Within the fields of Religious Studies and Cultural Anthropology, “ritual” tends to be defined in terms of how all related activities are marked off from other prosaic, non-ritual forms of behavior. Scholars agree that there is no limit to the activities that can be incorporated into ritual. The task of defining which activities to include in an investigation of Islamic ritual is helpfully simplified by the fact that the Muslim jurists themselves place most of the activities that we would normally consider to be rituals in their category of ‘ibada, which may be translated as “worship.” All acts of ‘ibada (i.e. the ‘ibadat) pertain to the relationship between human beings and God. Acts included in the category of mu’amalat, by contrast, pertain to the relationships that take place between human beings. Rules governing purification and prayer are located among the ‘ibadat; those governing the payment of taxes and the inheritance of property are classified among the mu’amalat. Admittedly, in the following pages mention is made of several other practices that the jurists do not include among the standard ‘ibadat. However, the same logic still applies: all practices under discussion are performed with the aim of directly involving God in the matters of Muslims.
Of a Muslim’s ritual obligations, the five pillars of Islam—the profession of faith (al-shahada); prayer (al-salat); alms-giving (al-zakat); fasting (al-sawm); and pilgrimage (al-hajj)—are regarded as the most important by Islam’s normative Sunni tradition. While Shi’is do not attribute the same importance to the theory of five pillars, the majority of Shi’i scholars also uphold the importance of these individual acts (occasionally modifying them in ways mentioned below). References to four of the five pillars (not to the complete shahada) occur several times in the Qur’an. The importance of the five pillars—with several traditions confirming that the rejection of any pillar’s validity equates to an act of disbelief (kufr)—is cemented in the canonical collections of hadith literature.
The first pillar is the profession, or testament, of faith (al-shahada): “I profess that there is no god but God; and the Prophet is His Messenger.” The Qur’an contains the phrase “there is no God but God” (e.g., Q. 3:18); and frequently acknowledges that Muhammad is, indeed, a “messenger” (rasul) of God (e.g., Q. 63:1). The full formula, however, does not appear in written form until the end of the seventh century. The shahada is spoken into the ears of a newborn baby, and repeated countless times by believers in devotional contexts throughout their lives before being uttered, finally, on their deathbeds.
The second pillar is prayer (salat; Q. 4:103). Although the number is left unspecified in the Qur’an, the vast majority of Muslims understand that they are to pray five times a day (dawn, mid-day, mid-afternoon, sunset, and nightfall), in Arabic, and facing Makka. The salat prayers are preceded by the call to prayer (adhan). Unlike the non-canonical prayers (du’at), which may or may not follow a formal pattern and can be offered at any time, the movements included in each unit of prayer (rak’a; pl. rak’at) are strictly prescribed. The number of units differs according to which of the salat prayers is offered. This mention of salat leads into brief discussions on the related subjects of ritual purity and sacred space.
For his/her prayers to be accepted, a Muslim must be ritually pure (Q. 4:43; 5:6). The state of ritual purity (tahara) is nullified by a number of ordinary biological “events” (ahdath; sing: hadath). A major hadath impurity is triggered by sexual intercourse, menstrual or lochial bleeding; this state requires ghusl; minor hadath impurity, by contrast, is triggered by acts such as visiting the toilet, sleeping, touching a person of the opposite sex and/or one’s genitals; this state logically requires wudu’. If no water can be found, both forms of hadath impurity can be removed by “washing” with sand—a ritual known as tayammum. It should be noted that the same concern to prevent ritual performance from becoming unnecessarily difficult—and a willingness to provide concessions (rukhas) whenever possible—underpins the Islamic ritual code in its entirety. In addition to ritual purification from the ahdath, Muslims are obligated to keep their bodies, clothes, and places of worship free at all times from substances which, from the jurists’ perspective, are intrinsically “filthy” (najasa). Such substances include excrement, urine, blood, vomit, pigs, and for most jurists, dogs.
While the prayers can be offered in any ritually pure location (i.e. any place free from najasa), male Muslims are encouraged to pray in congregation in mosques; women, by contrast, are encouraged to pray at home, although most sources agree that there is no harm in women attending mosques and even praying with men (providing they do not do so in front of them). In addition to the regular salat prayers, attendance at the Friday congregational prayer (salat al-jum’a) is also obligatory for all male Muslims.
To describe mosques as “sacred spaces” is not inaccurate. However, any discussions of sacred space in Islam must be prefaced by the acknowledgment that, as God is understood to exist in all places, everywhere is in a sense sacred—a belief encapsulated in the Prophetic hadith: “the whole earth has been made good for me, a place of purification and a mosque.” In practical and historical terms, some places are nevertheless more sacred than others. Originally constructed by Adam, only later to be rebuilt by Ibrahim and his son (Q. 3: 96–7), and housed within Makka’s Haram mosque (masjid al-haram), the Ka’ba is the most cherished of Islamic sites. Believers orient themselves towards the Ka’ba in their daily prayers and perform the major and minor pilgrimages (hajj and ‘umra) around it. As prayers and the other ‘ibadat are valid regardless of where they are performed (providing the site is ritually pure), the Ka’ba is the only location that is, of itself, a vital component of ‘ibada. To explain its uniqueness, certain widespread hadiths report that the Ka’ba is situated directly under God’s Throne. Adam is instructed to circumambulate it just as the angels circumambulate this throne.
In addition to the Ka’ba, the Prophet’s mosque in Madina and Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque are, on the basis of sound hadiths, thought to be uniquely blessed by the Sunni Muslim community, who also believe that prayers performed in these mosques are more effective than those performed in ordinary mosques. Ordinary mosques are, of course, the focus of ritual life for most Muslims. Pious Muslims may “retreat” (i’tikaf) to a mosque to dedicate several days—usually the final ten days of Ramadan—entirely to prayer and reflection.
As a final reflection on the inter-related subjects of prayer and sacred space, it should be noted that, while graves of ordinary Muslims are not sacred spaces, the act of visiting a grave to pray for and recite Qur’an over the deceased has traditionally been viewed as meritorious. While caution in such matters is advised—for the Sunni jurists, one should never address one’s prayers directly to a human being, alive or dead, and no matter how glorious their reputation—seeking the intercession (tawassul) of the Prophets (al-anbiya’) and the Saints (al-awliya’) while standing at their shrines has also been practiced since the earliest days of Islam.
The third pillar is almsgiving (al-zakat). All believers are required on an annual basis to dedicate a small portion of their wealth—usually between two to three percent—towards the alleviation of poverty. The Qur’an restricts the distribution of zakat to specific people: the poor; those who collect zakat; those “whose hearts have been reconciled”; slaves; those fighting jihad; and travelers (Q. 9:60). On the basis of sound hadiths, the jurists expect zakat only to be paid on specific items: gold, silver, crops, fruits, trade goods, and livestock. Once the money is collected, it is kept in the public treasury and spent for the public good during ritual celebrations. Other acts of religiously motivated generosity are referred to as “sadaqa” (“charity”) rather than zakat and, while also perceived as meritorious, are not treated as mandatory.
The fourth pillar is fasting (al-sawm; e.g., Q. 2:183). During the ninth month of the Islamic year, Ramadan, all Muslims who are physically able to do so must abstain from food and drink, as well as from sexual intercourse, from dawn to sunset. To mark the end of Ramadan, Muslims celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr, one of Islam’s two major feasts. Voluntary fasting (nafil) during other times of the year is also considered beneficial.
The fifth pillar is the pilgrimage (al-hajj; e.g., Q.2:196–9). Providing once again that they are physically capable, Muslims are expected to make the trip to Makka at least once in their lifetimes. The hajj takes places during the 8th and the 13th of Dhu al-Hijja, the twelfth month of the Muslim lunar calendar. On entering the state of ihram (and donning the clothes of the pilgrim), Muslims are required to perform numerous rituals including: the circumambulation of the Ka’ba (al-tawaf); running between the two hills of Safa and Marwah (sa’); the vigil at Mount “Arafat (wuquf al-”arafat); and the gathering of pebbles at al-Muzdalifa to throw at the pillars, which function as symbols of Shaytan, in Mina (rami al-jamarat). The story of Abraham’s own pilgrimage to Makka thematically unites these acts (Q. 22:26). Indeed, the second of Islam’s major feasts, ‘Id al-Adha (also known as the ‘Id al-Kabir, “the Great Feast”) coincides with the culmination of the hajj by recalling Abraham’s sacrifice of the ram after God has lifted His earlier command to sacrifice the patriarch’s son. ‘Id al-Adha lasts four days and is generally acknowledged to be the most important period in the Muslim calendar. A “lesser” version of the hajj, known as the ‘umra, which can be performed at any time, involves fewer rituals and is unconnected to any feasts. This is also highly recommended, but is not an obligation for Muslims.
Having provided some information on the five pillars, as well as on several significant other aspects of Muslim ritual, it is worth noting that, with the exception of the shahada, the Muslim jurists require each act of ‘ibada to be preceded by a statement of “intention” (niyya). This requirement is not explicitly found in the Qur’an; its mandatory status is rooted instead in a well-known Prophetic hadith, which reports that “actions are judged according to intentions.” Before beginning the ‘ibada, the statement of niyya confirms that an individual is fully aware that s/he is carrying out a particular act. Most jurists agree that the saying of the niyya should not be vocalized. A tendency to depict the saying of the niyya in explicitly spiritual terms—as if its role is to ensure that the spiritual essence of the act being performed is not lost—is often shared by both Muslim and Western authors. The jurists, however, describe the purpose of the niyya in more perfunctory terms, merely as a way of maintaining focus (Powers 2006).
The five pillars of Islam encompass many of the ingredients of Islam’s overall ritual code. As noted, in most cases, the obligation to perform the pillars is traced to the Qur’an, a text whose sacred status is itself emphasized through ritual practice. Muslims must be ritually pure to touch or even to recite from a mushaf, or copy of the Qur’an. In the believer’s home, the mushaf is to be kept in an elevated position, higher than other books in the room; and Qur’anic recitation (tilawa/tajwid/tartil) is strictly ritualized. Weeping when reciting the Qur’an is considered praiseworthy—an attitude that is confirmed by Scripture (Q. 17:109). There are health benefits to using the Qur’an; and it is reported that, when he was ill, the Prophet would recite chapters 113 (al-Falaq) and 114 (al-Nas)—verses that promise succor to believers from evil, the Evil Eye, and Shaytan.
Islam’s ritual code extends well beyond the five pillars. The legal manuals also provide information regarding a Muslim’s dress code, personal appearance, hygiene, and diet. Muslim men and women are, for instance, expected to dress modestly, depilate their pubic areas and under their arms, and circumcise their children (most jurists say both male and female should be circumcised). Men should grow beards, and women should cover their hair. Discussions on matters of food and drink are also to be found within the category of ‘ibada. Most foods and drink are declared halal (permissible), with only a few falling into the category of haram (prohibited). The Qur’an prohibits the consumption of five items: “mayta,” by which is meant any carcass that has died without God’s name being mentioned at the time of death (Q. 6:121); blood (dam); the flesh of swine (lahmat al-khinzir); the meat of animals that have been sacrificed to idols; or who have died by strangulation or force; or that from which wild animals have eaten (Q. 2:173, 5:3, 5:90–91, 6:145, 16:115). In addition, the jurists agree that, by describing it as “filthy” (rijs), the Qur’an intends for wine (and, by extension, all intoxicants) to be forbidden (Q. 5:90). The jurists’ discussions regarding each of the above prohibitions seek to define the limits of what is permissible and prohibited. Exceptions are commonly made: while carrion is haram, the dead bodies of insects are not because they do not contain blood; the blood of fish need not be drained because living in the sea their bodies are in a constant state of purification; and so forth.
In the same chapter on permitted and prohibited foods and drinks, the jurists set out the details governing the performance of ritual slaughter. The act of ritual slaughter occurs as the main arteries in the neck, along with the esophagus and vertebrate trachea, are severed with one swipe of a sharp, non-serrated blade. As the knife moves over the jugular, it is recommended or required to invoke the name of God (bi-ism allah al-rahman al-rahim). The slaughter must be performed by someone with the relevant knowledge; and no part of a slaughtered animal should be cut off before the animal is completely dead.
There is a series of ritual practices clustered around death and burial. All related provisions are laid out in the jurists’ books on funerary practice (kutub al-jana’iz). According to these, the corpse should be given the major ablution by a member of the same gender (or perhaps by a spouse). A cloth covers the genitals and “intimate parts” (al-’awra) of the deceased. After the ablution, the corpse is wrapped in a shroud while the funeral prayers are offered (outside, not inside the mosque). Most jurists recommend that the head of the deceased is turned towards the qibla. The body is lowered into the grave by male Muslim relatives (from the mother’s side); and the grave is filled in by those present. Women are, in general, discouraged from attending funerals on the grounds that the pre-Islamic rites of mourning—which included lamentations and wailing, acts usually associated by early Muslim authors with women—are forbidden to Muslims. Most jurists do not forbid women’s attendance at funerals, however.
To conclude this overview of normative Islam’s ritual practices, mention must finally be made of the subject of jihad, which is often included in the jurists’ manuals on ‘ibada and is sometimes referred to as a “sixth pillar of Islam.” Both in and outside of Muslim circles, there has been considerable discussion regarding the “true” nature of jihad—particularly since the birth of so-called Islamist groups—much of this has focused on whether its nature is primarily defensive or offensive. Historically, from the time of the Qur’an, jihad has always encompassed both spiritual and physical acts of exertion—providing a Muslim exerts him/herself “for the sake of God” (fi sabil li-llah).
Muslim ritual has so far been described in terms of a common source of material rooted primarily in, and generated through, the Qur’an and Sunna. Needless to say, not all interpretations of this material are identical. Rather, if we describe the daily experiences of Muslims in contrasting historical and geographical locations, it is not only possible, but necessary to speak of varying Islamic ritual traditions. For reasons of convenience, five alternative traditions are here identified: Shi’i, esoteric, folk, rationalist, and reformist.
From the outset, it should be acknowledged that several of these categories are labeled problematically. It is, in fact, erroneous to speak of esoteric, folk, rationalist or reformist interpretations of ritual as if these relate to authorities, and locations, alien to Sunnism and Shi’ism. Typically, esoteric interpretations of ritual are propounded by a wide range of Sufis, Isma’ilis, and other “gnostics” who perceive themselves as working within the wider Sunni or Shi’i traditions of Islam. Similarly, the category of acts here described as “folk” would not be described as “folkish” (sha’bi) by their practitioners, for whom such acts are often entirely orthodox. Rather, this label is applied by reformist Sunni Muslims, who point critically to the absence of such practices in the Qur’an and canonical hadith materials, and Western scholars who, for reasons of methodological convenience, are often willing to speak of “Great” (i.e. textual) and “Little” (i.e. popular/non-textual/folkloric) traditions of Islam. This caveat made, the following esoteric interpretations of ritual share a creativity and interior reflection rarely found in standard legal manuals and other sources; the folk rituals are not usually validated through appeals to the Qur’an, Sunna, or canonical textual traditions; and, despite their aim of recovering the spirit of early Islam, both rationalists and reformists introduce genuinely new aspects into their discussions of ritual.
Some differences in ritual behavior function—and seem always to have functioned—to distinguish Shi’is from Sunnis. The crux of the difference between Sunnis and Shi’is concerns the subject of leadership. Loyalty to their religious-political vision often informs the latter’s contrasting approaches to ritual. It explains, for instance, why in addition to the Makkan hajj Shi’is traditionally also perform pilgrimages to the shrine of “Ali ibn Abi Talib in Najaf as well as to those of their Imams in Karbala,” Kazimayn, Samarrah, and Mashhad. Similarly, by including the phrase “Aliyun wali allah” (“Ali is God’s friend”) in the call to prayer (adhan), many Shi’is embed their distinctive political allegiance within the most central of all Muslim rituals.
The festival of “Ashura, on the tenth day of the month of Muharram, commemorates the Shi’” version of Muslim history with singular clarity. While Sunnis prefer to remember this as the day on which God helped Moses lead the Israelites out of Egypt, Shi’is choose the same day to mourn the death of Husayn, the son of “Ali, at the battle of Karbala” (680 ce). Indeed, on ‘Ashura, thousands of Shi’is make the pilgrimage to the Imam Husayn mosque in “Iraq (which contains the shrine of Husayn as well as the mass grave of the seventy-two martyrs who died with him at Karbala”) to protest the injustice of Husayn’s death as well as the cruelties then inflicted upon his family and descendants. Shi’is have traditionally given expression to their experiences of suffering through acts of self-flagellation and chest beating. As it draws attention to a very painful moment in Muslim history and involves acts of self-inflicted violence, Sunnis have often criticized the Shi’i interpretation of ‘Ashura. The potential for these rituals to escalate into acts of political protest are well known and, under Reza Shah, were banned altogether in Iran.
Another key difference in Sunni and Shi’i attitudes to ritual concerns the threat posed by non-Muslims. There are, not surprisingly, specifically Shi’i interpretations of the doctrine of jihad. Some of these permit, and even exhort, Shi’is to wage jihad against Sunnis, on the grounds that the latter are not to be regarded as Muslims. Traditionally, however, Shi’is agree that their religious duty to perform military jihad has been placed on hold until the arrival of the mahdi (“divinely guided one”). A quite different, but still related aspect of Shi’i ritual thinking regards non-Muslims as ritually polluting (i.e. as a form of najasa). This opinion is known among Sunni scholars, but is generally rejected on the grounds that the Qur’an’s description of “the hypocrites” (al-mushrikun) as “filthy” (najasin; Q. 9:27) should be interpreted metaphorically, so as to refer to these hypocrites’ spiritual impurity. Most Shi’is, by contrast, choose to interpret the same verse literally. In their view, all non-Muslims (not only hypocrites) are ritually polluting. Ritually observant Muslims should, therefore, wash after coming into contact with them. (A minority of Shi’is even recommend purification following contact with Sunnis.) By the same logic, Shi’is generally insist that, if it is to be eaten, an animal must always be slaughtered by a Muslim. Sunni authorities, it should be noted, tend to be less troubled by non-Muslim involvement in the preparation of food and generally permit for consumption the meat of animals slaughtered by Jews, Christians, and Magians (although not by polytheists, atheists, or apostates).
The extent to which Sunnis and Shi’is disagree in matters of ritual should not be exaggerated; nor should all such differences be explained in light of ideology. The tendency, for instance, of some Shi’is (particularly among the Isma’ilis) to worship three, rather than five times a day, and of the vast majority of Shi’is to wipe, rather than wash their feet during the performance of wudu’ serves no obvious ideological purpose. It is, rather, the result of long-standing exegetical disagreements.
Normative Sunni legal tradition does not seek to explain why, precisely, Muslims should perform the five pillars and other acts of worship. For the overwhelming majority of jurists, it is enough merely to note that the ‘ibadat have been prescribed by Scripture and/or Sunna. The underlying logic that may be served by performing the same rituals is generally glossed over; and the latter are referred as “ta’abbudi”—“inscrutable acts of worship,” whose logic can only truly be understood by God. Sufis—many of whom have also been viewed as legal authorities—are generally more willing to explore the spiritual benefits and peculiar logic of Muslim ritual practice.
Undoubtedly the most famous exploration of the inner workings of Islamic ritual was written by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111 ce), the Sufi master who, through his Ihya’ “Ulum al-Din (‘Revivification of the Religious Sciences’), is often credited with successfully synthesizing the fields of Sufism and Islamic law. The Ihya” contains four books, the first of which is dedicated to the ‘ibadat. In this, al-Ghazali makes a sustained attempt to describe the spiritual riches he perceives to reside at the core of Islam’s complex ritual code. Anchoring his discussions of ritual activity in the moral dispositions he wishes to inculcate, Al-Ghazali’s approach to ritual is largely pragmatic and didactic. Accordingly, the technical details as well as the merits of prayer are accompanied by lengthy expositions on the importance of performing the prayers and other ‘ibadat with “presence of heart,” and full “comprehension.”
More creative readings of Islam’s ritual material are available courtesy of other Sufis. In al-Futuhat al-Makiyya (The Makkan Openings), the Andalusian mystic and theorist, Ibn al-ʾArabi (d. 1240), interprets the jurists’ contrasting rulings on the hadath and najasat forms of impurity along entirely metaphorical lines. Hadath impurity is thereby linked to any act that leads a believer to doubt his/her connection to God; najasah impurity, meanwhile, is tied to specific and “blameworthy character traits.” Few Sufis are more controversial than Ibn al-’Arabi, but Mansur al-Hallaj (ex. 922) is one of them. His interpretation of the hajj—allegedly rejecting its obligatory status on the grounds that Muslims should proceed seven times around the Ka’ba of their own hearts—led to the accusation that he sympathized with the Qarmati rebels who, at the time, were intent on desecrating Makka and the Ka’ba itself. Uniting the writings of each of these Sufi authorities is the conviction that ritual action carries a largely symbolic value. In the Sufis’ view, the “true” meaning of ritual lies in its capacity to protect and revive the mysterious connection between God and the hearts of His believers.
In addition to their willingness to explore its inner meanings, the Sufis construct formal settings and strategies within which ritual practice enables Muslims to attain a sense of “nearness to God” (taqarrub ila Allah). The importance of remembering God through the repetition of His Names (dhikr) is, for instance, mentioned in numerous hadiths, but it was through the Sufi branches (tariqas) that this practice was systematically developed, as a way for Muslims to achieve spiritual enlightenment. Other practices are also uniquely Sufi. The term “sama’” is linked etymologically to “listening,” but refers to a range of acts involving the playing of music, chanting, reciting poetry, and dance. As with dhikr, the aim of such practices is to encourage in believers a heightened sense of devotion—through which their own identities are lost in an experience of the divine. Such practices have traditionally taken place in Sufi “lodges” (khanqat/zawiyat), the most important of which were built close to the shrines of the founders of the Sufi branches.
Like the Sufis, Isma’ili Shi’is understand each ritual act to carry both “interior” (batini) and “exterior” (zahiri) aspects, while invariably prioritizing the latter. Their insistence on explaining Islam’s ritual materials in terms of its innermost meanings has important ramifications. Instead of describing the paying of zakat as an act of charity, for instance, the Isma’ilis treat it primarily as a form of purification. Given that the root meaning of the term zakat is “purity,” the inference is logical. Relying on the mechanism of ta’wil (exegesis), other Isma’ili readings are bolder. The key work in the Isma’ili Ta’wil tradition is, undoubtedly, al-Qadi al-Nu’man’s (d. 974) Ta’wil al-da’a’im al-islam (Exegesis of the Pillars of Islam). According to this work, the meanings of all ‘ibadat are rooted in (and presented through) the doctrine of walaya (devotion to the Imams).
Historically, there have always existed ritual practices the authority of which is derived primarily from custom or popular practice (‘urf), and not from the canonical textual traditions (of either Sunnism or Shi’ism). The mawalid festivals celebrating the birthday of the Prophet, for instance, first appeared in the 12th century ce; they cannot, therefore, be explained in relation to the Sunna. Typically involving feasting and recitals, the mawlid rituals soon came to be celebrated not only on the Prophet’s birthday, but also on those of saints, as well as for other events, such as marriages, childbirth, and death.
The mawalid are most popular in Sufi circles and, while most Sufi elites have been careful to ground their interpretations and practices in orthodoxy, these circles have often syncretically absorbed aspects from the peripheries of Islam and even from non-Muslim local cultures. This is the case, for instance, among the Gnawa people in Morocco whose traditional Animist beliefs and practices inform their Sufi identity. It is, in turn, very possible that the Gnawa influenced the resident Sufi orders such as the Hamdushiyya. Writing about this order in the 1970s, the anthropologist Vincent Crapanzano described it as composed of the “illiterate masses” who indulged in “wild dances including ecstatic, frenetic trances…eating spiny cactus…charming poisonous snakes; and innumerable acts of self-mutilation” (Crapanzo, 1973: 3). Similarly non-orthodox ritual activities can be found among Sufis orders in diverse settings across the Muslim world.
While orthodox Islam acknowledges the existence of a spirit realm populated by jinn, folk rituals often show a heightened concern with what happens when creatures from the spirit realm intrude into the mortal realm. This concern explains the wealth of ritual remedies for the deleterious effects of spirit possession and, most commonly, the Evil Eye. In addition to the usual, canonically-endorsed prescriptions (reading specific Qur’anic passages and performing the ablutions), folk remedies typically extend to the wearing of talismans and amulets. Perhaps the best known of the folk rituals is the “zar,” which continues to be performed, mostly by women, throughout East Africa and the Middle East. Often referred to incorrectly as an exorcism, the ritual pacifies the “visiting” spirit—the word “zar” means “visiting”—and brings relief to the individual in whom it dwells. The zar is rejected by almost all Muslim legal authorities, past and present, as insufficiently Islamic in nature.
Just as many jurists describe Islam’s ritual duties as “ta’abbudi” (“inscrutable acts of worship”), so they often describe the origins of these duties as “ghayr ma’qul,” lacking any rational explanation. There have always been voices, however, which prefer to explain Islam’s rituals along rational lines. A single example proves the point: in his Bidayat al-mujtahid wa nihayat al-muqtasid, the Maliki jurist and philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) recalls with appreciation the explanation of his grandfather as to why Muslims are expected to wash a vessel from which a dog has drunk seven times with water (and, some say, an eighth with sand). According to Ibn Rushd senior, this was to prevent the spread of rabies.
Rational explanations of Muslim ritual have increased since the nineteenth century as believers have come under increasing pressure to justify their devotional practices in ways that make sense to “the modern mind.” Recent examples of the rationalist tendency have emerged from the Muslim medical fraternity and, in particular, from within the growing field of Islamic bioethics. Here, the ‘ibadat are explored through—and sometimes reduced to—their medical benefits. The acts performed during salat, for instance, are applauded for improving fitness levels and blood circulation, strengthening and increasing mobility in the joints, aiding cerebral circulation and postural reflex; and the fast during Ramadan, the dietary laws and prohibitions on alcohol and drugs, are similarly presented as encouraging a healthy, rigorously monitored lifestyle.
Given that many of the specialists writing in the field of Islamic bioethics are trained in Western institutions and environments—where it is often presented as a cruelty—the fast rising number of works in defense of the practice of ritual slaughter is perhaps not surprising. Here, the consensus seems to be that, by advocating for animals to be treated gently, never slaughtered in the sight of other animals, and dispatched only by an expert using a sharp blade, Islam’s legal authorities have long demonstrated an awareness that animals should not suffer needlessly. It is understood that such awareness should extend into the modern period and, providing it does not kill the animal outright, many Muslim jurists permit animals to be stunned before they are slaughtered.
While also striving to make sense of Islam’s ritual obligations in the face of secular modernity’s perceived attack, the approach of Muslim reformists to ritual is very different. These scholars reengage with the classical tradition to salvage what they understand to be the pristine forms of Islam’s ritual practices, so that today’s Muslims may once again fully benefit from these. (As with the Rationalist approach, it is possible to find examples of this Reformist tendency throughout Muslim history.) The modern reformist movement that is most interested in the sphere of ritual is Salafism, the roots of which lie, inter alia, in both the anti-Sufi stance of the Wahhabi movement and in the writings of certain 19th century revivalist scholars, such as Muhammad ‘Abdu (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935).
Echoing ‘Abdu and Rida in their call for ijtihad, most modern Salafi authorities reject the “blind” imitation (taqlid) of Islam’s canonical authorities in matters of ritual practice. Further, the Salafis place great emphasis on the correct technical performance of ritual. To correct the errors he spots in Sunni Islam’s canonical works, the most influential of modern Salafi ritual authorities, Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), recommends a number of marginal and, on occasion, entirely new rulings. Appearing in works such as Sifat salat al-nabi: ka’annaka taraha (The Characteristics of the Prophet’s Prayer: as if you are witnessing it [yourself]), al-Albani’s modifications may seem insignificant. His assertion that, unless they follow his recommendations, Muslims will not reap the customary rewards for their devotional practices has nevertheless left many in traditional Muslim communities reeling.
Islam’s ritual sphere contains rules clearly intended to promote solidarity among believers, while concomitantly defining the boundary lines separating Muslims from non-Muslims. Regarding the former impulse, as is well known, political and/or monarchical hierarchies are rarely articulated through normative Muslim interpretations of ritual. The observation that “there is no priesthood in Islam” has been over-used, but is generally accurate. Regardless of status, the canonical legal texts recommend that all male Muslims perform their prayers side by side. For the Sunni jurists, the prayer leader is merely the man who is most qualified to recite the Qur’an. The strongest example of the communal nature of Islamic ritual is the hajj, during which all participants enact the mythic Abrahamic narrative in identical fashion.
It is nevertheless possible to find internal hierarchies generated through some Muslim ritual practices. When gender is a factor, as it often is, the emphasis of the classical textual traditions of both Sunnis and Shi’is is perhaps to sideline, rather than subordinate women through ritual strategies. This sidelining nevertheless reflects a patriarchal perception of the religious landscape, where the sacred sphere is dominated, if not owned exclusively by men. As noted, women cannot lead men in prayers. Most authorities, for instance, prefer women to pray at home so as to avoid contact with men. If a woman visits the mosque to pray, she must do so behind the rows of men or in a separate area. Similarly, the jurists prefer women not to attend funerals and permit only men to attend the burial itself. Interestingly, in communal burials, women receive preferential treatment: they are to be buried closest to Makka and the Ka’ba; men by contrast are buried further away, as “a shield for the dead women” (Halevi, 2007: 181).
The closest thing to gender hierarchization in the sphere of Muslim ritual is to be found in its purity laws. Ritual restrictions associated with a woman’s menstrual and lochial bleeding—she is not permitted to pray, circumambulate the Ka’ab, and touch or recite from the Qur’an—are not presented as punishments; and all restrictions cease when her bleeding stops (if bleeding continues beyond the maximum number of days the same woman is permitted to perform all ritual duties). There are, however, certain undeniably harsh reports in canonical hadith collections in which menstruation is described as the cause of women’s “deficiency” in religion, and even the reason that “the majority of the inhabitants of hell” are women. The existence of these hadiths have doubtless contributed to the widespread belief that a woman’s intrinsic ritual (and therefore moral and spiritual) condition is inferior to that of men, who ‘providing they perform their ablutions’ face no prohibitions.
As noted, religious-social/political hierarchies tend not to be reinforced through regulations pertaining to the ‘ibadat. This is particularly true in Sunni legal tradition. Despite the fact that prayers are regularly invoked upon the ruler during Friday prayers, most jurists refuse to recognize the legitimacy of this practice through the Qur’an or Sunna. In practice, the same scholars have tolerated blessings being invoked upon the political leaders during Friday prayers for practical reasons, but they do not do so as a matter of doctrine. The situation in Shi’ism is different: Shi’i authorities argue that an ordinary Muslim’s acts of worship are invalid if s/he did not emulate a jurisconsult (mujtahid) in performing them. Often in a minority, Shi’is have needed to negotiate Sunni ritual schedules without causing offense. There are reports of the imams counseling Shi’is to attend Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, but to transform their ritual into an individual noon prayer by completing two rak’as after the imam finishes praying. Sunnis in the vicinity may choose to turn a blind eye or, as happened in 14th century Madina when the Shafi’i imam Ibn al-Amyuti left the pulpit to beat a Shi’i votary for attempting to perform two supererogatory prayers on the sly, they may choose to confront the ritual participant (for this reference, see Katz, 2013: 136).
In the present discussion, it is worth noting that, in practice, figures of ritual authority often enjoy more importance within the interior, esoteric, and popular approaches than in the normative Sunni tradition. In both Sufi and Shi’i ritual contexts, for instance, the holy man is perceived as inheriting the spiritual and miracle making powers of the Prophet. His blessings (barakat) are sought in person and later in visits to his shrine; and his clothes, relics, and/or bodily emissions transmit his baraka to those fortunate enough to come into contact with them. Such veneration, in practical terms, guarantees that ordinary Sufis are expected to demonstrate full obedience to their shaykhs. Indeed, as the poet and mystic Rumi (d. 1273) observes: “anyone who obeys the order of the master is liberated from darkness, and becomes illuminated” (cited in Netton, 2000: 11). The dual conviction that the Sufi shaykh is capable of performing miracles and is deserving of complete obedience is often targeted by critics of Sufism. And on many occasions the elevation of the figure of shaykh over the ordinary Sufi is ritually dramatized. The long-since banned dawsa (“stepping”) ritual of traditional Egyptian mawalid—which involved the shaykh of the Sa’diya tariqa riding his horse over the backs of believers who, after prostrating themselves in front of him, were expected to miraculously arise unhurt—provides one example of this form of dramatization.
Turning to the canonical textual traditions, it is easier to locate examples of rituals that reinforce the Muslim community’s external (rather than internal) boundary lines. Such rituals serve to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. The Qur’anic description of polytheists as “impure” (najisun), a term that the majority of Shi’is (and a minority of Sunnis) interpret literally to require Muslims to wash after coming into contact with all non-believers, has already been mentioned. The Qur’an is particularly interested in defining Muslim relations to Jews and Christians and records the symbolic moment when the direction of the qibla (i.e. the direction of the Ka’ba to which Muslims turn in prayer) moved from Jerusalem to Makka (Q. 2: 143). Warning Muslims never to take them as “friends” (awliya’; Q. 5:51), the Qur’an nevertheless allows for considerable interaction between Muslims and the People of the Book, permitting them to share each other’s food and even to intermarry (Q. 5:5).
During the first three centuries of Islam, when Arab (and other) Muslims found themselves in a variety of new geographical contexts, interacting with people from very different backgrounds, the message that Muslim ritual should function to protect the boundaries of the early community was explicitly reinforced. Indeed, there is an entire corpus of “tashabbuh” (“imitation”) literature, often concerned with acts of ritual, in which Muslims are instructed not only to avoid any resemblance in behavior or appearance to non-Muslims, but also to forbid non-Muslims from seeking to resemble them. The key text in the canonical tradition is the Pact of ‘Umar—a series of conditions allegedly laid down by ‘Umar ibn Khattab (d. 644 ce) to the Christian occupants of Jerusalem when he conquered the city—in which Christians agree not to exhibit their religion in public, raise their voice at prayer time, build churches taller than mosques, and so forth.
Most legal discussions delineating the appropriate degree of interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly People of the Book, take place in the chapters on purity and dietary restrictions. In general, Sunnis permit believers to drink from the vessels of Jews and Christians and to eat meat slaughtered by their butchers; some extend this position to include the vessels and meat of polytheists. By contrast, very few Shi’i authorities permit believers to do so. Yet both Sunni and (to a far greater degree) Shi’i traditions leave Muslims, if they choose to do so, with the potential to define their boundary lines through purity and dietary restrictions. It is probable that accusations of contagious impurity against non-Muslims have been routinely heard in places where Muslims and non-Muslims are compelled to mix, particularly in times of tension.
Islamic ritual generated little interest among scholars of Islam until relatively recently. The conviction that Islamic ritual practices and the laws surrounding these were simply borrowed from pre-existing Jewish, Christian, and/or Pre-Islamic Arabian ritual systems to no small degree explains their lack of interest. It was not until a series of anthropological studies were published in the 1960s and 70s that the study of Islamic ritual, as a subject of interest in its own right, gained any sort of momentum.1
Communication between Islamicists and anthropologists remains sparse. However, since the 1980s, there has been a growing awareness among scholars in both camps that the study of Islamic ritual would be greatly strengthened if information was shared more often. At least some Islamicists have now incorporated anthropological theories (particularly regarding standard themes, such as purity, sacredness, and liminality) into their analyses of ritual in Islam’s textual traditions. Concomitantly, a growing number of anthropologists take seriously Talal Asad’s theory of Islam as a “discursive tradition,” “which includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith” (Asad, 1986: 14). Although open to criticism for different reasons, Asad’s theory stands as a corrective to the approaches of a previous generation of anthropologists who preferred to describe “local” (usually exotic) practices in isolation from Islam’s dominant traditions of textual authority. The same theory has inspired scholars to investigate (a plethora of discussions surrounding) ritual in the construction of Muslim identity in a number of contemporary settings. Future analyses of Islamic ritual—whether written by Islamicists or anthropologists—should eschew neither the importance of the textual traditions from which these reflections arise, nor the existence of comparative data within which to situate one’s findings.
There are other challenges. A growing body of work by Islamicists demonstrates the benefits of incorporating legal texts on ritual into their analyses of past Muslim societies. To date, these studies have almost exclusively focused on Sunni legal attitudes to ritual purity, prayer, fasting, or funeral rites so as to speak about the historical contexts within which these attitudes were expressed. Few, if any seek to combine their findings so as to speak holistically of entire (ritual) landscapes. More worryingly, there remains very little written among Islamicists about the ritual laws of Islam’s minorities. Shi’i ritual law, in particular, merits far more attention.
Many Muslims in today’s world reflect with unparalleled sincerity on the role of ritual practice in their lives. Steadfast perhaps in the conviction that ritual performance is all that matters, few anthropologists pause to consider the influence of social media in shaping Muslim attitudes to ritual. Yet rationalist and reformist authorities both develop their arguments and contest those of their opponents online. Salafi authorities, moreover, reenact their (often idiosyncratic, “elite” versions of Muslim) rituals on television shows, calling upon their audience members to join in. The fact that “virtual” Muslim ritual communities have now been formed represents an intriguing prospect for future study.