FORT SUMTER

Query

FEBRUARY 28

ON THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, MAJOR ANDERSON ASKED HIS OFFICERS to give him an assessment of how many men and ships would be required to effectively reinforce Sumter, with the idea of passing these on to the War Department and, presumably, to Lincoln. He specified that each officer was to do this on his own without consulting his colleagues. He did not actually want the government to resort to force; rather, he hoped that by providing a realistic appraisal of the size and complexity of a reinforcement mission he might be able to deter the incoming administration from entertaining any such plan. On that score, the estimates were satisfyingly bleak.

Captain Foster, chief engineer, came in with the highest estimate: “To land and carry the batteries on Cummings Point and Morris Island, 3,000 regulars, or 10,000 volunteers; to land and carry the batteries on Sullivan’s Island (at the same time), 3,000 regulars, or 10,000 volunteers more; to hold the above positions after taking them, 10,000 regulars, or 30,000 volunteers. The forces to be overcome in the attack are supposed to be those of the South Carolinians, aided by troops that may be gathered from the adjoining States at short notice.”

Artillery Capt. Truman Seymour offered a particularly dire appraisal. To attempt a resupply mission by ruse or deception was now impossible, he wrote, “such is the unceasing vigilance employed to prevent it. To do so openly by vessels alone, unless they are shot-proof, is virtually impossible, so numerous and powerful are the opposing batteries.” Any Union attempt to raise the necessary force of men and ships would be telegraphed south immediately; vessels approaching the fort would be exposed to continuous fire. “A projected attack in large force would draw to this harbor all the available resources in men and material of the contiguous States. Batteries of guns of heavy caliber would be multiplied rapidly and indefinitely. At least twenty thousand men, good marksmen and trained for months past with a view to this very contingency, would be concentrated here before the attacking force could leave Northern ports.” The Confederate forces would effectively close the harbor, forcing an inbound fleet to land its troops well away from the protective covering fire of Fort Sumter. “Charleston Harbor would be a Sevastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would probably be required to insure success, before which time the garrison of Fort Sumter would be starved out.” The carnage of the “Siege of Sevastopol,” 1854–55, which claimed over one hundred thousand casualties and ended the Crimean War, was still fresh in the world’s psyche and needed no elaboration by Seymour.

Estimates provided by Sumter’s other officers called for invading forces that ranged in size from three thousand to ten thousand troops, transported and defended by warships. Quartermaster Hall, who advocated deploying seven warships, provided a detailed description of how his plan could be carried out but acknowledged that its success would depend “upon the most fortunate and improbable circumstances. It might succeed; but I think failure would be the rule.”

Anderson sent these on to Washington with his own concurring assessment, in which he wrote, “I confess that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an attempt to throw re-enforcements into this harbor … with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men.”

What he was recommending was an invading force larger than the entire U.S. Army as then constituted.