PREFACE
1. For example, at his press conference in Singapore on June 12, 2018, after a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, President Trump said “But on NATO, we’re paying 4.2%; she’s paying 1% of a much smaller GDP than we have. We’re paying 4.2% on a much larger—we’re paying for—I mean, anyone can say—from 60 to 90% of NATO. And we’re protecting countries of Europe. And then on top of it, they kill us on trade. So we just can’t have it that way. It’s unfair to our taxpayers and to our people. But no, I have a good relationship with Justin. And I have a, I think, a very good relationship with Chairman Kim right now. I really do.” Donald J. Trump, “Press Conference by President Trump,” White House. June 12, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-conference-president-trump/.
INTRODUCTION: CHALLENGED FRIENDSHIPS IN CHALLENGING TIMES
1. George Washington, “Washington’s Farewell Address,” 1796, Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. For an exceptional summary of America’s historical approach to alliances and partnerships, see Ashley J. Tellis, “The Long Road to Confederationism in US Grand Strategy,” in US Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), 2–32.
3. Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 4.
4. For more on the linkage between the hedging strategies on Asian middle powers and heterarchy, see Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 3 (2014): 331–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu005.
1. ORDER AND POWER IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 29.
1. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), 173.
2. The division of human history into discrete eras necessarily involves simplification, but also has the potential to illuminate what a deluge of details would obscure.
3. To say that law is “binding” is a descriptive rather than normative statement. See, e.g., John Gardner, “Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 46, no. 1 (2001): 199–227, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/46.1.199.
4. In The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull draws an important contrast between a “world order,” providing universal justice, and an “international order,” which only entails that states have settled expectations. Bull argues that the latter, unlike the former, can exist in the absence of world government. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). See also Patrick Porter, “Sorry, Folks: There Is No Rules-Based World Order,” The National Interest, August 29, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/sorry-folks-there-no-rules-based-world-order-17497.
5. Bellum omnium contra omnes, a Latin phrase meaning “the war of all against all,” is the description that Thomas Hobbes gives to human existence in the state-of-nature thought experiment that he conducts in De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651).
6. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
7. See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 47.
8. Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Understanding the Current International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 7.
10. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
13. For a more complete analysis of how nations build power, see Strategic Asia 2015–16: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Michael Wills, Ashley J. Tellis, and Alison Szalwinski (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015), and especially the overview chapter by Tellis.
14. Historians disagree about how to divide the history of Asia’ regional order, and this review does not seek to contribute to that discussion. Rather, it seeks to establish the historical link between the regional balance of power and the regional order across several iterations.
15. David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
16. John King Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 2.
17. Kang, East Asia Before the West.
18. Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (London: Abacus, 2016).
19. See Howard W. French, Ian Johnson, Jeremiah Jenne, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Robert A. Kapp, and Tobie Meyer-Fong, “How China’s History Shapes, and Warps, Its Policies Today,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/22/how-chinas-history-shapes-its-foreign-policy-empire-humiliation/.
20. This includes the Korean War (1950–53) and the Vietnam War (1955–75).
21. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal World,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2018.
22. Mazarr et al., Understanding, 1; NSC-68, 34.
23. The elements of the US-led order are derived from Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 169–93.
24. It should be noted that allied and partner views of a liberal order were not entirely aligned with the United States. Japan, e.g., sought to pursue protectionist policies that supported its expanding postwar economy but were contrary to the rules of the established liberal order and became a major challenge in the US–Japan relationship in the 1970s and 1980s.
26. Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967): 111, https://doi.org/10.2307/20039285. The US play for East Asia would have significant consequences for South Asia. When, in 1971, East Pakistan sought independence under the name of Bangladesh, Washington provided material support to Pakistan, a close friend of China, while the Soviet Union aided Bangladesh and its Indian allies.
28. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 20.
30. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 249–51.
32. Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Plume/Penguin, 2012), 4, as quoted in the Human Security Report 2013, 25. Explanations regarding the decreasing frequency and scale of war have come under question, with some arguing that improvements in medical medicine can account for the reduction in battlefield deaths overall. See Tanisha M. Fazal, “Dead Wrong?,” International Security 39, no. 1 (2014): 95–125, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00166. Ultimately, the question of battle- field deaths against overall casualties is beyond the focus of this book. The key point—that the frequency and scale of major power conflict decreasing significantly since the end of World War II—is not disputed.
33. Simon Fraser University, Human Security Report 2013, 87.
34. Simon Fraser University, 93.
35. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail.”
2. A REGION IN FLUX
1. E.g., as described by Henry Kissinger, the ability of any country to dominate “Eurasia’s two principal spheres…remains a good definition of strategic danger for America.” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 813.
2. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019. The Asia-Pacific countries include Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database, http://sipri.org/. The percentage change is calculated in constant (2017) US dollars.
4. Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” report at 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 8, 2002. As quoted by Evan Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 23.
6. Portions of this section were originally presented in the author’s lecture “Beyond Nationalism: Considering a Chinese World Order,” to the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program. April 18, 2018, at Princeton University.
10. Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 5.
11. This is based on my discussions with Chinese scholars in 2009 and 2010. Perceptions of America’s weakness were informed by its continuing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and especially the financial crisis and resulting Great Recession.
15. SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database.
18. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Ideas, Perceptions, and Power: An Examination of China’s Military Strategy,” in Strategic Asia, 2017–2018: Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, 19–44.
19. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2002).
20. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).
21. Some of these points are derived from the author’s testimony before the US Congress. See Abraham M. Denmark, “The Department of Defense’s Role in Long-Term Major State Competition,” Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, February 11, 2020, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20200211/110518/HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate-DenmarkA-20200211.pdf; Abraham M. Denmark, “The China Challenge: Military and Security Developments,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Security Policy, September 5, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/090518_Denmark_Testimony.pdf; and Abraham M. Denmark, “Across the Other Pond: US Opportunities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 26, 2015. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20150226/103064/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-DenmarkA-20150226.pdf.
33. Allison, Destined for War; Walter Russell Mead, “In the Footsteps of the Kaiser: China Boosts US Power in Asia,” The American Interest, September 26, 2010; Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?,” Survival 42, no. 3 (2010): 147–60, https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/42.3.147.
34. See Cameron G. Thies and Mark David Nieman, Rising Powers and Foreign Policy Revisionism: Understanding BRICS Identity and Behavior Through Time (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017).
36. Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/863.
40. See Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Vintage Books, 2017).
44. Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress—Concluding Remarks,” December 1, 1862.
46. Peter Mattis provides a more specific definition of united front work: “Mao Zedong described the purpose of this work as mobilizing the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies. In a more specific definition from a paper in the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency defined united front work as ‘a technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-communist masses.’ Put another way, united front policy addresses the party’s relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the party. The most important point here is that what needs to be shaped is not just the Chinese people or world outside the People’s Republic of China, but rather those outside the party.” Peter Mattis, “China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control,” Testimony Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 16, 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20190516/109462/HHRG-116-IG00-Wstate-MattisP-20190516.pdf.
48. Brady, Magic Weapons, 7.
50. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, “China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance,” November 29, 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance; Ryan Hass, “Democracy, the China Challenge, and the 2020 Elections in Taiwan,” Taipei Times, March 18, 2019, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/03/18/2003711694.
51. See Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72.
53. World Bank, DataBank; Chong-En Bai and Qiong Zhang, “Is the People’s Republic of China’s Current Slowdown a Cyclical Downturn or a Long-Term Trend? A Productivity-Based Analysis,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 22, no. 1 (2017): 29–46.
54. David Shambaugh, China’s Future (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 3. See also David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crack Up,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198; and David Shambaugh, “Writing China: David Shambaugh, China’s Future, interview by Andrew Browne,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2016, https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/14/writing-china-david-shambaugh-chinas-future.
56. Minxin Pei, “Transition in China? More Likely Than You Think,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (2016): 5–19.
62. Thomas J. T. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 5–40.
73. Brady, Magic Weapons.
78. Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, “Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies,” China Quarterly 161 (2000): 66–94.
79. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), chap. 6.
81. “…是我国日益走近世界舞台中央、不断为人类作出更大贡献的时代”; and “意味着中国特色社会主义道路、理论、制度、文化不断发展，拓展了发展中国家走向现代化的途径，给世界上那些既希望加快发展又希望保持自身独立性的国家和民族提供了全新选择，为解决人类问题贡献了中国智慧和中国方案.” Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory,” 9.
83. Thayer, “Alarming Escalation.”
84. Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
85. Glen H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95.
88. Andrew Marble, “China, the Financial Crisis, and Sino-American Relations: An Interview with Pieter Bottelier,” Asia Policy, no. 9 (January 2010): 121–29.
90. This is in current dollars. SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database.
91. Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (2012): 14–54.
92. See Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).
93. For a “present at the creation” account of the rebalance, see Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016).
97. Full disclosure: the author was a senior official in the Obama administration from 2015 through 2017.
102. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, and Janell Fetterolf, “Trump Unpopular Worldwide, American Image Suffers,” Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, June 26, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trumps-leadership/.
108. Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 3 (2014): 331–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu005.
109. For the purposes of clarity, this study includes as US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific the United States’ five treaty allies (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) as well as its six regional partners (India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam). All data (in current US dollars) are from the World Bank, except for Taiwan’s 1991 and 2016 GDP, which come from the Republic of China (Taiwan) Statistical Bureau, https://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=37408&CtNode=5347&mp=5.
111. World Bank; Republic of China (Taiwan) Statistical Bureau.
112. SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, 2018.
114. World Economic League Table 2018, Center for Economics and Business Research, December 26, 2017, https://cebr.com/welt-2018/. Assuming an average annual US growth rate of 2.5 percent and an average annual Chinese growth rate of 6.0 percent would make China’s GDP larger in 2032. Malcolm Scott and Cedric Sam, “Here’s How Fast China’s Economy Is Catching Up to the US,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-us-vs-china-economy/.
118. See Takashi Terada, “The Competing US and Chinese Models for East Asian Economic Order,” Asia Policy 13, no. 2 (2018): 19–25.
119. I am grateful to Evan Medeiros for introducing me to this concept.
120. Bandwagoning is the strategic alignment of one state with another. Balancing is the alignment of one state against another, and can take at least two forms: internal (accumulation of military power) and external (alliances and military cooperation). For the most thorough discussion available of these ideal types of alignment, see Randall L. Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (2007): 927–30, as described and cited by Jackson, “Power,” 333.
121. Tian, “China Rises.”
123. Graham Bowley, “Cash Helped China Win Costa Rica’s Recognition,” New York Times, September 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/13/world/asia/13costa.html; J. R. Wu and Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan Loses Another Ally, Says Won’t Help China Ties,” Reuters, December 20, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-saotome/taiwan-loses-another-ally-says-wont-help-china-ties-idUSKBN1492SO; Ben Blanchard, “After Ditching Taiwan, China Says Panama Will Get the Help It Needs,” Reuters, November 17, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-panama/after-ditching-taiwan-china-says-panama-will-get-the-help-it-needs-idUSKBN1DH1FZ.
126. Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports.”
127. Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect.”
128. Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal?”
144. SIPRI, military expenditures by country, in millions of US dollars at current prices and exchange rates, 1949–2017. Figures are in millions of US dollars—in current prices for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam—converted at the exchange rate for the given year.
3. EMPOWERING US ALLIES AND PARTNERSIN THE INDO-PACIFIC
1. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 21–26; Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself (New York: Penguin, 2012); Dana Allin and Erik Jones, Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012); and Michael O’Hanlon, The Wounded Giant: America’s Armed Forces in an Age of Austerity (New York: Penguin, 2011).
2. Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” International Security 41, no. 2 (2016): 90–139.
3. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
4. Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp Hooper, “American Strategy for a New International Order,” Washington Quaterly, Spring 2018, 19–20.
5. Some of the points made in this section are derived from the author’s testimony before the US Congress. Abraham M. Denmark, “The China Challenge: Military and Security Developments,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Security Policy, September 5, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/090518_Denmark_Testimony.pdf.
7. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 1.
13. Parts of this subsection were previously published by the author in the Wilson Center’s blog Asia Dispatches, or were recounted in his speech to the 2018 Seoul Defense Dialogue; see Abraham M. Denmark, “Competing with China in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Dispatches, February 27, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/competing-china-the-indo-pacific; and Abraham M. Denmark, “US-China Competition and Implications for the Korean Peninsula,” speech to Seoul Defense Dialogue, October 31, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-china-competition-and-implications-for-the-korean-peninsula.
14. Although Beijing has certainly outperformed Washington in its ability to link strategic objectives with investments and initiatives, there is also a structural element at play. Because of its authoritarian system, Beijing has the ability to aggregate its economic power and utilize it as a tool of the state. This is markedly different from the United States’ disaggregated, market-led approach. Though the latter is certainly more efficient and historically more successful, it is also a more complicated tool of power for American policymakers to wield.
15. Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan’s Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, nos. 4–5 (2007): 758–59; Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan and China at a Crossroads,” East Asian Insights 1, no. 2 (2006): 1–5, at 2–3, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAI/1-2.pdf.
17. Balbina Hwang, “The US Pivot to Asia and South Korea’s Rise,” Asian Perspective 41 (2017): 83; Jae Ho Chung and Jiyoon Kim, “Is South Korea in China’s Orbit? Assessing Seoul’s Perceptions and Policies,” Asia Policy 21 (2016): 126.
18. Chung and Kim, “Is South Korea in China’s Orbit?,” 135.
22. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update.
24. See Nicholas Eberstadt, “Asia-Pacific Demographics in 2010–2040: Implications for Strategic Balance,” in Strategic Asia, 2010–11: Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 237–78.
28. See David J. Berteau and Michael J. Green, “US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012.
29. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Recovering American Leadership.” Survival 50, no. 1 (2008): 55–68.
32. Specifically, this includes the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), and the Registration Convention (1976).
36. See Kurt M. Campbell et al., “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change,” Center for a New American Security, November 2007.
37. In recent years, Indonesia and the Philippines have developed dedicated disaster response units as part of their military. Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and South Korea all highlight the intensifying threat of natural disasters to regional stability in their most recent defense white papers, and identify carrying out in humanitarian relief and disaster response missions as a core function of their respective militaries.
42. Ellen Hallams, The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed (New York: Routledge, 2010), 58.
44. President Nixon described his doctrine thusly: “Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.” Quoted from US Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d60.
48. It should be noted that the author’s spouse is currently a contractor for the US Agency for International Development.
52. Tillerson, “FY 2018,” 3.
53. “FY 2018 Foreign Affairs Budget.”
57. “Senators Urge Secretary Mattis to Create New Indo-Pacific Defense Fund,” Senate website of Dan Sullivan, US senator for Alaska, March 1, 2017, https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-urge-secretary-mattis-to-create-new-Indo-Pacific-defense-fund; letter from Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Joe Wilson, Colleen Hanabusa, Vicky Hartzler, and Stephanie Murphy to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, February 28, 2017, https://stephaniemurphy.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2.28.2017_house_letter_to_secdef_mattis_on_asia_pacific_stability_initiative_apsi.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Jane Wardell and Jonathan Barrett, “Analysis: Silk Roads and Chilled Beef: How China Is Trying to Fill a Trump Vacuum in Australia,” CNBC, March 29, 2017.
68. This was one of the primary arguments in favor of the US–South Korea free trade agreement, known as KORUS, negotiations for which were begun in the George W. Bush administration and ratified in 2011.
74. See, e.g., Ana Swanson, “ ‘None of These Big Quagmire Deals’: Trump Spells Out Historic Shift in Approach to Trade,” Washington Post, February 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/24/trump-spells-out-historic-shift-in-trade-that-could-weigh-on-companies-growth/?utm_term=.4db619e037d1; Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,” White House, January 23, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement/.
80. See Andrew T. H. Tan, The Arms Race in Asia: Trends, Causes and Implications (New York: Routledge, 2013).
82. SIPRI, “Military Expenditure.” Percentage changes are calculated in constant (2016) US dollars.
89. US State Department, “Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2018,” 381–85, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf; “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,” Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 34, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blueprint.pdf.
90. Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould, “Trump Budget to Cut Foreign Military Financing, with Loans Looming,” Defense News, May 19, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/05/19/trump-budget-to-cut-foreign-military-financing-with-loan-option-looming/; Rachel Stohl and Shannon Dick, “Trump on Arms Sales,” Forum on the Arms Trade, April 25, 2017, https://www.forumarmstrade.org/looking-ahead-blog/trump-on-arms-sales.
95. Ross, “Congressional Oversight.”
96. Ross, “Congressional Oversight.”
102. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf.
108. Morris, “Blunt Defenders.”
111. Joby Warrick, “Microbes by the Ton: Officials See Weapons Threat as North Korea Gains Biotech Expertise,” Washington Post, December 10, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/microbes-by-the-ton-officials-see-weapons-threat-as-north-korea-gains-biotech-expertise/2017/12/10/9b9d5f9e-d5f0-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html?utm_term=.54190a689fd1; Yoshihiro Makino, “North Korea Said to Be Testing Anthrax-Tipped Ballistic Missiles,” Asahi Shimbun, December 20, 2017, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201712200036.html.
113. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan, US, South Korea Hold Missile Defense Drill,” The Diplomat, January 24, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/japan-us-south-korea-hold-missile-defense-drill/; Brad Lendon, “US, South Korea, Japan Start Drills Off North Korea,” CNN, March 14, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/asia/us-south-korea-japan-aegis-missile-defense-ship-exercises/index.html; Dagyum Ji, “US, South Korea, Japan Staging Missile Warning Exercises Near Korean Peninsula,” NK News, October 24, 2017, https://www.nknews.org/2017/10/u-s-south-korea-japan-staging-missile-warning-exercises-near-korean-peninsula/; Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, South Korea to Hold Missile Tracking Exercises,” The Diplomat, December 11, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/us-japan-south-korea-to-hold-missile-tracking-exercises/.
122. Kamphausen et al., “Case,” 17.
125. Kamphausen et al., “Case,” 3.
126. See, e.g., Amitav Acharya, “Doomed by Dialogue? Will ASEAN Survive Great Power Rivalry in Asia?,” Asan Forum, June 29, 2015; and Amitav Acharya, “Is ASEAN Losing Its Way?,” YaleGlobal Online, September 24, 2015, https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/asean-losing-its-way.
129. Rolland Nadège, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
134. “Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development—A Vision Document,” Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, and Institute of Developing Economies, May 2017, http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf.
138. Other international agreements that focus on specific aspects of the use of space have entered into force generally, but have not sought to generally govern the use of space. They include the “Outer Space Treaty,” “Rescue Agreement,” “Liability Convention,” “Registration Convention,” and the “Moon Agreement”; see http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.
139. “Beyond the Stalemate in the Space Commons,” in Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, ed. Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 105–37.
1. See Strategic Asia, 2015–2016: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Michael Wills, Ashley J. Tellis, and Alison Szalwinski (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015); Strategic Asia 2016–2017: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Michael Wills, Ashley J. Tellis, and Alison Szalwinski (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016); and Strategic Asia, 2017–2018: Power, Ideas, and Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).
9. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 2019.
20. Harry Krejsa, “Under Pressure: The Growing Reach of Chinese Influence Campaigns in Democratic Societies,” CNAS, April 2018.
39. Andrew Small, “Why Europe Is Getting Tough on China,” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2019.
42. International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects (PPP Valuation of Country GDP),” 2017.
50. Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Unrealized Power,” in Strategic Asia, 2015–16: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Michael Wills, Ashley J. Tellis, and Alison Szalwinski (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015), 160–89.
51. Quoted by Tellis, Szalwinski, and Wills, Power, 142.
52. Ian Hall, Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, “The Persistence of Nehruvianism in India’s Strategic Culture,” Strategic Asia 17 (2016): 141–67.
57. US Embassy in New Delhi.
61. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017.
66. Rinehart, “New US–Japan Defense Guidelines,” 2.
68. “Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development—A Vision Document,” Research and Information System for Developing Countries, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, and Institute of Developing Economies, May 2017, http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf.
71. Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Guidelines.”
72. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response: Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea,” April 5, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.
73. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trends.”
77. For more on the Scarborough Standoff, see Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, “Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, May 22, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/.
78. Beijing denies that any such agreement was made.
91. In his role as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, the author played a significant role in negotiating and finalizing this agreement.
96. Park, “Cybersecurity.”
99. Snyder and Seukhoon Paul Choi, “From Aid to Development,” 5.
114. For US arms sales with Taiwan between 2004 and 2011, see Shirley Kan, “Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales since 1990,” Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf. For the two arms sales agreements since 2011, see David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed, “US Plans to Sell Taiwan about $1.42 Billion in Arms,” Reuters, June 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms/u-s-plans-to-sell-taiwan-about-1-42-billion-in-arms-idUSKBN19K2XO.
123. For Taiwan’s sustainability in air defense, see Michael Lostumbo, David R. Frelinger, James Williams, and Barry Wilson, Air Defense Options for Taiwan: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Operational Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
128. 黃煌雄, 台灣國防變革: 1982–2016 (Taipei: China Time Publishing, 2017).
134. Tran Viet Thai, “The Evolving Regional Order in East Asia: A View from Vietnam,” Asia Policy 13, no. 2 (2018): 64–68.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
1. E.g., see Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).