Chapter 1
For more on this and the other subjects in this book, see Jones 2009. Also see Solomon 1999 on the lost joy of philosophizing and Magee 2016. On wonder and awe, see Fuller 2006. For a survey on wonder in philosophy, see Rubenstein 2008: 1–24. For introductions to the Big Questions, see Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 1998. On types of senses of mystery, see Verkamp 1997. On “why” questions, see Edwards 1967. On the classic account of the distinction between an irremovable “mystery” and a solvable “problem,” see Gabriel Marcel 1950–1951.
Chapter 2
Analytic philosophers have written little on mystery in the last hundred years—see Foster 1957, Ross 1984, Cooper 2002, Jones 2009, and Rhodes 2012. On the complexity of concepts, see Wilson 2006. On the law of noncontradiction and paradoxes, see Fogelin 2003: chap. 2.
Chapter 3
On other logical and conceptual limitations to our knowledge, see Williamson 2002. For skepticism, see Unger 1975 and Stroud 1984. On agnosticism, see Joshi 2007. On reason and evolution, see Nagel 2003: chap. 7 and Sterelny 2003. On the paradox of knowability, see Kvanvig 2006. For a contemporary version of the Clifford/James debate, see Feldman and Warfield 2010.
Chapter 4
On current metaphysics, see Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 1998. On naturalized “scientific metaphysics,” see Ross, Ladyman, and Kincaid 2015. For metametaphysics, see Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 2009. On being, see Munitz 1986: 181–235 and 1990: 192–208; on being and language, see Jones 2016: chap. 6. Also see Lawson 2001 on “closure” versus the “openness” of reality and Rubenstein 2008.
See Munitz 1965, Nozick 1981, Parfit 1992, Rundle 2004, Holt 2012, and Goldschmidt 2013. For Stephen Hawking’s view, see Hawking and Mlodinow 2010 and Krauss 2012. See Leslie 1989 for the idea that values are the source of the phenomenal universe.
Chapter 6
On whether there actually is causation in the world, see Field 2003.
Chapter 7
For a fuller treatment, see Jones 2013. See Anderson 1972 for a classic take on the issue by a physicist. See Morowitz 2002: 25–38 for a delineation of twenty-eight levels of emergence. On the new emergentists, see Clayton and Davies 2006. On metametaphysics and conceptual reductionism, see Sider 2009.
Chapter 8
On the sciences, see Gleiser 2014. On limits in mathematics and science, see Yanofsky 2013. See Davies 2003 for the suggestion that mathematized theories in science are unlikely to survive long.
Chapter 9
On the Big Bang, see Craig and Smith, 1993. On TOEs, see Lindley 1993. On fine tuning, see Rees 2000 and Stenger 2011. On string theory, see Greene 1999 (pro); Smolin 2006 and Woit 2006 (con). On the multiverse controversy, see Rubenstein 2013. On the end of science as we know it, see Baggott 2013.
Chapter 10
See Kaufmann 1993 on an order rather than natural selection that generates effects as the reason why genes tend to settle into recurring patterns. On alternatives to neo-Darwinism, see Corning 2005. For a reductionist view of evolution, see Dawkins 1986. For antireductionist views, see Davies 1987, Morris 2003, and Nagel 2010.
Chapter 11
On the elimination of the self, see Parfit 1984 and Dennett 1991. On the self as causal, see Flanagan 1992. On Advaita and the self, see Jones 2014.
Chapter 12
For a current overview of the mind/body field, see Chalmers 2003. Also see Dennett 1991, Searle 1997, McGinn 1999, and Nagel 2012. For a defense of dualism, see Foster 1991. On the rebirth of hylomorphism, see Jaworski 2016. On recent work on consciousness and quantum physics, see Tuszynski 2006. On John Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument, see Preston and Bishop 2002. On panpsychism, see Strawson 2006.
Chapter 13
For compatibilism, see Dennett 1984 and Koch 2012; against it, see Honderich 2002. On free will debate, see Russell and Deery 2013. For the denial of free will, see Wegner 2002. For agent causation, see Chisholm 1966. On Libet’s experiments and free will, see Libet 1999.
Chapter 14
On the arguments for the existence of God, see Peterson and VanArragon 2003. On atheism, see Martin 2002. On mysticism, see Jones 2016. On the absence of God argument, see Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002. On religious agnosticism, see Gutting 2013. For an evangelical Christian take on God as being both revealed and an impenetrable mystery, see Boyer and Hall 2012.
Chapter 15
See Klemke and Cahn 2007 and Baggini 2005. See Munitz 1993 on beingness and meaning. On value, see Nagel 2012: 97–126. On religion and meaning, see Smith 2001 and Runzo and Martin 2000. On whether immortality must be boring, see Williams 1973 (pro) and Chappell 2007 (con). For existentialism, see Kaufmann 2004.