On 7 June, when Brigadier Thompson had informed Major General Moore that 3 Commando Brigade was in a position to attack Stanley during the night 8/9 June, differences in strategy began to emerge with Brigadier Wilson favouring a narrow front javelin strike along the Fitzroy to Stanley track south of Mount Harriet followed by a divisional breakout onto Stanley Common. This view was hardly surprising considering that his Brigade was being forced into a narrow frontage attack by Wickham Heights on his left and the sea on the right flank. Thompson, not unnaturally, favoured the broad front, including seizing the strategically important Mount Longdon, which dominated the ground north and south of Stanley Harbour. Both men were on board HMS Fearless at San Carlos when they learnt of the attack on the two LSLs and the conference broke up.
By 9 June, Major General Moore was confident that Brigadier Thompson could handle a three-battalion Brigade attack; however, with the attack on Port Pleasant, he was unsure about Brigadier Wilson’s ability to fight any more than on a single-battalion frontage, particularly as the Welsh Guards had been decimated. Since 3 Commando Brigade had completed their recces and battle preparations, Thompson’s option was adopted with the attack rescheduled for 10/11 June. There was some urgency because the health of 3 Commando Brigade was causing concerns. Moore issued his Operational Order for a three-phase attack on Stanley:
3 Commando Brigade to attack Two Sisters and Mount Harriet with the option of attacking Mount Longdon.
5 Infantry Brigade to attack Tumbledown Mountain and Mount William.
Secure Sapper Hill.
Next day, Brigadier Thompson summoned his commanding officers to Brigade HQ on Mount Kent and issued his orders for Phase One on the basis that if the Argentines folded, the momentum of the attack must be maintained:
3 Para to seize Mount Lorigdon and exploit to Wireless Ridge. Thompson had included Mount Longdon in May because he could not afford to be outflanked by a counter-attack or be subjected to enfilading fire. Mount Longdon was defended by 287 men from B Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, marine infantry and army engineers commanded by Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores, the 7th Infantry Regimental Operations Officer. The Argentines had been on Mount Longdon since April and had a defence based on a series of bunkers.
45 Commando to attack Two Sisters and exploit to Mount Tumbledown and Mount William. Two Sisters was held by about 200 men from C Company, 4th Infantry Regiment and two sections commanded by Major Ricardo Cordon, the Regimental Operations Officer. In support was B Company, 6th Infantry Regiment.
42 Commando, with the Welsh Guards in reserve, to attack Mount Harriet and be prepared to support 45 Commando on its drive to Mount Tumbledown. The feature was a formidable fortress defended by B Company, 4th Infantry Regiment and sections from the 1st Cavalry Regiment, 3 Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon and a platoon from Combat Team Solari. In command was Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Soria. On Goat Ridge was a platoon from A Company, the rest of this company being with the reserve.
2 Para, having reverted to 3 Commando Brigade, was in reserve for the attacks on Mount Longdon and Two Sisters. Lieutenant Colonel Vaux was unhappy about the Welsh Guards securing his start line because he did not know them and they did not know the ground. This seems to have been a political decision imposed on Thompson by HQ LFFI and consequently Vaux had no alternative but to agree. He despatched Lieutenant Tony Allen RM to be his liaison officer. To replace the two companies shattered on Sir Galahad, the Welsh Guards were joined by A (Captain Sean Cusack) Company and C (Captain Andy Pillar) Company from 40 Commando. Lieutenant Colonel Rickett:
Their companies were very well trained. However I had to make sure that everything was carefully spelt out to avoid any unnecessary misunderstandings; I couldn’t afford to take any short cuts in my orders or instructions which I could have done with my own Company Commanders who were totally in my mind.
The Battalion was also joined by 1 Troop, 59 Independent Commando Squadron RE (Lieutenant Robert Hendicott), who were impressed by the welcome – they were rationed, issued signals instructions and generally properly looked after. The arrival of the RFA Engadine at San Carlos on 9 June with four helicopters gave much-needed support helicopter reinforcement. When Murrell Bridge collapsed, 1 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron RE at Fitzroy built an airportable bridge and Staff Sergeant ‘Yorkie’ Strickland, who had spent two years at the Joint Air Transport Establishment devising methods of delivering loads, convinced the Chinook pilot that it would be alright ‘if you take it steady!’ Precariously flown to the site, the bridge was gingerly guided into position by commando sappers. (When Major Davies tried the same trick in Scotland a year later, a strap broke, the Chinook nearly crashed and the bridge disappeared into the middle of a wood.)
Brigadier Wilson held his Orders Group at Fitzroy beginning, ‘Well, we have suffered some setbacks …’ Major Davies:
Brian Hanrahan and his team filmed the beginning for the BBC. The whole scene was a little unreal. In some ways the mechanics of what was happening were very much like those hundreds of exercises we had all done before. I suppose we were grateful for such mechanics. They do help to suppress the feeling of nausea which might otherwise prevent effective action in the fearful business of war. (Davies, ‘A Memoir of 9 Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers’)
When the journalists left, Wilson emphasized that 5 Infantry Brigade must be ready to move through 3 Commando Brigade for Phase Two. By now, key officers in Brigade HQ agreed that 2nd Scots Guards were best prepared to lead the attack. It was unfortunate that the Welsh Guards had lost over half a Battalion and, although now reinforced, were not in a fit state to lead the attack. There was a feeling that l/7th Gurkha Rifles was the strongest battalion and better placed to break out onto Stanley Common. The plan:
The Scots Guards, reinforced by D Company, l/7th Gurkha Rifles, to provide right-flank protection for the 42 Commando assault on Mount Harriet.
l/7th Gurkha Rifles to patrol aggressively against Tumbledown and Mount William in the hope that the defenders, 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, would surrender. If the features did not fall, the Scots Guards and the Gurkhas to attack Tumbledown and Mount William in a coordinated daylight operation by dawn on the 14th. This would involve a long uphill assault from the predicted direction through a minefield and across ground that had not been reconnoitred.
Once the two features were secure, the Welsh Guards would seize Sapper Hill to support the Gurkhas’ breakout onto Stanley Common.
At a planning conference at his headquarters at Bluff Cove, when Lieutenant Colonel Scott asked Lieutenant Peter McManners RE, whose 3 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron RE was supporting the Scots Guards, how long it would take to breach the minefield, McManners replied, ‘All night’. Major Bethell suggested that if there was a delay, both battalions could hit their objectives piecemeal and in daylight. Scott then developed an alternative plan for Phase Two, to attack from Mount Harriet and Goat Ridge. This axis would not be expected by the Argentines and would allow the attack to be mounted from a secure base supported by 42 and 45 Commandos across ground that could be viewed. Brigadier Wilson agreed with Scott’s proposals. Scott then terminated Operation Impunity, which was carried out under fire and resulted in several casualties.
Early next day, 10 June, when Brigadier Wilson pushed D Company, l/7th Gurkha Rifles forward to Mount Challenger to establish a patrol base against Mount William, it was accurately shelled, causing four wounded. Meanwhile, the rest of the Battalion moved into positions ahead of 1st Welsh Guards, which nearly resulted in a clash because of poor radio communications and lack of unit co-ordination.
Meanwhile, the Argentines had drawn up plans to disrupt British operations in Operation Buzon (Mailbox). The idea was for 5th Infantry Regiment to land and seize San Carlos supported by 8th Infantry Regiment approaching from Goose Green. The 4th Airborne Infantry Brigade, 603 Commando Company and 1st Amphibious Commando would then be delivered to San Carlos and advance to the east. Marine Corps Major Raul Cufre, of the Tactical Divers, had devised Plan SZE-21 to install 601 and 602 Commando Companies, the 601 Border Guard Special Forces Squadron and a 1st General San Martin Cavalry Regiment squadron behind British lines to link up with the 4th Airborne Brigade. However, the Argentines did not have air superiority to ensure protection for the parachute drop and British attrition on helicopters undermined Cufre’s plan. These plans, and the inability of the RAF to destroy the Stanley Airport runway to prevent Pucaras attacking British positions, led Major General Moore to ask Rear Admiral Woodward to keep aircraft on stand-by to support the attack.
Moore was forced to cancel the attack until the following night, 11/12 June, when it became apparent 5 Infantry Brigade was still not ready. Another reason was logistics, in particular a lack of artillery ammunition. The commanding officers of 4th Field and 29 Commando Regiments both wanted 1,000 rounds per gun, however, adding 700 rounds to the existing 300 shells dumped with each of the thirty light guns would mean four days of flying. Poor weather could extend this into a week. Moore decided that each gun would have 500 rounds. Throughout the 11th, the two brigades prepared for the battle. Early in the day, a Wessex 5 flying from Teal Inlet attacked Stanley Town Hall and the Police Station with an AS-12. Later, four Sea Harriers tossed twelve bombs on to Stanley Airport but still the Pucaras were able to take off. As night fell, 3 Commando Brigade stirred.
Lieutenant Colonel Pike’s plan for 3 Para was restricted by the Argentine occupation of Wireless Ridge, a large minefield to the south protecting the approaches to Stanley from the west and the narrowness of the ridge which was just wide enough for one infantry company. His aim was take advantage of every opportunity and exploit as far east as possible:
A Company to seize the ridge north-east of the western summit (‘Wing Forward’). This was defended by 2nd Platoon (First Sergeant Gonzalez).
B Company to clear the northern slopes of a suspected company position, in fact 1st Platoon (Lieutenant Baldini), and capture the two summits ‘Fly Half’ and ‘Full Back’.
C Company in reserve and available to exploit to Wireless Ridge.
On priority call was HMS Avenger and 79 (Kirkee) Commando Battery. The sogginess of the terrain meant that gun detachments usually had to dig their guns out after twenty rounds and readjust. Each company had a GPMG support group formed from Wombat Platoon, whose anti-tank weapons were still afloat. D (Support) Company provided two fire bases. The Manpack Group (Major Dennison) consisted of six GPMG(SF) and an LMG manned by Drums Platoon, five Milan posts and eighteen stretcher-bearers from the Army Catering Corps, REME, RAPC, RCT and mess staff doubling up as ammunition porters, each carrying the not inconsiderable weight of 600 rounds of link ammunition, and the primary battalion-manned RAP. The Vehicle Group consisted of five BVs, three requisitioned tractors and trailers and four civilian Land Rovers carrying the Mortar Platoon, one Milan post, the secondary RAMC-manned RAP, 3 Section, 9 Parachute Squadron RE, and a 32nd Guided Weapon Regiment Blowpipe section.
The Battalion left their positions in the general area of Mount Kent as night fell. The Manpack Group sliced through B Company while half of 5 and all of 6 Platoons became separated from the main column for about half an hour. There was then a delay in crossing the airportable bridge over the Murrell River, which was also being used by 45 Commando for its attack on Two Sisters. B Company (Major Mike Argue) approached the start line (‘Free Kick’) behind time. To ensure that B Company crossed at H-Hour at 8.01 pm, he changed direction to approach Free Kick from the west, as opposed to the north-west.
On Mount Longdon, the platoons had nothing to report, which was unusual after a period of intense activity, and although Major Carrizo-Salvadores ordered extra vigilance, he told Sergeant Nista to switch off the Rasit ground radar, in case it was detected by British electronic warfare. At 8.15 pm 3 Para crossed Free Kick. Covered by the Manpack Group, by 9.15 pm B Company had advanced 500 yards and was in shadow below Baldini’s position. 6 Platoon (Lieutenant Jonathan Shaw) angled to the south-east to clear the southern slopes of Fly Half of 3rd Platoon (Lieutenant Neirotti). As the Company climbed, 5 Platoon (Lieutenant Mark Cox) found room to manoeuvre among the crags, however below them 4 Platoon (Lieutenant Ian Bickerdike) was being channelled into rocks. At about 9.30 pm, the silence was shattered when Corporal Ian Milne, a 4 Platoon section commander, stepped on a mine. Surprise lost, the attack went ‘noisy’ as B Company, supported by 79 (Kirkee) Commando Battery shelling Argentine positions, advanced up the rocky slope.
Below Fly Half, 6 Platoon had encountered stiff resistance from Corporals Geronimo Diaz and Gustavo Pedemonte’s infantry sections, and Corporal Domingo Lamas’s marine machine-gunners. When Lieutenant Neirotti and his platoon sergeant were both wounded, Captain Lopez took over 3rd Platoon and gave Shaw’s men a torrid time, made worse when the paras missed a bunker and had to turn back and deal with it. The deeper the Platoon penetrated the Argentine defences, the more difficult the advance became, even when they moved into open ground. 6 Platoon then strayed into the crossfire of a 0.50 Browning firing on 5 Platoon and stopped. With Full Back about 700 yards to the east, Shaw had lost twelve dead and wounded.
Squeezed into narrow rock runs, 5 Platoon was taunted by Argentines swearing American jargon and rolling grenades down the slopes into a feature that became known as Grenade Alley. The swearing and finding dead and wounded marine infantry dressed in camouflaged fatigues led 3 Para to believe that they were facing mercenaries. In fact, 7th Infantry Regiment recruited from a Buenos Aires suburb where the reservists adopted American phraseology after watching American films. The paras’ tactical formation broke up as individuals and small groups slowly battled up the slopes, forcing their way between Baldini’s platoon and Lama’s marine machine-gunners. 4 Platoon, moving north around Fly Half, drove into Baldini’s right flank and seeped into Gonzalez’s platoon. A machine gun was silenced by Sergeant Ian McKay, the Platoon Sergeant, with 66mm and small-arms fire. When Carrizo-Salvadores saw that Baldini’s situation was serious and then heard that he had been killed, he launched a counter-attack at about midnight with the 45-strong 1st Platoon, 10th Engineer Company (Lieutenant Quiroga) along the spine of the ridge. Meanwhile Platoon Sergeant Rolando Spizuocco had assembled the remnants of 1st Platoon and withdrew to the company defence line near the Command Post.
As B Company battled toward the high ground, the rocky ridges began to give way to moorland. 600 metres to the east, Full Back was silhouetted against the moon. It was about 11.30 pm. Ahead were well-protected Argentine positions on reverse slopes. Every move by 4 Platoon drew withering, accurate fire from a 0.50 Browning machine gun in a bunker manned by 2nd Platoon. The Argentines taunted the paras, ‘Hey! Amigo!’ followed by a burst of fire. It had to be silenced. When Lieutenant Bickerdike and his signaller, Private Cullen, were both wounded as they sprinted from a shallow depression to recce the position, Bickerdike shouted, ‘Sergeant McKay! It’s your Platoon now!’ The next natural bound was just 35 metres, but miles under fire. Shouting for covering fire from Corporal Ian Bailey’s section, McKay, Bailey and Privates Burt and Jones broke cover straight into a hail of fire that killed Burt and wounded Jones. The three survivors attacked another position and then Bailey was wounded. He described McKay ‘going on to the next position but there was no one else with him. The last I saw of him, he was going on running towards the remaining positions in that group.’ (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
A short time later the troublesome 0.50 Browning ceased firing. McKay’s lone attack weakened the Argentine defence and he was later awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for an act of gallantry that turned the battle in favour of 3 Para.
Meanwhile, A Company (Major David Collett) had almost reached the top of the northern slopes to attack Wing Forward, but when the mine exploded, they came under fire from First Sergeant Gonzalez’s platoon. At about 1.25 am, with the Company unlikely to make progress, Lieutenant Colonel Pike ordered Collett to move around to the west of Mount Longdon, pass through B Company and seize Full Back. As the Company passed close to where Corporal Milne was still being treated, three soldiers from 2 Platoon helping him into a BV were wounded by another mine.
At Brigade HQ, Brigadier Thompson was concerned that 3 Para had been brought to a virtual standstill and dispatched a guide from D (Patrol) Company to bring up 2 Para as reinforcements. Pike had reported that there was fierce resistance on the feature and it was difficult to pinpoint the exact locations of the enemy among the rocks.
Messages then arrived indicating that the Battalion was on the move again. When Major Argue, who was close behind 5 Platoon, heard that 4 Platoon had lost both its senior commanders, he sent Sergeant Des Fuller to take command. Sergeant Fuller:
I talked to Lt Bickerdike and called all the section commanders together. With covering fire from Cpl McLaughlin’s section, 4 and 5 Platoons skirmished forward together. Some enemy positions were still discovered and several men were wounded moving forward. It was clear that some positions had been deserted. As we continued up the slope from position to position, enemy grenades exploded but fortunately not effectively. Cpl McLaughlin passed through us and reached a good forward position near the top of the hill. I passed the rest of 4 Platoon through to his position. Mr Cox then met up with me and I asked him to take over from Cpl McLaughlin at the top, which he did … Sergeant-Major Weekes appeared telling us to withdraw the casualties and evacuate this area which was about to be shelled. (3 Para Post Operation Report)
At about 2.00 am, the Manpack Group joined 6 Platoon and the stretcher-bearers evacuated some casualties from the primary RAP established by Colour Sergeant Brian Faulkner in the shelter of Grenade Alley. Within fifteen minutes of the first contact, Captain Burgess, the Regimental Medical Officer, was treating the first casualties. One stretcher-bearer recalled: ‘I didn’t have enough guys and because there were so many casualties it meant a number of trips. I remember taking one young lad out. I’ll never forget him. He was alive when I carried him but he died in my arms. It was his eighteenth birthday.’
During the night the medics dealt with 48 British and 5 Argentines, with 20 evacuated before first light. The lack of natural protection from the shelling made life difficult, and twice, when counter-attacks threatened, Faulkner deployed men fit enough to defend the RAP. The wounded were evacuated to the RAMC-manned RAP a mile west of Murrell Bridge by BVs, which could take two stretchers or seven walking wounded. 3 Para would comment on the inadequacy of the plastic lightweight stretcher, but favourably on the high standard of first aid.
By 1.30 am, Major Carrizo-Salvadores knew that he was losing the battle. He had not heard from Gonzales for some time and the British had seized the western summit. Communications with Lieutenant Colonel Gimenez on Wireless Ridge had been lost, however he relayed messages to him through Army Group, Stanley. When he asked for reinforcements, he heard Gimenez being instructed to send snipers. At about 11.00 pm, First Lieutenant Raul Castaneda burst into his Command Post with his reservist 2nd Platoon, C Company, from Wireless Ridge, all from the same Buenos Aires suburb and most equipped with night-vision goggles. After being briefed by Carrizo-Salvadores and with three soldiers from Command Platoon as guides, Castaneda joined First Sergeant Gonzales defending Wing Forward. His men soon gained a reputation for reckless courage and helped Gonzales buy time for Carrizo-Salvadores to organize an orderly withdrawal to the company defence line on Full Back.
After its battering, Major Argue withdrew B Company into cover and reorganized . Leaving 6 Platoon to deal with Neirotti’s platoon, he grouped the beaten-up 4 and 5 Platoons into a composite platoon commanded by Lieutenant Cox and then advanced again against Argentine positions he believed to be weakening. A and C Companies, behind B Company, were under increasingly accurate artillery fire. Lieutenant Colonel Pike then instructed 79 (Kirkee) Commando Battery and HMS Avenger to plaster Wing Forward to keep Gonzales quiet while Cox advanced behind a shifting barrage, using a sheep track as his axis. Cox had hardly advanced 40 metres before his Platoon came under heavy fire from Argentines who emerged from bunkers as the shelling shifted. A particularly troublesome sangar was destroyed by Company HQ and then, confident that the nearest Argentine positions had been overwhelmed, Cox again advanced but came under fire from both flanks, leading to three paras being wounded.
With B Company now at less than 50 per cent strength, Pike instructed A Company to take over the lead. Supported by the suppressive firepower of Manpack Group and with orders that no occupied Argentine positions were to be left in their rear, A Company’s advance was methodical. Meanwhile 79 (Kirkee) Commando Battery had shifted to shelling the positions held by Corporal Lamas’ marine machine-gunners and Sergeant Pedro Lopez’s 120mm Mortar Platoon near Full Back. The Battalion would include in their post-operation report the widely held view that the ’58 pattern fighting order was difficult to fight in, particularly when picks or shovels were attached. Second Lieutenants John Kearton, of 1 Platoon, and Ian Moore, an Australian, of 2 Platoon, told their men to remove their webbing and stuff ammunition, grenades and dressings into their pockets. Noticing that the arcs of fire of two machine guns which had held up B Company left a narrow safe gap between some rocks, A Company squeezed through the rocks. Major Collett:
The lesson from B Company’s advance was to ensure that positions were taken out systematically leaving none behind. Supporting artillery was maintained and on the whole 1 Platoon was crawling forward, the enemy was seen to be withdrawing. 1 Platoon followed 2 Platoon across the open area and both platoons, 1 on the right and 2 on the north began to clear the enemy trenches with bayonets. Once Full Back was secure, 3 Platoon moved forward to the eastern end of Mount Longdon. (3 Para Post Operation Report)
By 5.00 am, Major Carrizo-Salvadores knew that his B Company had been defeated. Ignoring instructions from Brigadier General Jofre to abandon Mount Longdon, and although he knew that more reinforcements from C Company would not be arriving, he was, nevertheless, confident that his company battle group was in sufficiently good order to counter-attack and could rescue men taken prisoner. Earlier in the battle, he had considered negotiating a truce to recover his wounded. However, as the pace of the 3 Para advance quickened, the supporting barrage was stopped and although the Argentines rigorously defended Full Back, A Company seized it at about 6.30 am. Almost the final act of the Argentines was the wounded Corporal Manuel Medina, of Castaneda’s platoon, firing a recoilless rifle along the ridge, killing three of the Manpack Group. Carrizo-Salvadores abandoned his command post when a Milan missile smashed into nearby rocks, and, finally convinced by Jofre to help in the defence of Stanley, called for machine-gun and mortar fire from Sergeant Lucero’s machine-gunners and Major Jaimet’s infantry on Tumbledown. When he led his battered company into Stanley, they mustered seventy-eight men, many of them sappers, from the 287 with which he had begun the battle.
As 3 Para prepared to face counter-attacks from Wireless Ridge, daybreak brought a damp, heavy mist. 2 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron RE checked the Argentine positions for booby traps and made safe several Cobra missiles. Sergeant McKay was found in the marine machine-gun bunker which had given B Company such a difficult time.
Mount Longdon had fallen after ten hours of severe fighting which cost 3 Para eighteen killed and forty-eight wounded, most of them in B Company. Captain Giles Orpen-Smellie, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, had been wounded in the right arm during the fighting:
A medic, Sergeant Sibley of D Company, patched me up at the time and put my arm in a traditional white sling. I felt more stupid than injured. Some time later, after daybreak, I led a group of Argentine PWs and their escort down to the PW collection point where the Assistant Intelligence Officer, Sergeant Pearson, took charge of them. This was close to the RAP so I went across to get someone to look at my arm. I quickly realised that the Medical Officer and his team were far too busy to deal with a malingerer like me so I turned around and went back up the mountain. Before doing so, I got rid of the sling and tucked the arm inside my smock, which was a much more practical arrangement in the circumstances. Later, I was casevaced back to the Main Dressing Station at Teal Inlet and from there back to the Uganda.
Eleven years after the war, claims by Corporal Carrizo that he was shot after surrendering were rejected when a photograph taken by a Daily Express photographer showed paras treating him. A former Parachute Regiment officer claimed that he had witnessed a British soldier shoot a wounded Argentine and others that the ears of killed Argentines had been collected by a British soldier. Interestingly, none of these allegations were aired immediately after the Argentine surrender, indeed several 7th Infantry Regiment interviewed by Daniel Kon, for his book on 10 Infantry Brigade, Los Chicos de la Guerra, commented upon their humane treatment after capture. A Scotland Yard investigation proved inconclusive and the Argentine authorities distanced themselves from Carrizo’s allegations.
Lieutenant Colonel Whitehead’s plan for 45 Commando was a silent, two-phase, right straight jab and left hook attack on Two Sisters, which was defended by the C Company, 4th Infantry Regiment (Major Ricardo Cordon) combat team. Whitehead was restricted by being in the centre of the Brigade attack, however his patrols had found a route from Mount Kent. The three-phase plan was for:
X Company to seize the western peak (‘Long Toenail’) from the west and form a firebase for Phase Two.
Y and Z Company to approach from Murrell Bridge (‘Pub Garden’) and attack the eastern peak (‘Summer Days’) from the north-west.
The entire Commando then to regroup and assault Mount Tumbledown.
In direct support were 8 Commando Battery and HMS Glamorgan. Replacing the Milan firings posts destroyed in the air raid on 27 May was Milan Troop, 40 Commando which joined X Company. 45 Commando’s Milan Troop was converted to a heavy weapons troop. During the morning, Y and Z Companies and Tac HQ moved from Mount Kent to an assembly area east of Murrell Bridge and then, setting off at about 5.00 pm, began the 7-kilometre march to the start line south-east of Murrell Bridge which was reached at 9.00 pm, having been secured by 2 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron, which was supporting 3 Para.
At 5.00 pm, X Company (Captain Ian Gardiner) set off along the 6-kilometre track east from south of Mount Kent, however Milan Troop, carrying the firing posts and forty missiles, each weighing thirty pounds, found the going difficult. Gardiner had estimated that it would take three hours to reach his start line, but it was not until 10.30 pm that his men reached the forming-up place. Feeling there was no alternative but to inform Whitehead, he broke radio silence and admitted that he was late. Whitehead calmy replied, ‘Carry on as planned. I will do nothing until I hear from you.’ Greatly relieved, Gardiner told his troop commanders, ‘Put the last six hours behind you, make your final preparations in your own time and, when you are completely ready, let me know and we will go.’ Ten minutes later they were ready.
At 11.15 pm, X Company splashed across the chilly Murrell River. To the north, Mount Longdon was under attack and the Argentines were shelling Murrell Bridge. Reaching the base of Long Toenail, 3 Troop took over the advance and then at 12.30 am, after advancing about 600 metres, came under heavy machine-gun fire from the 3rd Platoon (Second Lieutenant Llambias-Pravaz). Llambias-Pravaz had graduated in April and commanded a platoon of Guarini Indians weakened by casualties and sickness. Supported by Corporal Mario Pacheco‘s 10th Engineer Company section, the Argentines taunted the Royal Marines with war cries. With 8 Commando Battery on another fire mission and the Mortar Troop 81mm baseplates sinking into the turf every few rounds, Milan Troop fired missiles at Llambias-Pravaz‘s men, and then 2 Troop (Lieutenant Chris Caroe) advanced against stiff opposition from Lieutenant Martella‘s Support Platoon in the rocks. Clinging to a foothold using fighting-in-built-up-area techniques, the Troop was forced off by a defensive fire mission, however they regained another foothold, forced the Argentines to abandon positions and dealt with the machine-gunners covering the retreating Argentines. When it became obvious that the fighting around Long Toenail was more than a patrol, Major Cordon alerted his command.
Needing to take advantage of the darkness, at 12.16 am, Whitehead did not wait for X Company to seize Long Toenail and instructed Y (Major Davis) and Z (Captain Michael Cole) Companies to advance on Summer Days, clear in the moonlight. Shortly after Z Company had crossed its start line, an Argentine defensive fire mission pounded the ground they were about to cross. 400 metres short of the summit, Corporal David Hunt, a section commander in 8 Troop (Lieutenant Clive Dytor), reported that he could see people moving on the ridge. Dytor joined him:
I didn’t believe him but borrowed one of his riflemen’s night sights, and yes, I could see them. I saw one man talking to another head – it turned out later that it was the head of one of their Browning 0.5-inch machine-gunners. From my section on the left, I could hear men saying they could see them as well. The first thing to do was to stop the marines firing. I could hear them saying ‘I can see him. I can see him. Let’s kill him.’ (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
The Argentines were from Second Lieutenant Perez-Grandi’s 2nd Platoon. In a whispered discussion on the radio, Dytor told Cole what he had seen:
There was a bit of an argument then. The company commander must have reported to the CO and then I head an order for me ‘From Nine. Move forward.’ Nine was the CO. I said ‘No’ because I knew they would see us as soon as we stood up and we would lose a lot of blokes. The conversation went on for some time. I wasn’t speaking directly to the CO; we were not on the same net. (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
When a flare fired by an Argentine fizzled along the ground, Perez-Grandi’s men were startled to see the Royal Marines and a firefight developed, with most of the Argentine fire cracking overhead. Most Royal Marines later admitted that the Argentine cover was good and their own fire ineffective. Marine Steve Oyitch in 9 Troop:
The firefight went on for about an hour. We were laughing and joking about it; we were in dead ground and their fire was passing over our heads the whole time. I was behind a rock and I kept pushing my rifle around it and getting a few rounds off. I could see their trenches and positions through my night sight; they had them as well, much better then ours, but their cover was good and I don’t think our fire was much good either. (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
However, the stalemate stopped when the 3rd Artillery Group and 6th Infantry Regiment Mortar Platoon began to shell the western fringes of Summer Days. Oyitch:
Their artillery was getting close and 7 Troop, the left hand point Troop, started taking casualties. You couldn’t hear them coming but you could see the red glow of the fuze coming through the darkness – and that’s when I started to get frightened. Our section was in a circle – about ten yards wide – and one mortar bomb landed right in the middle. It lifted me right up and threw me straight on my back. The man in front was wounded in the arm and chest and Corporal Burdett was badly wounded in the foot. That’s when Gordon Macpherson was killed; he was just lifted and thrown into rocks and must have died instantly. That just about put an end to my section’s usefulness in the battle. Wounded from other Troops were brought back to us and we, in effect, became the casualty post. (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
Three Royal Marines and a Condor Troop sapper were killed. In Y Company, the death of Marine ‘Blue’ Nowak is remembered by the small blue square on the Company flag. In spite of the discomfort of the shelling, Whitehead ordered both companies to stay where they were and organized artillery fire on Long Toenail. When Corporal Edward Holt’s Forward Observation Officer was wounded, Holt took over his duties. His Military Medal citation reads:
When his officer was wounded, Holt took over completely the leadership of his team, continuing to produce artillery fire with coolness and skill, while he and the company he was supporting was being subjected to intense and accurate enemy machine gun fire. His outstanding leadership continued in subsequent operations right up to the cessation of hostilities. Bombardier Holt has shown qualities of leadership and courage under fire and professional skill far beyond those expected of his rank and experience. (London Gazette)
3rd Artillery Group was still shelling the western edge of Summer Days, however when mortar rounds fell behind Z Company, Lieutenant Dytor realized that staying still was achieving nothing and withdrawal was now out of the question. He remembered an incident during the Second World War when the Black Watch were pinned down in fighting in North Africa and the Adjutant stood up, waved his stick and said, ‘Is this the Black Watch?’ Although he was then killed, it stimulated the Battalion into action. Dytor:
I remember thinking about that and then, before I knew it, I suppose, I was up and running forward in the gap between my forward sections. I shouted, ‘Forward everybody!’ I talked to my blokes afterwards; they were amazed. One of them told me that he had shouted out to me ‘Get your fucking head down, you stupid bastard.’ I ran on, firing my rifle from the hip and I heard, behind me, my Troop getting up and coming forward, also firing. The voice I remember most clearly was that of Corporal Hunt. I think that what happened was that Corporal Hunt was the first man to follow me, his section followed him, the other sections followed and the Troop Sergeant came up the rear, kicking everybody’s arse. So, 4, 5 and 6 Sections came up abreast, pepper potting properly. I could hear the section commanders calling ‘Section up, section down!’ It worked fantastically; it was all done by the section commanders and the Troop Sergeant at the rear shouting to everybody on the move and the hare-brained Troop Commander out at the front. That assault up that hill was the greatest thrill of my life. Even today, I think of it was a divine miracle that we went up, 400 metres, I think it was, and never had a bad casualty. Only one man was hurt in the Troop, with grenade splinters from a grenade thrown by a man in his own section. When we had been waiting on the start line, I prayed that the Lord would give me strength and courage to lead my men and do what you will and He did just that. (Middlebrook, Operation Corporate)
Charging up the hill, shouting ‘Zulu! Zulu!’ Z Company ran into stiff resistance, 7 Troop from Perez-Grandi’s platoon and 8 Troop from Second Lieutenant Mosquera’s 1st Platoon. Lieutenant Colonel Whitehead then arrived and ordered Dytor to seize the southern slopes of Summer Days. 8 Troop advanced with a captured .50 Browning, although few Royal Marines knew how to use it, and cleared the positions held by Mosquera’s battered platoon, but were then pulled up by B Company, 6th Infantry Regiment pasting the crest. It was about 2.40 am.
The options of Y Company, which had lost two troop officers wounded by shelling, had been limited by Z Company until Whitehead ordered Davis to move south until Y Company was alongside Z Company. As Y Company fought across the saddle between the two peaks of Two Sisters, they came under heavy fire from Cordon’s command post and from B Company, 6th Infantry Regiment, one of whose reservists, 0.50 machine-gunner Private Oscar Poltronieri was overrun several times but each time made his way back to his platoon. In order to avoid a ‘blue on blue’ in the darkness, Whitehead instructed Dytor to stop and Y Company to seize Summer Days. Wary of a suspected wire-controlled mine, 4 Troop captured the summit at 4.18 am. To the south, X Company had overrun Long Toenail. Major Cordon was captured in his command post. Second Lieutenant Aldo Franco, with his 3rd Platoon B Company 6th Infantry Regiment, commanded the rearguard and fell back to an alternative position on the eastern slopes, known as Cambio. Only Second Lieutenant Llambias-Pravaz’s platoon escaped from Two Sisters, and joined M Company, 5th Marine Infantry Battalion on Sapper Hill.
When X Company reached Summer Days, Major Davis sent Corporal Harry Siddall and Bombardier Holt 400 metres to the eastern slopes to deal with a suspected mortar position. The citation for Siddall’s Military Medal reads:
Because of difficult terrain and lack of routes, Corporal Siddall left his section to his rear in a firm base. From his forward position, he heard enemy approaching. When the four-man patrol closed, he opened fire, killing one man and capturing the remaining three, one of whom was wounded. Corporal Siddall’s sustained qualities of leadership and determination showed a complete indifference to adverse conditions and his personal safety. (London Gazette)
At about 4.30 am, HMS Glamorgan and HMS Yarmouth had left the gun line, leaving HMS Avenger to support 3 Para and were 17 miles offshore, taking a short cut across the shore-based Exocet box, when a radar operator picked up a signature similar to a 155mm shell. When HMS Avenger, 10 miles to the north, then reported the signature to be a land-based Exocet, HMS Glamorgan opened fire, however the Exocet skipped on to her Flight Deck and skidded into the hangar. Burning fuel from her Wessex flooded into the Galley and a fireball thundered into the gas turbine room. Nine men were killed and fourteen others injured, mostly chefs and helicopter maintenance crews.
The Battle for Two Sisters ended two and a half hours after 45 Commando crossed their start line and was essentially won by Dytor’s charge, for which he was awarded the Military Cross. The Royal Marines were astonished at the ease with which Two Sisters had been captured. As the Commanding Officer remarked when daylight exposed the near invincibility of Two Sisters, ‘If we had a Company up here, we would have died of old age before it was captured.’ Three Royal Marines were killed and one Royal Engineer. Corporal Hunt, incorrectly identified as serving with 42 Commando in the London Gazette, was awarded the Military Medal. It was he who Dytor had identified as being wounded by the grenade splinter. Ten Argentines were killed, fifty wounded and fifty-four taken prisoner.
During the afternoon, 1st Welsh Guards advanced from Bluff Cove into a position south of Mount Harriet to protect the right flank of 42 Commando. However, communications broke down, even with the intervention of Brigade HQ, and Lieutenant Colonel Vaux was irritated when their Recce Platoon moved east across the moorland toward the forming-up place, in full view of Mount Harriet and drew Argentine artillery fire. Vaux wanted the Argentines to concentrate on watching Mount Challenger. His plan to capture Mount Harriet is widely regarded as an example of a classic night attack:
J Company to create a diversion on Mount Wall and keep 4th Infantry Regiment focused on the west.
1st Welsh Guards Recce Platoon to secure the start line.
K and L Company to make a wide march south across the Stanley-Fitzroy track and right hook Mount Harriet from the south.
K Company to seize the eastern summit.
L Company to then take the western summit, Zoya, and exploit to Goat Ridge ready to support 45 Commando’s attack on Mount Tumbledown.
On call was 7 (Kirkee) Commando Battery and HMS Yarmouth, and in support was 2 Troop, 59 Commando Squadron RE (Captain Hicks).
At 4.15 pm, as the light faded, K Company left Mount Challenger for the 8-mile approach. Guided through the minefield by 11 Troop, it crossed the Stanley-Fitzroy track and formed up north of the road near a lake. The Milan gunners, which included a detachment from the Welsh Guards, found the going difficult. Two were deployed to cover Argentine exploitation from the east, in particular with their Panhard AML-90s. During the night, an ineffective Argentine counter-attack was driven off by the Welsh Guards Recce Platoon. At about 5.30 pm, L Company moved off and had a moment’s anxiety when there was a negligent discharge. As planned, the gunners shelled Mount Harriet. At about 6.30 pm, the composite 35-strong Porter Troop, from Headquarters Company, left with the GPMG (SF) tripods and sights and 10,000 rounds of ammunition ready for immediate use once Mount Harriet had been captured.
Meanwhile, the 1st Welsh Guards Recce Platoon had secured the start line. Lieutenant Symes:
The Start Line was secured at about 22.30.I personally sent the codeword ‘Wild Crags’ … though I insisted on speaking to an officer … 42 Commando was due to start its assault at midnight. At 10pm, there was no sign of the Commando – it transpires they were waiting to hear from us, but, of course, communications had broken down.
Assuming that something had gone wrong, Lieutenant Symes drew his Platoon away from the apex of the fence marking the start line in order to withdraw from the area in darkness. It was while this was happening that 11 Troop arrived and when the Welsh Guards could not be found, Lieutenant Beadon gained permission for his Troop to secure the start line. No sooner had the Royal Marines began to do so when the Welsh Guards were seen and they then completed the task.
At 10.00 pm, just as HMS Yarmouth started bombarding Mount Harriet and K Company crossed the start line, Captain Wheen radioed that L Company had strayed off route and, although wary of minefields, was confident of reaching the forming-up place on time. On Mount Wall, the 9 Troop diversion drew machine-gun fire from Mount Harriet, Mortar Troop illuminated Zoya and Milan Troop then loosed off several Milans at the Argentine position.
K Company covered about 700 metres in about thirty minutes and, undetected in the shadows of Mount Harriet, they began to infiltrate into the 4th Infantry Regiment Command Company’s position, at the eastern end of Mount Harriet. When a Mortar Platoon sentry, Corporal Mario Cortez, heard rustling in the frozen grass, he thought it was a Special Forces Group patrol until he realized his error and opened fire. Finding it difficult to pinpoint enemy positions, the Royal Marines adopted fighting-in-built-up-area tactics and stormed Argentine trenches and bunkers, however it took nearly forty-five minutes of stiff fighting before the lower eastern positions were overrun. Corporal Laurence Watts, a section commander, was killed when he attacked a tented position. 1 Troop overran the Mortar Platoon, denying Lieutenant Colonel Soria valuable support and 2 Troop dealt with the 12th Infantry Regiment Combat Team Solari platoon on the eastern slopes. Confused by the sheer momentum of the attack, the inexperienced conscripts wavered until rallied by First Lieutenant Jorge Echeverria, Soria’s Intelligence officer, until he was badly wounded. Dealing with prisoners was already becoming a problem.
As K Company bit deeper into the Argentine positions, 1 and 3 Troops began to intermingle. 3 Troop then reported stiffening resistance from a machine-gun position, which was manned by a 1st Cavalry Regiment platoon, about 80 metres to their front, south-east of the summit. Corporals Mick Eccles and ‘Sharkey’ Ward, both in 3 Troop, were having ‘a fag and a rethink’ when Corporal Steve Newland, who had heard their Troop was pinned down, joined them and then went off to see what he could do:
I crawled around this boulder … and looked around the corner of the rock, thinking that there had to be a sniper somewhere. There was more than a sniper; it was a half-troop. About ten of them lying on a nice, flat rock, table-top rock overlooking our positions. They had a machine-gun on the left and the rest of them were lined out with rifles. Every time one of ours tried to move forward, one of them would shoot at him, so it looked as if there was only a sniper. I sat back behind this rock and whispered down my throat mike to Sharkey about what I’d found. I told him to keep the lads and I’d see what I could do … I picked up my SLR, changed the magazine and put a fresh one on and slipped the safety catch. I then looped the pin of one grenade onto one finger of my left hand and did the same with the other. I pulled one grenade straight into the machine gun. Pulled the other. I dodged around the back of the rock and heard two bangs. As soon as they had gone off, I went in and anything that moved got three rounds … I went back around the corner of the rock, changed the mag and was about to go back when Sharkey called on the net ‘Get out! We are going to put two 66s in!’ I ran down the hill and dived into this little hollow … I heard Sharkie on the radio ‘It’s clear. They’ve given up … make sure they don’t get out the back’ … I went up by a different route and as I rounded the rock, I saw one of the guys I had hit. I’d only got him in the shoulder but he’d gone down like the rest … I automatically thought he was dead. But he was far from that, because as I came back around the corner, he just squeezed off a burst from his automatic. He must have realized he was going to die unless he got me first. I felt the bullets go into both my legs … I was so angry I fired 15 rounds into his head.
The three corporals were awarded Military Medals. 3rd Artillery Group was accurately shelling Mount Harriet using Lieutenant Colonel Soria’s command post, which had been set on fire by a phosphorous grenade, as its target indicator. K Company pressed on, captured the Argentine RAP post and reached Zoya.
Vaux released L Company at 11.00 pm. Within 150 metres of crossing the start line, they ran into a deluge of fire from the HQ 3rd Infantry Brigade Defence Platoon (Second Lieutenant Oliva) defending the central southern slopes:
About this time, Lieutenant Whitely was injured when L Company came under heavy fire from enemy located on K Company’s objective. L Company retaliated with GPMG fire, which caused a heated radio broadcast from K Company. As they began their attack an hour after K Company, the element of surprise was lost and they came under heavy fire within 200 metres of crossing their Start Line, taking three casualties almost immediately. Captain Wheen called for Milan fire at the machine gun position. They cleared six machine gun positions, which involved an advance over 600 metres, and as each position could only be taken by a Troop or a section at a time, it took L Company five hours to reach their objective. The Company had to skirmish forward over rocky and sometimes open terrain, which required surgical precision fire missions to cover the advance. The Argentine defence was far more resolute than K Company had experienced as these were the main positions, and far better protected. L Company had eleven casualties in some of the most ferocious fighting before reaching the western end of Harriet. (Vaux, March to the South Atlantic)
The Milan fired by Lance Sergeant Bennett proved vital for the Royal Marine momentum. Shortly before his command post was overrun, Soria joined First Lieutenant Arroyo on the western summit to organize a counterattack, however when he saw that his Regiment was cut off from Stanley, and concluding that it was folly to commit inexperienced conscripts, he ordered his men to make their way to Tumbledown. Only 2nd Platoon, A Company (Second Lieutenant Silva) on Goat Ridge and 3rd Platoon (Jimenez-Corvalan) on the northern slopes of Mount Harriet avoided capture. Soria was captured soon afterwards. 10 Troop guided Lieutenant-Colonel Vaux and Tac HQ to Mount Harriet using the southern cleared route, where Vaux modified his plan and instructed L Company to seize Goat Ridge. Coming under fire from Suva’s platoon withdrawing to Tumbledown, a fire mission resolved the resistance.
The formidable fortress of Mount Harriet had been captured and over 300 Argentines surrendered at a cost of two Royal Marines killed and twenty-eight wounded. The Argentines had lost five 4th Infantry Regiment conscripts, together with one man from 1st Cavalry Regiment, three from HQ 3rd Brigade Defence Platoon, and one sapper; about fifty-three men were wounded.
3 Commando Brigade had seized the Outer Defence Zone. At 4.30 am, with only two hours of darkness remaining, Lieutenant Colonel Whitehead radioed Brigadier Thompson that 45 Commando was ready to exploit to Mount Tumbledown, but much to his frustration, he was ordered to remain where he was. The guns were low on ammunition, 8 Commando Battery had fired 1,500 rounds during the night and, critically, Mount Longdon and Mount Harriet had yet to be captured. With their equipment still at Teal Inlet, Whitehead permitted his men to scavenge the Argentine positions. Sleeping bags and boots were prized, as were the Argentine ration packs with their cigarettes and, usually, a tot of Scotch whisky. Condor Troop checked the Argentine positions for booby traps. At 7.50 am, Lieutenant Colonel Pike reported that there was an opportunity for 3 Para to advance to Wireless Ridge, but Brigadier Thompson vetoed this, knowing that it would be enfiladed from Mount Tumbledown.
As the morning mist cleared, Argentine artillery shelled the lost peaks, killing four men of 3 Para and wounding seven others, including Corporal Denzil Connick, who lost both legs. He was instrumental in forming the South Atlantic Medal Association (1982), which is open to those awarded the campaign medal, to immediate next-of-kin and to Falkland Islanders; its motto ‘From The Sea, Freedom’ epitomized the British aim of the campaign. 42 Commando had seven Royal Marines wounded, including Marine Steve Chubb, who had been captured at South Georgia.
Even though the night had again proven that the Argentines were prepared to fight, Brigadier General Jofre was appalled by the loss of the Outer Defence Zone and severely criticized Major Cordon for losing Two Sisters. To bolster wavering units, he threatened to shell any unit considering withdrawal. Brigadier General Menendez signalled the Joint Operations Centre: ‘We need immediate support from the mainland to bombard defined targets. The National Reserve must do all that is possible to prevent the fall of Stanley.’
Later in the day, a fifty-strong 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment platoon flew in and joined 7th Infantry Regiment on Wireless Ridge. 603 Commando Company and the Amphibious Commando Grouping remained on short notice to move to the Falklands. Of concern to the Argentine gunners was that by the end of 12 June, most of their 155mm ammunition had been used up. At about midday, the Argentine artillery came under intense counter-battery fire. First Lieutenant Jorge Cerezo, who commanded C Battery, 4th Airborne Artillery Group near Moody Brook had five 105mm M56 pack howitzers in a circle to provide 360 degree fire support. Each gun had sixty rounds and at the battery ammunition point 500 metres away was a further 2000 rounds. The British bombardment of the Argentine front line was continuous and caused numerous casualties which demoralised the troops. The attrition rate was so severe Lieutenant Colonel Balza, who was commanding the Argentine artillery, ordered the Forward Observation Officers to be relieved every two days. Every time he was given a fire mission, the British shelled the gun positions, however their inaccuracy sometimes permitted the Argentines to return fire. When the situation became untenable, everyone took cover in shelters until the bombardment ceased. Cerezo reckoned that the patron saint of gunners, Saint Barbara, protected his Battery and prevented major losses. An enemy shell destroyed a B Battery shelter but no one was hurt, just shaken up. On another occasion a detachment had loaded a gun and was forced to take cover when they saw it fire after a direct hit. Two soldiers in the command post were killed by naval gunfire and a B Battery gunner was mortally wounded by counter-battery fire. When the guns sank in the muddy waterlogged gun pits and recoil problems began to develop, Balza ordered them to be removed to firmer and drier ground.