knew the Argentines were not equipped with them. It all unfolded in a few very brief seconds, the radio handset was already poised and the command ‘Check, check, check, confirmed sighting of a Scout helicopter’. This was repeated back from the gun lines and the net went instantly silent. It still wasn’t clear if all the activity could be attributed to the British but it was apparent that we had been very close to bringing down fire on our own side.
With Fitzroy Bridge now under British control, Murray’s patrol was extracted. This was essentially the end of Nicholls’ war. Rejoining 45 Commando as a section commander, he returned to the Cadre, in 1984, to complete the Senior Mountain Leader when the BBC filmed the Cadre in Behind the Lines.
A fundamental principle of warfare is always to keep neighbouring units informed of strategies that may affect them. On this occasion, a potentially damaging ‘blue on blue’ had been avoided by a fortunate break in the clammy clouds. Knowing that Major General Moore intended to attack the Outer Defence Zone on 6 June, and under huge pressure to advance, Wilson had taken a huge risk and, so far, his judgement had paid off. It was a bold, if controversial, move. As he later said on television: ‘I’ve grabbed my land in this great jump forward. Now I want to consolidate it.’
Communications between Fitzroy and Goose Green were poor and when the two Scouts returned from dropping the two Patrols Platoon sections, they had exhausted their flying hours. Wilson stepped into the breach and shortly before dark, Corporal Banks and a Signals Platoon rebroadcast team were inserted midway on Wickham Heights in his helicopter. At about the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Chaundler, Major Keeble and B Company were approaching Fitzroy in the Chinook. Chaundler remembers that the RAF loadmaster drew a laugh when he invited everyone to sit down. Frost:
Connor had switched on the strobe light to bring in the helicopter. Once landed, Major Keeble, assuming A Company to have landed correctly at Bluff Cove, ordered the recce party to move to higher ground to establish communications, and this they did. But already the darkness had led to a loss of contact with the B Company group below and Keeble therefore decided that the best course would be to move forward to Fitzroy. Only then did the magnitude of the helicopter pilot’s error become apparent, as the paras realised that they were full 4 kilometres short of the proposed landing site. (Frost, 2 Para in the Falklands)
Connor was Lieutenant Chris Connor, the Recce Platoon Commander. Covered by B Company on the ridge, Connor checked the settlement for enemy. Learning that there were none, Chaundler recalled: ‘We walked forward and had tea with Ron Binney.’
While Mrs Binney was producing tea and cakes, her husband reported that Fitzroy Bridge was damaged. Connor and a patrol were taken by Land Rover and when they estimated that the damage could be repaired, this was passed to Major Chris Davies at 9 Parachute Squadron RE. He and three Signals Section hitched a lift in a Sea King and were taken to the bridge by Tim Dobyn of Bluff Cove:
The Argies had indeed had a reasonably successful attempt at rupturing the one hundred and fifty metre (or so) bridge, which spanned the cold black water of the western neck of Port Fitzroy inlet. There was a gap of sixty-six feet in the eastern end of the bridge. The wooden decking had gone and of the three wooden loadbearers, one had gone completely and one was broken, although it had dropped only a couple of feet onto the rocky abutment. The third was pitted by the explosion but still spanned the gap providing the precarious tight rope connecting the bridge to the bank. The pair of piles nearest the eastern bank had gone too. I could see that the nearest four pairs of piles had demolition charges attached to them and that an apparently intact detonation cord ring main connected these together and led away to a firing point. In addition, there were a number of mines of a type unknown to me lying amongst the rubble. (Davies, ‘A Memoir of 9 Parachute Squadron RE’)
Alert to booby traps, Davies prodded the ground with his bayonet, cut detonation cables and dragged out mines with cord. The Argentine camp was littered with boxed explosive, mines and loose ammunition. Using 2 Para’s Assault Engineers and several civilians, he dismantled explosive charges and jury-rigged a wobbly footbridge across the gap. Davies then sent a list of material that he needed to 61 Field Support Squadron (Major ‘Taffy’ Morgan) at San Carlos.
When late in the afternoon, Squadron Leader Langworthy strolled into the HMS Fearless Amphibious Operations Room and reported that 2 Para had seized Fitzroy and Bluff Cove, this was received with astonishment because no one was aware that Brigadier Wilson was planning such a coup de main. Wilson then convinced Moore that his initiative should be supported quickly.
Brigadier Wilson ignored advice from Chaundler that an air defence and logistic envelope should be developed around Fitzroy and issued orders that: the Welsh Guards were to defend Bluff Cove; the Scots Guards were to take over from D Company, 2 Para east of Bluff Cove Inlet; and 2 Para was to pull back to Fitzroy as Brigade Reserve. The Brigade would then be ready to move through 3 Commando Brigade in the attack on Stanley on 6 June. The remaining troops would be landed at Fitzroy.
When Major Smith, of T (Shah Shujah’s Troop) Air Defence Battery, was then instructed to send Rapiers to Fitzroy, he had a tactical problem – too few Rapiers. The beachhead still required air defence because of the risk of raids on clear days. I Troop was at Teal Inlet protecting the 3 Commando Brigade Forward Maintenance Area. This left two Troops at San Carlos, however he knew that the Rapier-equipped 63 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment, was due to land. Smith therefore instructed Lieutenant Adrian Waddell, who commanded H Troop, to take a composite Troop from firing units, whose loss could be afforded. Bombardier Stewart McMartin’s Rapier positioned above Port San Carlos had experienced a command transmitter fault. The transmitter is the nerve centre into which variables of weather conditions and environment are fed to help the operator align the missile launch pads – without a functioning transmitter, the Rapier cannot be fired. Sergeant Bob Pearson’s unit had also developed a problem. Smith and Waddell agreed to send two fully operational and two malfunctioning Rapiers, in the hope that they could be repaired by a REME technician to accompany the faulty Rapiers. Until the weather cleared, none could be moved anyway.
Next morning, 3 June, the fly-in of the remainder of 2 Para proved to be interesting. C (Patrol) Company was delivered to Fitzroy instead of Bluff Cove and D Company was flown to their position on the eastern shores of Bluff Cove creek in full view of Mount Harriet and 2 miles from their intended position. Eventually, the Battalion sorted themselves with: A Company defending Bluff Cove; B Company on Fitzroy Ridge to the north of the settlement; C Company covering the approaches from the north-east; and D Company across Bluff Cove Inlet to deal with any approaches directly from the east. Battalion HQ was at Fitzroy. Bergens and supplies would not arrive for two days because of bad weather.
The Kilmartins at Bluff Cove did much to rejuvenate the weary paras with hot meals, somewhere to dry socks and transport to move equipment. Nine Polish seamen, who had defected from their ship in February and had made their way to Fitzroy, were conscripted as labourers. Those British who came into contact with the civilians in the ‘camp’ are unlikely to forget their loyalty to the Crown and generosity in raising spirits. Their contribution to the campaign was significant.
Meanwhile, 5 Infantry Brigade was approaching San Carlos Water. Stopping briefly at Sierra Leone, the Queen Elizabeth II had circled Ascension on 21 May taking on stores and then rendezvoused with HMS Antrim to transfer Major General Moore and Brigadier Wilson and their staff before anchoring off Grytviken on 27 May. There followed a lengthy process to cross-deck the Brigade onto the Canberra and Norland. Staff Sergeant Andy Peck, of 81 Intelligence Section, wrote:
The actual cross decking was very confusing; chaotic, boring and proved the old adage ‘Hurry up and wait’. Corporal Ramsey and myself spent nearly three hours sitting on the deck of a trawler getting very cold, as Canberra could not load troops fast enough. Once aboard, it was with a real sense of urgency that we practised air attack and abandon ship drills. Sipping soup in the dining room while one’s waiters cheerfully regaled you with tales of Mirages swooping in below bridge height not only gave one indigestion but also dispelled the cruise atmosphere quickly. The weather also decided to let us know what the South Atlantic could produce in the way of waves. Conscious of the fact that I had been booked that week for a cruise to Cherbourg on Gladeye, I took to my bed feeling exceptionally seasick.
Accompanied by Baltic Ferry, the ships anchored not far from the Blue Beaches. Anxiety about air raids meant that within thirteen minutes an LCU was alongside. Supported by four ships’ boats, it was hoped to unload the 3,000 men by the end of the day, which seemed optimistic by any imagination, considering it had taken over twenty-four hours to cross-deck the Brigade at Grytviken. This was an administrative landing, in which troops are landed tactically on secure beaches, nevertheless it took twenty-four hours to empty the two passenger ships. An additional complication was that while some vehicles and stores were being unloaded from the Baltic Ferry, Nordic Ferry was not scheduled to arrive for another day. Some stores never reached their units. 97 (Lawson’s Company) Field Battery was reliant upon quadrants and prismatic compasses for several days until the gun sights turned up.
1st Welsh Guards dug in around the general area of Old Horse Paddock, which is about 3 miles south of San Carlos, and found mortar ammunition and rations dumped by 2 Para. The Scots Guards took over positions around San Carlos and l/7th Gurkha Rifles, less D Company, were flown to Goose Green, releasing J Company to rejoin 42 Commando. D Company (Major Mike Kefford) deployed on to Sussex Mountain. Father Alfred Hayes, Roman Catholic chaplain to 5 Infantry Brigade:
Once ashore, the order came from RSM Bill Hunt ‘Gentlemen, dig in or else you will die.’ This spurred us into digging shell scrapes above Blue Beach. I cooked some soup, then went over to the place I thought it best to be, the Field Ambulance. There I encountered difficulties with the CO, who told me that he didn’t want a Chaplain since, in his experience, the sight of a priest at a dying man’s side made the man give up. I said that in my four years as hospital chaplain in a large general hospital before joining the Army, I never had that experience, and had usually found that patients got genuine comfort from the priest.
The Field Ambulance had already upset the 3 Commando Brigade rear echelon by demanding that Hotel Galtieri be handed over, a suggestion which was rejected with two-word soldierly robustness.
2 Para needed to be reinforced, and quickly. The Royal Navy had the experience, organization and resources to execute a sea move, but the will was not always evident. Commodore Clapp: ‘Although anxious to help the soldiers out, I never liked the idea of such a move forward by sea for the men and hoped that it could be avoided. (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands)
He does acknowledge that warfare ‘requires dash and initiative’, nevertheless amphibious operations require coordinated planning. Aware that Fitzroy Bridge had been damaged, he preferred that 5 Infantry Brigade should be ferried to Brenton Cove and then march to Fitzroy and to his great credit, he set about solving the problem. Each time Clapp gave his staff the problem, they came back with the same solution – an assault ship was needed. Clapp signalled Rear Admiral Woodward outlining his intention:
At first light on 6 June, land the Scots Guards and half the Welsh Guards from HMS Intrepid in the Bluff Cove area using her landing craft. The ship had to be back in San Carlos by first light on the 7th.
RFA Sir Tristram to ferry the remainder of the Welsh Guards, the Rapier detachment, the Brigade War Maintenance Reserve and a Mexeflote for the Brigade Forward Maintenance Area to Fitzroy. She would return when empty.
Major Southby-Tailyour offered his expertise:
I had asked if there was anything I could do, to be warned by a member of COMAW’s staff that the two LSLs might be tasked to take the Guards battalions direct to Bluff Cove. This worried me for I knew there were no suitable LSL beaches in the area and so we would have to use LCUs, but with their maximum speed, even when empty, of under ten knots, I was not sure how we would get them forward. If the LCUs went in their mother ships then so could the men, but an LPD could not get close enough to either anchorage due to shallow water. We could load LCVPs as deck cargo and un-ship them at the destination, but whatever we did the whole enterprise would need sea and air protection. (Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing)
Southby-Tailyour suggested that Mexeflotes would be needed. A Mexeflote is a three-part (bow, centre and stern), multi-purpose pontoon specifically designed for salt-water operations and can be used as rafts or joined together to form jetties, causeways and breakwaters. Each Mexeflote has its own specialized diesel engine. During the campaign, 17 Port Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, operated them. Landing craft could either be taken in an assault ship or sail independently, which over a long distance was out of the question.
Although the flank had not been cleared of enemy, Clapp viewed the operation as a sea move. He asked Woodward for two escorts, naval gunfire support and combat air patrols, and wanted to take advantage of the bad weather that was prevailing at the time. There was also good intelligence that the Argentines had a land-based Exocet at Stanley. After the sinking of HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor, the Royal Navy had become preoccupied with Exocet almost to the exclusion of everything else. Clapp himself was not particularly concerned about the threat.
Soon after the attacks on 1 May, the Argentine Navy had decided that an Exocet at Stanley would deter the Royal Navy from bombarding military positions. Since converting a shipboard system would take at least forty-four days and consequently a simple design was needed, a naval engineering officer, Commander Julio Perez, and two civilians were asked to design a solution within ten days. Named the ‘Do-It-Yourself Firing Installation’, their system consisted of a generator and two Exocet launcher ramps removed from two of Argentina’s A-69 corvettes, all mounted on two old wheeled trailers. The manual firing sequence was operated from a box with four telephone switchboard switches, each of which had to be thrown in specific order timed by a stopwatch. Ready in mid-May, an attempt to fly the system to Stanley on 24 May was thwarted by British air activity. Eventually, in early June, the system was landed. With the risk of the Firing Installation becoming bogged in mud, a short stretch of the tarmac road between the town and airport was selected as the firing point. Each night at 6.00 pm, the system was dragged from beneath camouflage netting and placed behind a 16-foot high bunker, ready to be fired from 8.30 pm when British ships tended to begin their bombardments. Air Force Westinghouse radars with the 2nd Air Surveillance and Control Group swept a 60-degree arc to the south of Stanley Common and the Army provided fire control with its AN-TPS 43 system. So far, three Exocets had been launched. The first one proved to be defective and the second was wasted when the transformer was incorrectly fitted and the missile veered to the right, as opposed to the left. The third was more successful when on the night of 27/28 May, a large projectile hurtled across the flight deck of HMS Avenger while she was on the gun line south of Harriet Cove, and out of range of conventional artillery. Suspecting an Exocet system on the Falklands, Rear Admiral Woodward created a 25-mile sanitized zone south of Stanley that no ship was to enter. Four more missiles arrived by C-130 during the night of 5 June.
Rear Admiral Woodward wanted a second Harrier forward operating base at Goose Green so that he could withdraw the Carrier Battle Group further to the east, so concerned was he about the Exocet threat. When the Argentine counter-attack threats against the beachhead emerged, he suggested that San Carlos be emptied of ships, but did not explain how the two Brigades should be supplied. Fortunately, Clapp rejected these suggestions but agreed that as the conventional forces closed on Stanley, Special Forces patrols should monitor Port Howard and Fox Bay.
The most pressing issue for HQ LFFI was to organize logistics to support both brigades. 3 Commando Brigade, in the rugged mountains to the north, were probing Argentine defences, however the urgency to reinforce 2 Para resulted in its helicopter support being diverted to 5 Infantry Brigade. The Brigade suddenly found itself starved of warm clothing, regular rations and fresh water. Some troops were without their bergens for nearly five days in temperatures that dropped to -11 degrees. Combat effectiveness decreased as sickness rates from exposure and hypothermia crept up, even among those familiar with the cold of Norway.
Even though 5 Infantry Brigade was ashore, it still needed to sort itself out for the first time after leaving UK. A Light Gun from 29 (Corunna) Battery, the Command Post and seventy gunners was flown to Bluff Cove, but when the only Chinook was diverted to another task, the gun was left without ammunition for two days. The Command Post could do absolutely nothing about several fire missions it received. On 5 June, the rest of the Battery arrived and was soon registering targets identified by D Company.
Assured that his Brigade would be ferried to Bluff Cove, Brigadier Wilson issued instructions on 3 June that the Scots Guards were to embark on HMS Fearless on 4 June. Lieutenant Colonel Rickett:
We were all extremely frustrated being in San Carlos. I remember meeting Tony Wilson, our Brigade Commander, with Mike Scott and one or two members of the Brigade HQ staff the morning after we had landed. There were no available ‘assets’ to be given to the Brigade as the Commando Brigade were on their positions in the mountains and were preparing for the build-up for the next phase the taking of the Mount Harriet/Two Sisters line. The only way we could get anything was by ‘pirating’ the odd passing helicopter to give us a lift. I suggested to Tony Wilson that the best way for us to get out of San Carlos was by walking and I volunteered to get things going by leading off with my battalion towards Darwin where Brigade HQ Tactical now was; thence we would march on from there towards Bluff Cove or ‘to the front’ wherever we were required. Tony Wilson agreed instantly and I asked if my Recce Platoon could be lifted forward ahead of us to be my eyes and ears; this was also agreed and helicopters would lift them forward but short of Darwin/Goose Green at last light. He also said that he would do his best to get us some Snocats, which was all he had at his disposal, to take our mortars, Browning machine-guns, ammunition and bergens. Notwithstanding this I tasked my 2ic to beg, borrow or steal some sort of tractor lift from the settlement at San Carlos, as I was not sanguine that we would get any Snocat lift.
At last light our Scout helicopters arrived and took off with Recce Platoon. We waited, in vain, for the promised Snocat and then set off with our 81mm mortars, Milans and ammo loaded on a light tractor and farm trailer. We carried our heavy Browning Medium Machine Guns. About an hour after our departure the Snocats appeared from the direction of Darwin, empty of fuel and unclear of what they were meant to be doing. It was immediately apparent that these vehicles would ‘bulk out’ in any case – there simply wasn’t space for our equipment. So I decided to press on. Morale was high and, providing the tractor kept going, I was confident we could get across the Sussex Mountains and marry up with the Recce Platoon. The tractor, which was a small wheel based one, immediately bogged down piling the mortars and ammo into the mud. We dug it out once, twice, three times but by this time I realized that to carry on in this way was hopeless. We waited in vain for the sound of any returning Snocats but to no avail. I had two choices – either we could continue on light scales, but bearing in mind we were to march to the Bluff Cove area, not just to Darwin, or we could return to San Carlos and wait for some other means to get us forward. I wasn’t prepared to fight a war without my mortars and other heavy weapons and with the chaos reigning around us I wasn’t prepared to be separated from our equipment. After all it had been my idea to move under our own steam self-contained, now it was the turn of somebody else to give us the support we required to get us forward.
So, extremely tired with morale now on the low side, we returned to our foul area in San Carlos ready to start again the next day but this time with proper support. At first light somehow I managed to ‘pirate’ a helicopter to take me to Brigade HQ at Darwin where I reported our position and demanded some means of support to get the battalion into line. After a while I was told that the battalion would be taken round by ship.
By this time I was getting extremely anxious about my Recce Platoon as we had heard nothing from them and I asked for a helicopter to search for them and make contact. Sharing a helicopter with Captain Tim Spicer, Operations Officer of the Scots Guards, who wanted to go forward to recce Bluff Cove as 2 Para had made their great leap forward by then, we set off. We searched in vain for the Recce Platoon but had to go on to Bluff Cove, as fuel was getting tight, which was highly frustrating for me as I was extremely worried about them. Eventually returning to San Carlos I learnt with great relief that the Recce Platoon had made contact with Brigade HQ and was safe.
So far, there had been no reaction from the Argentines. The Special Forces Group had been defeated on Mount Kent and with Army Group, Malvinas still expecting 5 Infantry Brigade to land at or near Stanley, the strong 10 Infantry Brigade was waiting for something that would not happen. To prepare for the move, Commodore Clapp instructed the SBS and a diving team from 1 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron (Captain Richard Willet) to select Yellow Beaches at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. While the SBS would check gradients and beach composition, the Royal Engineers would check for mines and assess the suitability of the beachhead to support a military force. Lieutenant Commander Chris Meatyard, a mine clearance diving officer, joined the recce. Until they reported, Clapp could not advise ships’ captains where to anchor. When the team flew to Port Pleasant during the night of 4/5 June, Major Davies met Willet and instructed him to assemble his Troop and repair Fitzroy Bridge. Meanwhile, Major Morgan had received Davies’s request for supplies and his sappers were scavenging ships and supply dumps for welding gear, bags of nails, timber and rolled steel joints, all of which were loaded on LSL Sir Tristram.
5 Infantry Brigade was still marrying equipment to units and concerns emerged about the time it was taking to sort itself out. While Rear Admiral Woodward worried about the seaworthiness of his ships after two months at sea, Major General Moore wanted to attack Stanley by the 6th, and 3 Commando Brigade was ready. Commodore Clapp admitted that he failed to appreciate the lack of amphibious operations understanding by the Army Brigade, and some naval officers did not appreciate that in land warfare supplies need to be stockpiled before an attack. When the Welsh Guards aborted their march and Woodward suggested that they try again, it shows just how isolated those on board the ships were from reality. The Royal Navy had forgotten that their traditional role is to support the ground forces and were slow to react to Wilson’s initiative, taking four days before the first ship left San Carlos. Half the problem was that the Royal Navy was inexperienced in amphibious warfare, a far cry from the Second World War. Several suggestions also hindered implementing the plan. Clapp received a signal from Woodward suggesting ‘more robust plan might be to move the troops forward by foot/helo and provide logistic support by one/two relatively inconspicuous LSLs at Teal.’
Clapp put the suggestion down to a communication problem between colleagues separated by miles of turbulent ocean. Admiral Fieldhouse, co-incidentally, then suggested that the Guards be landed at Teal Inlet and not Bluff Cove, citing the risks from the Argentine 155mm artillery, the air threat and sea-mines outweighing the likelihood of success. This still did not solve the isolation of 2 Para. Major General Moore and Commodore Clapp jointly signalled Northwood emphasizing that the sea move from San Carlos to the Port Pleasant sector was the only option and then tasked their staffs to plan that: ‘Intrepid should sail east at dusk, launch her LCUs in two waves with a battalion in each wave, straight into Fitzroy. This would ensure that she would only be at sea and away from San Carlos in the dark’ (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands).
On 5 June, Brigadier Wilson selected D Company, l/7th Gurkha Rifles (Major Mike Kefford) to be his Brigade Patrol Company and instructed Kefford to seek out an artillery and radar unit thought to be somewhere in the Port Harriet area. Instructed to march to Darwin to be ferried to Fitzroy, the Gurkhas shouldered their loads. Twenty miles and thirty hours later, after an extremely difficult march, D Company was dug in north of Goose Green when they received orders to be ferried to Fitzroy on the Monsunen.
The Argentine forces had seized the 230-ton Falkland Islands Company coaster MV Monsunen, after finding it abandoned off Lively Island, and used her to ferry supplies. Beached near Goose Green after being attacked by HMS Yarmouth on 23 May, she was refloated by a HMS Fearless party with the help of 23-year-old Janet MacLeod, a local diver. Although Major Robert Satchell, Wilson’s senior Engineer Staff Officer, was placed in charge of her, Commodore Clapp did not relish the Brigade operating its own fleet. He therefore appointed Lieutenant Ian McLaren and three ratings from HMS Fearless to crew it as Naval Party 2160, with instructions that it was to sail only at night and requests from 5 Infantry Brigade were to be confirmed with his staff. While 3 Commando Brigade had the 1st Royal Marine Raiding Squadron, 5 Infantry Brigade was denied dedicated maritime resources. As a member of 97 (Lawson’s Company) Field Battery commented: ‘It seemed that nobody was really concerned with helping blue berets. After all, we were trespassing on an operation to maintain the mobility of the Red and Green berets’ (‘4th Field Regiment in the Falkland Islands’).
During the afternoon, the SBS/Royal Engineer beach recce reported to Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Wilson that they had not found any obstacles at Bluff Cove and that two beaches, Yellow Beach One and Two, were suitable for landing craft operations. Major Davies disagreed:
Quite apart from it being clearly in view of the Argentine high ground, there was insufficient cover and the meagre freshwater supply would never have supported the large number of men associated with such a set up. I pointed all this out to the SBS Patrol commander but, clearly, his horizons were limited to swimming and beach gradients and he had no comprehension of the basic needs of a ‘campsite’. I told him he must not recommend Bluff Cove as the BMA but he went ahead. I put the facts to the Brigadier and managed to convince him that Fitzroy was a much better location. It had more water and there were larger sheep sheds and other buildings that could provide some shelter. The weather, and its effect upon the troops, was of increasing concern. It was cold and windy all of the time. For the most part, it was wet too. (Davies, ‘A Memoir of 9 Parachute Squadron RE’)
Wilson agreed. Commodore Clapp then instructed Colonel Ian Baxter, Moore’s senior logistics officer, to order the two Guards battalions to embark on HMS Intrepid. Captain Robin Green, captain of Sir Tristram, was given confirmatory orders to load Lieutenant Waddell’s Rapier Troop, however it was trapped by fog. Major Forge had improved communications with Port Pleasant by installing a signals detachment and a defence section, commanded by Corporals Daughtrey and Corporal ‘Dizzy’ Wicken respectively, on to Pleasant Peak.
The final plans were being firmed up when, late in the afternoon, Admiral Fieldhouse instructed that the two LPDs were not to be risked out of San Carlos in daylight, in case their loss would force the Government to negotiate for a ceasefire. The cynic might suggest that since Fieldhouse and Woodward had been unable to persuade Moore and Clapp to land 5 Infantry Brigade at Teal Inlet, the two assault ships, which are designed to deliver troops to enemy beaches, were now politically sensitive. They had not been so at San Carlos. The recipients were nonplussed. It seems that the War Cabinet were again meddling in military affairs and someone was remarkably defeatist. The British had seized the initiative from Argentine forces simply waiting to be attacked. And now, Britain’s resolve was being tested by risking an assault ship in a landing. Clapp:
At 16.45 that afternoon I signalled back that while I recognised the political views over the LPDs, the less-than-satisfactory and more time-expensive alternatives would be to use at least one, and preferably, two ‘expendable’ LSLs to which Admiral Fieldhouse replied that that would not be vetoed by politicians. He ended his signal with the words, ‘The man on the spot must decide.’ As ‘that man’, I decided to send two LPDs totally in the dark and over two nights, but an LSL would be needed and it would have to stay in daylight. (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands)
The plan:
HMS Intrepid (Captain Peter Dingemans) to land the Scots Guards at Bluff Cove during the night 6/7 June.
Leave the LCUs at a forward operating base at Bluff Cove.
The Rapiers and other essential stores and equipment to be delivered to Fitzroy by LSL and unload, even if that meant in daylight.
Landing craft to meet HMS Fearless during the night of 7/8 June and land the Welsh Guards at Fitzroy.
Sending a frigate to protect the beachhead was rejected in case it provoked the Argentines, even though its absence would give less firepower and warning of air attack. Until the Rapiers landed, the ground forces would be vulnerable to air attack. While San Carlos Water had been heavily protected since 21 May, the same resources were again not being made available to 5 Infantry Brigade. Clapp:
I knew that Peter Dingemans held the view that the LPD was a major war vessel and, as such, carried the same political weight as an aircraft carrier. During my briefing for his night’s task he had challenged me with the opinion that an LPD was too high risk to lose. I had gone through all the arguments many times with Jeremy’s and my own staff and the only risks I knew of were two enemy patrol craft (one was beached and the other holed up in Stanley), mines (which would affect the LCUs and LSLs not the Lids, which could stand offshore) and the weather suddenly changing for the better (not the forecast), if he was still at sea in daylight (unlikely). (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands)
Brigadier Wilson’s plans were again thrown into disarray. For a commander under continual pressure to ‘get on with it’, here was yet another obstacle not of his making. For the Welsh Guards, it was order, counter order, disorder! Orders were sent to them to return to their soggy trenches. Commodore Clapp continued to receive several conflicting signals from Rear Admiral Woodward and Northwood, most of which he filed in the wastepaper basket. Woodward suggested that all six LSLs be filled with troops to land in Stanley Harbour; this was sent on a low classification. When its content became known, LSL morale wavered.
Major Southby-Tailyour, still under the impression that landing craft would take the two Guards battalions from San Carlos to Canberra Beach for their march to Fitzroy, was summoned to HMS Fearless:
I was anxious to be involved in any operation that took me away from San Carlos, which was fast becoming a mere maintenance and stores area. I was not the only one interested who wanted to put San Carlos behind them. 5 Brigade, for rather more relevant reasons, was anxious to get on the move, and any distance that I could take them by landing craft would be a bonus. I braced myself for the inevitable teasing as I entered the Staff Planning Office (The Chapel), after which the officers warned me that they were now looking again at the Canberra Beach option. (Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing)
He was instructed to transfer to HMS Intrepid and, using the warship’s four LCUs, to take the Scots Guards from a drop-off point near Elephant Island to Bluff Cove. Elephant Island was just outside the ‘Exocet’ perimeter. He was then to wait until the next night, 6/7 June, when he was to rendezvous with HMS Fearless and land the Welsh Guards at Fitzroy. Southby-Tailyour commented that since the landing craft were not designed for long open sea voyages, he would still prefer to take the infantry to the upper reaches of Brenton Loch, from where they could march to Fitzroy. Southby-Tailyour returned to his headquarters. Captain Dingemans was placed in command of the operation and given the destroyer HMS Penelope.
Woodward was still expecting 3 Commando Brigade to attack Stanley during the night 5/6 June and assigned the destroyers HMS Cardiff (Captain Michael Harris) and HMS Yarmouth (Captain Tony Morton) and two frigates, HMS Active and HMS Arrow to support the assault. However, when it became clear that 5 Infantry Brigade was not ready and Major General Moore had postponed the attack until the 9th, Woodward, recalling the two frigates, left the two destroyers to ambush aircraft blockade-runners using Wickham Heights as a way finder to Stanley. He also assured Clapp that he would not have any ships operating in the area where HMS Intrepid would be operating. Clapp:
One snippet I did learn from Sandy that day was that he was withdrawing HMS Hermes further to the east for a routine boiler clean. While it was not my place to comment, I did think it was a strange time to remove the largest ‘airfield’ we had in the war at such a critical time. He must have appreciated how badly we would need close air support and CAP over the next few days if the cloud-base lifted. He was possibly, quite simply, taking no chances on a longer term view. (Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands)
Clapp is too generous. He was equal in authority to Woodward and was entitled to challenge such a critical decision. If the weather cleared, there would now be less combat air patrols during the move, except for the Harriers using ‘Sid’s Strip’. During the day, Captain Greenhalgh flew over the many islands east of Bluff Cove, searching for Exocet traps without success, while a Gurkha patrol checked Lively Island. HMS Avenger was ordered to bombard Fox Bay and then investigate the steep-sided and narrow Albemarle Harbour as a suitable bolthole for ships caught in the open in daylight. Clapp:
This caused a small eruption. Sandy signalled that ships should not use it. This was the first and only occasion when he countermanded my orders. I did not agree with him and he had not consulted with me. It was clearly better for the LSLs to know that I was concerned for them and if they had to use it, then I would probably have the time to place a frigate to cork the bottle and provide some protection. I decided to quietly ignore Sandy’s signal. I was in control of this area and would accept the consequences.