WASHINGTON

Conflict

APRIL 4–5

BY THE FIRST WEEK IN APRIL, MAJOR ANDERSON, USUALLY THE MODEL of stoicism and forbearance, seemed at last to become fed up with the lack of attention from Washington. The immediate trigger was his learning for the first time about the telegram sent by Confederate Commissioner Crawford to General Beauregard in which the commissioner warned that Lincoln lacked the courage to evacuate Fort Sumter and planned instead to leave the decision to Anderson, “by suffering him to be starved out.” Crawford had sent that telegram to Beauregard on April 1; three days later news of its contents filtered to Anderson.

“I cannot but think that Mr. Crawford has misunderstood what he has heard in Washington,” Anderson wrote to Adjutant General Thomas the next day, with evident irritation, “as I cannot think that the Government would abandon, without instructions and without advice, a command which has tried to do all its duty to our country.”

He worried about public perception if he alone were to decide to abandon the fort. He found it inconceivable that at so sensitive a moment, with war in the wind, the government would leave such a fateful decision to him.

“I am sure that I shall not be left without instructions, even though they may be confidential,” he told Thomas. “After thirty odd years of service I do not wish it to be said that I have treasonably abandoned a post and turned over to unauthorized persons public property entrusted to my charge. I am entitled to this act of justice at the hands of my Government, and I feel confident that I shall not be disappointed. What to do with the public property, and where to take my command, are questions to which answers will, I hope, be at once returned.”

AS IT HAPPENED, a letter was on its way from Washington that would provide Anderson some guidance, but not the kind he was hoping for. By now he had become convinced that evacuation was the prudent course.

Anderson’s message warning that he would run out of food much sooner than expected had startled Lincoln. Based on information provided by Captain Fox after his March reconnaissance visit to the fort, Lincoln had come to believe that the Sumter garrison could hold out until April 15 “without any real inconvenience.” Now it appeared Anderson might run out of food a week earlier.

Lincoln personally drafted a set of instructions for the major, which he gave to War Secretary Cameron, who then sent a copy to Anderson under his own signature. The instructions, which referred to the president in the third person, contained no hint that they were actually composed by Lincoln himself.

Lincoln (via Cameron) first informed Anderson that his letter had caused “some anxiety.” He told the major that he had authorized a seaborne expedition to relieve Sumter, and indirectly affirmed that Captain Fox would be its commander. “Hoping still that you will be able to sustain yourself till the 11th. or 12th. inst[ant], the expedition will go forward; and, finding your flag flying, will attempt to provision you, and, in case the effort is resisted, will endeavor also to reinforce you. You will therefore hold out if possible till the arrival of the expedition.”

Lest this sound unduly draconian, Lincoln added that he didn’t expect Anderson to subject his command to any danger beyond what “would be usual in military life.” Further, he said he was confident that Anderson would “act as becomes a patriot and soldier, under all circumstances.”

He ended with, “Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are authorized to make it.”

Cameron posted one copy of the letter on Thursday, April 4, by mail; two days later, he dispatched another copy by messenger, Sumter’s own Lieutenant Talbot, still in Washington.