WASHINGTON

Lincoln

MARCH 9–15

GENERAL SCOTT’S OFFHAND APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION IN Charleston—that Sumter should simply be surrendered—had rattled Lincoln, but in a subsequent in-person encounter, the general told him that since then he had “given the subject a more full and thorough consideration.” Lincoln wanted to hear more and, in a letter dated Saturday, March 9, asked Scott to answer three questions in writing:

“1st To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumpter, without fresh supplies or reinforcement?” (Just as Lincoln had difficulty spelling “inauguration,” he could never quite manage “Sumter,” which has no p.)

“2d Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or re-inforce Fort Sumpter within that time?

“3d If not, what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at your control, would enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress within the time?”

In his reply two days later Scott told Lincoln that Fort Sumter had enough “hard bread, flour and rice” to last about twenty-six days, and enough “salt meat” for forty-eight days; how long Anderson could hold out, however, “cannot be answered with absolute accuracy,” but certainly not long enough to allow the mounting of an expedition large enough to succeed now that Charleston Harbor was ringed with heavy artillery and thousands of troops.

Lincoln’s third question pressed Scott as to timing: What would he need in order to reinforce Sumter within the period remaining before its provisions would be exhausted?

“I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood), could not be collected in less than four months; 5,000 additional regular troops and 20,000 volunteers; that is, a force sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie), as well as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize, and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a practical military question the time for succoring Fort Sumter with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then a surrender under assault or from starvation has been merely a question of time.”

Lincoln mulled this as he wrestled with the continuing crush of office seekers and the need to make important new appointments. “Solicitants for office besiege him,” Secretary of State Seward wrote home to his wife. He saw this firsthand on his many visits to the White House. “The grounds, halls, stairways, closets, are filled with applicants, who render ingress and egress difficult.”

In the meantime, at the urging of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, Lincoln met with a former U.S. Navy lieutenant named Gustavus Vasa Fox, who claimed to have devised an effective plan for the relief of Sumter. Fox was a vain man, according to a fellow naval officer, Lt. David Dixon Porter. “He was vain of his physique, which was excellent, he could knock down a bull. He was vain of his personal appearance.” He had a large head, broad forehead, and could have passed for a poet, Porter wrote. “He thought himself superior to the Secretary [of the Navy] and all the rest of the cabinet, in his political talents, whereas if he had thrown away his corks, he would have sank to the bottom.”

Fox had extensive service on transatlantic civilian ships but little experience with naval combat, and he was now the manager of a decidedly landlocked fabric mill in Massachusetts. He was, however, an ambitious man with a powerful need for recognition. He was also Postmaster Blair’s brother-in-law. As early as February he had imagined himself leading an expedition to rescue Major Anderson and his men and on February 6 had presented a plan to General Scott. To make sure he got all the credit, Fox insisted on full control. Scott liked the plan; so did then war secretary Holt. That day Fox wrote to his wife, “Anderson’s fame will be nothing to mine if I succeed.”

But President Buchanan had rejected it, apparently fearing a repeat of the Star of the West debacle, and, more to the point, hoping to shove the whole crisis forward to the next administration. Fox went back to his mill.

Since then Fox had revised his plan, and now, on March 14, he presented it to Lincoln and his cabinet, including Fox’s brother-in-law, the postmaster. Lincoln found it compelling; similarly he found the thirty-nine-year-old Fox to be a forceful, dynamic evangelist for its execution. At a meeting the next day, March 15, the cabinet debated the plan; afterward, Lincoln sent each member a brief note asking a single question: “Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort-Sumpter”—that p again—“under all the circumstances, is it wise to attempt it?”

Some answered that day, others the next. Together the responses demonstrated how complex the issue was. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase said he would oppose reinforcement if it meant civil war, but that seemed unlikely to him, so he offered a qualified endorsement. Secretary of War Simon Cameron voted no: He agreed with General Scott and Major Anderson’s officers that an attempt now was impossible. Attorney General Edward Bates voted no as well. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles—whom Lincoln referred to as “Father Neptune”—argued that from both a political and military perspective, it would be “unwise.” Interior Secretary Caleb Smith ventured that “the probabilities are in favor of the success of the proposed enterprise” but believed “it would not be wise under all the circumstances.”

Postmaster Blair offered a nuanced view: He blamed the spreading rebellion on “the connivance of the late administration” and argued that the responsibility for ending it now lay in the hands of the inhabitants of the seceded states; that to achieve this, Lincoln needed to act forcefully. The secessionists, he wrote, already believed the North to be “deficient in the courage necessary to maintain the Government.” It was time to prove otherwise. “You should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in this enterprise”—an allusion to the relief expedition and its officers, including presumably his own brother-in-law, Fox. “They willingly take the hazard for the sake of the country and the honor which, successful or not, they will receive from you and the lovers of free government in all lands.”

The seventh and most influential member of the cabinet, Secretary of State Seward, voted against reinforcement. “If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, of course I should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it,” he wrote. But as things stood, an attempt to do so seemed likely to trigger civil war and drive the border states from the Union. He argued that maintaining a defensive posture was the best way to retain them. At the moment, he said, those states “indicate a disposition to adhere to the Union, if nothing extraordinary shall occur to renew excitement and produce popular exasperation.”

He also made the point that any expedition would be impaired from the start by the impossibility of keeping it secret. “In this active and enlightened country,” Seward wrote, “in this season of excitement, with a daily press, daily mails, and an incessantly operating telegraph, the design to reinforce and supply the garrison must become known to the opposite party at Charleston, as soon, at least, as preparations for it should begin. The garrison would then almost certainly fall by assault, before the expedition could reach the harbor of Charleston.”

In sum: five noes, one definitive yes, and one qualified yes. The cabinet’s position was clear, but Lincoln was unsure: On an instinctive level he felt that giving up Sumter would be wrong, “utterly ruinous,” as he would later put it, arguing that “at home, it would discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter, a recognition abroad; that in fact it would be our national destruction consummated.”

He remained intrigued by Fox’s plan but wanted more information, intelligence of a more direct and observational nature, and directed War Secretary Cameron to help him get it. Cameron in turn assigned the task to General Scott. “The President requires accurate information in regard to the command of Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, and wishes a competent person sent for that purpose,” Cameron wrote to the general on Tuesday, March 19. “You will therefore direct some suitable person to proceed there immediately, and report the result of the information obtained by him.”

Scott proposed Gustavus Fox, possibly the least objective agent he could have chosen.

Lincoln approved.