III. THE DIFFERENTIATION OF BEING AND BEINGS1
1. Differentiation as de-cision
De-cision—here, that which takes out of the mere separation and differentiation of what can be pregiven.
Beyng itself is the decision—not something that is differentiated from beings for a representing, supervening, reifying differentiation that levels them.
Being de-cides as an e-vent in the e-venting of man and of the gods into the need for the essence of mankind and of divinity.—This e-venting lets the strife of the world and of the earth arise to striving,—the strife in which alone the open clears, in which beings fall back to themselves and receive a weight.
2. The differentiation of being and beings
This “differentiation,” i.e., the characterization of that which is so named with the help of difference, is merely the foreground and is still metaphysical,—the outermost illumination of the ground of metaphysics within it and therefore for the common opinion always an indication and evidence and nevertheless something misleading.
Difference [Unter-schied]—carrying-apart—leap into this “not” that stems from the nihilation that beyng is.
The difference equates (cf. earlier considerations) that which is differentiated, it makes being into “something” that is [“etwas” Seiendem]. And if not—what does difference [Unter-schied] mean then?
To differentiate:
1. to carry apart? or to ascertain only after the fact, namely the passage and the transition of??, “the between”
2. to make equal
3. to abstain and look away (mindlessly).
1. Only as the superficial foreground [vordergründig] and the in fact pernicious determination of the relation between being and beings.