EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION: THE PEOPLE MADE THE PEACE
KARIN AGUILARSAN JUAN AND FRANK JOYCE
Students were shot dead.1 Hundreds of thousands of citizens from all walks of life marched in the streets—repeatedly. Civil disobedience took place on a scale never seen before in U.S. history. Draft cards were burned, and draft board offices were non-violently attacked. Entertainers who opposed the War had TV shows and performances canceled in retaliation. Soldiers rebelled against their commanders. At least eight U.S. Americans immolated themselves in public places. Fed up with their own government, ordinary people became diplomats and reporters, meeting face-to-face with the Vietnamese enemy in Viet Nam and other locations around the world.2 Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger later said that the antiwar movement rubbed President Nixon’s rawest nerve.
The fact that a movement against the Vietnam War came into being in the first place is something of a miracle. Majority support for war has been the rule throughout U.S. history; mass opposition to war has been the exception.
To be clear, virtually every U.S. war has faced opposition. But the Vietnam War stands out. What made it different? What forces called an antiwar movement into existence? Did the antiwar movement help to end the War? If so, how? How do the activists who opposed the Vietnam War understand “Vietnam” today, as an era, a war, a country, and a people?
This book addresses these questions and more. The People Make the Peace features the reflections and analyses of nine activists who made wartime trips to Viet Nam. The authors of this book tell many stories that are previously untold. They address issues of how the War affected them and how it affected our society that every generation needs to consider.
While each person’s journey differs in its specific details, circumstances, and lasting impact, all share a high degree of moral conviction and political courage. During the War they went to Viet Nam to learn about the Vietnamese people and to observe first-hand the terrible impact of the War. Looking back now, each of them sees their encounters with the Vietnamese land and people, devastated by war yet determined to set their own future, as a defining and instructive moment in their lives.
In 2013, the group that playfully came to refer to itself as the “Hanoi 9” returned to Viet Nam to participate in observances of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. That trip was a major force behind this book.
The Vietnam War
How far back do we need to go to trace the origins of the Vietnam War? We share the view that the Vietnam War came at the end of an arc of U.S. imperialism in Asia and the Pacific.3 From the settler colonial conquest of the West on to Hawaii, the Philippines and beyond, the U.S. military has a long history of brutality. All of which comes wrapped in an alibi of Western benevolence and tutelage.4
As World War II ended, a new set of “Cold War” animosities emerged, led on the capitalist side by the United States and Europe; and on the communist side by the USSR and China. Viet Nam was among the many Third World nations that, having recently fought off their colonial masters, sought to remain neutral with regard to the Cold War superpowers. But instead of achieving freedom from French rule and garnering U.S. support for their independent status, the Vietnamese found the United States inserting itself into the role of substitute colonizer. In convincing ways, Jeffrey Kimball establishes that it was Nixon’s war, because of all the U.S. presidents, he had the longest tie to it. Nixon, as a young vice president in the Eisenhower administration, got invested in his own personal Vietnam War as early as 1953.5 John F. Kennedy observed the seeds of U.S. war in Viet Nam in the 1950s. Fredrik Logevall traces the path of Kennedy, then a congressman from Massachusetts, on a trip with his siblings to Saigon in 1951. Even then, the Kennedys saw the United States taking on the mantle of colonialism, and they knew that the picture did not have a bright future.6 Historians debate whether Kennedy would have ended the War earlier had he not been killed in 1963.
Everyone knows how this story ends. The United States ultimately failed in its war objectives and was forced to withdraw in April 1975. North and South Viet Nam were reunified as the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; 29 years later, Viet Nam became a significant participant in the global economy. But debates still rage about the origins, meaning, purpose, impact, legacies, and implications of the Vietnam War. Nearly all of those debates focus on the consequences for U.S. history and policy. For some, the devastating results for Viet Nam may be too much to consider. Jimmy Carter declared the damage from the Vietnam War to be “mutual,” a message that simultaneously points to U.S. vulnerability and to the War’s devastating impact on the Vietnamese people.
The War produced at least one legislative consequence: The War Powers Resolution of 1973—also referred to as the War Powers Act—which sought to limit the power of the president to commit U.S. forces to combat without the authorization of Congress. Nixon tried unsuccessfully to veto it. This resolution came as a response to Nixon’s escalation of ground and air troops in the Vietnam War and could be interpreted as an achievement of the grassroots antiwar movement. Most U.S. presidents abide by the spirit of this resolution while also claiming they are not required to do so.7 Yet the War Powers Resolution did not prevent the U.S. government from: ousting Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende, in 1973; backing up a dictator in the Philippines from the early 1970s to 1986; or cozying up to F. W. de Klerk’s regime of apartheid in South Africa, just to name a few interventions from that era. As this book was being written, President Barack Obama was trying to get Congress to authorize U.S. attacks on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) while continuing U.S. engagement in several other conflicts in the Middle East.
Since the Vietnam War ended, successive U.S. leaders have had to contend with the “Vietnam syndrome,” a hesitation to commit troops to combat and thus repeat the mistakes of that War. In fact, successive presidents from Jimmy Carter to Bill Clinton have twisted the meaning and public memory of the Vietnam War in order to develop a new justification for military intervention abroad. Ronald Reagan called the Vietnam War a “noble” and “just cause.” Subsequently, the U.S. government engaged in low-intensity warfare in El Salvador and throughout Central America, prompting a new antiwar slogan “El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam.” Upon sending troops to the Gulf War in 1991, George H.W. Bush exclaimed, “It’s a proud day for America. And, by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”8
President Obama sings in that choir too. On May 28, 2012, in a speech aimed at Vietnam War veterans, he said, “You were often blamed for a war you didn’t start, when you should have been commended for serving your country with valor. You were sometimes blamed for misdeeds of a few, when the honorable service of the many should have been praised. You came home and sometimes were denigrated, when you should have been celebrated.” The president went on to endorse the mythical widespread mistreatment of returning Vietnam veterans as “a national shame and a disgrace that should never have happened” and to accuse the Vietnamese of brutality. He also issued a proclamation calling for “a 13-year program to honor and give thanks to a generation of proud Americans who saw our country through one of the most challenging missions we have ever faced.”9
The Vietnam Antiwar Movement
If you have seen the movie Forrest Gump (1994), you probably remember the quote “life is like a box of chocolates.” Actually, the film is a box of propaganda, especially when it comes to how it portrays the antiwar movement. The movie is populated by caricatures: flag-wearing hippies; militant and sexist Black Panthers; and air-headed, would-be feminists. Forrest, a charming simpleton, never has a meaningful or specific discussion of the Vietnam War. But his sideways encounters with antiwar activists leave the distinct impression that the movement was wasteful, annoying, insignificant, and possibly unethical. For viewers who will go no further to investigate any other perspective, Forrest Gump serves as a main cultural and political lesson on the 1960s, creating disdain and hostility toward the antiwar movement. It is but one example of a sustained and multipronged effort to do so.
The truth is that the antiwar movement fomented and channeled opposition to the War, both from ordinary people and elites. Over time, the War became the anchor issue for activists, journalists, and politicians. Vietnam was the first televised war, but television alone did not create opposition to the War. As Susan Sontag pointed out, the TV showed the War, but TV viewers saw those images through the interpretive lens that the antiwar movement created through their struggles and protests.10
Between 1965 and 1968, Lyndon Johnson relied on the draft to build the number of U.S. troops in battle from 100,000 to 500,000.11 Draft resistance and conscientious objection became a key strategy of antiwar activists. The draft resulted in disproportionate numbers of working class, black, and Latino men fighting and dying in Vietnam. These inequities further enraged antiwar activists, who then targeted the race and class bias of draft deferments. Richard Nixon lowered overall troop numbers in part to defuse opposition to the draft. In 1973, the draft ended and was replaced by an all-volunteer service.
Julian Bond made an antiwar comic book after he was expelled from the Georgia House of Representative for his antiwar views.
Reproduced with permission of Julian Bond.
This poster connects Chicano struggles to the antiwar movement.
Artwork by Malaquias Montoya.
Filipino labor leader Philip Vera Cruz spoke at a Vietnam Moratorium in San Francisco, 1972.
Photo by Leon Sun.
Working alongside blacks in the civil-rights movement in the South provided a crucial learning experience for the young, mostly white university students who would later join the antiwar movement. Hundreds were recruited to join the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project; in their poignant letters home, they describe transformative, eye-opening moments confronting institutionalized white racism and state-sponsored violence.12 The connections between Jim Crow in the South and the U.S. war in Viet Nam were not lost on them. One white project volunteer asked a Justice Department official: “How is it that the government can protect the Vietnamese from the Vietcong, and the same government will not accept the moral responsibility of protecting the people of Mississippi?”13
The antiwar movement is generally treated as white turf, yet people of color—black, Latino/Chicano, Native/indigenous, and Asian—also actively opposed the War.14 In the late 1950s, leaders including Ella Baker and Bayard Rustin connected U.S. racial justice issues to anticolonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Later, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) clarified the links between “the suppression of Blacks’ political rights and the continued violence in the South as part of the larger U.S. war against nonwhites, including Vietnam.”15 In April 1967, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King delivered his powerful speech against the War, denouncing the United States as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world.” An editorial in the New York Times headlined “Dr. King’s Error,” denounced the speech. As explained in Death of a King by Tavis Smiley, other establishment figures and institutions piled on.16 Even some of King’s allies thought he was putting the civil rights movement in jeopardy. One year later to the day, he was assassinated. And today the United States is still “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world.”
Vietnamese foreign students on U.S. campuses organized against the War, 1972.
Image courtesy of Steve Louie.
By looking at the Vietnam War as part of an extended arc of U.S. imperialism in Asia, we surface the historic and material connection between U.S. wars and Asian-American populations. Yet many people continue to ignore Asian-American participation in the antiwar movement. Actually, the Vietnam War provided a catalyst for a pan-ethnic Asian-American social consciousness. For example, Philip Vera Cruz was a leader of the Filipino farmworkers, and a key organizer in the Delano grape boycott of 1965. By speaking up at an antiwar rally organized by Asian-American activists, Vera Cruz helped to solidify a feeling of a shared racial bond.
Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino Americans who served as soldiers in the War saw themselves in the faces of the so-called “enemy.” They personally experienced the contradiction between their status as U.S. citizens, and the way their battalions treated them—sometimes as target practice.17 Indeed, the racism directed against Vietnamese people during the War served as a wakeup call that propelled many Asian Americans—students, intellectuals, laborers, and cultural workers—to embrace Viet Nam as a symbol of “third world” peoples and struggles all over the world.18
Toward the end of the War, at least 2,000 Vietnamese foreign students based on various U.S. campuses organized themselves into the Union of Vietnamese. Their antiwar position crystalized after the 1972 murder of Nguyen Thai Binh, a student of fishery at the University of Washington. On graduation day, Binh walked across the stage, shed his black gown, and revealed a demand to stop the War, written in his own blood. He was then deported to South Vietnam. At the airport in Sai Gon, he was shot dead. His death spurred his peers to hold a memorial for him and to form alliances with other U.S. liberation struggles.19
The first large-scale protests organized against the War by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) were triggered by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1965 air bombing campaign called Operation Rolling Thunder. Like all social movements, this one grew in phases. The phases involved: selecting and framing the issues, establishing decision-making processes, developing expertise, finding a common denominator among many conflicting viewpoints, attacking dominant values and assumptions, and sustaining participation. Sometimes, the goal was to mobilize public opinion about a specific aspect of the War or the draft; at other times, it was to provoke a response from policy makers at the highest levels of the government. Always, the ultimate aim was to stop the bombing, negotiate for peace, and end the War.
Framing and isolating the War with a “single issue” point of focus is one way that the antiwar movement became a primarily white movement rather than a multiracial coalition. That is why black antiwar activists in Committee Organized for Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Black Panthers criticized white activists for being unable to include the broader concerns and experience of black communities.20 The single-issue focus clarified the goals and objectives of the movement, but it also narrowed the agenda. Precisely how did U.S. military aggression abroad connect to domestic urban growth and social control? Once the bombing ended and the U.S. troops were withdrawn, in whose hands would the responsibility for the long-lasting damage and destruction fall? Racism and patriarchy shaped antiwar activism back then, and continues to shape how we look at the movement and the Vietnam War today.
The Vietnam antiwar movement was most visible on streets and campuses, but antiwar sentiment also influenced the political atmosphere in the upper echelons of society, in newsrooms, inside the halls of Congress, and even within the military itself. Some elite families were directly affected by the War, and the children of presidential staff showed up at antiwar rallies and protests. Mainstream journalists revealed civilian casualties and bombings that the Pentagon denied. As the War seemed to be less “winnable,” Congress proposed at least 10 resolutions to cut military funding. In March 1968, President Johnson’s unofficial group of senior advisors, called the “Wise Men,” told him that he should “take steps to disengage” from Vietnam. Days later, Johnson announced that the United States would enter into negotiations with North Vietnam, and that he would not run for re-election. In March 1971, Daniel Ellsberg leaked the “Pentagon Papers” to the New York Times, a secret study commissioned by Robert McNamara about the poor decision-making behind the War. Nixon tried to suppress Ellsberg and the New York Times, which triggered events leading to the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s impeachment.
At the grassroots level, the antiwar movement was subjected to repression through various means, including Operation CHAOS and COINTELPRO. The CIA, the FBI, and local police departments infiltrated, harassed, threatened, and provoked activists for expressing their opposition to the War and for encouraging others to do so. Although the act of gathering in public places is theoretically protected by the Constitution, the government prepared itself for large antiwar protests at the Capitol by amassing tens of thousands of fully armed city police, National Guardsmen, and even federal troops.21
One way to examine the antiwar movement would be to present a chronology listing all of its major public events—rallies, marches, sit-ins, teach-ins, moratoria, and more. Besides the huge gatherings in Washington D.C. organized by SDS and Mobe (Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam), this list would include: the Chicago Conspiracy Trial after the 1968 Democratic National Convention; the Yippies humorously running a pig named “Pigasus” for president and attempting to levitate the Pentagon in 1967; and the first coordinated act of non-violence against the draft by the “Catonsville 9,” a group of Catholic priests and nuns who broke into a Selective Service agency, poured blood on the files, burned them with homemade napalm, and then waited calmly for the police to arrest them and take them to jail. A complete list would also mention the GI “coffee houses” where feelings of anger and betrayal among the ranks of the military fed the antiwar movement.22 In 1971, more than a thousand veterans staged “Operation Dewey Canyon III,” an action sarcastically described as “a limited incursion into the country of Congress.” The five-day event organized by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War dramatically closed as decorated soldiers took their medals and hurled them onto the steps of the Capitol. The symbolism of this act was effective and long-lasting.
Like a fast-moving trailer for a feature film, this chronology presents fascinating snapshots of the movement. But it does not reveal or emphasize the subtle details behind the scenes, or tell what it really meant to be involved in creating the movement and keeping it going. Wholeheartedly investing themselves in the movement against the War, many activists were themselves transformed, and the impact of the historical moment was forever imprinted on their lives.
While the movement is generally portrayed by its protests, there was far more to it than that. This book offers an extensive discussion of the People’s Peace Treaty, a remarkable story of people’s diplomacy that even Melvin Small—a skeptic when it comes to the achievements of the antiwar movement—describes as “the most innovative approach to ending the war.”23 Fed up with the glacial pace of negotiations led by the older generation, the student organizers of the People’s Peace Treaty took matters into their own hands. The simple and direct language they crafted for ending the War came about as they met face-to-face and discussed together across the United States, South Viet Nam, and North Viet Nam. The authors of this section speak from direct experience, a perspective on the People’s Peace Treaty that has never been published as far as we know.
As the nation learned more and more about the scope and brutality of military operations—not only in Viet Nam but Laos and Cambodia as well—skepticism, mistrust of the U.S. government’s reports on the War, and outright opposition grew larger still.
Increasingly, that opposition penetrated the military itself. An accomplished journalist for the Washington Post and author of Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation (2002), Myra MacPherson toured Viet Nam in 2013 with five U.S. veterans, ex-soldiers who now live in Viet Nam. In Chapter 9, she tells the stories of this “band of brothers in peace”—a poet, an ex-cop, a former gang member, a psychiatric social worker, and a former aid to a U.S. senator. Today, each is dedicated in his own way to dealing with the most painful legacies of the War, including widespread contamination from Agent Orange. Their examples shine a new light on the ideals of military service, and on the patriotism and brotherly love that is often touted as a sustaining force among troops in combat in Vietnam.
As the War dragged on, the Vietnamese were so effective on the battlefield and the opposition became so intense within the United States that the U.S. government was compelled to open the formal peace talks that ultimately resulted in the Paris Peace Accords, which was signed in 1973. To some, then and now, it might seem that escalating opposition to the War was some accidental mood shift. This book shows otherwise. Relating their own personal experiences as leaders of the antiwar movement, the authors in this book offer first-hand and concrete examples of innovative strategies and tactics they devised to express public opposition to the War and to challenge the war-makers’ version of what the War was about and how well it was going.
As it turned out, some of the worst consequences of U.S. military and foreign policy intervention happened in Laos and Cambodia. In the 1970s, Fred Branfman, an antiwar activist based in Laos, made crucial revelations about military operations that were being concealed by the U.S. government. Those returning from trips to Laos and Viet Nam brought home information about the effects of the War not being reported by either the government or the mainstream media.
The “Hanoi 9” represent thousands of others who eagerly interacted with the Vietnamese, not just for information unfiltered by media or the government, but for important human bonds across the boundaries of nation-states and ideologies. Even as antiwar activity in the United States has waned since the end of the Vietnam War, citizens still work to counteract the U.S. military juggernaut. From Latin America to the Middle East and beyond, “people’s diplomats” take trips, arrange conferences, make media, and bear witness in a multitude of efforts to change perceptions and policies.
Traveling to Viet Nam
Presidents Johnson and Nixon tried to discredit antiwar activists by claiming that they were “dupes,” spies in the service of international communism. But precisely because antiwar activists did not want to be mindless pawns for anyone, they purposefully searched beyond the conventional sources of news for the truth about the War. After Tom Hayden’s trip to Ha Noi in 1965, approximately 200 U.S. citizens followed his path, bypassing the Cold War travel ban implemented by the State Department so that they could meet face-to-face with Vietnamese people and see with their own eyes what the U.S. military was actually doing in Viet Nam. Neither journalists nor combatants, these travelers became known as “people’s” or “citizen” diplomats because they established an unofficial line of communication between the two countries.
The people’s diplomats represented a variety of peace or antiwar perspectives, social groups, and professional backgrounds. Many of them were prominent and influential cultural figures, such as writers, doctors, or entertainers. By going to Viet Nam and returning home with first-hand observations and anecdotes about the War, they became credible witnesses for the antiwar movement. They delivered speeches, made documentary films, and wrote books and essays that exposed the realities of U.S. military and political intervention in Viet Nam. Some also criticized the underlying attitudes and assumptions about what “winning” the War would mean. The travelers made practical connections, carrying mail between POWs and their families. In a few remarkable instances, the travelers took on even more serious responsibility, escorting POWs back to the United States. These communications with POWs were made possible by the Committee of Liaison with Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam, a group formed by Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in 1969.24 Over time, the people’s diplomats developed trustworthy international relationships that continue to shape the dialogue about the War even today.
Predictably, rather than take advantage of the unofficial diplomatic channel opened to Ha Noi by these travelers, the State Department either ignored or punished their efforts. Passports were revoked, then returned—but only after courts ruled in favor of the right to travel. Some became subjects of government investigation and surveillance because of their trip. Many people who might have considered the trip were deterred because of the potential backlash or harassment they expected to receive upon their return.25
Going to Viet Nam as a war witness presented other obstacles as well. In one direction, the trip required ten or more days of travel through three or more nations, boarding several different planes. To enter Ha Noi, travelers had to be flown in on tiny aircraft operated by the International Control Commission (ICC), a neutral agency composed of troops and officers from Poland, India, and Canada. Entering contested space, the ICC planes created a safe corridor meant to pause fighting on the ground and in the air. Once in Ha Noi, many travelers experienced war-time bombing by U.S. aircraft. For their protection, Vietnamese children and elders were evacuated to the countryside and remained there during the War. But the remaining residents of Ha Noi were on constant alert, driving at night time with their lights off, and ready to hide in bomb shelters at any moment during the day.
Traveling to Viet Nam as sympathetic observers was possible in large part because the Vietnamese in Ha Noi actively cultivated people’s diplomacy as a solution to their lack of access to international media. They arranged face-to-face encounters not only in Ha Noi, but also in Paris, Bratislava, and Canada.26 They established organizational structures to handle “delegations” of foreigners; for example, the Viet Nam Committee for Solidarity with American People met U.S. travelers at the airport and provided drivers, guides, and translators for the duration of their stay. Essentially, the Solidarity Committee created an antiwar travel-and-study circuit that kept travelers safe and yet allowed for an exchange of views and information that would have otherwise been forbidden. The international networks and friendships that were created by the dual efforts of the Vietnamese and sympathetic individuals around the world were a unique and distinctive aspect of the antiwar effort.
The “Hanoi 9”: Students, Rebels, Diplomats
With the exception of the five U.S. soldiers featured in Chapter 9, “Voices of Veterans: The Endless Tragedy of Vietnam,” all of the authors featured in this book visited Viet Nam during the War as representatives of the antiwar movement in the United States. In January 2013, this group returned to Viet Nam on a special trip that coincided with the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973.
The “Hanoi 9” were treated as special guests of the Vietnamese government because of their visible role in the U.S. antiwar movement. Among the invitation-only activities they joined: a government sponsored and nationally televised event commemorating the Paris Peace Accords that involved a police escort, a red carpet entrance, and a marching band; a brunch attended by President Truong Tan Sang and high-ranking members of the Communist Party; a tree-planting ceremony with the President; and a home-style dinner with Nguyen Thi Binh, known throughout the world as “Madame Binh.”27 The royal treatment that the U.S. travelers received in Viet Nam is diametrically opposite to the way they were treated in the United States during the years of the War. And certainly today, no branch of the current U.S. government has any intention of inviting them to anything.
After five days in Ha Noi, the group then headed south via train through Quang Tri and Da Nang before ending in Sai Gon/Ho Chi Minh City. Along the way, the group stopped to speak with local and provincial government leaders, veterans, and other community representatives. An important segment of the trip involved encounters with victims of Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance. Decades after the War, these effects still manifest in death, injury, illnesses, and physical defects in subsequent generations of the Vietnamese population. Being exposed to this most enduring consequence of the War enabled the group to see one way that they could extend the commitments they made in their youth into their current political agendas.
President Truong Tan Sang receives a framed photograph of the May Day March on Washington DC, 1971. Appearing from left to right: Nancy Kurshan, Frank Joyce, Rennie Davis, and John McAuliff.
Photo courtesy of Frank Joyce.
How the Trip Happened
The “Hanoi 9” project started in an ad hoc way. In 2006, the co-editors of this book met on a trip to Viet Nam led by the late Erwin Marquit, editor of the journal Nature, Society and Thought. We quickly discovered we had many things in common. Perhaps most important: we share an irreverent and active sense of humor that has served us well throughout the process of creating this book. Furthermore, despite quite different paths in life, we felt a love for Viet Nam and a hatred of the long, ugly history of U.S. imperialist and racist interventions. On top of that, from Frank’s lifetime of political activism in Detroit and Karin’s repeated visits to the city, they found much to discuss about Detroit’s role as an emerging multicultural, multiracial icon in the effort to create viable economic solutions to Detroit’s problems.
One conversation after another led to the idea of the timeliness and importance of looking back at the Vietnam antiwar movement and forward into the contemporary relationship between Americans and Vietnamese, including Americans of Vietnamese heritage. From that came the idea of focusing on those who had taken the considerable risks of traveling to Viet Nam during the War. Countless phone calls and emails later, eight other people came forward and the 2013 trip finally happened. The group was joined by six others who included scholars, a filmmaker, and spouses.
And yet, the “Hanoi 9” might not have made it to Viet Nam but for Frank’s encounter with John McAuliff at the 50th anniversary conference of SNCC in Raleigh, North Carolina, in April 2010. John and Frank were among those whites who shared experience in both the civil-rights and the antiwar movements. As McAuliff explains later in this book, he had developed and maintained relationships with many Vietnamese in the years since the War ended. Those ties were invaluable in planning the itinerary and the logistical details of bringing the visit together.
Last but by no mean least, the Viet Nam USA Friendship Society provided invaluable support for the trip. Bui Van Nghi, Secretary General of the Viet Nam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO), along with his colleagues who served as our hosts, guides, translators, and cultural interlocutors were all essential to the trip’s success.
As editors, we share important values and attitudes in common although our life stories and professional experiences differ greatly. For example, we are both interested and invested in the grassroots, multiracial struggles to rebuild Detroit. Frank, a lifelong Detroiter and trade union leader, actively participates as an elder white male in multiracial, intergenerational dialogues about community activism and urban development based in the Boggs Center and elsewhere. As a writer-activist and college professor, Karin developed an interest in Detroit and took her students there many times to experience Detroit Summer, a youth-oriented initiative to rebuild the city.
Being committed to Detroit means that when it comes to the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement, we both prioritize the multiracial/antiracist aspects of struggle. We both understand place-based struggles as a valuable paradigm for coalitions and solidarity work. It also means we each position ourselves in certain ways vis-à-vis the histories of people of color and other subjugated groups in the United States and around the globe. For Frank, it is important to identify and acknowledge the continuing dynamics of white supremacy in U.S. society. For Karin, it is important to connect as an Asian American, woman of color, and lesbian feminist.
In addition, we do not want to set off stereotypes about Vietnamese or for that matter other people of color as helpless populations in need of rescue by heroic white savior nations. We want to fill the void left by Forrest Gump but we do not want to perpetuate an idealized Western projection of revolution in place of a realistic assessment of a place, people, or struggle. The “Vietnam” of our memories needs to be in constant dialogue with the contemporary nation, culture, and diaspora of Viet Nam. We greatly appreciate the work of Ngô Vĩnh Long and other Vietnamese-American scholars and peace veterans who continue to explain and analyze contemporary developments in Viet Nam and in the U.S.–Viet Nam relationship.28
The Editors’ Perspective on the War and the Movement
As we tell the story of the antiwar movement, we are often torn between explanation and advocacy. In what circumstances do we need to explain what happened in literal terms, and when is it necessary to advocate for a particular angle on the story? In this introduction, we strive to balance a view that emphasizes on one side the long historical cycles of war, domination, exploitation, and repression, and on the other side, the continuing and overlapping struggles for peace and democracy. In other words, our interpretation of U.S. history leads us to expect the negative cycles to repeat over and over again. But we also recognize the traditions of rebellion and resistance especially among indigenous and enslaved peoples, migrant laborers, and poor and urban minorities. To borrow from Antonio Gramsci, we hope this project achieves a tricky combination of pessimism of the mind and optimism of the will.
The examples we provide show people who stood up against a colossal global power structure to fight for what they believed was right. They were not just “clicktivists” posting antiwar messages and collecting “friends” on Facebook. Yes, social media is a powerful tool for bringing people together as we saw during Occupy Wall Street and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. But during the Vietnam War, activists had to explain the consequences of the War without the Internet. They had to be able to present their ideas to people they did not know or necessarily like, and argue convincingly for a new way to look at the world. The antiwar movement gained traction because activists were able to shift people’s thoughts and feelings about the War. In return, the lives of antiwar activists were transformed.
We celebrate the accomplishments of the Vietnam antiwar movement knowing full well that it was also rife with conflict, factionalism, and everyday human flaws. Every struggle for justice in the course of U.S. history also bears the traces of the problems it is trying to solve; the antiwar movement was not alone in this shortcoming. But what propels this book forward is the hope that we do not mindlessly re-invent racism, sexism, homophobia, or other “isms” as we draw out the lessons of the Vietnam era.
We understand as well that climate change and many other problems demand our attention today. Consequently, neither the Vietnam War nor the antiwar movement ranks high on anyone’s agenda. One might even ask: Why look backward at all? The fact is that Vietnam antiwar movement was one of the most significant collective mobilizations of the twentieth century. Spanning from 1965 through 1971, the movement fomented so much dissent that observers refer to an “internal war” within the United States involving students, grassroots activists, liberal Establishment figures, business people, clergy, and the media.
Admittedly, current U.S. wars, especially those in the Middle East, differ from the Vietnam War in important ways. Viet Nam never attacked the United States; Al Qaeda did.
Furthermore, the U.S. military is not drafting soldiers to go to Iraq or Afghanistan, or other theaters of conflict. This alone merits further scrutiny, particularly because it is often argued that opposition to the War was primarily driven by a reluctance to serve. Draft resistance (called “dodging” by supporters of the War) and conscientious objection to the draft were huge components of the Vietnam antiwar movement.
In pointing this out, however, we do not intend to give in to the arguments made by supporters of the Vietnam War that the protests were merely an attempt to avoid the draft on the part of cowardly activists. Many draft resistors exhibited courage by their deeds. Thousands risked arrest and a significant number were imprisoned or otherwise punished. Widespread protests on college campuses invariably involved women who were not subject to the draft at all. For that matter, males on college campuses were among those best positioned to avoid the draft because of student deferments and other opportunities available to the more affluent. Yet in massive numbers, they opposed the War anyway. Furthermore, the Korean War was sold to the public in “WE MUST STOP COMMUNISM IN ITS TRACKS” terms virtually identical to the Vietnam War. The Korean War, too, had a massive draft. What it did not have was significant draft resistance.29
The contrast between the absence of opposition to the Korean War compared to the Vietnam War is indeed striking. Clearly the times were very different. If there was some sort of thermal imaging technology allowing satellites to register political dissent and upheaval, on any given day in the 1960s the planet would have been glowing bright red. Within the United States alone there was conflict over racism and civil rights; the place of women in relation to men; and the pay, benefits, and status of workers. Students in the United States and Europe took to the streets. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, people were throwing off the yoke of their colonial rulers. Across the globe, more and more people were sympathizing with the Vietnamese “David” taking on the U.S. “Goliath.”
Courtesy of Lincoln Cushing/Docs Populi.
Big social movements do not happen all the time—especially on the scale of the 1960s. They are the exception, not the rule, occurring every few decades, not every few years. Mass movements against war in the United States are especially unusual. To be clear, antiwar and pacifist sentiment in the United States has a long and proud tradition. A strain of what is often called isolationism has always been strong. Many U.S. Americans opposed involvement in World War II because they supported Hitler or Mussolini or both. Becoming a mass antiwar undertaking, however, is exceptional and, in that regard, the Vietnam opposition stands out.
This book recognizes and celebrates making face-to-face contact with the Vietnamese on the other side of the War as an essential component of the spirit of defiance that characterized what Tom Hayden has called the “long 1960s.” Herbert Aptheker, Tom Hayden, Staughton Lynd, Cora Weiss, Diane Nash, Joan Baez, Eldridge Cleaver, Noam Chomsky, and Susan Sontag were among the highly visible writers, activists, and intellectuals who went to Viet Nam not as combatants or journalists but as citizen-advocates for peace.
Their travels did not necessarily make them experts in Vietnamese culture or politics; in some cases, they realized that it was very hard to relate as Americans and as Westerners to the Vietnamese people they had hoped to befriend. But in the context of the War that was destroying the Vietnamese land and people, not to mention costing U.S. soldiers a great deal, it was important to look for a greater truth.
The Movement Did Not Endure
In January 2013, the 40th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords was commemorated in events throughout Viet Nam that received considerable media attention around the world. This was not so in U.S. media.
The failure of any U.S. media, including alternative media, to carry a single story about the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords is a glaring example of the role played by media in encouraging a process of forgetting what, for many, are unpleasant events and outcomes. Yet this example also highlights an important reality of the antiwar movement: it left no institutionalized organizational legacy. Thus, there was no group to lobby the U.S. media to pay attention to the anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords.
With a few small exceptions, none of the organizations and coalitions that emerged to oppose the Vietnam War exists today. This is not unique to the antiwar movement. Most 1960s movement organizations including the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) did not endure.
Groups such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Mennonites, the War Resisters League, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation constitute an ongoing voice for peace. They continue to be involved in Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia in various ways, but each of these organizations existed long before the War.
Since the War ended, several organizations have been formed in Europe, the United States, and within Viet Nam itself to deal with ongoing consequences of the War such as Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance. They have also facilitated travel by U.S. military veterans back to Viet Nam. The “Hanoi 9” met with leaders of several of such organizations and visited a number of their projects during their trip. These groups are listed in the Resources section of this book.
Once we returned from the 2013 trip, the idea of a book featuring the “Hanoi 9” became even more compelling. One reason was the richness of their diverse backgrounds and perspectives. Some came from leftist families and grew up critical of U.S. foreign policy. Some came from the civil-rights movement and through that movement, came to identify with anti-colonial struggles around the world. Others are pacifists, committed to non-violence even in the midst of war. Some came from the cultural rebellion wing of the movement of the 1960s. Others joined the movement as students against the War. Several resisted the draft.
The sad truth is that while opposition to the War was strong throughout the U.S. population, antiwar organizing largely reproduced the lines of racial separation within society. Furthermore, the demonstrations and protests against the War that were mostly white, on campus and off, received the greatest media attention. And while the draft put the War very much in the face of all young men, whites had access to a far greater range of strategies for avoiding service. To be fair, as noted previously, the extent to which black and brown men were disproportionately represented, especially in combat, was part of what motivated many whites to oppose the War.
Many antiwar whites saw the War as a deviation from what they thought were the nation’s core values. For them, the War was a “mistake,” evidence that the country had gone off track. Secretary of State John Kerry’s famous question, “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?” 30 captured this viewpoint perfectly.
In any case, the scale of opposition took the nation’s leaders by surprise. In retrospect, it is clear that the architects of the War made at least two miscalculations. First, and most importantly, their colossal arrogance led them to think they could succeed in subduing the Vietnamese, even though the French and others before them had failed. Second, they did not anticipate the domestic resistance to the War. Why would they? Arguably the previous intervention in Korea was an expensive failure. The ill-fated attempt to invade Cuba during the Bay of Pigs certainly was. Nevertheless, neither action aroused all that much opposition. Why would generals, senators, or presidents think that Viet Nam might somehow be different?
Ironically, the current times make it easier to understand their mindset. We think this book is important in no small measure precisely because opposition to war has again become muted and marginal.
While there was initially intense ad hoc opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, once that war began in earnest, the U.S. military has operated with a mostly free hand. It has gone wherever it wants, using any and all weapons (except nuclear) that it sees fit.
Tom Hayden in particular has been outspoken and relentless in working to mobilize opposition to the Iraq War. CODEPINK has also been creative and steadfast in keeping the serial military interventions in the Middle East before the public. The reality, however, is that there has been no sustained mass movement against these wars.
A meme of failure to “support the troops” retains deep and strong roots in U.S. culture. Furthermore, the widely held belief that the United States “lost” the Vietnam War energized a backlash against the antiwar movement—the effects of which linger to this day. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was both effect and cause of a national rededication to war, violence, and racism.
Part of rededicating the nation to war involves revising any memories of the movement against it. Professor David Steigerwald, a historian at Ohio State University, observes that when he teaches the history of the Vietnam antiwar movement, his students imagine “pot-smoking, tie-dyed, anti-American hippies who heaped public scorn on soldiers.” Steigerwald argues that instead of having no ideas about the War, the U.S. public misremembers it just as the lead character played by Tom Hanks did in Forrest Gump.31
An even more sharply distorted perspective on the War and the antiwar movement was institutionalized in 2008 when Congress passed legislation authorizing and funding the Pentagon-sponsored Vietnam War commemoration, which is scheduled to run until 2025. President Obama enthusiastically endorsed the commemoration in his 2012 Memorial Day proclamation.
Since then, the commission has developed a robust website at www.vietnamwar50th.com. It has already organized hundreds of events to commemorate the Vietnam War—including plans for half-time celebrations at university football games around the country—and has thousands more in the works. As far as we know, there is no meaningful reference to the antiwar movement. Veterans of the antiwar movement, including some of the authors in this book, are waging their own campaign to counteract the Pentagon’s perspective.
The key to what made the Vietnam War different than previous wars was that U.S. military and technological prowess could not secure or maintain U.S. domination. Millions of tons of bombs were dumped on the Vietnamese people, causing more than three million deaths. Nevertheless, a unified Vietnamese nation emerged that was determined to control its own cultural, historical, and political agenda, despite severe losses and deep trauma that would continue for generations.
During their 2013 trip, members of the Hanoi 9 repeatedly inquired about how the Vietnamese won the War against the United States. People of all ages and walks of life invariably had a similar response: “We didn’t,” they said. “All we did was defend our country. Besides, the losses we suffered make the notion of winning nonsensical.”
Indeed, as U.S. citizens we can hardly stop ourselves from thinking in terms of “winning” or “losing” any competition or sports event, never mind a major war. In Chapter 3, Alex Hing comments that our Western “either/or” patterns of thought can make it more difficult to understand our contemporary realities. For example, most of us see the casualties of the Vietnam War only in terms of “Americans” or “Vietnamese.” But at least one million Vietnamese Americans, including refugees, immigrants, and people of Vietnamese heritage born in the United States are also deeply divided over the origins, meaning, and consequences of the War.
Far too often, those who opposed the War stereotype Vietnamese Americans as simply anti-communist, or worse, stooges of U.S. imperialism. On the other hand, for good reasons, Vietnamese Americans frequently assert that they are tired of being seen only through the lens of the Vietnam War. They might think that U.S. antiwar activists are pathologically nostalgic about “Vietnam,” constantly referring to a place and culture they hardly know.
Today, scholars of Critical Refugee Studies are exposing a particular motif of the Vietnamese refugee: tragic, docile, helpless, and in need of rescue by the United States. In order to justify future wars in Iraq and elsewhere, Vietnamese, Hmong, and other war refugees are woven into a “good refugee means good war” story.
When a Vietnamese-American poet like Bao Phi seethes with anger about racism and poverty in his hometown of Minneapolis, Minnesota, this story breaks apart and new divisions appear.32 This much more complicated view of the intersections of U.S. racism and imperialism emerges from struggles and lived experiences within Vietnamese American communities. No longer strapped to one single narrative, people of Vietnamese ancestry in the United States are more openly reconsidering their relationships to the history of the United States and Viet Nam. Many Vietnamese Americans feel they have lost all meaningful connection to their homeland; others have resolved those conflicts and returned to Viet Nam.
The very idea of the United States “losing” the War reflects a certain point of view. The United States “lost” because it failed to overthrow the government of another country—not because the U.S. government or way of life was attacked by another nation. When the War ended, the sovereignty of the United States was intact. For the failure of the United States to change the government and economic system of Viet Nam or any other country to be described as a loss presumes the legitimacy of the United States’ determining how other countries should be governed in the first place. To put it another way, to argue that the United States “lost” Viet Nam is to believe that its fate was up to the United States to begin with.
Even beyond that, if the goal was to either gain or maintain world hegemony—remembering that beyond regime-change in Viet Nam, “containing communism,” was the stated objective of the War—then the outcome did not prevent the United States from becoming “the sole superpower.”
In fact, Viet Nam is now a valued U.S. economic partner and strategic ally in the game of geopolitics. Recent documents signed by the governments of Viet Nam and the United States give some reason to think that ever so slowly the United States will take a little bit more responsibility for the ongoing death and pain caused by the massive use of chemical Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance at least in Viet Nam if not in Laos and Cambodia. Or, for that matter, in the Philippines, because the U.S. military bases in the Philippines were a staging area for Vietnam, and Agent Orange has left its traces there, too.
Which brings us to a pressing question: What exactly did the antiwar movement achieve?
Achievements of the Antiwar Movement
In the 40 years since the War ended, there have been few, if any, conferences or symposia bringing Vietnam antiwar leaders together to “debrief” the movement. Scholarly attention to the civil rights, feminist and student movements of the 1960s significantly exceeds that given to the antiwar movement as well.33
The Resources section of this book lists some of the studies that have been done, as well as biographies and autobiographies of those who were leaders or participants in the antiwar movement. We are proud that this book will add to that literature. We do not submit that this book is the definitive history, let alone analysis, of what the antiwar movement did or what it meant.
That said, from our vantage point, several things seem clear. First, the antiwar movement made a tangible and significant difference in how people thought about the War. From beauty shop conversations to presidential politics, it put the legality, morality, and efficacy of the War into question in ways that would not have happened otherwise.
Transcripts of White House tapes reveal that the highest level of government paid close attention to the antiwar movement’s actions and its leaders. Without the visibility and controversy generated by many, many courageous and creative protestors in the United States and around the world, the War would have been longer, and the death and destruction would have been worse.
It is harder to prove, but still possible, that the antiwar movement prevented the use of nuclear weapons against Viet Nam. The United States offered its nuclear weapons to the French during their nine-year war with the Vietnamese (1945–54). To their credit, the French declined. As Nick Turse notes in his book, Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (2013), the U.S. military deployed chemical weapons, bombing on an unprecedented scale, torture, mass assassination, and every other weapon of war as never before in history. But perhaps because of the pressure of the antiwar movement, the United States did not cross the nuclear line.
These are remarkable achievements. But there is even more to the story. As we have said earlier, neither before nor since has the machinery of perpetual war been as seriously challenged as it was over this War.
People in the United States think that every other country is absorbed in one or more wars 365 days of the year, year after year after year, just like we are. They are wrong. The sole superpower stands alone in its dedication to all war all the time.
Obviously, the antiwar movement did not reverse that pattern. To be fair, however, that was not its objective. The forces that dominated the movement were never about ending all war—they were about one war at one time in one place. It was the pro-war movement that propagated the notion that the antiwar movement would bring the whole edifice of the government and everything else crashing to the ground. They still do.
Were there those within the movement who wanted a more fundamental and radical shift in U.S. foreign and military policy? To be sure. And some of them played an important role in the creative strategy of the movement. But they were always a minority. Noam Chomsky, Chris Hedges, Juan Cole, Kathy Kelly, David Swanson, Christian Appy, Medea Benjamin, Father Roy Bourgeois, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Richard Falk, and others continue to voice strong condemnation of U.S. foreign and military policy. A range of critiques of current U.S. policies occasionally enters mainstream political discussion, but these criticisms do not begin to approach the impact of the movement against the Vietnam War.
Could the Vietnam antiwar movement have been more effective in generating more pressure sooner and thus ending the War earlier? Probably. Could it have had a more lasting impact on future wars? Perhaps. Does the fragmentation of today’s social movements continue to impair the impact of war opponents as it did decades ago? Sadly, the answer is yes.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that understanding the experiences of the Vietnam antiwar movement, including its strengths and weaknesses, can contribute to ending U.S. wars and preventing future ones. If there is one message that we hope comes through loud and clear from this book it is this: If the people could rein in the war-making mania of the United States government once, they can do it again.