Mariam Abou Zahab
The rise of the Pakistani Taliban has not happened overnight. It is the product of the ideological dependence of Pakistan on religion since Partition, of the deliberate marginalization of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and of the instrumentalization of Islam by the state as a counterweight to the internal threat of Pashtun nationalism in the 1980s. Last but not least, in the FATA, the insurgency is also the consequence of persistent conflict across the border in Afghanistan.1
External factors—beyond the Afghan factor—are emphasized in studies dealing with the FATA. They played a role in the insurgency, but the local dynamics should be taken into account. The old system, which denied people social and political rights, was already dysfunctional before 9/11 and the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan acted as a catalyst for those who had long-standing grievances.
This chapter attempts to analyze the dynamics of Talibanization in the FATA with a focus on the socioeconomic factors. It begins by outlining the changes that have occurred in the last four decades in the social structure of the FATA and examines the impact of labor migration, of the Afghan war of the 1980s, and of the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The focus then shifts to the emergence of the Taliban, describing how the Taliban exploited the grievances of the tribal population to carve out enclaves of alternative power, and tries to identify the main socioeconomic drivers of militancy in the FATA. It then analyzes the issue of population displacement and its consequences. Finally, it describes the steps that should be taken to address the situation.
THE FATA SEEN AS FROZEN IN TIME
Since Partition, the Pakistani state has maintained in the FATA a colonial system based on patronage of a few maliks—tribal elders who, since the colonial era, were the mediators between their tribe and the political agent and who allied themselves with the administration to pursue personal interests.2 The system of allowances and subsidies survived after the British left.3 The failure to integrate the FATA has been driven by the desire to use this territory as a geostrategic space to influence events in Afghanistan. To justify the isolation of the area often referred to as ilaqa ghair (foreign land)—part of Pakistan and at the same time apart from Pakistan as if the real Pakistan stopped at the left bank of the Indus—and the continuation of colonial legal and administrative structures, a narrative drawing on colonial literature has been developed. Pashtun tribal identity is described as unchanging, frozen in time. Tribal Pashtuns are portrayed as inward-looking, living in self-imposed social and cultural isolation, opposed to integration, which is seen as a threat to their identity, and opposed to modern education, especially for girls. As Robert Nichols has demonstrated,4 Pashtuns have never been an insular community; they have a tradition of circulating through the Indian subcontinent and as far as Australia in the colonial era, looking for opportunities, and their identity has always been fluid.
SOCIAL CHANGE WITHOUT POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT
Pashtun tribal society has changed rapidly in the FATA over the last 40 years, starting with tribals migrating to Karachi and the Gulf in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The Dubai chalo phenomenon attracted many young tribals, particularly from North and South Waziristan.5 Members of minor lineages generated new wealth,6 which challenged the social hierarchy. Then, in the 1980s, the rise of smuggling and the tremendous inflow of remittances further increased wealth in the emerging lower middle classes—predominantly the disadvantaged and traditionally subordinate segments of the rural society.7 New inequalities based on wealth developed, which completely changed the social hierarchy and the dependence on land as the greatest source of power.
In the 1970s, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated development projects in the FATA in the context of his rivalry with the National Awami Party. But in the absence of political reforms, the main beneficiaries of these projects were the maliks (as contractors) and their children,8 and the sense of alienation of the common people only grew deeper. Bhutto also facilitated the issuance of passports, which had far-reaching socioeconomic and political implications for the FATA.
One of the impacts of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s on the FATA was the increase in religious institutions where a whole generation was socialized in radical Islam in the madrasahs and along Afghan mujahideen. The rupture of tradition was caused by the import of the Islamist ideology in the 1980s. The Islamization of the Pashtuns was the fallout of the Afghan jihad; used to fight the internal threat of Pashtun nationalism, Islam became a politics of identity. General Zia ul Haq did not realize the impact it would have on traditional power structures. The breakdown of tribal authority began during the Afghan jihad when the agencies marginalized the maliks and used mullahs to unite the tribes against the USSR. Religious groups were empowered and became autonomous as the writ of the Pakistani state was ineffective in the FATA.
The pattern of politics was changed by the introduction in 1996 of universal adult franchise in the FATA. A total of 298 candidates stood for the eight National Assembly seats; elections were, however, held on a nonparty basis. Adult franchise was a long-standing demand of the young educated tribals and the emerging business elite. The participation of the tribals in elections further eroded the power and authority of the maliks,9 as clerics, mostly linked to the Jamiat-e Ulama-e Islam (JUI), were elected and were thus able to transform their religious authority into political power.
Pashtun tribal society considered as classless and egalitarian has gradually changed into a class society with new social and political players challenging the tribal elite. Four categories were identified in a World Bank report:10 first, the traditional leaders (landowning elders and maliks), who are allied with the administration to pursue their own interests and have been the sole recipients of the system, supporting the status quo; second, the new rich11 (traders, contractors, timber merchants, transporters, drug/arms traffickers), who are the main beneficiaries of the war economy; third, the educated and professionals (doctors, teachers, engineers, journalists, students, nongovernmental organization employees, active and retired members of the military and the bureaucracy), who oppose the status quo and are the agents of social change; and fourth, the common people (farmers, sharecroppers, landless peasants, artisans, workers in the transport sector, unemployed youth), who have no civil and political rights and are dissatisfied with the existing setup. A fifth category should be added: migrants settled in Karachi and in the Gulf who, just like the educated and professionals, oppose the status quo and could be agents of social change.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN
Many young tribals who were unemployed joined the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1996 and fought against the Northern Alliance. They built links with the Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters to whom they provided safe passage and support after 9/11. Maliks and elders did not support the Afghan Taliban because the latter embodied the revenge of the young and the rural poor on the khans (landholders).
After the arrival of Al Qaeda in the FATA at the end of 2001, “tribal entrepreneurs” discovered the lucrative business of harboring foreign militants, which became a source of extra money.12 Charismatic young men understood the change in political opportunities and used their jihadi credentials and their access to resources to compensate for their youth and their lack of tribal and religious legitimacy, and they filled the power vacuum.
Generalizations about the Pakistani Taliban act as smoke screens: the FATA is not a single entity, the reality is highly complex, and each agency has its characteristics and dynamics and a unique set of political and ideological drivers that affect the nature and level of militancy. In fact, armed groups active in the FATA are disparate entities, divided by tribal, ethnic, cultural, and political differences.13 They are not a disciplined organization as tribal influence impedes unity among Taliban factions. The groups maintain separate command structures to avoid friction, and tribal animosities influence decisions to join one side or the other. In true Pashtun fashion, alliances in the region abruptly materialize and suddenly disappear when they are no more useful to gain advantage in local disputes.
Several wars are fought at the same time in the FATA: a “greater war” between the Taliban and the state over lost territory; a war in Afghanistan with the FATA as a safe haven for groups fighting foreign forces in Afghanistan (Waziristan, Bajaur); a sectarian war14 between Sunnis and Shias in Kurram and Orakzai and between Deobandis and Barelvis in Khyber; tribal wars, for instance, between Wazirs and Mehsuds (South Waziristan); wars between minor and dominant clans of a tribe—examples can be found in every tribal agency—who instrumentalize external actors (the army or foreign fighters) to challenge their rivals; and factional wars over water, land, and other resources. What is happening is a series of overlapping localized civil wars. Moreover, the fault line between pro- and anti-Taliban is much less relevant than social and religious cleavages: for instance, in Orakzai, Sunni subtribes joined the Taliban because they were anti-Shia.
The initial target of the Pakistani Taliban was Afghanistan. Until 2004, their focus was on protecting foreign militants, recruiting, and training for war in Afghanistan. They were not a challenge to Pakistani authorities, who did not interfere in their activities and just looked the other way as if whatever happened west of the Indus was not a concern for the Pakistani state. Musharraf’s policy, marked by inconsistency and intermittency, was one of containment rather than elimination in order to get the backing of the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA)15 for the military regime and because the government thought the Taliban could be contained within the FATA. But the MMA provincial government (2002–2008) did not prevent spillover in settled areas, and the militants expanded their operational space to the cities, notably, Dera Ismaïl Khan, Tank, and Kohat.
A tactical change took place after the beginning of military operations in 2003: by kidnapping security and state officials, the Taliban could negotiate with the government on their own terms.16 The army was part of the marginalization of the state and of the tribal political and administrative system when it signed peace deals with the militants in 2004 and 2005, sidelining the tribal elders and the political agent. The Taliban were empowered; by signing the deals, the army gave them legitimacy, and the huge sums paid as compensation for the destructions resulting from the military operations allowed them to consolidate themselves and to sustain patronage networks.
Another turning point was the creation of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud as an umbrella for dozens of local groups with local agendas and some elements of transnational militancy. The TTP’s aim was to pool resources and manpower of Pakistani Taliban to fight against the security forces and to extend help to the Afghan Taliban taking part in the jihad against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Its proclaimed objectives were to enforce sharia, to perform “defensive jihad” against the Pakistani army in the aftermath of the storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in July 2007, and to refuse future peace deals with the government. In fact, the TTP is not as united as it claims to be: there are intertribal and intra-tribal cleavages, and many factions and clans have not joined the TTP. It is not always a disciplined organization, as several recent events have shown. Moreover, the TTP has progressively transformed itself into a Mehsud-dominated group.
THE SOCIOECONOMIC DRIVERS OF MILITANCY
The government refused to see the Pakistani Taliban as a product of the social and political modernization of the Pashtun belt, which emerged on the ruins of the tribal system. But it is clearly part of the story. Turmoil in the FATA is the expression of social change. The legitimacy of traditional leaders based on age and kinship relationships has become increasingly irrelevant. Militancy can be explained partly by the general weakening of tribal society at the hand of external forces and partly by the socialization of an increasing number of youth inside radical political Islam and outside of the traditional framework.
The militancy retains a strong hidden socioeconomic dimension. It has the characteristics of a social movement, and the class and generation factors should be taken into account to understand the dynamics. The Taliban are the expression of the conflict between the hujra (the men’s house where tribal political activity was traditionally conducted, the hujra embodies the power of landowners and maliks) and the masjid (the mosque now representing the underprivileged).
Poverty is to some extent a factor, but the main factors are related to status in terms of economic and political marginalization. Having no social links, no future, is the main driver. The lack of physical protection, legal rights, and economic opportunities for largely subsistence farmers has prepared the ground for militant recruitment. Unemployed young tribals want to find employment and to obtain some status in society; both demands are fulfilled once they join the militants.17 The perception of rising social inequality, a call for social justice and a challenge to the power-seeking elite, a sense of alienation, the slow pace of development projects, the military operations and later the drone strikes: all these factors contributed in radicalizing young tribals.
In the beginning, the Taliban capitalized on the local anger at the general lawlessness and became an alternative moral authority.18 They exploited the issue of corruption and delays in justice as well as unemployment, social inequality, and lack of health and education facilities. They reinforced the perception of weakness of the state and of the local elite, who failed to respond to the aspirations of the marginalized in terms of security, justice, political empowerment, and socioeconomic development. They took advantage of the lack of governance and political participation in the FATA, eroded the tribal political and administrative system further—notably by killing elders to eliminate political opponents—and provoked deep-rooted class divisions. They garnered support by promising to replace the Pakistani governance and judicial system, which is widely viewed as corrupt and unjust.19 The Taliban’s strict interpretation of sharia did not appeal to everyone in the tribal agencies, but its promises of fairness and swift dispute resolution appealed to many. Unlike Pakistani civil institutions, Taliban courts delivered justice quickly and could implement punishments immediately. The process was initially successful; Taliban courts resolved disputes between tribes and clans that had dragged on for decades. The Taliban even limited corruption among some political agents. Their efforts were rewarded with broad-based political support from everyday people in the FATA.20 Welcomed originally because they eliminated drugs, gambling, and other “immoral activities,”21 they became unpopular when they turned to crime.22 Moreover, the disintegration of the institutional structure has provided an open space to criminal gangs who have access to weapons and have borrowed Taliban rhetoric for their own interests.
“As long as the Taliban targeted security forces alone, the local people supported them as they believed it to be part of the jihad against the United States,” said Maulana Abdul Wahid, a prayer leader in this city [Peshawar]. “… However, towards the end of 2005, as the Taliban launched a terror campaign against the general public, targeting mosques, marketplaces, schools and government buildings, public sympathy turned to anger,” Wahid said. “We stopped supporting the Taliban after they began killing and injuring innocent and non-combatant people,” Wahid said. “The people here repent the goodwill they had shown towards Taliban.”23
DISPLACEMENT
Since 2004, massive population displacements have taken place. More than a third of the population of the FATA—estimated at five to six million—has been displaced at some point or another, in some cases several times. The causes of displacement are diverse: abuses of armed groups, tribal and sectarian conflicts, fighting between insurgents and tribes, drone attacks,24 economic sanctions following the failure of peace deals with the militants, and, last but not least, military operations that have been planned without accounting for the consequences and that relied heavily on indiscriminate airpower and artillery.
The sociopolitical consequences of the displacement are a source of deep concern. The people of the FATA are very attached to their land and are desperate to return home, but the ongoing conflict, the poor security situation, the destruction of their homes and sources of income, and the lack of compensation for their losses prevent them from returning. The government has encouraged and, in some cases, forced them to go back, claiming that military operations had eliminated the Taliban and that the population can safely return. In many cases, the Taliban had just fled to a neighboring tribal agency, and once the army withdrew, they came back. Forced returns are sometimes accompanied with threats: the army asks the elders to raise a lashkar (tribal militia) to fight the Taliban and maintain law and order, while the Taliban threaten the population with reprisals.25
Until 2008, the displaced tribals stayed near their home in areas controlled by their tribe or their religious community. In Kurram and Orakzai Agencies, this led to the ghettoization of Shias, putting them at a greater risk from Taliban attacks. Tensions were also exacerbated in the cities between the local population and some tribes, notably the Mehsud, who are viewed with suspicion and even hostility, because they belong to the same tribe as Baitullah Mehsud26 and Hakimullah Mehsud,27 the leaders of the TTP. From 2008, the intensification of military operations forced people to move farther from the FATA and settle in the cities, particularly Peshawar and Karachi, where families joined the men who had been working there. Karachi, which was already the largest Pashtun city in the world, is now home to four to five million Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns (about 20 percent of the population of the city), which means that more Pashtuns are living in Karachi than in the FATA. This massive influx of displaced tribals has reignited ethnic tensions, which have been a dominant factor in Karachi’s politics since the 1980s.28 The local chapter of the Awami National Party (ANP) claimed to be the sole representative of Pashtuns living in Karachi and exploited their grievances in its rivalry with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement over scarce resources. The ANP has been under sustained attack in Karachi, particularly since June 2012. The western part of the city, which was an ANP stronghold, is now under the control of the TTP. Leaders and workers of the ANP have been killed in revenge attacks for the army’s operations in Swat (2009) or have left Karachi. Party offices have been closed, and ANP candidates were targeted during the election campaign in April–May 2013.
Tribal people do not feel safe in Karachi, where they are discriminated against and victims of ethnic violence. Hundreds have been killed in recent years just because they were Pashtuns. There is a general hostility toward displaced Pashtuns in Karachi, and particularly against Mehsud. Many Mehsud who have been displaced since the 2009 military operation would like to go back to South Waziristan, but they are not allowed by the army to do so.
The forced urbanization of the tribal population and its marginalization present serious consequences for the future. The displaced people risk lapsing into chronic poverty and experience an increased sense of deprivation. Children who have been exposed to extreme violence and deprived of education are often forced to work to support their family. Many among the displaced persons and the professional class who left the FATA to seek safety or better economic opportunities will not return to the region.
THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE TTP
A tentative peace process was initiated from February 2014 by Nawaz Sharif, who announced that his government would engage in peace talks with the TTP. Both sides named committees to represent them, but hardly any progress was made. This initiative, together with the appointment of Fazlullah as the new emir of the TTP after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, led to a split of the TTP.
Mehsud militants who were dominant in the organizational structure and policymaking of the TTP could not accept Fazlullah as the emir, and the majority of them chose Khan Said (alias Sajna) as their leader. The TTP was seen as shifting “into a group based increasingly on ideology rather than tribal ties.”29 Fazlullah, who operates from Kunar and Nuristan (Afghanistan), has influence in Karachi, but he has lost influence, if he ever had any, in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Mohmand Agencies.
Another reason for the split of the TTP was disagreements about the negotiations with the government. On March 1, 2014, the TTP and the government agreed on a monthlong temporary cease-fire. A few days later, Ahrar ul Hind and Ansar ul Mujahidin, two little-known groups, carried out attacks respectively in Islamabad and Hangu, which the TTP condemned. Ahrar ul Hind is in fact a splinter group of the Punjabi Taliban (or TTP Punjab)30 formed by those who disagreed with their leader, Asmatullah Muawiya, who was engaged in the peace talks. Similarly, Mohmand militants led by Abdul Wali (alias Omar Khalid Khurasani) left the TTP in August 2014 to form Jamaat ul Ahrar and announced their support for Lashkar-e Islam of Mangal Bagh, a group active in Khyber Agency and not part of the TTP.
The peace process quickly disintegrated. The army launched a military operation in North Waziristan (Zarb-e Azab) in June 2014 after the attack on Karachi airport. At least 1.5 million persons were displaced, and around 250,000 crossed the border into Afghanistan.
Jamaat ul Ahrar orchestrated the Wagah suicide attack on November 2, 2014, which killed over sixty people and left 110 others injured. The spokesman of the group, Ehsanullah Ehsan, claimed that the attack was “revenge for the innocent people killed by Pakistan army in North-Waziristan.”
At the same time, the former TTP spokesman, Abu Umar Maqbool al Khurasani (alias Shahidullah Shahid), declared allegiance “in individual capacity” to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi along with five other “commanders.” Graffiti supporting Ad Dawlah al Islamiya fil Iraq wal Sham (Daesh) and black flags appeared in different cities.
The Mehsud led by Sajna have denounced Fazlullah and are carrying on peace talks with the government through an eleven-member jirga consisting of Mehsud tribal elders, while the Punjabi Taliban faithful to Muawiya announced in September 2014 the cessation of subversive activities in Pakistan to focus on Afghanistan.31 They are becoming “good Taliban” who, at the time of writing, were seen by the Pakistani army as potentially even more useful after the American withdrawal in 2014–2015.
STEPS TO ADDRESS THE SITUATION
The response of the state has been the promotion of lashkars (tribal militias), which is somehow fomenting a civil war—Pashtuns against Pashtun—as a counterinsurgency strategy. A lashkar is a traditional tribal militia, often formed on an ad hoc basis for the accomplishment of a specific purpose (e.g., to hunt down an outlaw, address a family feud that has gone out of control, or challenge a government policy) and then disbanded. Lashkars failed in 2003 and 2007 to expel Al Qaeda fighters. Since then, hundreds of tribal elders have been killed, the Taliban targeting all those who have been part of lashkars.
By arming the tribes,32 the state is part of the process of its own marginalization. Instead of mainstreaming the FATA, it is trying to keep these areas apart. Lashkars are a way for dominant tribes or clans to get access to modern weapons and money and can be analyzed as a reaction to the Taliban threatening the old tribal structure. The sociology of these lashkars is interesting: for instance, in Bajaur, lashkars have been raised by the Salarzai, who are the dominant tribe; most of the land belongs to them, and they occupy better lands; their aim was to eliminate the Taliban, described as poor ordinary people, and restore the old tribal order.
Outlaws have also joined anti-Taliban militias, which means they can carry out their activities openly and wear arms. Finally, lashkars could get out of control and cause unending tribal feuds. They might also turn against the state.
Even if military operations were successful, as the government has claimed, the underlying conditions that created the insurgency have not been addressed. Contrary to what privileged tribal elders who have a vested interest in the status quo claim, the old order based on exploitation cannot be revived. It is discredited because it has been unable to respond to social change and did not build loyalty to the state.
The idea that tribal people want to be left alone is wrong. The government ignores the possibility of a tribal society’s acceptance of nontribal norms of collective and personal behavior without the abolition of tribal relations—economic, political, and social. For instance, the jirga (council of elders) had lost credibility since the 1980s because it was not egalitarian; its membership had been restricted to men from powerful tribes; it did not provide justice to the poor; and in most cases, it favored the richer or more influential party. The Taliban redefined the concept of jirga with a prominent role for mullahs. The solution does not consist in doing away with the jirga—it can continue to exist, but it requires a change in its composition, with the inclusion of the educated middle class and the marginalized categories.
A new legitimacy based on principles of representation through elections and merit, transparency, and inclusiveness should be built in order to integrate gradually the FATA into the mainstream. In that respect, the two decrees signed in August 2011 by President Zardari are encouraging steps. Reforms were announced in 2009, but their implementation was stalled. The decrees bring amendments in the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR)33 (2011) and extend the Political Parties Order (2002) to the Tribal Areas. The collective responsibility clause was amended: from now on, women, children below the age of sixteen, and elders above age sixty-five cannot be jailed, and the whole tribe will not be punished for the actions of one of its members. An appeal procedure has been set up, and the right to bail is recognized. Political parties can now legally function in the FATA, which should generate internal tribal dynamics and reduce the appeal of religious parties.34 This should be followed by the election of representative FATA councils—with seats for women and religious minorities, among others—to fill the political vacuum that will be created by the elimination of the alternative leadership of the Taliban.
Political rights are meaningless without sustainable development and economic stability. Huge sums have been allocated to the FATA under foreign-funded development projects. The major flaw was the imposition of plans from above and through the FATA secretariat without taking the tribal population into confidence. Moreover, the lack of oversight means that donors’ money has benefited the civil and military bureaucracy and FATA elites without reaching the people who need it most. The real stakeholders should be involved in development projects to ensure ownership by the people and overcome their sense of alienation. The focus should also be on services, ensuring that schools and clinics operate properly and that government employees do not avoid their duties in the FATA.
Jobs should be provided to those who are fifteen to seventeen years old to give them prospects for upward social mobility. This also means bringing madrasah graduates in the mainstream by engaging madrasahs in projects to develop market-relevant vocational training that is likely to benefit the most disadvantaged categories.
Some promising initiatives have recently been taken under the FATA Development Program—Livelihood Development and with United States Agency for International Development funding for the educated unemployed. For instance, a five-month diploma course in mining is offered by Peshawar University to develop the mineral sector in the FATA. Loans and other incentives are given to young people to start a business.35
Mainstreaming the FATA implies the eventual merger of the FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The political parties have a clear interest in seeking the FATA’s merger with the province, but due to the lack of confidence in the state, some people have reservations about coming under the Pakistani Constitution. Are the tribals ready to accept a new social contract under which they abandon some of their freedoms in exchange for the protection of the state and rights and privileges linked to citizenship? Can the state respect this contract?
CONCLUSION
Talibanization is not a Pashtun problem but the extension of Sunni–Deobandi militancy. As Asad Hashim has said: “There would be no Pakistani Taliban if there were no militants that Pakistan had supported over a number of years. And Pakistanis have paid a heavy price for this [in lives].”36 As Taliban influence grew in the FATA during the past few years, sectarian groups reasserted themselves across Pakistan and they exploited the Talibanization of the FATA to expand their operational space.37 This was again facilitated by the inaction and denial of the state, which claimed for a long time that the “Punjabi Taliban” did not exist. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor Awais Ghani gave this warning in September 2008: “It will be ill-advised to think that the militancy will remain confined to the NWFP. Militant activities have already shifted to the settled areas and Punjab and they have established strong links with South Punjab.”
Moreover, the FCR amendments have come soon after the federal government issued two identical regulations, Action (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation 2011 for FATA and PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas), to give unprecedented powers to the armed forces operating against the militants in the conflict areas. The regulations provide legal cover to the “unlawful acts of armed forces” during military operations with retrospective effect—from February 1, 2008—and empower the security forces operating in both the FATA and PATA to keep terror suspects in custody at undisclosed location for 120 days.38 The government claims that these regulations will specifically target militants, but there are fears of misuse.
There is no real hope that the security situation will improve soon in the FATA. Putting an end to violent insurgency through dialogue is a distant possibility. Contrary to what the military establishment thinks, the Taliban will not lay down arms when NATO leaves Afghanistan; they are fighting the Pakistani state. Normalcy in the FATA is not in the interests of the groups, local and foreign, active in Afghanistan who need safe havens in North Waziristan.
No real change and sustainable development can take place until the military ends its operations in the FATA. The people of the FATA will have to wait till their grievances are really addressed.
NOTES