FIRST COMMENTARY
58 BCE
Caesar departed for Gaul in early 58 BCE, leaving behind a newly enriched imperial city stumbling into what would be the worst decade of its history—until the decade that followed it. Caesar would enrich himself and Rome even more, while the governability of the whole was in free fall toward ruin. For three of the nine years Caesar would spend with his army, Rome did not manage to conduct consular elections until the new consular year had already begun. The three generalissimos dandling the empire on their knees would all die violently—Crassus with his army in 53, Pompey on the run from Caesar in 49, and Caesar at the base of a statue of Pompey in 44. Rome’s chance for stable government lay hidden at this moment thirty miles south of Rome in the person of a four-year-old boy whose father had just died.
The consuls in 58 were Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus and Aulus Gabinius. Piso was Caesar’s father-in-law and also earned a different fame by being the likely builder of the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum, where he was the patron of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. We benefit from that patronage because his villa had the good luck to be inundated with the ash of Vesuvius in 79 CE, and a considerable trove of literature, including works of Philodemus, remained there to await modern technology’s ability to recover them, an effort still in progress.
But the tribune Clodius was the lawmaker in evidence as the year began and passed his precedent-setting grain law in January, along with a law removing a ban on collegia. In theory they were beneficial burial societies organized by likeminded businessmen, tradesmen, or neighbors, but they had been banned because they also became a vehicle for thugs and groups engaged in more or less organized crime. Clodius used them as his own private militia.
Caesar crossed the pomerium, the sacred narrowly-drawn boundary of the city, to take up his command (a general had always to leave his army outside that pomerium) but lingered close to the city to watch the political situation. He knew the praetors Ahenobarbus and Memmius would attack his consular acts of the year before on grounds that he had gone against the auspices. (Caesar’s intransigent colleague Bibulus had made sure there were always negative auspices to ignore!) Caesar published three speeches against the two praetors, while keeping a wary eye on Cicero, who he thought might join the attack. Clodius hated Cicero, so Caesar was glad in these weeks to join the rising outrage that the demagogue was whipping up against the orator, notionally for putting Roman citizens to death without full due process at the end of the Catilinarian insurgency four years earlier.
In the third month of the year, Clodius organized an assembly (contio) outside the pomerium in the Circus Flaminius for a debate on Cicero’s case. Caesar and the consuls spoke in terms that made it clear to Cicero that he could not withstand the forces against him, and so he fled the city for the safety of exile in mid-March. Clodius spent a month proposing and revising a formal ban, which was approved on April 24 by the concilium plebis, the people’s assembly over which the tribune held sway. (Exile was enforced by a law saying the condemned could be killed at will if he did not withdraw a certain distance, usually hundreds of miles, from the city. An exile who kept his distance could live quite comfortably.)
When Caesar saw that nothing would come of the challenges to his consular acts and that Cicero was taken care of, he left in late March, traveling rapidly toward Geneva, covering some five hundred miles in about eight days. (In haste, a carriage could take him something like seventy-five miles a day if needed.) If he were ever to return to Rome and avoid the destructive rage of his rivals for power, he would have to come back with undeniable success, strong military support, and a lot of money. Failing that trifecta, he still needed money—to set himself up in protected obscurity on a Greek island somewhere. Gaul was a means to an end.
What did he find when he arrived there?
First of all, he had hurried past a good part of what he was responsible for. Cisalpine Gaul was the heart of his responsibility, and he was charged as well with maintaining Roman rule in Illyricum, the eastern coast of the Adriatic. He had veered north to the outermost edge of his domains, to Geneva, where the lake narrows to become the beginning of the Rhone river that flows west to Lyon, then south to the Mediterranean. The Gallic nation on Rome’s side of the Rhone there was the Allobroges, mainly peaceable enough apart from a flurry of rumors of insurgency two years earlier. A very good luxury hotel now stands on the first few yards of territory that then lay outside Rome’s rule facing the narrow channel of water that is the nascent Rhone.
Caesar knew as he made this journey that he had an army, at least. He was authorized one legion (about 5,000 soldiers) for Transalpine Gaul and three for northern Italy and Illyricum. Not long after his arrival, he recruited two more legions, paying for them himself. In 57, he would recruit two more.
At a distance of two hundred years, a historian could describe the military situation calmly: “While this was going on in the city, Caesar found no hostility in Gaul, but everything was absolutely quiet. The state of peace, however, did not continue, but first one war broke out against him of its own accord, and then another was added, so that his greatest wish was fulfilled of waging war and winning success for the whole.”1
“Of its own accord” rather stretches a point. Caesar very consciously chose to be alarmed and take action when he heard that the Helvetians (a name we never translate, though we very reasonably could, as “Swiss”) were restless in their lands north of lake Geneva and were packing up to move to the west of Gaul, quite a bit further out of Roman way than where they already lived. They presented themselves to the new proconsul very respectably, with no more than a bit of attitude, and asked his kind permission to make their way west just inside the boundaries of his province, crossing that narrow channel at Geneva and then making their way down the narrow and sometimes steep valley of the rising Rhone toward Lyon, where they would bend a bit northwards and continue toward the open, or at least seizable, land in the far west, around and north of Toulouse. In response, Caesar mildly requested a two weeks’ delay to consider the issue. What he actually meant was that he needed time to move his troops into place and force the Helvetians to take a more difficult and more northerly route through the lands of the Sequani.
Of the many reasons Caesar had for opposing the Helvetians (e.g., ambition and greed), the one he chose to emphasize then and after was a crudely simple one: wild and wicked invaders had come toward Rome from Gaul fifty years earlier, so he had to act to make sure history did not repeat itself.
This first commentary tells the story of what happened next. Things don’t go well for the Helvetians. A people in mass migration, young and old, male and female, moving at oxcart speed, are ambushed twice and quickly tamed and sent back where they came from. Even Caesar can’t make this victory look challenging. Once defeated, the Helvetians, perhaps 100,000 in number, trudge wretchedly home, on short rations, to remake their lives in the ruins they had left behind. They disappear from Caesar’s story until they supply a few troops to the great revolt recounted in the seventh commentary.
Beyond the Helvetians lay another enemy, conveniently queued up and almost waiting for Caesar—on his telling. Led by Ariovistus, whom Caesar had recognized the year earlier in his consulship as a friend of the Roman people, this was a warband that had elbowed across the Rhine to pillage and intrude upon the Sequani along the river south of Strasbourg. There are problems with that story, exacerbated by our hearing from Caesar that Ariovistus’ friendship with the Roman people went so far as to put him in communication with Caesar’s enemies back in Rome. To be sure, the speech that Caesar attributes to Ariovistus in 1.44 is a pretty fair rendition of an anti-Caesar position that has a lot to be said for it. On Caesar’s telling, Ariovistus was the wicked German enemy of Gallic peace, but we can see that he was also a player in a very domestic Roman political story. We could believe it if he thought that he had been led off on this expedition precisely so that a convenient barbarian could do him in. Of course, by the time Caesar’s commentary tells this story for him back at Rome a few months later, Caesar’s victory is a shot across the bow for those enemies, to know what they must reckon with. What is ostensibly a story about Germans is also a story about domestic Roman politics.
This battle story does not go quite as easily as the first with the Helvetians. Caesar’s troops are not now chasing a people in migration but directly facing a serious army. Whatever actually happened, Caesar the writer takes the opportunity to present Caesar the dauntless commander, rallying his troops from sluggardly cowardice to the peak of combat energy with a dramatic speech. Well, he says, if you lot can’t be counted on, at least the tenth legion will support me! (This is the first of four moments for the tenth legion in the commentaries where they appear as the favorite child.2) The troops rally; they win a decisive victory; and the dastardly Germans run pell-mell for the Rhine, tails between legs, just as one might hope. (This is the first place in the commentaries to observe that Caesar’s ostensible knowledge sometimes runs a little further than perhaps it might reasonably have been expected to. Just who Ariovistus’ followers really were and where they went to ground should be open to doubt.)
While Caesar made his way into Gaul, Rome remained a snakepit. The question of Egypt—how it would subserve Rome best—flared up again. The most lucrative solution was for king Ptolemy to be accepted as Rome’s ruler of his own land and for him to pay substantial tribute. That was the deal that had been cut in Caesar’s consulship, but a difficulty lay in Ptolemy’s ability to produce the tribute. The simple Roman solution was enacted by Clodius, passing a bill to annex Cyprus to Roman authority, then sending everyone’s enemy, Cato the Younger, as plenipotentiary to implement the subjugation.
Trapped by his citizenly loyalty, Cato departed on the mission. The purpose of the annexation was to seize Cyprus’ resources to pay the king’s promissory note.
With Caesar safely on his Gallic campaigns, Cicero was no longer really a threat. He could come back, tamed and harmless, could he not? Pompey began floating this idea during the summer. Ten years later, in the midst of civil war, Pompey would tell Cicero that it was Caesar’s doing, strings pulled from Gaul, that made the movement for return go so slowly. Clodius, feeling the ground cut out from under him, sent his toughs into the streets and there was even talk that there had been an assassination plot against Pompey. Pompey wisely withdrew from public life and remained in his house— “mansion” or “compound” might be better words—for the rest of the year.
And so Caesar’s first year in Gaul drew to a close. Probably in late September, he set his troops to winter among the Sequani, the people he had just supposedly rescued from Ariovistus’ depredations, while he himself returned to Cisalpine Gaul. The Sequani will not be so much as mentioned again until the sixth commentary for the year 53, but they play their part here. By settling his troops among them, outside the official boundaries of the Roman province, Caesar indicated most clearly his expansionist aims. With Helvetian and German hash settled, there was no excuse for that choice except imperialism.
Observe now Caesar’s dealings with the Haedui, powerful and influential in central Gaul, with a capital city called Bibracte not far from modern Autun in Burgundy. They had “friended” (as we now say) the Helvetians, but washed their hands of them as they went down to disaster. Then most importantly it was they who put Caesar on the warpath against Ariovistus. The story of the threat to Gallic stability by the German wild men is all theirs. When all is done for Caesar, after many vicissitudes, the Haedui will prove to be doing just fine. Caesar never lets on that he knows their game.
On October 29, Pompey arranged for eight tribunes to bring forward a vote on Cicero’s recall, but it was vetoed by one of the other two. Pompey then sent Sestius to Caesar to get his approval for the recall, but he still replied carefully, observing that it wouldn’t help relations between Pompey and Caesar for Cicero to come back on fire for vindication. The matter would string on for most of another year.
IN THE CONSULSHIP OF PISO AND GABINIUS
1. Gaul is divided, all in three parts: Belgians live in one, Aquitanians in another, and people called Celts in a third (we call them Gauls). They all differ from one another in languages, customs, and laws. The river Garonne separates Gauls from Aquitanians, the Marne and the Seine from Belgians. The toughest of all are the Belgians, because they are farthest from our province, its culture, and its manners, and because merchants reach them least often bringing things that make men womanly. And they’re closest to the Germans living across the Rhine and are constantly at war with them. That’s also why the Helvetians outdo other Gauls in courage. They fight almost daily battles with Germans, either keeping them out of their own land or taking the war right to them.3
2. By far the noblest and richest Helvetian was Orgetorix. In the consulship of Messalla and Piso (61 BCE), drawn by thirst for rule, he raised a conspiracy among the nobles and convinced the nation to gather all their possessions and leave their land. They could easily—they were stronger than all the others—seize control of all Gaul.
He persuaded them easily because the Helvetians were hemmed in on all sides by geography: on one side by the Rhine, broad and deep, separating Helvetian territory from German; on another, by the high Jura mountains between the Helvetians and the Sequani; on the third by Lake Geneva and the Rhone separating them from our province. This all kept them from roving very far and made it hard to make war on their neighbors, and so these men who loved to fight were very unhappy. They thought their land too small for so many people so brave and so good at warmaking. It extended 220 miles in one direction, 80 in another.4
3. And so, persuaded and heartened by Orgetorix’s authority, they decided to gather what they needed for setting out, buying up as many pack animals and carts as possible,5 sowing fields full (to have enough grain along the way), and ensuring peace and friendship with the nations closest to them. They judged two years would suffice for accomplishing this. By decree, they set the third year for their departure.
Orgetorix took upon himself to go as ambassador to the neighbors. Making the rounds, he convinced Casticus of the Sequani—son of Catamantaloedes, who had been king for many years and was named Friend of the Roman People by the senate—to take the throne in his country. Likewise he persuaded Dumnorix of the Haedui, brother of Diviciacus—just then the leading man there and well regarded among the people6—to try the same thing, giving Dumnorix his own daughter as a wife. He convinced them it would be easy to succeed if they tried, and besides, he was about to take command in his own nation. The Helvetians were easily the strongest in all Gaul, and he with all his resources and his army would guarantee them their thrones.
They were persuaded by what he said and swore faith and loyalty among themselves, hoping that when they had taken their thrones, three immensely powerful and resolute peoples could control all of Gaul.
4. This business was divulged to the Helvetians by an informer. After their custom, they made Orgetorix plead for himself in chains; if condemned, his penalty was to be burned alive. On the day set for making his case, Orgetorix dragged his whole retinue to court, some ten thousand people, and gathered all his clients and debtors as well—he had a lot of them. In that way he kept himself from having to plead his case. People were upset by this and sought to protect the law by force of arms. While the magistrates were bringing a mass of men in from the countryside, Orgetorix died, not without suspicion, so the Helvetians think, that he had done himself in.
5. After his death, the Helvetians still undertook to carry out their decision to leave their own country. When they thought they were ready, they set fire to all their towns (a dozen of them), their villages (some 400), and all their private farmhouses. They burned up all their grain except what they would take with them, to make them readier to face every danger for knowing there was no hope of returning home. They ordered everyone to take three months’ worth of ground grain from home. They convinced their neighbors, the Rauraci and Tulingi and Latobrigi, to join the plan, burn their towns and villages, and set out with them. They also took as allies the Boii, who used to live across the Rhine and had crossed to Noricum and besieged Noreia.7
6. There were just two routes they could take from home: one through the Sequani, narrow and hard, running between the Jura and the Rhone, where carts could barely pass single file and a steep mountain loomed, making it easy for a few men to block passage; the other through our province, much easier and unimpeded, especially because the Rhone, easily forded at places, flows between the Helvetians and the recently pacified Allobroges.8 The Allobrogan town closest to the Helvetians is Geneva, where a bridge reaches to the Helvetians. The Helvetians were sure they could either persuade or force Allobroges still not well disposed to the Roman people to let them pass through their land. Everything was ready for departure and they set the day to meet at the Rhone banks: five days before the Kalends of April (28 March), in the consulship of Piso and Gabinius (58 BCE).
7. Caesar, when told they would try their way through our province, hastened his departure from Rome and headed for farther Gaul with long days on the road and so reached Geneva. He ordered up as many soldiers as possible from the whole province (there was just one legion in further Gaul), and ordered the bridge at Geneva be torn down.
When the Helvetians learned of his arrival, they sent high-ranking ambassadors to see him. Nammeius and Verucloetius led the embassy, saying they would make their way through the province with no harmful intention, because they had no other route. They asked it be allowed with his permission. Caesar, remembering how the consul Cassius had been killed by the Helvetians and his army routed and sent under the yoke (107 BCE), had no intention of agreeing, thinking that men as hostile as these, given the chance to pass through the province, could not keep from harm and mischief. But so a little time could elapse until the soldiers he had summoned would gather, he told the legates he would take time to think. If they wanted an answer, they should return on the the Ides of April (13 April).
8. Meanwhile, he used the legion he had with him and soldiers gathered from the province to extend a rampart from Lake Geneva, which flows into the Rhone, seventeen miles to the Jura mountains, which separate Sequani and Helvetians.9 The wall was sixteen feet high with a ditch in front of it. When they finished, he arranged guardposts and fortified strong points, to be able to stop them easily if they tried to cross against his will.
When the day that was set with the ambassadors came and they returned to him, he said that by custom and tradition of the Roman people he could allow no one to pass through the province. He would stop them if they tried to force their way. Thwarted in this hope, the Helvetians roped together boats and made numerous rafts, while others tried to break through at the Rhone’s fords where the river was shallowest, sometimes by day, but usually by night. Repelled by the wall and by soldiers coming and hurling spears, they gave up the attempt.
9. The one way left led through the Sequani, too narrow to pass if the Sequani opposed them. Unable to persuade them on their own, they sent messengers to Dumnorix the Haeduan, to prevail with the Sequani through his pleading. Dumnorix had influence with the Sequani for his well-regarded generosity and was a friend of the Helvetians as well, because he had married the daughter of Orgetorix from there. Craving a throne, he sought revolution and wanted as many nations as possible indebted to his kindness. So he took on the task and won from the Sequani permission for the Helvetians to go through their land and made the two sides exchange hostages: The Sequani were not to block the Helvetian route; the Helvetians, to pass through without harm or injury.
10. Caesar heard the Helvetians were planning to go through Sequani and Haedui territory to the land of the Santones, not far from the Tolosates,10 a nation in our province. If that happened, he knew it would be a great danger for the province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, close to us on open plains rich in grain. So he put the legate Labienus in charge of the fortification he had ordered. He headed for Italy by long marches and enrolled two legions there and brought three more, wintering around Aquileia, out of winter camp. These five headed back to further Gaul through the Alps by the shortest route.
There the Ceutrones and Graioceli and Caturiges took the high ground and tried to stop the army. They were beaten off in repeated skirmishes and on the seventh day from Ocelum— the last town of the nearer province—he reached the land of the Vocontii in the farther province. From there he took the army through the Allobroges to the Segusiavi, the first people across the Rhone, outside our province.11
11. The Helvetians had brought their forces through the narrows and the Sequanian land and reached Haedui territory, plundering the countryside. The Haedui, unable to defend themselves, sent representatives to Caesar to ask for help: for their long service to the Roman people they should not see their land devastated, their children enslaved, and their towns besieged almost in plain view of our army. At the same time, the Ambarri, close relatives of the Haedui, let Caesar know that their own land was being ravaged: they could barely keep the enemy out of their towns. So too the Allobroges, who had villages and property across the Rhone, fled to Caesar and showed him they had nothing left but their land. All this made Caesar decide not to wait for the Helvetians to reach the Santones—by then they would have devoured our allies’ wealth.
12. There is a river Saône, flowing through the land of the Haedui and Sequani into the Rhone so unbelievably slowly that the eye can’t tell which way it flows. The Helvetians crossed it, tying boats and rafts together. When Caesar’s scouts reported that three-fourths of them had crossed and a fourth part remained this side of the Saône, he left camp after midnight with three legions and came to the group that hadn’t yet crossed the river. He caught them burdened and unawares and hacked most of them down. The rest fled and hid in the nearby woods.
This canton was called “Tigurinus”—for the whole Helvetian nation is divided in four cantons. This one had gone out in the days of our fathers and killed the consul Lucius Cassius and sent his army under the yoke (107 BCE). So by chance or by the plan of the deathless gods, the Helvetian canton that had brought great calamity on the Roman people was first to pay the price. Caesar avenged not only public but even private losses, because the Tigurini had killed, in the same battle as Cassius, the legate Lucius Piso, grandfather of his own father-in-law Lucius Piso.
13. After that battle, he had a bridge made across the Saône to pursue the rest of the Helvetians and brought the army across. The Helvetians, startled by his sudden arrival, realized he had accomplished in one day what they had barely done in twenty—cross the river—and sent representatives to him. Divico led the embassy: he had been the Helvetian leader in the war with Cassius.
He addressed Caesar this way: If the Roman people made peace with the Helvetians, they would go and stay where Caesar determined and wanted. But if he went on prosecuting the war, he would come to recall the old loss the Roman people had suffered and the strength of the Helvetians then. Just because he had confronted one canton unawares, when those who had crossed the river could not help them, he should not credit that to his own strength or look down on them. They had learned from their fathers and forefathers to fight from strength not trickery and not to rely on ambushes. He should take care that the place where they stood shouldn’t take its name from and preserve for history a disaster for the Roman people.
14. Caesar’s answer: He did not hesitate, precisely because he remembered the events the Helvetian legates retold. He took them more seriously because the Roman people had so little deserved what happened. If he had known of some injury of his own doing, it wouldn’t have been hard to watch out, but he was confused just because he knew he had done nothing to cause himself anxiety nor was he a man for baseless fear. Even if he could overlook the old insult, could he put aside memory of recent assaults, such as the attempt to force their way through the province against his will? Such as their harassment of the Haedui, Ambarri, and Allobroges? Their vulgar boasting of their victory and their marveling that their attacks had gone unpunished so long both led to the same conclusion. For the immortal gods regularly allow prosperity and continuing impunity to those they will punish for their crimes—to make them feel more keenly their change of fortunes.
For all that, if they would give hostages even now (so he would know they would do what they promised) and if they made up to the Haedui and likewise the Allobroges for the injuries done them and their allies, he would make peace with them.
Divico answered: The Helvetians had been trained by their forebears to take hostages, not give them, and the Roman people had seen that. That was the answer he gave, and he left.
15. Next day they broke camp. Caesar did the same and sent all his cavalry on ahead—four thousand of them, gathered from throughout the province and from the Haedui and their allies—to watch where the enemy went. Pressing the rear guard too eagerly, they skirmished with Helvetian cavalry and some few of our men fell. The Helvetians were elated that five hundred horse had repelled so many of ours and began to hang back, harassing our forces now and then with their rear guard. Caesar held his men back from fighting and judged it enough for now to keep the enemy from plunder and destruction. So they went forward for about two weeks with no more than four or five miles between their rear guard and our front line.
16. Daily all the while Caesar demanded the Haedui supply the grain they had officially promised. Because of the cold the grain in the field was not yet ripe nor was there even enough fodder. The grain they had brought down the Saône in boats was less useful because the Helvetians had turned course away from the river, and Caesar did not want to break off pursuit. The Haedui strung him on day by day: they said it was being gathered, shipped—it was just coming. When Caesar realized he was being led on and the date when grain must be rationed to the soldiers was pressing, he called the Haedui leaders together (there were many of them in camp). Most notable were Diviciacus and Liscus—he held the highest office, which Haedui call vergobret, appointed annually with power of life and death over them. Caesar rebuked them severely for not supporting him at such a critical moment, with the enemy so near at hand, when grain could be neither bought not harvested. He took it specially badly because he had taken on the war so much at their instigation.
17. At last Liscus, drawn by Caesar’s words, set out what he had kept quiet before. There were men of great influence with the people who as individuals had more power than the magistrates. Their rebellious and wicked words kept the people from gathering the grain they owed. If they could not be first in Gaul, better to endure Gallic commands than Roman ones. If the Romans defeated the Helvetians, they would doubtless snatch liberty from the Haedui and all the rest of Gaul. These men reported our plans and what went on in our camp to the enemy. He could not stop them. He knew how dangerous it was for him to tell Caesar what he was now forced to. That was why he had kept quiet so long.
18. Caesar guessed Liscus’ words pointed to Dumnorix, Diviciacus’ brother, but quickly dismissed the meeting to keep the matter from discussion in a large group. Liscus he kept back, asking him about what he had said in the meeting. Liscus spoke freely and boldly. Caesar asked others the same privately and found the truth: Dumnorix, full of daring, was hugely popular with the people for his generosity and wanted revolution. For many years he had bought up all the tolls and taxes of the Haedui cheaply, because no one dared bid against him. So he had increased his wealth and his capacity to be very generous. He maintained a large cavalry troop around him at his own expense. His wealth made him powerful at home and among neighboring nations. To extend his power, he married his own mother to a noble and powerful man among the Bituriges, he had a Helvetian wife himself, and he married off his half-sister and other women relatives to other nations.
Dumnorix favored and supported the Helvetians because of that connection, but hated Caesar and the Romans on his own, because their coming reduced his power and his brother Diviciacus had been restored to his former influence and honor. If anything happened to the Romans, his best chance of gaining the throne would come through Helvetian influence. The rule of the Roman people made him despair not only for the throne but for all his influence. Caesar found by his inquiries that in the cavalry skirmish gone bad a few days earlier, Dumnorix and his horsemen had been the first to flee (Dumnorix led the cavalry the Haedui had sent Caesar), spooking the rest of the cavalry by their flight.
19. When Caesar found this out, other facts appeared confirming his suspicions. Dumnorix had brought the Helvetians through the Sequani, arranging hostages between them, doing what he did without Caesar or his own people approving or even knowing, and so he was being brought up on charges before a Haedui judge. Caesar thought he had reason to act against him or else order the Haedui to do so. There was one reason not to act: Caesar’s awareness of his brother Diviciacus’ good will toward the Roman people, support for himself, and remarkable loyalty, fairness, and good judgment. He feared insulting the one by punishing the other.
Before trying anything, he summoned Diviciacus and sent away the usual interpreters. He spoke with him with the help of Valerius Troucillus, chief citizen of the Gallic province, a friend in whom he had utmost confidence. He reminded Diviciacus what was said in front of them about Dumnorix in the open meeting and reported what people had told him privately. He asked and encouraged him to take no offense but either to hear the case and judge for himself or direct the Haedui to judge.
20. Diviciacus, awash in tears, embraced Caesar and begged him not to judge his brother harshly. It was all true: no one was sorrier than he was. He once had broad influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, when his brother was too young to do much and depended on Diviciacus for his advance, but then he used wealth and strength to undermine Diviciacus’ influence and almost to destroy him. But Diviciacus was still swayed by brotherly love and public opinion. If anything bad happened to Dumnorix at Caesar’s hand while Diviciacus stood high in his friendship, no one would believe it hadn’t been done with his consent. That would turn all Gaul against him in future.
When he had pleaded at length in tears, Caesar took his hand and comforted him, asking him to end his pleading. Diviciacus’ influence was so great with him that in response to his wish and request Caesar could excuse harm to the republic and his own unhappiness. He called in Dumnorix with the brother present. He said what he had against him, telling him what he knew and what the Haedui complained of. He warned him to avoid all suspicion in future and said he would forgive bygones at Diviciacus’ request. He set guards on Dumnorix so he would know what he did and with whom he spoke.12
21. The same day Caesar was alerted by scouts that the enemy had camped at the foot of a mountain about seven miles from his camp. He sent them to describe the mountain and what the climb was like around it. They reported back it was easy. At midnight, he ordered Titus Labienus, legate with rank of praetor, to take two legions and guides who knew the way and go to the mountaintop. He told him what he was thinking. A couple of hours later, he went out himself the same way the enemy had gone and sent the cavalry on ahead. Publius Considius, a well-regarded old soldier who had fought with Sulla and later Crassus, he sent on with scouts.
22. At dawn, when Labienus had taken the summit, Caesar was a bit over a mile from the enemy camp and—he learned later from captives—neither approach had been detected. Considius raced up on horseback to tell him that the mountain he wanted Labienus to take was in enemy hands: he knew it from the Gallic weapons and insignia. Caesar took his own force up on a nearby hill and put them in battle order. Labienus, since he’d been told by Caesar not to engage until Caesar’s forces were seen approaching the enemy camp—so they could attack the enemy at one time from all sides—, held the mountain and waited for our forces, holding off battle. Much later in the day, Caesar learned from scouts that the mountain was in our hands and the Helvetians had decamped. Considius in his terror had reported seeing something he hadn’t seen. Caesar followed the enemy that day at the usual distance and pitched camp three miles from theirs.
23. Next day, with only two days until the army needed grain allotments and with Bibracte, much the biggest and richest Haedui town, no more than seventeen miles away, he decided he should look after his grain supply.13 He turned from the Helvetians and headed for Bibracte. Runaway slaves from decurion Lucius Aemilius’ Gallic cavalry alerted the enemy. The Helvetians changed plan—perhaps thinking the Romans had withdrawn out of fear (especially because the day before we had not joined battle when we held the high ground) or else they thought we could be cut off from our grain supply. They reversed course to follow and then harass our men in the rear guard.
24. When he noticed this, Caesar took his troops up the next hill and sent cavalry to fend off enemy attacks. He set a triple line of four veteran legions halfway up the hill, then put the two legions he had just enrolled in northern Italy and all his support troops on the hilltop, thus filling the whole height above him with troops. He put baggage and packs in one place, ordering it guarded by the formation above. The Helvetians followed with all their wagons and put their baggage in one place, brushed off our cavalry, and moved in a tight phalanx toward our front line.
25. Caesar first removed his own horse, then those of other officers from sight, equalizing the risk by removing hope of flight. Encouraging his men, he joined battle. The troops on higher ground easily broke the enemy phalanx with throwing spears; then they drew swords and attacked. The Gauls were greatly hindered in fighting because several of their shields would get pierced and pinned by one spear. When the iron bent they could not pull it out or fight well enough with their left hand entangled. Many then, after flailing their arms a while, preferred to throw shields aside and fight with bodies bared. Wearied eventually by wounds, they pulled back and started to regroup on a hill almost a mile away, taking it with our men in pursuit. The Boii and Tulingi, who brought up the rear and guarded it for the enemy with about 15,000 men, attacked and surrounded our men on their unprotected flank. Seeing this, the Helvetians who had taken the hill surged back and renewed battle. The Romans moved their standards in two directions: the first and second lines to oppose the beaten and retreating, the third line to take on the newcomers.
26. So they fought a two-front battle, long and hard. When they could resist our men’s attack no longer, some retreated to the hill again as they had begun, others gathered by the baggage and carts. In this whole battle, fought from the early afternoon until evening, no one saw an enemy turn his back. Even late into the night they fought by the baggage, because they made a rampart of the carts and hurled spears from higher up at our men coming on. Some put pikes and javelins between the carts and wheels to injure our men. After a long fight, we took the baggage and the camp. The daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were captured there. Some 130,000 people survived that battle and journeyed all night long. Not breaking the journey at night at all, on the fourth day they reached the territory of the Lingones, while our men could not keep up with them, because of the casualties and taking three days to bury our dead. Caesar sent messengers with a letter to the Lingones, asking them not to help the Helvetians with grain or anything else. If they helped them, he would treat them as he did the Helvetians. After three days’ break, he began to pursue the Helvetians with all his forces.
27. The Helvetians, short of everything, sent an embassy to discuss surrender with him. Some met him on the road and threw themselves at his feet and begged for peace, weeping as they spoke; he ordered them to await his arrival, and they obeyed. When Caesar arrived, he demanded hostages, arms, and slaves who had fled to the other side. While these things were being found and collected, about 6,000 men of the canton called Verbigenus—perhaps afraid they would be punished after handing over their weapons or just hoping to be safe— thought that in such a mob of captives they could conceal their flight or just be overlooked, left the Helvetian camp at nightfall, and headed for the Rhine and German lands.
28. When Caesar found this out, he ordered the nations whose lands they crossed to chase them down and bring them back if they wanted to clear themselves. He treated the returned refugees as enemies.14 He accepted the surrender of the others when they handed over hostages, weapons, and runaways. He ordered Helvetians, Tulingi, and Latobrigi to go back where they came from; since with their crops lost they had nothing at home for their hunger, he ordered the Allogbroges to supply them grain. He insisted they restore the towns and villages they had burned. He did this mainly because he wanted the place the Helvetians had left not to lie empty, or the Germans living across the Rhine would cross to Helvetian territory for the good land and they would then neighbor the Allobroges and the Gallic province. The Haedui asked to let the Boii, known for great strength, live on their land, and he agreed. The Haedui gave them land and afterwards legal status and liberty the same as their own.
29. Tablets written in Greek characters15 were found in the Helvetian camp and taken to Caesar. They recorded by name how many had left home who could bear arms, and likewise how many children, old men, and women. There were 263,000 Helvetians, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobrigi, 23,000 Rauraci, 32,000 Boii; of these, 92,000 could bear arms. The total of all came to 368,000. When a census Caesar ordered was held after they returned home, the number was found to be 110,000.
30. When the Helvetian war was done, ambassadors from almost all of Gaul, leaders of nations, gathered to congratulate Caesar. They understood that if the Romans had punished the Helvetians in war to avenge old injuries, the result stood as much in Gallic as Roman tradition. The Helvetians had planned to leave their homes in good times to wage war on all Gaul and seize power. They would choose whatever place to live in all Gaul they judged most convenient and fertile and make the other nations pay them tribute. The Gallic leaders sought to call a council of all Gaul on a set day and to do so with Caesar’s permission and approval. They would have some requests to make of him by general agreement. Permission granted, they set a date for the council and on oath swore among themselves that no one would speak of it unless directed by common agreement.
31. When the meeting broke up, the same leaders as before returned to Caesar and asked to discuss their own and everyone’s safety secretly, in private. Granted this, they threw themselves at his feet in tears: they were working and struggling as much to make sure what they said did not get out as to get what they wanted, for if it got out, they foresaw the worst tortures for themselves.
The Haeduan Diviciacus spoke for them: There were two factions in all Gaul, one led by the Haedui, one by the Arverni. After they struggled so much for supremacy over many years, it happened that the Germans were brought in and paid by the Arverni and Sequani. About 15,000 crossed the Rhine; when these fierce barbarians fell in love with the land, life, and riches of Gaul, more crossed; now about 120,000 of them were in Gaul. The Haedui and their supporters had taken arms against them once and again; beaten, they endured great disaster, and lost all their nobles, all their senate, all their knights. Broken by battles and disasters, the people once most powerful in Gaul for its own strength and for the support and friendship of the Roman people was driven to give as hostages to the Sequani its most noble citizens and to bind the nation on oath neither to ask the hostages be returned nor to beseech the Roman people for help nor to resist remaining under the sway and command of the Sequani forever.
He alone of the Haedui could not be brought to swear the oath or give his children as hostages. So he fled his nation and came to Rome to ask the senate for help, because he was the only one not bound by oath or hostages. But worse had come to the victorious Sequani than to the defeated Haedui, because Ariovistus, the German king, had settled in their territory, taking a third of Sequani land, the best in all Gaul, and now he was ordering the Sequani to abandon another third: a few months earlier 24,000 Harudes16 had come to him, for whom he needed a place to live. In a few years everyone would be driven out of Gaul and all the Germans would cross the Rhine. German land couldn’t compare to the Gallic, nor their diet with the Gallic standard. But Ariovistus, once he had beaten Gauls in battle, a battle at Magetobriga,17 arrogantly and cruelly demanded hostages, insisting on the children of every noble house and practicing every kind of torture upon them if anything were not done just at his whim and will. He was a barbarian, angry and impetuous. They could not endure his rule much longer. Without help from Caesar and the Roman people, then all Gauls would have to do what the Helvetians did, leave home to look for another, a new residence far from the Germans, and try their fortune however it fell out.
If this were reported to Ariovistus, Diviciacus didn’t doubt he would exact the harshest punishment on all the hostages he held. Caesar, by reputation (his own and the army’s), by fresh victory, and in the name of the Roman people, could keep a greater mass of Germans from being brought across the Rhine and could protect all Gaul from Ariovistus’ depredations.
32. When Diviciacus had spoken, everyone present began weeping and begging help from Caesar. Caesar noticed the Sequani alone of all did none of what the others did but looked sadly down, heads bowed. Struck by this, he asked them why. The Sequani gave no answer, but remained sad and silent. When he asked them repeatedly and they couldn’t utter a word, Diviciacus the Haeduan answered: The Sequani’s fate was worse and weightier than the rest, in that they alone did not dare complain or seek help even secretly. They feared the cruelty of the absent Ariovistus as though he were right there, because the others were able to flee, but the Sequani, who had welcomed Ariovistus into their land, whose towns were all under his control, would have to suffer every cruelty.
33. Learning this, Caesar heartened Gallic spirits with words and promised to make the matter his own concern: he had great hope that his deeds and reputation would make Ariovistus stop his depredations. Giving this speech, he dismissed the meeting. Afterwards, many reasons made him think he should consider and undertake the business. First, because he saw the Haedui, often called brothers and relations by the senate, enslaved and subjected to the Germans, with hostages held by Ariovistus and the Sequani. To have this under the great authority of the Roman people was exceedingly embarrassing to himself and to the republic. He saw the danger of Germans growing gradually accustomed to crossing the Rhine and a great mass of them coming to Gaul. He did not think fierce barbarians would hold back, once in control of Gaul, from entering the Roman province and then heading for Italy, as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before. This he thought he had to oppose as quickly as possible. Ariovistus had clothed himself in insufferable chutzpah and arrogance such as not to be endured.
34. So he decided to send messengers to Ariovistus to ask he pick some middle ground for a meeting: he wanted to discuss public affairs of the highest importance for both. To that embassy Ariovistus replied: If he needed anything from Caesar, he would go to him; if Caesar wanted anything, he should come to him. He certainly would not dare go without his army to the parts of Gaul Caesar had now taken, and he could not gather his army in one place without great logistical effort. He was surprised that Caesar or indeed the Roman people should have any business in his Gaul, which he had won in combat.
35. When this answer reached Caesar, again Caesar sent messengers with this commission: so indebted was Ariovistus to the kindness of Caesar and the Roman people (for during Caesar’s consulate he had been named king and friend by the senate), then if these were his thanks to Caesar and the Roman people—grumbling at an invitation to conversation and thinking it not worthwhile to discuss and understand their common concerns—, here is what Caesar demanded: first, he should bring no further groups of people across the Rhine into Gaul; then he should give back the hostages he had from the Haedui and allow the Sequani to give back the ones they had taken at his direction; he should not harm the Haedui nor make war on them or their allies. If he complied, he would have permanent influence and friendship with Caesar and the Roman people; if Caesar did not get what he asked, then, since the senate had decreed in the consulship of Messala and Piso (61 BCE) that whoever governed the Gallic province should for the republic’s sake defend the Haedui and the other friends of the Roman people, Caesar would not overlook the harm done to the Haedui.
36. Ariovistus replied: It was the law of war that conquerors command the conquered as they wish. The Roman people was equally accustomed to commanding their vanquished as they chose, not as others prescribed. If Ariovistus did not tell the Roman people how to use its authority, he should not be kept from exercising authority by the Roman people. The Haedui had risked war, clashed at arms, and been overcome, so now they were his tributaries. Caesar would do great harm if his arrival made Ariovistus’ revenue decline. He would neither return hostages to the Haedui nor do harm of war to them or their allies, if they abided by their agreement and paid annual tribute. If they did not, the “brotherly” Roman people would be far away. And Caesar trumpeted that he would not overlook harm done to the Haedui—no one fought with Ariovistus without being destroyed. If Caesar wished, let him join battle, but he should know what strength unbeaten Germans possessed, a people tested in arms, now living in the open fourteen years.
37. This message came to Caesar just as legates from the Haedui and also from the Treveri arrived. The Haedui complained that the Harudes, lately crossing into Gaul, were ravaging their land: they couldn’t buy peace from Ariovistus even with hostages. The Treveri complained that a hundred cantons of Suebi had camped on the Rhine, trying to cross, led by the brothers Nasua and Cimberius. Greatly upset by this news, Caesar thought he must hurry, for if the new band of Suebi joined up with the old forces of Ariovistus, they would be harder to fight off. So with grain collected as quickly as possible, he headed against Ariovistus in long marches.
38. When he had gone three days, he had report that Ariovistus with all his troops was heading to Vesontio,18 the largest town of the Sequani, to occupy it. Caesar thought he should take great care that this not happen. Everything useful for war could be found there, and nature fortified the place to make it good for conducting warfare. The Dubis river surrounded almost the whole town as if drawn by compasses. The remaining space, about 600 feet, where the river left off, was closed in by a high hill, whose base reached the riverbank on each side. A wall around the hill made it a citadel joined to the town. Marching there by long nights and days Caesar took the town and posted his guard.
39. While he stayed at Vesontio a few days to gather grain and supplies, our men inquired and heard Gauls and merchants describing the Germans’ huge bodies, their incredible strength, and their experience in arms. They had often encountered them and could not stand the sight of them or endure their gaze. Great fear suddenly seized our whole army and upset their minds greatly. It started from the military tribunes, the prefects, and the others who followed Caesar out of friendship from Rome without much military experience. One and another suggested reasons why they had to leave and asked his permission to go. Some remained out of shame, wanting not to be suspected of fear. These could not make sham faces or hold back tears, so hid in their tents, complaining of fate and lamenting with friends their common danger. All over camp, wills were signed and sealed.
The fear they voiced gradually upset the ones with long experience in camp, the soldiers and centurions and cavalry commanders. They wanted to be thought less fearful and said it wasn’t the enemy they were worried about, but the narrow road and deep woods between them and Ariovistus, or else they said grain could not easily enough be supplied. Some even told Caesar that when he ordered camp broken and the standards forward the soldiers would not obey or move the standards, out of fear.
40. Realizing this, he called a council bringing together the centurions from all units, rebuking them strongly: mainly for thinking that where or how they were led was theirs to discuss and consider. Ariovistus had eagerly sought the friendship of the Roman people during his consulship; why would anyone think he would abandon his responsibility so rashly? Caesar was sure that when Ariovistus heard his demands and saw the fairness of his proposals he would not reject the favor he and the Roman people showed. But if fury and madness drove him to make war, what then to fear? Why should they despair of their own strength or his prudence? That enemy threat came in the times of our fathers when the Cimbri and Teutones were beaten back by Marius, earning fame for the army no less than the general; the threat came again lately in Italy in the uprising of slaves who had the advantage of a certain amount of experience and training gotten from us.19 So one can judge how important bravery is, particularly because we see how people who had been baselessly feared when unarmed were overcome when they were later armed and victorious. These are the same people the Helvetians often fought and generally beat on both sides of the river, but the Helvetians were no match for our army.
Ariovistus defeating the Gauls20 and their ensuing flight should not trouble anyone, knowing that he was lucky to find the Gauls wearied by war, then held himself in camp amid swamps for many months, giving battle no chance. When the Gauls gave up and began to scatter he suddenly attacked, defeating them by strategy and planning more than strength. That plan could work against inexperienced barbarians, but our troops he could scarcely hope to take in this way. If they supposedly feared for grain and for the narrows ahead, they were arrogant, showing no confidence in their general and trying to tell him his job. He was taking care: the Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were supplying grain, with more ripening in the fields. They could see the road for themselves soon enough. If rumor said some would not obey or move the standards, he was unworried: he knew whose orders an army wouldn’t follow, someone either abandoned by luck or proven to be greedy. His whole life testified his innocence, while his luck was shown by the Helvetian campaign. So what he had been putting off for another day he would do immediately, breaking camp that night at the fourth watch, to find out at once whether shame and duty were stronger with them than fear. If no one followed, then he would go with the tenth legion alone, of which he had no doubts. They would be his praetorian guard.
41. That speech ended, their minds veered round wonderfully and became eager and ready for fighting. The tenth legion expressed thanks first through the military tribunes because he regarded them so highly, assuring him they were right ready for war. Then the other legions through the military tribunes and first rank centurions made amends with Caesar: they never hesitated or feared or preferred their view of the war over the general’s. Accepting their assurances and taking directions from Diviciacus, in whom he had the greatest confidence, he set out before dawn, as he had said, to take the army by a circuitous route of almost fifty miles through open country. On the seventh day, not breaking the journey, he was told by scouts that Ariovistus’ force was no more than twenty-two miles away from ours.
42. Hearing of Caesar’s arrival, Ariovistus sent legates to him. The conversation he had sought before was now acceptable to him, since Caesar had come near and Ariovistus thought he could engage without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and thought Ariovistus was finally coming to his senses, since he volunteered what before he had refused to concede. He had great hope, for the kindnesses he and the Roman people had shown him before, that he would climb down from his stubbornness when he knew what Caesar wanted. The fifth day was set for the conference. Meanwhile with legates going back and forth regularly, Ariovistus insisted Caesar bring no infantry to the conference, fearing he would be surrounded and ambushed. Both should come with cavalry: otherwise he would not come. Caesar, since he wanted nothing to get in the way and disrupt the conference and didn’t trust his safety to Gallic cavalry, thought it best to unmount all the Gallic horsemen and place on horse legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in whom he had the highest confidence, to have the friendliest guards if need arose. When he did this, one of the soldiers of the tenth not unfacetiously said Caesar had done more than he promised. He promised to make the tenth his praetorian guard, but enrolled it among the knights instead.21
43. There was a large open plain and on it a substantial earthen mound: a place equally spaced from the camps of both. They came there as agreed to confer. Caesar posted the legion he had brought on horse 200 paces from the mound, so Ariovistus posted cavalry at like distance. Ariovistus demanded they confer on horseback, bringing ten others each with them. When they got there, Caesar began speaking by recalling his own and the senate’s generosity toward Ariovistus: he had been called king and friend by the senate, with gifts abundantly sent. This happened to few and was usually granted for the highest services. Ariovistus, who had no special entrée or legitimate reason for asking, won these awards by the generosity and kindness of Caesar and the senate. Caesar described the old and sound reasons for the connection with the Haedui, how often and how honorably the senate had named them in its decrees, how the Haedui had been leaders of all Gaul before ever they sought our friendship. The Roman people habitually wanted their allies and friends to suffer no losses, but to advance in influence, dignity, and honor. Who could stand it if what they brought to their friendship with the Roman people could be snatched away? He ended by demanding what he had given the legates to demand: Ariovistus should wage no war on the Haedui or their allies, he should return hostages, and if none of the Germans could be sent home, no more at least should be allowed across the Rhine.
44. Ariovistus replied briefly to Caesar’s demands, then spoke at length of his own strength. He had crossed the Rhine not on his own but on invitation and request from Gauls. With great hope for great rewards he had left home and family. They had homes given to them in Gaul by Gauls, hostages given them voluntarily. By right of war he took tribute, which victors regularly impose on the vanquished. He had not attacked the Gauls, but the Gauls him. All the nations of Gaul had come to attack him and range camps against him. All their forces had been driven back and beaten by him in one battle. If they wanted to try again, he was ready to fight again; if they wanted peace, it was unfair to refuse him the tribute they had paid voluntarily till then. The friendship of the Roman people should be an ornament and protection for him, not a disadvantage—that’s why he sought it. If tribute were forgiven and his prisoners taken away because of the Roman people, he would no less easily reject the friendship of the Roman people than he had sought it. Bringing many Germans into Gaul: he did it to protect himself, not to attack Gaul, as you could see because he had come only when asked and fought not to attack but to defend. He had come to Gaul before the Roman people did. Never before this time had the army of the Roman people gone beyond their Gallic province. What did Caesar want? why had he come into Ariovistus’ territory?
This Gaul was his province as the other was ours. He should not be forgiven if he attacked our territory, and so we were unfair to hinder him in exercise of his rights. As for Caesar calling the Haedui “friends,” he was not such a simple barbarian that he didn’t know that in the last Allobroges war the Haedui had not helped the Romans and in the quarrels the Haedui had with the Sequani they had not used the help of the Roman people. He had every right to be suspicious of pretended friendship—Caesar had an army in Gaul to oppress him with. If Caesar did not leave and take his army out of this part of the country, Ariovistus would treat him not as friend but as enemy. If Ariovistus killed him, he would do a favor for many nobles and leaders of the Roman people—he’d been told this directly by their own messengers. He could win their friendship and influence by killing Caesar. But if Caesar departed and handed him free possession of Gaul, Ariovistus would reward him with a great prize and fight whatever wars Caesar wished with no effort or risk on Caesar’s part.
45. Much was said by Caesar making his point: He could not abandon the matter, for neither he nor the Roman people were used to abandoning allies of great merit, nor did he think Gaul belonged more to Ariovistus than to the Roman people. The Arverni and Ruteni, overcome in war by Fabius Maximus (121 BCE), were pardoned by the Roman people, making no province of them and exacting no tribute. However far back we look, Rome’s dominion in Gaul was always fair. Gaul deserves to be free, left by the senate’s judgment to use its own laws even when defeated in war.
46. While the conversation went on, Caesar was told that Ariovistus’ cavalry was approaching the hill, riding up to our troops, hurling stones and spears against them. Caesar ended the parley and returned to his men, ordering them to throw no spears at all back against the enemy. Even if his chosen legion could safely fight the horsemen, he did not want beaten enemies to be able to say they were surrounded by him when they had trusted in the parleying. After it got abroad among the soldiers how arrogantly Ariovistus had banned Romans from all Gaul while his cavalry attacked our side and disrupted the meeting, they were filled with much greater enthusiasm and energy for fighting.
47. Two days later, Ariovistus sent spokesmen to Caesar. He wanted to deal with him on the things they had started to talk about and left unfinished. They could set a day for renewing the parley or, if he didn’t want that, he could send a legate to Ariovistus. Caesar saw nothing to talk about, especially because the Germans on that day before could not be kept from throwing spears at our side. He thought it would be dangerous to send a legate from our side and expose him to these wild men. He thought best to send Ariovistus a brave and polished young man, Valerius Procillus, son of Valerius Caburius (the father won citizenship from Valerius Flaccus22). Procillus was reliable and knew the Gallic language well, which Ariovistus had long used himself, and the Germans had no reason to harm him. He sent along Metius as well, who had been Ariovistus’ guest. He ordered them to find out and report what Ariovistus was saying. When Ariovistus saw them in his camp, he exclaimed in front of his army, why have they come to him? To spy on him? He kept them from speaking and threw them in chains.23
48. That day he moved camp forward and settled at the foot of a hill five or so miles from Caesar’s camp. The next day he brought his troops past Caesar’s camp and made camp almost two miles beyond him, the better to cut Caesar off from the grain and supplies brought in by the Sequani and Haedui. For the next five days, Caesar brought his forces out and kept them in battle order so Ariovistus could fight if he wished. Ariovistus kept his army in camp all these days, skirmishing daily with cavalry.
This was the way of fighting the German practiced: he had 6,000 cavalry and the same number of swift and fierce infantrymen, each selected by a horseman to protect him. During these fights, the cavalry returned to them, and they came into the fight if things got tougher. If a badly wounded rider fell, they swarmed round. If they had to go out farther or pull back faster, their swiftness was so practiced that they could keep up with the horses, clinging to their manes.
49. When Caesar saw Ariovistus holding to camp, he didn’t want to be kept from his supplies, so he picked a good place about 600 yards past where the Germans were settled and marched there in triple line. He kept the first and second lines in arms, ordering the third to fortify camp. Ariovistus sent some 16,000 men in arms with the whole cavalry to frighten our men and keep them from fortifying camp. Nevertheless Caesar, as he had decided, ordered two lines to repel the enemy, the third to complete the work. When camp was fortified, he left two legions there and some of the auxiliaries, taking the other four legions back to the main camp.
50. Next day, following his plan, Caesar took troops out of both camps and, going a little way from the main camp, drew up his line to give the enemy a chance to fight. When he saw they still didn’t come out, he led the army back to camp around noon. Then Ariovistus finally sent some of his force to attack the smaller camp. Both sides fought hard till evening. At sunset, Ariovistus took his troops, who had given and taken many injuries, back to camp. When Caesar asked prisoners why Ariovistus wouldn’t fight, he found out that the custom with the Germans was for the mothers to cast lots and read signs to proclaim whether it was time to engage or not. They had said the Germans would not win if they joined battle before the new moon.
51. Next day Caesar left enough guard for each camp, then set all his auxiliaries before the smaller camp for the enemy to see. His legionaries were fewer in number than the enemy, so he used auxiliaries for appearances. He himself marched in triple line up to the enemy camp. The Germans finally had to bring their forces from camp and line them up by nation evenly spaced: Harudes, Marcomani, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Eudosii, Suebi. To take away hope of escape, they surrounded the army with carts and wagons and set upon them their women, who reached out to the soldiers going into battle, weeping and begging not to be handed over to Romans as slaves.
52. Caesar put legates (and in one case a quaestor) in charge of each legion so every soldier’s bravery would have a witness. He began the fight on the right flank, noticing the enemy was weaker there. Our men answered the signal eagerly and ran at the enemy suddenly and swiftly, so there wasn’t room for throwing spears at them. Abandoning their spears, they fought hand to hand with swords. The Germans quickly made their usual phalanx to resist assault from our swords. Many of our men were seen jumping up on the phalanx, ripping away shields, and inflicting wounds from above. When the enemy’s left flank was beaten back and thrown into flight, they pressed hard with their larger force on their right. Young Crassus,24 commanding the cavalry, noticed this, and since he was less bogged down than the officers on the front line, he sent the third line to help our men where they were struggling.
53. So the battle was renewed and the enemy all turned and ran, not stopping until they got to the Rhine nearly five miles away. A few were sure enough of themselves to swim or take boats and find their safety. Among them, Ariovistus found a small boat tied to the bank and fled. Our cavalry chased down and killed all the rest.25 Ariovistus had two wives, a Suebian he had brought from home and a Norican, sister of king Voccio, whose brother sent her to marry him in Gaul. Both died trying to escape. One of his two daughters was killed, the other captured. Valerius Procillus was dragged off bound in triple chains by his guards as they fled until Caesar, riding in pursuit with cavalry, came upon him. This pleased Caesar as much as the victory, to see this leading man of the Gallic province, his friend and often host, snatched from the enemy’s hands and restored to him. Fortune had not reduced his pleasure and satisfaction by doing the prisoner serious harm. Procillus said they had cast lots over him three times in his presence, to see whether to burn him alive at once or hold him for another day, and he was saved by virtue of the lots. Metius was also found and brought back.
54. When the battle news crossed the Rhine, the Suebi who had come to the Rhine banks began to return home. When those who lived closest to the Rhine sensed their fear, they pursued and killed a great number of them. Winning two great wars in one summer, Caesar led the army to quarters among the Sequani a little earlier than the season required. He put Labienus in command of quarters while he left for nearer Gaul to hold court.
1 Cassius Dio 38.31.
2 Tenth legion: 1.40–42, 2.21–25, 4.25 (Britain), 7.47–51.
3 The medieval manuscripts supplement C.’s geography with this addition: “One region, which we said the Gauls hold, starts from the river Rhone and is bounded by the Garonne river, the ocean, and the borders of the Belgae, reaching the Rhine river in the territory of the Sequani and Helvetians, and it faces the north. The Belgae start from the furthest boundaries of Gaul, reach the lower part of the Rhine river, and look to the north and the rising sun. Aquitaine reaches from the Garonne river to the Pyrenees mountains and that part of the Ocean facing Spain. It faces the setting sun and the north.”
4 Caesar’s manuscripts give 180 Roman miles (CLXXX) for the breadth NW—SE of what is now Switzerland, but that is likely an error for LXXX (just under 75 English miles).
5 Napoleon III estimated 8,500 carts and 34,000 draft animals to pull them.
6 Diviciacus was Cicero’s houseguest at Rome in 63 BCE, the year of Cicero’s consulship. Cicero is our source for knowing D. was a druid, the only such figure whose name we know.
7 The Rauraci lived south and west of the Rhine, the Tulingi north and east of it, and the Latobrigi beyond them, about where the Rhine passes out of modern Switzerland. The Boii were in motion from seats along the Danube; Noreia is possibly modern Neumarkt in Styria, Austria.
8 The Romans had suppressed an Allobrogan rebellion in 61 BCE.
9 The rampart ran along the left (south) bank of the Rhone, to prevent a Helvetian crossing into the provincia.
10 The Santones lived along and inland from the coast north of Bordeaux, about 160 miles northwest of the Tolosates.
11 C. exceeds his formal authority, leaving the province for the first time. Ocelum is probably modern Usseglio, a tiny town northwest of Turin.
12 Dumnorix will reappear in the fifth commentary.
13 Bibracte, a fortified town west of modern Autun, lies about 150 miles WNW of Geneva.
14 They would be killed or enslaved.
15 Marseilles had been founded by Greeks c. 600 BCE, hence the Greek alphabet was known: see 6.14; in 5.48, Greek letters are used in a code.
16 Later sources place the (C)harudes on the Baltic coast just east of Denmark.
17 Amage, near Luxeuil, well north of the territory we have seen so far.
18 Besançon was a hundred miles NE of where C. left the Helvetians.
19 The slave revolt led by Spartacus occurred in 73–71 BCE.
20 At Magetobriga (1.31 above).
21 A joke no less: the so-called knights (equites) were the second-ranking class of Roman citizens after the senators, and in many cases outshone the senators in wealth.
22 Proconsul for Gaul in 83 BCE.
23 Ariovistus had every right to do this; C. has A. appear arbitrary and cruel in doing exactly what C. would do himself.
24 Son of the wealthy triumvir, to fall with his father fighting the Persians at Carrhae five years later.
25 Plutarch Caesar 19.5 says the victims numbered 80,000.