FIFTH COMMENTARY
54 BCE
Caesar began the year with gritted teeth as his persistent adversary Domitius Ahenobarbus took office as one of the consuls for the year. The other was Appius Claudius Pulcher, the eldest brother of the vile Clodius, but himself a solid citizen: de facto leader of the distinguished family of Claudii, widely respected as an augur. (In 63, he had reported as augur his prediction of a civil war, which all took as fulfilled by the outbreak and suppression of Catiline’s revolt.) He had just married his daughter to Pompey’s son, an alliance suggesting his continuing support for the junta, which he had first demonstrated two years before when he was in the cloud of powerful senators who went to Lucca to ratify the generalissimos’ bargain. In 53, he would go out to Cilicia in southern Asia Minor as proconsul and do a miserable job that his successor, Cicero, had to clean up.
Back from further Gaul at the beginning of the year, Caesar made his one extended trip to his other sphere of responsibility, Illyricum, to inspect and shore up defenses against the Pirustae, a people from the region of modern Montenegro/Albania who were raiding into Roman territory farther north along the Adriatic. This took Caesar only a few weeks.
As he made his way back through the Po valley, to linger a while monitoring the news from Rome before going on toward Gaul and Britain, he stayed at Verona with the father of the poet Catullus. Their dinner party had more than a touch of awkwardness about it, for the younger Catullus had very recently written some stinging verses about Caesar, both about his habit of plunder and about his financially and sexually scurrilous sidekick Mamurra.1 We don’t know how the dinner went, and Catullus may have died not many months later.
During the winter, Caesar also found time to study Cicero’s On the Orator. It was both a work about rhetoric but also a veiled manifesto about a Roman political system in which the qualities of what old Cato had called the “good man skilled at speaking” mattered more in leaders than proficiency at conquest and plunder. Caesar took the work so seriously that he used his time in these months to write his own learned and polished reply De analogia (On Analogy). The work espoused a view of language more austere, rational, and disciplined than was usually to be found in old crowd-pleasers like Cicero. Caesar himself was much less frequently than Cicero on stage as a speaker, but was nonetheless highly successful and both widely and deeply well-read besides. Suetonius tells us that the work was written while Caesar was on the way from hearing cases in northern Italy back to his army. We should agree with Suetonius that the discipline and focus required to do this were impressive, if the story is true.
The friendly-enough literary competition would continue in the coming months when, by the end of the year, Cicero wrote an epic poem on Caesar’s expedition to Britain before continuing to an account of his own exile and return. Caesar praised the first book of that memoir highly. This renewed friendship also took the form of, and was nurtured by, the appointment of Quintus Cicero, the orator’s younger brother, to serve as a legate with Caesar in Gaul for what would turn out to be three years. He was unabashedly there to enrich himself. We welcome that news because it also means we are better informed about affairs in camp by the surviving correspondence between the two brothers.
Mamurra and Oppius appear now alongside Balbus as Caesar’s staff contacts with the world of politics and money back at Rome. (They undoubtedly got very rich themselves in the course of their service.) Balbus, for example, was in Rome the winter of 55–54, went out to join Caesar in Gaul in the spring and went on to Britain with him, then returned to Rome that winter and stayed there until May of 53. Correspondence was one thing, but the dispatch of a trusted agent was another, and it is reasonable that Balbus would have seen Pompey whenever he was at Rome and functioned as the most confidential line of communication between the two generalissimos. In his turn, Pompey sent his own man, Vibullius Rufus, to Gaul on similar errands at least once or twice. The “chief of staff” of this whole enterprise, staying close to Caesar and managing all his affairs, was in this period Pompeius Trogus, a Roman citizen of Gallic origin with a good knowledge of the region and some connections. Aulus Hirtius, who would eventually write the eighth of these commentaries, was apparently his successor. Caesar’s attention to affairs at Rome never flagged and so we know of several letters he wrote to Cicero while actually in Britain this summer. (Pliny the elder reports that Caesar could write, with relays of secretaries, as many as seven letters at one time.)
The real march north for Caesar this year came at the end of May. The trip was longer than usual, for he had to go all the way north, first to the land of the Treveri (around modern Trier), with four legions, to bully into submission the locals, divided for leadership between the Roman-friendly Cingetorix and the resistant Indutiomarus, then on to the coast to supervise fleet preparations. He was also concerned to round up the heads of a number of Gallic nations to take along as virtual hostages, to make sure that their people did not take the opportunity to revolt. Dumnorix the Haeduan, as fearlessly unimpressed with Caesar as he had been in 58, tried to induce the other Gauls to refuse to go along (he told them they would be taken to Britain and killed there), then tried to escape back home himself. Caesar illustrates Dumnorix’s admirable zeal for liberty, then reports he had him hounded down and killed. Dumnorix went down calling on his men to save him and proclaiming himself a free man from a free people.
After about three weeks’ delay waiting for favorable winds, Caesar returned to Britain with five legions in August and September. This visit left more time for exploration and skirmishes with the locals, but in fact was as fruitless as the first. He says that the local chief Cassivellaunus promised to pay him tribute, but we may reasonably guess that with no Roman presence again north of the channel for most of a hundred years, payment fell quickly into arrears. There was some trade with a people called the Trinobantes on the Essex shore north of the Thames estuary, but not much substantial other contact.
The delays in the British trip and its duration meant that the question of winter quarters was pressing when Caesar returned. There was a food shortage in Gaul generally, so he was forced to distribute his forces to several locations some distance from each other in northern Gaul. He himself waited at Amiens until all were settled, by then realizing he would have to stay in Gaul himself this year rather than face challenging winter travel.
Caesar tells frankly the memorable story of the disaster that ensued. The Eburones under Ambiorix attacked and massacred one and a half legions in the winter quarters closest to them. Caesar makes it clear that it was the legate Sabinus whose irresolution and borderline cowardice lost the day. Making that clear also made it clear that Caesar himself, spreading his forces out in small groups far apart, bore no responsibility. The Nervii not far away took heart and besieged Quintus Cicero in his camp (using siegework tactics they had learned by imitating what Caesar did to them earlier in the war) until the general came rushing in pell-mell to the rescue with two under-strength legions: Caesar was quite the hero. Finally, Indutiomarus and the Treveri sought to entrap Labienus similarly, but Indutiomarus’ rival Cingetorix rallied to the Romans, and so Labienus was able to use local cavalry in his defense and succeeded in defeating and killing Indutiomarus and his forces. By now it was late in the year and Caesar’s resolution to stay in Gaul to repair the position in which he found himself was firm. He ordered conscription of three more legions from northern Italy, one of which was nominally designated for Pompey. By the time they could join Caesar in early 53, he had ten legions in the field but his forces were clearly shaken and unsure just how pacified Gaul would remain.
Failed invasions, fatal insurgencies, and recalcitrant consuls did not entirely ruin the year for Caesar. Remembering Pompey’s great theater, Caesar had his own project for Rome, building a new basilica in the traditional forum, as well as his whole new forum, the “forum of Julius,” a lavish extension of Rome’s central market and assembly space reaching north from the old gathering place between the Capitoline and Palatine hills. Early in 54, Caesar had made Cicero a large loan, had of course looked out for Quintus at his right hand, and had welcomed other patronage requests to place promising young men with the army, and so he now came back to ask Cicero to work with Oppius on plans for the Forum Iulii and for a huge new construction in the Campus Martius, not far from Pompey’s theater, to use as a voting assembly place for Roman citizens. The cost of the land (perhaps for just the forum) came to 60 million sesterces, no inconsiderable sum compared to the 40 million a year that would later be imposed on all of Gaul as an annual tax.
There was bad news from Rome for Caesar on his return from Britain. His daughter Julia, married to Pompey in 59, died this summer. Her funeral was huge and noisy, with a crowd carrying her body off to bury in the Campus Martius. Well and good for Caesar’s standing in Rome, but the relationship with Pompey was inevitably attenuated by the loss.
But for both the generalissimos, the year ended badly. No elections could be held, between the riotous mobs and the political maneuvers of the senators. It was not until the summer of 53 that consuls and praetors were finally elected for a year already half done—and this was the winter that Caesar had to stay in Gaul, trapped between the uncertainties of his situation there and the instability at Rome.
IN THE CONSULSHIP OF DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS AND APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER
1. When Domitius and Claudius were consuls, Caesar left winter quarters for Italy, as he did every year, telling the legates he left in charge of the legions to build and repair as many ships as they could that winter, specifying their shape and kind. To load and beach them quickly he made them a little lower than is usual on our sea, especially because he knew frequent changes of the tide made waves lower there. For transporting cargo and animal herds, he made them a little broader than we use on other seas. He ordered them all made nimble, for which it helps to be lower. He ordered things needed for arming ships brought from Spain.
Concluding his trials in nearer Gaul, he left for Illyricum, hearing that the part of the province near the Pirustae was devastated by raids.2 When he arrived, he summoned soldiers from the cities and bid them gather in a particular place. Hearing this, the Pirustae sent ambassadors to tell him that none of what had happened arose from official policy and showed themselves ready to make full amends for damages. Hearing their speech, Caesar demanded hostages and ordered them delivered on a specific day; unless they did so, he would wage war against their nation. When they were brought as ordered on the day, he assigned arbiters between the nations to assess the quarrel and establish penalties.
2. When these things were done and trials completed there, he returned to nearer Gaul and then headed for the army. When he got there, going around all the winter quarters, he found that the soldiers, with extraordinary energy, short on everything, had equipped about 600 ships of the kind we described and 28 warships, and not much was left for their being ready to launch in a few days. Praising the soldiers and those who had led the work, he showed what he wanted done and ordered all to gather at the port of Itius,3 where he knew the crossing to Britain was easiest, twenty-five or thirty miles’ distance from the continent. He left enough soldiers for that task and with four legions (but no baggage train) and 800 cavalry he left for the country of the Treveri. That nation did not come to councils or obey his orders and was said to be encouraging the Germans across the Rhine.
3. This nation, by far the strongest of Gaul in cavalry, has huge forces of infantry as well and extends to the Rhine. Two men struggled for leadership there, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix. The latter came to Caesar as soon as the legions’ arrival was known, to assure him that he and his people would remain loyal and never cease to be friends of the Roman people, and to report what was going on among the Treveri. But Indutiomarus began to gather cavalry and infantry and make ready for war. Those unable to bear arms because of age, he hid in the Ardennes forest4—which stretches huge through Treveri country from the Rhine to the boundary with the Remi.
But then some leaders of that nation, drawn by friendship for Cingetorix and fear of the coming of our army, came to Caesar to deal with him for themselves, since they could not make provisions for their nation. Indutiomarus, afraid all would abandon him, sent legates to Caesar to say that he did not want to leave his own people and come to Caesar. Better to keep his nation loyal and to keep the masses from rashly getting into trouble if all the nobility should leave. With the whole nation in his hands, he would come to Caesar in camp if allowed, trusting his own and his nation’s future to Caesar’s honor.
4. Caesar, though he understood why he said this and what was keeping Indutiomarus from his plan, still didn’t want to waste the summer among the Treveri when everything was ready for the British war, so he ordered Indutiomarus to come with 200 hostages. When he brought them—including his son and all his relatives,5 summoned by name—Caesar reassured Indutiomarus and encouraged him to remain loyal. Then he still summoned all the leaders of the Treveri, reconciling them one at a time with Cingetorix. Cingetorix had earned this, but it was also of great importance that the authority of a man so outstandingly faithful to Caesar should be built up among his own people. Indutiomarus took this badly. Already hostile toward us, he flared up much worse with resentment.
5. Settling affairs thus, Caesar came to the port of Itius with the legions. There he found that 60 ships, built among the Meldi, couldn’t hold course, blown back by storms, and had returned where they came from.6 The rest were ready to sail, equipped with everything. 4,000 cavalry from all Gaul gathered there, as well as leaders from all nations, a few of whom, proven in loyalty, he left in Gaul. He decided to take the rest along as hostages, fearing Gallic uprising in his absence.
6. There with the rest was Dumnorix the Haeduan, of whom we’ve spoken before. Caesar really wanted him along, recognizing a strong figure, eager for revolution and rule, widely respected in Gaul. And in the Haedui council Dumnorix had said Caesar was giving him their throne—which the Haedui took badly, without daring to send ambassadors to Caesar to reject or deplore the decision. Caesar learned this from his allies. Dumnorix asked every which way to be left in Gaul, partly out of inexperience and fear of the sea, partly because he said his religious obligations stood in the way. After he saw that he was stubbornly refused and gave up hope, he started canvassing the Gallic leaders, calling each aside and urging them to stay on the mainland. He was frightening them, saying it was no accident Gaul was being stripped of its leadership. Caesar’s plan was to take them to Britain and murder them there because he was afraid to kill them where Gaul could see. He pledged faith to them asking they swear to do together what they knew would help Gaul. These words were reported to Caesar by many people.
7. Knowing this, Caesar, because he greatly esteemed the Haedui, decided he had to control and constrain Dumnorix however he could. As he saw Dumnorix’s delusions increasing, he needed to make sure no harm came to Caesar or the republic. So while spending about twenty-five days there, because northerly winds, blowing there year-round, prevented sailing, he worked to keep Dumnorix to his commitments while finding out all his plans.
Finally he got decent weather and ordered infantry and cavalry to board ship. While everyone was distracted, Dumnorix and his Haedui cavalry began leaving camp for home without Caesar’s knowledge. Hearing this, Caesar interrupted his departure and put everything aside to send most of the cavalry to pursue Dumnorix and ordered him returned. If he resisted and disobeyed, he was to be killed. He couldn’t expect Dumnorix to act sensibly after Caesar departed, when he was flouting his authority face to face. When he was summoned, Dumnorix began to resist and fight back and call on the loyalty of his men, regularly proclaiming himself a free man from a free nation. As ordered, they surrounded the man and killed him. All the Haedui cavalry returned to Caesar.
8. After this, Labienus was left on the mainland with three legions and two thousand cavalry to watch the ports, gather grain, keep track of what happened in Gaul, and plan as the circumstances of the moment suggested. Caesar sailed at sunset with five legions and as many cavalry as he left behind on the mainland. Carried on a light southwest wind, he lost headway around midnight when the wind dropped. Drifting farther with the current, at dawn he saw Britain on his left.7 Then following the change of tide, he pressed with oars to reach that part of the island he had learned the previous summer was best for landing. The bravery of the troops then was admirable, as they rowed tirelessly and kept the heavy transports up with the longboats. They all reached Britain about mid-day, with no enemy there in sight. Caesar later learned from captives that a great force had gathered there, but was frightened by the mass of ships. With last year’s ships and the private ships made for profit, more than 800 were seen at one time.8 They left the shore and hid themselves on higher ground.
9. Caesar landed his force and chose a good place for his camp, then learned from captives where the enemy forces had halted. He left ten cohorts and three hundred cavalry on shore to guard the ships, unworried because he left them at anchor on an open, sandy shore, with Q. Atrius put in charge of the ship garrison. By night he went forward about ten miles and spotted the enemy force.9 They came by horse and chariot to the river from high ground to intercept our forces and began the fight. Driven back by cavalry, they hid in the woods, choosing a place extremely well fortified by nature and man, apparently prepared beforehand in some local war. Every approach was blocked by piles of felled trees. A few came out of the woods to fight and kept our men from getting beyond the barricades. Soldiers of the seventh legion, making a tortoise and driving a ramp up to the barricades, took the place and drove them from the woods with only a few of our own wounded. Caesar forbade chasing them further in flight, both because he did not know the ground and because they had used up most of the day and wanted time left for fortifying camp.
10. Next morning he sent cavalry and infantry out in three detachments to pursue the refugees. When they had gone a distance and the stragglers were already in sight, horsemen came from Quintus Atrius to Caesar to report that on the preceding evening a great storm had risen and battered almost all the ships and beached them, for their anchors and ropes did not hold and the sailors and helmsmen could not resist the force of the storm. From that battering of the ships much damage had been done.
11. Learning this, Caesar recalls legions and cavalry, bidding them halt on the way while he returned to the ships. He saw things were plainly just as he had learned from messengers and messages, with about forty ships lost, the rest able to be repaired but at great effort. He orders carpenters assigned from the legions and others summoned from the continent. He writes Labienus to prepare as many ships as possible for the legions with him. He judged it best to bring the ships all on shore and consolidate a single fortified camp, even though it took considerable work and effort. They spend about ten days on this, not even stopping the soldiers’ work at night. With the ships beached and the camp strongly fortified, he leaves the same troops on ship garrison as before: he goes back where he had returned from. When he arrived, many British forces had gathered there from all over, by common agreement yielding supreme command and war leadership to Cassivellanus. In former times, continuous wars came between him and other nations, but when we arrived all the Britons were alarmed and put him in charge of war and command.
12. Inland Britain is inhabited by people traditionally said to have been born there, the coast by people who came from Belgium (they are called by names of the nations they came from) for booty and warfare, and after waging war they remained and began to till the land. There are infinitely many people and farmhouses everywhere very like Gallic ones, and a great number of cattle. They use bronze and gold coin or iron bars measured to a certain weight in place of coin. Tin is found in the inland regions, iron by the sea, but in small amounts. Bronze they import. There is timber of every kind you find in Gaul, except beech and fir. They think it not right to eat rabbit, chicken, or goose, but raise them for the delight of it. Their climate is milder than Gaul, the cold weather less severe.
13. The island is a triangle, one side facing Gaul. One corner on this side, by Kent, where almost all ships from Gaul come ashore, looks to the rising sun, while the lower corner looks south. This is about 500 miles long. Another side faces Spain and the setting sun, where lies Ireland, thought to be about half the size of Britain, but the crossing is about the same as from Gaul to Britain. Halfway is the island called Mona,10 and many other islands are thought to lie there, where some claim that night lasts thirty full days in winter. We could not find out anything about this by our inquiries except that by careful water measures we saw the nights were shorter than on the continent. The length of that side, as the story goes, is seven hundred miles. The third side faces north, with no land facing, but the corner on that side mostly faces Germany. This side is about eight hundred miles long. The whole island around extends 2,000 miles.11
14. The most civilized people of them all are the ones who live in Kent, an entirely maritime area, not much unlike Gaul in customs. Inland they mostly do not plant grain, but live on milk and meat and dress in skins. All the Britons stain themselves with woad,12 which produces the color blue, and so they are more horrifying to see in battle, with long hair and all their bodies shaved except for head and upper lip. By tens and twelves they have wives in common, especially brothers with brothers and fathers with sons. Children born of them are counted as children of the man to whom the mother was first brought as a virgin.
15. Enemy cavalry and charioteers battled our cavalry fiercely on the road, but ours were still victors all around, forcing them into the woods and hills, cutting them down in a furious chase, losing a few of our own. A while later, when our men were fortifying camp and heedless, theirs suddenly burst from the woods attacking those who were stationed outside camp and fought strongly. Caesar sent two cohorts to help, the first ranks of two legions, and when these stood fast with little space between them, our men were still frightened by the new style of fighting, so the Britons fought bravely through our lines and retreated safely. That day Quintus Laberius Durus, military tribune, was killed. The enemy were driven back when more cohorts were sent forward.
16. In all this sort of fighting, where they battled in plain sight before the camp, we realized that our men, weighed down by weapons and unable to leave their standards and pursue retreating enemy, were less ready for a foe like this. Cavalry fought at very great risk because the enemy deliberately withdrew, then when they had drawn our men a little away from the legions, they leapt down from their chariots and fought the uneven contest on foot. Their cavalry style of fighting brought equal danger in retreat and in pursuit. The Britons fought, moreover, nowhere in close order but in small numbers all spread out, and had troops posted so some could take up for others, with fresh unwearied troops relieving the exhausted.
17. Next day the enemy stayed on hills far from camp, with here and there a few of them showing themselves, harassing our cavalry, skirmishing more tentatively than the day before. But at noon, when Caesar sent three legions and all the cavalry foraging with the legate Gaius Trebonius, suddenly they flew against the foragers on all sides, not even avoiding the standards where the legions were. Our men attacked them fiercely, driving them back and not abandoning the chase until the cavalry, confident of support as they saw the legions following, drove the enemy headlong, killed a large number and gave them no chance to regroup or stop or dismount their chariots. In this rout, the auxiliaries they had gathered from everywhere departed, and after that the enemy never fought with us with their full strength.
18. Learning their plans, Caesar led the army to the river Thames in Cassivellaunus’ territory, a river able to be crossed— with difficulty—in only one place.13 Arriving there, he saw huge enemy forces aligned on the opposite bank, protected there by sharp stakes fixed before them, with stakes of the same kind hidden underwater in the river. Finding this out from captives and refugees, Caesar sent cavalry ahead and ordered the legions to follow at once. The soldiers moved with such speed and momentum, just their heads out of the water, that the enemy could not resist the combined attack of legions and cavalry, and so left the bank and gave themselves to flight.
19. Cassivellaunus, as we have seen, gave up all hope of battle, released most of his troops and kept four thousand charioteers to watch our progress. He went off the road and hid in tangled woods. Where he knew we would pass he ordered people and livestock out of the fields into the woods and, when our cavalry poured out freely into farmland to plunder and pillage, he sent out his chariots by every road and path from the woods to fight our cavalry, at our great peril, and made them fear to roam farther. Caesar was left forbidding men to go far from the legions’ line of march and was able to harm the enemy only by ravaging farmland and setting fires, as much as legionary soldiers could do on the march.
20. Meanwhile the Trinovantes were nearly the strongest people thereabouts,14 whose young Mandubracius trusted Caesar and came to him in Gaul when his father, holding power among them, had been killed by Cassivellaunus and he himself avoided death by flight. They sent ambassadors now to Caesar promising to surrender to him and obey his orders and asking him to protect Mandubracius against harm from Cassivellaunus and send him home to rule and hold command. Caesar ordered them to supply forty hostages and grain for his army and sent them Mandubracius. They obeyed at once, sending the number of hostages and grain.
21. With the Trinovantes protected and sheltered against military attack, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi sent ambassadors and surrendered to Caesar. From them he learned about Cassivellaunus’ town not far away, fortified by forest and swamp, where a considerable number of men and livestock had gathered. The Britons call it a town when they fortify thick woods with walls and ditches to gather there routinely against enemy attack. Caesar went there with the legions. He found the place wonderfully protected by nature and engineering, but still he set out to attack from two sides. The enemy hesitated a little, unable to bear the onrush of our soldiers, then fled out another side of town. A great many livestock were found there and many fugitives were captured and killed.
22. While this went on there, Cassivellaunus sent messengers to Kent, where four kings ruled, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax. He ordered them, gathering all their forces, to approach and attack our naval station by surprise. When they came near camp, our men broke out, killed many of them, captured their noble general Lugotorix, and brought our men home safe. Cassivellaunus had news of this battle. Troubled by suffering such losses, by the ravaging of his land, and especially by the loss of allies, he sent ambassadors to Caesar by way of Commius of the Atrebates to discuss surrender. Caesar, deciding to winter on the continent in case of sudden Gallic uprisings, with not much summer left (he knew the time could easily be dragged out), demanded hostages and set the annual tribute Britain would pay the Roman people.15 He particularly ordered Cassivellaunus to do no harm to Mandubracius or the Trinovantes.
23. Accepting hostages, he led troops back to the coast and found the ships rebuilt. Launching them, because he had many captives and some ships had been lost in storm, he decided to return the army in two trips. And so for all the ships and sailings this year and the last, not one ship carrying troops was lost. But of those sent back empty from the continent, the ones from which the soldiers of the earlier crossing had disembarked and the sixty Labienus had built later, few made their place and almost all were driven back. When Caesar had waited for them a while,16 not wanting to be kept from sailing by the season, as the equinox neared, he had to crowd the soldiers in tighter and, when a great calm set in, they set off at second watch and at dawn reached land, bringing all the ships in safe.
24. When the ships were ashore and the Gauls’ council at Samarobriva17 was done, because harvests had fallen short through drought that year in Gaul, he had to arrange forces in winter quarters differently from years before and assign the legions among more nations.18 He gave legate Gaius Fabius one to take to the Morini, Quintus Cicero another for the Nervii, Lucius Roscius a third for the Esuvii, and a fourth he ordered to winter among the Remi in Treveri territory with Titus Labienus. Three he stationed among the Belgae, putting quaestor Marcus Crassus and legates Lucius Munatius Plancus and Gaius Trebonius in charge.19
One legion, lately drafted beyond the Po, he sent with five cohorts to the Eburones, most of whom are between the Meuse and Rhine rivers and ruled by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. He ordered legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to lead them. Arranging the legions thus he thought he could easily deal with the grain shortage. The camps of all these legions—except the one he’d given Lucius Roscius to take to the most quiet and peaceful region—were within less than a hundred miles of each other. He decided to linger in Gaul himself until he knew the legions were settled and the camps fortified.
25. Born to high station among the Carnutes was Tasgetius, whose ancestors had ruled that nation. For his power and his kindness to him—he had depended on his distinctive energy in all his battles—Caesar restored him to the rank of his ancestors. Reigning now a third year, he was killed by his enemies, many of the ringleaders coming from his own city. The affair was reported to Caesar. He worried the city might revolt on encouragement of the many involved and ordered Lucius Plan-cus and his legion swiftly from Belgium to go to the Carnutes, to winter there, seizing and sending him those involved in Tasgetius’ murder. By then he had report from all the legates and the quaestor to whom he had assigned legions that they had reached and fortified their winter quarters.
26. Some fifteen days after they were in quarters a sudden uprising and revolt began, led by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. Though they had presented themselves to Sabinus and Cotta at their border and brought grain for the camps, nevertheless on urging from messengers sent by the Treveran Indutiomarus they stirred up their people, suddenly overrunning our wood-gatherers, and came with great force to attack the camp. Our men snatched up arms and mounted the rampart. They prevailed in a cavalry battle by sending out the Spanish horsemen on one side. The enemy lost hope and drew back from attacking. Then as customary for them they all shouted that someone of our side should come to parley: they had things to say of mutual interest that they hoped could lessen the disagreements.
27. Gaius Arpinius, equestrian and a friend of Sabinus, was sent to parley with them, and with him one Quintus Junius from Spain, who had for a while been Caesar’s messenger to Ambiorix. Ambiorix spoke to them so: He acknowledged how much he owed to Caesar’s generosity toward him, freeing him from paying what he had been paying his neighbors, the Aduatuci, and freeing as well his son and nephew, whom, when they’d been sent among hostages, the Aduatuci had kept in servitude and chains. What he had done in attacking the camp was not by his will or judgment, but he had been forced by the people. They had no less authority over him than he over them—such was the nature of his regime. For to the people the justification for war was that they could not resist the fast-rising conspiracy of the Gauls. In all humility, he could easily prove he was not so inexperienced that he thought he could overcome the Roman people with his forces.
But Gaul was of one mind: this day was set for attacking all Caesar’s winter camps, so no legion could come to the aid of another. Gauls could not easily refuse Gauls, especially concerning a plan for regaining their common freedom. He went along out of loyalty but was now reckoning what he owed for the kindness of Caesar. He warned, indeed prayed, Sabinus as his guest-friend to look out for the safety of himself and his troops. A huge band of German mercenaries had crossed the Rhine and would be here in two days. They should think whether, before the neighbors could notice, to lead troops from camp and take them to Cicero or Labienus, the one a bit less than fifty miles away from them, the other rather farther. He promised and confirmed by oath he would give them safe conduct through his land. In doing so, he was looking out for his own nation—to free it of quartering obligations—and paying back Caesar for all his kindness. With this speech, Ambiorix left them.
28. Arpinius and Junius reported what they heard to the legates, who were alarmed by the sudden news and thought they should not ignore the report, even from an enemy. They were especially concerned and incredulous that the lowly and weakling Eburones should dare by themselves to make war on the Roman people. They took the matter to a council; a great quarrel erupted among them. Aurunculeius Cotta and numerous tribunes and first rank centurions thought nothing should be done in a hurry. They should not leave winter quarters unless Caesar ordered them. They claimed they could withstand any Gallic forces—or even Germans—in fortified camp. Their evidence was that they had strongly withstood the first attack of the enemy, wounding many besides. They were not short of grain. Help would arrive from nearby camps and from Caesar. And besides, what was more foolish and embarrassing than to take advice on great matters from the enemy?
29. Sabinus rejoined loudly that it would be too late when larger enemy forces joined up with additional Germans or when neighboring winter camps endured some disaster. Time for discussion was short. He thought Caesar had left for Italy—the Carnutes would not otherwise have planned Tasgetius’ killing, and the Eburones, if Caesar were nearby, would not have approached our camps so contemptuously. His eye was not on the enemy but on the facts: the Rhine was nearby, the Germans were outraged at the death of Ariovistus20 and our earlier victories, and Gaul was on fire over subjection to the Roman people’s rule and the many humiliations that extinguished their former military renown. Finally, who could convince himself Ambiorix would stoop to such designs without good reason? His own view was safe either way. If there was no challenge, no danger in joining the nearest legion; if all Gaul was in league with the Germans, only in speed was there safety. What could come from the advice of Cotta and the others? If not immediate risk, at least fear of starving under a long siege.
30. The argument went both ways, with Cotta and the first officers pushing back strongly. “You win,” said Sabinus, “if that’s how you want it,” loud enough for most soldiers to hear: “I’m not the type to be terrified by you with danger of death. These men will understand, and if something serious happens, they’ll hold you accountable. If you let them, in three days they would join the nearby camps to face the common fortunes of war there, not be left cast out and abandoned far from the others, to die by sword or starvation.”
31. Everyone leapt to their feet, laying hands on both and pleading that disagreement and stubbornness not lead to the worst danger. Easy enough, to stay or go, if everyone thought and voted as one; but they saw no safety in disagreement. The argument lasted till midnight. Finally Cotta was persuaded and gave in; Sabinus’ opinion prevailed. It was declared they would march at first light. The rest of the night was wakeful, every soldier looking to his kit: what would he take with him, what winter equipment would he be forced to abandon? They thought of everything dangerous about staying, how exhaustion and night watches would increase risk. So at first light they left camp in a long line, heavily laden, like men believing Ambiorix’s argument was not that of an enemy but of their greatest friend.
32. The enemy, in the noisy and wakeful night, sensed they were leaving and set ambush in the woods on both sides of their way. Well-hidden, a couple of miles off, they awaited the Roman coming. When most of our line had descended into a steep valley, they showed themselves suddenly on both sides of the defile, crowding the rear and blocking the vanguard from ascending. They began battle in a setting entirely bad for our men.
33. Then at last Sabinus, as if he had foreseen none of this, took fright and ran around arranging his cohorts, timidly, as though everything he needed was lacking—which happens often enough to those who need to stop and plan in the midst of action. Cotta, who had thought this could happen en route and so had advised against marching, was everywhere he was needed and did his duty as general and soldier in battle, calling out and encouraging the troops. Since the line of march was long and the two could not be everywhere and see what was needed in each place, they ordered it passed along that baggage should be abandoned and that forces should gather in a circle. In a crisis of this sort, that advice is not bad, but it still turned out badly. It took away our soldiers’ hope and made the enemy keener to fight, for we appeared to act only out of great fear and despair. It also happened—as it had to—that soldiers left their standards and hurried to find and take whatever they valued most from their baggage. There was shouting and weeping everywhere.21
34. The barbarians were not without a plan. Their leaders sent orders up the line for no one to give way. The booty was theirs and whatever the Romans left would be kept for them. They should think everything depended on victory. Our men, bereft of leadership and luck, relied on their courage above all and whenever any cohort attacked, many enemy fell. Ambiorix sees this and orders it passed along that they should throw spears from a distance and not go closer, yielding ground wherever the Romans attacked, but pursue them when they returned to their standards.
35. This command they obeyed exactly. When a cohort left the circle and attacked, the enemy drew back quickly. That cohort was necessarily exposed and took spears thrown on the open side. When they began to go back where they had come from, they were surrounded by those who had retreated and by the ones near them. If they held their ground, they had no chance to show their courage and in the crowd they could not dodge spears thrown by so many. With so many disadvantages and many wounds, they still stood fast most of the day, fighting from dawn to the eighth hour, doing nothing to be ashamed of. Then Titus Balventius, first spear just last year, a man strong and greatly respected, took a javelin wound in each leg. Quintus Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting heroically, was killed helping his son, who had been surrounded. The legate Lucius Cotta, cheering on every cohort and rank, was wounded in the face by a slingshot.
36. Troubled by all this, Sabinus, seeing Ambiorix at a distance encouraging his troops, sent his interpreter Gnaeus Pompeius22 to him to ask for mercy for him and his men. Ambiorix responded to the plea: If Sabinus wanted to talk to him, fine. He hoped he could win safety for the soldiers from the people. Sabinus himself would not be harmed, and for that, Ambiorix pledged his own faith. Sabinus consulted with the wounded Cotta whether they should leave battle and confer with Ambiorix, hoping to win safety for themselves and their soldiers. Cotta said he would not approach an armed enemy and went on fighting.
37. Sabinus ordered the military tribunes and first rank centurions around him to follow, and when he neared Ambiorix, he was commanded to cast aside his weapons. He did as he was commanded and ordered his men to do likewise. Then while they talked terms together and Ambiorix designedly began a longer speech, he was gradually surrounded and then killed. They proclaimed victory and raised the war-whoop in their fashion, scattering our men with an attack. Lucius Cotta was killed fighting there along with most of the soldiers. The rest made it back to the camps they had left. One, Lucius Petrosidius, a standard-bearer, pursued by a great many enemy, hurled his eagle over the rampart and was slain fighting heroically before the gate. They barely held off the attack till nightfall, but after dark, despairing of rescue, they all killed themselves to the man. A few slipped away from battle and through sketchy woodland paths made it to legate Titus Labienus’ camp and reported what had occurred.
38. Elated by victory, Ambiorix and his cavalry departed immediately for the Aduatuci, his kingdom’s neighbors. They paused neither night nor day, ordering infantry to follow. Reporting events and rousing the Aduatuci, next day they reached the Nervii and urged them not to miss the chance of freeing themselves forever and avenging themselves on the Romans for the injuries they had suffered.23 Two legates had been killed and a large part of the army destroyed. It would not be hard to surprise and kill the legion wintering with Cicero. Ambiorix promised his support. His speech easily won over the Nervii.
39. So they sent messengers at once to the Ceutrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumoxii, and Geidumni, all under their sway, gathered all the forces they could, and rushed unexpected to Cicero’s camp: news of Sabinus’ death had not reached him.24 Here too inevitably some soldiers who had gone out in the forest for firewood and lumber were cut off by the sudden arrival of cavalry. They were surrounded. Then with a large force, the Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci, and all their allies and followers began to attack the legion. Our men rushed to arms, mounting the rampart. They barely held the day, for the enemy counted entirely on speedy attack—winning this, they were sure of lasting victory.
40. A message was sent from Cicero to Caesar at once and the couriers were promised great rewards, but all roads were watched and they were captured. From lumber collected for fortification, 120 towers went up at night. Everything needed was accomplished with incredible speed. The enemy attacked camp next day with a much larger force, filling in the ditch. Our men fought back the same as the day before, and again on the following days. No hour of night saw effort lessen: there was no rest for the weary or the wounded. Whatever the next day’s attack required was gotten together at night. Many sharp stakes were fire-cured, many wall spears were made.25 Towers were boarded over, with protecting tops and covers made of woven wicker. Cicero himself, though in poor health, left him self no time for rest, even at night, until a crowd of protesting soldiers made him spare himself.
41. Then the leaders and princes of the Nervii who could approach Cicero with some claim of friendship said they wished to speak with him. Permission granted, they argued the same as Ambiorix had done to Sabinus. All Gaul was in arms, the Germans had crossed the Rhine, the winter quarters of Caesar and the others were assailed. They reported Sabinus’ death as well and invoked the example of Ambiorix. The Romans were wrong to hope for help from people fearing for their own affairs. Their intentions for Cicero and the Roman people were to deny them nothing but winter quarters—they did not want the practice to become a habit. They were free to leave camp and go where they wished without fear. Cicero gave them one answer: The Roman people were not in the habit of accepting terms proposed by armed enemies. If they would disarm, they would have his support sending representatives to Caesar. He had hopes, considering Caesar’s fairness, that they would get what they wanted.
42. Disappointed in their hope, the Nervii surround camp with a rampart ten feet high and a ditch fifteen feet deep. They had learned this from us in prior years’ encounters and were taught by captives from our army, but without suitable iron tools they were forced to hack the turf with swords and bring up the dirt in hands and cloaks. One could tell how large the force was, for in less than three hours they completed a fortification two or three miles around, then in the next days began to build towers as high as the rampart and prepared hooks and tortoises the way the same captives had showed them.
43. On the seventh day of siege, when great winds sprang up, they started launching fiery projectiles of molten clay from slings and heated spears against the huts covered in the Gallic manner with thatch.26 They quickly caught fire and in the strong wind spread flame throughout the camp. The enemy shouted as if victory were over and done, moved forward towers and tortoises, and began to climb the rampart with ladders. Our soldiers were so brave and alert that, with fire and flying spears on all sides, seeing all their baggage and possessions aflame, not only did no one think of leaving the rampart to slip away, but almost no one even looked back and they went on fighting fiercely and powerfully. This was by far the worst day for our men, but ended with a great many enemy wounded and killed. They had crowded up under the rampart with those behind giving those in front no room for retreat. When the flames died down a bit and in one place a tower was brought up to touch the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort pulled back from where they stood and moved back all their men, then with words and gestures invited the enemy to enter if they wished. None of them dared to advance. Then stones flew on all sides, they were driven back, and the tower set ablaze.
44. There were heroic men, centurions, in that legion, ready for promotion to the highest ranks, Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus. They were always competing for who was ahead, every year fiercely vying for position. Pullo, when the fighting was fierce at the wall, said, “Why hesitate, Vorenus? What chance to prove your courage are you waiting for? This day will settle our contest.” Saying this, he went beyond the wall and rushed where the enemy seemed crowded thickest. Vorenus didn’t stay within the rampart either, but followed, conscious of what everyone thought. At close range, Pullo threw his spear at the enemy throng and transfixed one running toward him. The man fell lifeless, protected by the shields of enemy who all hurled weapons at Pullo and left him no chance to retreat.
Pullo’s shield was pierced, the point lodging in his belt. This pushed aside his scabbard and slowed his right hand reaching to draw his sword. The enemy surrounded him in his awkwardness. His rival Vorenus came to help him struggle. The whole crowd turned from Pullo right toward him, thinking Pullo run through by a spear. Vorenus went hand-to-hand with his sword, killed one and drove others back a little. Pushing on too eagerly, he fell and landed in a hollow. Now Pullo brought help to his surrounded rival, and both made it back inside the ramparts, with numerous kills and high acclaim. So fortune turned for each in their rivalry and competition. Each rival brought help and safety to the other, nor could you tell which outdid the other in courage.
45. As each day’s siege fighting grew more serious, more dangerous—especially because many soldiers were wounded, leaving the matter to few defenders—so reports and messengers went oftener to Caesar. Some messengers were caught and tortured to death in sight of our soldiers. There was one Nervian named Verticus with us, of honorable birth, who had fled to Cicero when the siege began and shown him loyalty. He convinced a slave, promising him freedom and great rewards, to take a message to Caesar. He took it wrapped around a javelin and came, unsuspected, a Gaul among Gauls, all the way to Caesar. From him they learned of the danger to Cicero and the legion.
46. Caesar received the report late afternoon and immediately sent a messenger to the Bellovaci for quaestor Marcus Crassus, whose quarters were twenty-odd miles away. He ordered the legion to start at night and come quickly. Crassus left immediately with the messenger. He sent another to legate Gaius Fabius, to bring a legion to Atrebates territory, where he knew he would have to go himself. He wrote Labienus to come with a legion to the Nervii, if it could be done without endangering the republic. He did not think he should wait for the rest of the army, which was a bit farther away. He brought about 400 cavalry from camps nearby.
47. Learning mid-morning from runners of Crassus’ approach, he covered about eighteen miles that day. He put Crassus in command at Samarobriva and assigned him a legion, because he left there the army’s baggage, native hostages, public documents, and all the grain collected there for surviving the winter. Fabius, as ordered, hardly hesitating, met him on the way with his legion. Labienus, hearing of Sabinus’ death and slaughtered cohorts, with all the Treveri forces approaching, feared if he made a similar flight from camp he would not be able to sustain an enemy attack, especially from those heartened by recent victory. He wrote back to Caesar how dangerous it would be to bring his legion from quarters, wrote what had happened among the Eburones, and reported that all the horse and foot of the Treveri had set down a couple of miles from his camp.
48. Caesar approved his advice, even if it meant giving up on three legions and settling for two and still putting his one hope for common safety on speed. He came by long marches to the Nervii. There he learned from captives what was happening with Cicero and how dangerous things were. Then he convinced a Gallic cavalryman with a large bribe to take a message to Cicero. He sent it written in Greek characters,27 so our plans would not be understood by the enemy if intercepted. If he could not reach Cicero, Caesar advised him to tie the message to a throwing spear’s strap and throw it into the fort. In it he said he would arrive very soon with legions and encouraged him to maintain his old courage. The Gaul, fearing danger, threw the spear as ordered. By chance it stuck in a tower unnoticed by our men for two days and was seen on the third by a soldier, taken down, and brought to Cicero. He read it then recited it to the assembled troops, filling all with great happiness. Then the smoke of fires was seen from afar, erasing all doubt of the coming of our legions.
49. The Gauls, alerted by scouts, abandon siege and make for Caesar in full force: about 60,000 armed men.28 Cicero took the chance to ask Vertico, mentioned above, for a Gaul to take a message to Caesar. He tells him to go cautiously and carefully. He writes in it that the enemy has left him and turned its whole force to Caesar. The letter was brought to Caesar around midnight. He alerts his men and encourages them to fight. Next day at dawn, he moves camp and goes three or so miles, spotting enemy forces across a valley and a stream. It was very dangerous to fight such a force on disadvantageous ground. Then, knowing Cicero was free of siege, he thought he could relax his speed, stopping to fortify camp in the most favorable position he could. Small as it was for a force of seven thousand with no baggage, still he shrinks it as much as possible with narrow lanes, thinking to make himself contemptible in the eye of the enemy. He sends meanwhile scouts in all directions to see where to cross the valley most easily.
50. Both sides held their positions that day, with a few cavalry skirmishes by the river. The Gauls were awaiting large forces not yet arrived. Caesar was looking to see if he could pretend fear to lure the enemy to his position, across the valley, to fight in front of his camp. If he could not do this, he would scout the fords to cross valley and stream less dangerously. At dawn enemy cavalry approached camp and joined battle with ours. Caesar deliberately ordered our cavalry to withdraw and return to camp and for the camp to be fortified by a higher rampart on all sides and the gates barred, and to do this with much rushing about and appearance of fear.
51. Encouraged by all this, the enemy cross over their forces and form on uneven ground as our men come out from the rampart. They close and hurl spears into our fort from all sides. Sending around heralds they order this proclamation: Anyone, Gaul or Roman, who went over to them before the third hour could do so without danger; after that, no opportunity. They so disrespected us that when we blocked the gates with single rows of turf, seemingly unbreakable, some began to tear down the rampart bare-handed, while others were filling the ditch. Then Caesar burst out from every gate. Swift-rushing cavalry put the enemy to flight, so none could stand to fight at all. He killed a great many and stripped all of their weapons.
52. He hesitated to go farther, seeing woods and swamps between and no chance left to harm the enemy even slightly. On the same day, he reached Cicero with all his forces safe. The enemy’s towers, shelters, and fortifications surprised him. When the legion formed up in ranks he saw not even one-tenth of them unwounded. From this he judged how dangerous it had been and how bravely done. He praised Cicero and the legion deservedly. He praised individually by name the centurions and tribunes whose great courage he learned from Cicero’s account. He heard from prisoners the true fate of Sabinus and Cotta. Next day he made a speech, recounting what had happened, consoling and heartening the soldiers. He said they should endure the disaster brought by the legate’s fault and folly, because by the kindness of immortal gods and by their own courage, the loss was atoned for, leaving neither lasting joy for the enemy nor lasting pain for them.
53. News of Caesar’s victory flew unbelievably fast through the Remi to Labienus. The camp of Cicero was more than fifty miles away and Caesar reached it after the ninth hour, but by midnight a roar went up at the camp gates, signifying the victory and congratulations from the Remi to Labienus. When this news reached the Treveri, Indutiomarus, who had decided to attack Labienus’ camp the next day, fled by night and took his forces back to Treveri country. Caesar sent Fabius and his legion back to quarters, choosing to winter himself with three legions in three camps around Samarobriva. He decided to stay with the army all winter, because the uprisings in Gaul had been so considerable.
The harm done by Sabinus’ death led almost every Gallic nation to think about war, sending messengers and legates back and forth to ascertain what might be done, how war might begin, and holding night gatherings in remote places. No part of the winter passed for Caesar without concern for some news of schemes and unrest among the Gauls. He was informed by Lucius Roscius, whom he had put in charge of the thirteenth legion, of a great gathering of forces among the Gallic nations called Armorican, massing to attack him no more than seven miles from his quarters—but departing on hearing news of Caesar’s victory, a departure that looked like flight.
54. Caesar summoned leaders from every nation. Frightening some by revealing what he knew was going on and encouraging others, he kept most of Gaul to its obligations. But the Senones, one of the strongest and most respected Gallic nations, decided to kill Cavarinus, whom Caesar had made king among them.29 (His brother Moritasgus ruled when Caesar came to Gaul, his ancestors before that.) When Cavarinus realized this and fled, they chased him to their borders, driving him from home and kingdom, then sent representatives to Caesar to justify themselves. He ordered their whole senate to come to him, but they did not heed him. Having a few leaders ready to begin hostilities so impressed these barbarians and made such a change of intentions among all that there was almost no nation free of our suspicion except the Haedui and the Remi, whom Caesar had always specially honored—the Haedui for their ancient and constant loyalty to Rome, the Remi for their recent service in the Gallic war. I do not know if this is surprising, especially because—among many other reasons—a people thought to be more courageous than all others in war were extremely unhappy to have lost so much of their reputation by taking Roman orders.30
55. The Treveri and Indutiomarus let no time pass all this winter without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, recruiting allies, offering money, and saying that with most of our army slaughtered a much smaller part remained. But no German nation could be persuaded to cross the Rhine, saying that having experienced both the war of Ariovistus and the crossing of the Tencteri, they would not tempt fortune again. Failing this hope, Indutiomarus still gathered and trained forces, acquired horses from neighbors, and recruited exiles and criminals from throughout Gaul with promise of great rewards. He had thus gained such a reputation in Gaul that embassies hastened to him, publicly and privately seeking his influence and friendship.
56. Seeing their spontaneous approach—Senones and Carnutes driven by guilty conscience, Nervii and Aduatuci preparing war against the Romans—and knowing he would have no shortage of volunteer forces if he wanted to emerge from his country, he summoned an armed council. In Gallic custom, this is the start of war, where by a general law all armed youth assemble. The last to arrive is tortured horribly and killed in public view. In the assembly he declared Cingetorix, the other party’s leader and his own son-in-law (whom we have before31 seen staying loyally with Caesar), to be a public enemy and confiscated his property. This done, in the assembly he reports that on invitation of the Senones, Carnutes, and many other Gallic nations, he would march that way through Remi territory and lay waste to the land after first attacking Labienus’ camp. He orders what he wants done.
57. Labienus, keeping to a camp well fortified by nature and effort, was not afraid for himself and his legion; he was thinking how not to miss any chance for success. When he hears of Indutiomarus’ speech in council from Cingetorix and his family, he sends messengers to neighboring nations and summons cavalry from all sides, giving them a date to assemble. Meanwhile, Indutiomarus roamed near his camp almost daily with all his cavalry, partly to learn the layout of the camp, partly to parley or to intimidate. Most of his cavalry threw spears across the rampart. Labienus kept his men inside the fort and did what he could to make himself seem fearful.
58. Every day Indutiomarus approached the camp more defiantly, so one night Labienus brought the cavalry he had summoned from nearby nations inside and kept all his forces inside the guarded camp so there was no way this could be reported or disclosed to the Treveri. Following daily habit, Indutiomarus approached camp and spent most of the day there, his cavalry throwing spears and challenging ours to fight with highly insulting language.
No answer from our men until they are seen dispersing and scattering at evening. Suddenly Labienus sends out all his cavalry through two gates. He strictly commands and orders that when they drive the terrified enemy to flee (he accurately foresaw what would happen) they should all make for Indutiomarus alone and wound no one else until they see him killed. He didn’t want him to escape by gaining time while we hung back with the others. He offers the killers great rewards and sends infantry to support the cavalry. Fortune approves his plan; when all pursue him, Indutiomarus is trapped and killed at the ford of the river. His head is brought back to camp. The returning cavalry chase and kill whoever they can. At this news, all the Eburones and Nervii forces that had gathered go away and Caesar had a somewhat more peaceful Gaul afterwards.
1 Peter Green had fun translating Catullus 29 lampooning Mamurra (and Caesar): “O military Supremo, was this then your aim, / While you were in that final island of the west, / To let this shagged-out prick, your crony, chomp his way / Through twenty million, maybe thirty?” In another poem, Catullus 11, this vignette of travel to the ends of the earth shows awareness of C.’s adventures in 55: “or toil across high-towering Alpine passes / to visit the monuments of mighty Caesar, / the Gaulish Rhine, those rude back-of-beyonders / the woad-dyed Britons.”
2 His second visit (the last was two years earlier) to his other province. The border raids were probably around modern Lake Ohrid on the Albania/Macedonia border. The Pirustae had made peace with Rome in 167 BCE but now were plaguing other nations subject to Rome.
3 Location uncertain, still in the region between Boulogne and Calais; he arrives in early June.
4 Caesar never describes the Treveri as having fixed settlements of any kind, hence the forest hideouts.
5 By the end of this year, Indutiomarus will be leading a major insurrection against Caesar, which suggests that C. may have let the hostages go on return from Britain, imprudently. A year from now, reported at 6.2, when Indutiomarus is dead, it is his “relatives” (exact same expression as here) who take over leadership of the Treveri.
6 From Meaux, on the Marne northeast of Paris; they returned to Caesar’s depot at the mouth of the Seine, where they had entered the ocean.
7 This gang that couldn’t float straight wanted to go mainly due north, but wind and current took them north and east and so they looked back on the port side with alarm at the receding land. They made their way back to landing around Sandwich, a bit north of where they had likely grounded the year before.
8 In his grammatical work De analogia, written in this year, Caesar prescribed that unfamiliar words should be avoided as a mariner avoids rocks: “tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum.” The word annotinis (“last year’s”) appears in surviving ancient Latin literature here and in two scientific writers of a century later. The mention of ships-for-profit seems to suggest that various officers and camp followers had equipped themselves with boats that would be useful for freighting plunder or people captured into slavery back to the continent.
9 If this distance is reliable, it would bring him to the vicinity of Canterbury, at appreciable risk of being surrounded and cut off, unless he had considerable confidence in his intelligence of the enemy’s whereabouts.
10 Anglesey? Isle of Man?
11 Measuring every foot of coastline gives a much larger modern number, but as a rough measure of the triangle of Great Britain from Kent to Cornwall to John o’ Groats and around, the approximation is credible. Tacitus’ father-in-law Agricola would become the first Roman to circumnavigate the island more than a century later.
12 A plant of the cabbage family.
13 Perhaps around Brentford, a little upriver from London.
14 From north and east of London, mainly modern Essex.
15 Cassivellaunus gave in quickly. Did he gamble that Caesar was unlikely to return and the promised tribute could go unpaid?
16 A letter of Cicero’s suggests they had stayed in Britain almost two months. Two to three weeks intervened between first sailing and the end of Caesar’s impatience.
17 Amiens.
18 He was compelled to a division of forces that went very badly for him. That’s his excuse. Further excuse is in the remark below that they were all stationed within a hundred miles (truer if he had said 200) of each other, and the one outlier was among (apparently) quiet and peaceful folk.
19 The most senior legate, Labienus, was given the hosts who had seemed most restive and dangerous since Indutiomarus’ sedition (5.3 above). Marcus Crassus now replaces his brother Publius, who had been with Caesar but had left to join his father, the triumvir, in the east. Munatius Plancus was in his early thirties, with a long career of shifting allegiances ahead of him.
20 Ariovistus’ death has gone unmentioned till now; cf. 1.53.
21 Big Roman soldiers don’t cry; stern editors blush and think about deleting this sentence.
22 Likely the father of the historian Pompeius Trogus on Caesar’s staff. Originally himself a Celtic Gaul, he would have obtained citizenship fighting for the great Pompey (hence the name).
23 We are about ten days from the end of October 54 BCE. Here the Nervii, said to have been wiped out at 2.28, rise again. In 7.75 they will have 5,000 fighters to contribute to the siege of Alesia.
24 Cicero was south of Brussels, near the Sambre, not far south of Waterloo. Caesar was at Amiens, some 125 miles away.
25 “Wall spears” were five to six feet long, usually planted atop a rampart close together to create a pointed barricade. The fire-cured stakes were shorter, planted out farther.
26 Both flying weapons may have been not only heated but set aflame with pitch or the like.
27 Dio 40.9.3 says it was not only in Greek but in Caesar’s private code, which we know of from Suet. Jul. 56.6 (a simple letter substitution or pixxiv wyfwxmxyxmsr, if you prefer); Polyaenus 8.23.6 gives a Greek text supposedly of the short note that doesn’t in fact match what Caesar says here. The Gauls knew at least the Greek alphabet (see 6.14), so the code was still necessary.
28 He holds off 60,000 enemy with 7,000 of his own?
29 We will meet the ringleader of this insurgency, Acco, among the Senones in 6.4.
30 Other reasons included death and taxes – Roman slaughter and invasion, tribute imposed, general devastation of the countryside. Instead he mentions only wounded pride. Note the first person singular verb here.
31 5.3.