I have such good reason for offering this work to you, and I trust
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that you will have such good reason for taking it under your protection, once you understand my intention in writing it, that I could recommend it here in no better way than by saying briefly what my aim was.
I have always thought that the two issues of God and the soul were the most important of those that should be resolved by philosophical rather than theological means. For although it is sufficient for us Christians to believe by faith that the human soul does not
perish with the body and that God exists, yet it seems certain that
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unbelievers cannot be convinced of the truth of religion, and scarcely even of any moral values, unless these first two truths are proved to them by natural reason. And since often in this life there are greater rewards for the vices than for the virtues, few will prefer what is right to what is useful, if they neither fear God nor expect an afterlife. And although it is completely true that we should believe in the existence of God because it is taught in the holy scriptures, and by the same token that we should believe the holy scriptures because we have them from God—since, faith being a gift of God, he who gives us the grace to believe the rest of religion can also give us the grace to believe he exists—there is no point in asserting this to unbelievers, because they would call it arguing in a circle. And indeed I have observed that not only do you and all other theologians affirm that God’s existence can be proved by natural reason, but that also the holy scriptures imply that the knowledge of him is much easier to attain than that of many created things: so easy, in fact, that those who lack it do so by their own fault. This is clear from this passage of Wisdom 13: ‘They have no excuse. For if they are capable of acquiring enough knowledge to be able to investigate the world, how have they been so slow to find its Master?’* And in Romans 1: [20] they are said to ‘have no excuse’. In the same chapter [1: 19], the words ‘What can be known about God is perfectly plain in them,’* seem to be pointing out that all that can be known of God can be shown by reasons derived from no other source than our own mind. How this comes to be true, and by what means God may be known more easily and with more certainty than the things of this world, I thought it would be appropriate to investigate.
And as regards the soul, even though many authors have judged
that it is very difficult to discover its nature, and some have even
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dared to say that human reasoning convinces us that it perishes along with the body, and that we believe the contrary by faith alone, nonetheless because the Council of the Lateran* held in the reign of Leo X condemns these people (session 8), and explicitly enjoins Christian philosophers to refute their arguments, and to make every effort to prove the truth, I did not hesitate to tackle this issue as well. Besides, I know that most of the impious refuse to believe that God exists and that the human mind is distinct from the body, for no other reason than that they say that these two points have never been proved by anybody up to now. I do not agree with them at all in this: on the contrary, I think that nearly all the reasons adduced by great thinkers in this debate, when they are sufficiently grasped, have the status of demonstrations;* and I can scarcely persuade myself that any proofs might be found that have not been already discovered by someone else. Nonetheless I think that I could achieve nothing more useful in philosophy than to perform a careful search, once and for all, for the best arguments put forward by anyone, and to arrange them in so clear and precise an order* that from now on everyone will accept them as having the status of demonstrations. And finally, since there are several people who know that I have developed a particular method for resolving all difficulties in the sciences—not indeed a new one, for nothing is older than truth, but one they have seen me use with some success in other areas—they have insistently urged me to do this; and therefore I decided it was my duty to make an effort in this area as well.
Whatever I have been able to achieve is all in this treatise. It is not
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that I have sought in it to bring together all the different arguments that can be adduced to prove these two points, since this does not seem worth while, except where there is no argument considered sufficiently certain. But I have gone into the primary and most important arguments in such a way that I now dare to offer them as demonstrations that are as certain and evident as possible. I will add that they are such, that I do not think there is any path open to human intelligence along which better ones can ever be found: for the importance of the issues and the glory of God, for the sake of which this whole book was written, compel me here to speak a little more freely about my own work than is my custom. Yet, however certain and evident I think them, I do not for that reason convince myself that they are capable of being grasped by all. In geometry there are many arguments by Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus, and others that are regarded as evident and also as certain by everyone, because everything they contain, considered separately, is very easy to know, and the later sections are fully coherent with the earlier ones; yet because they are on the long side and demand a very attentive reader, they are grasped by very few people indeed. In the same way, although I think the arguments I use here are no less certain and evident than the geometrical ones, indeed more so, I am afraid that many people will not be able to grasp them sufficiently clearly, both because they too are on the long side, and one part depends on another, and above all because they require a mind completely free of prejudices, and which can readily withdraw itself from the company of the senses. And it is certain that the capacity for metaphysics is
not more widespread than that for geometry. And there is another
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difference between the two. In geometry everyone is convinced that nothing is written down, as a rule, without a rigorous demonstration, and so the unskilful more often err in approving what is false, since they want to be thought to understand it, than in challenging what is true. On the other hand, in philosophy, since it is believed that one can argue on both sides of any question,* few search for the truth, and many more seek a reputation for intelligence on account of their daring to challenge the soundest views.
And therefore, whatever my reasons are worth, because they deal with philosophical issues, I do not think they will have a great impact, unless you help me with your patronage. But since everyone holds your faculty in such high and deep-rooted esteem, and since the name of the Sorbonne has such authority that not only in matters of faith there is no group of men, after the holy councils, that has greater influence than yours, but also in human philosophy no one can think of anywhere where there is greater perspicacity and seriousness, and a greater integrity and wisdom in passing judgement, than among yourselves, I do not doubt that if you deign to take an interest in this work—first, by correcting it (for mindful of my own humanity and above all of my own ignorance, I do not claim that it contains no errors); secondly, where there are gaps, or imperfections, or parts that need further explanation, by adding to it, improving it, and clarifying it, or at least, pointing out these defects to me so that I can undertake the task; and finally, once the arguments contained in it, by which the existence of God and the distinction between mind and body are proved, have been brought to the degree of clarity
to which I trust they can be brought, so that they can be considered
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as absolutely rigorous demonstrations, by agreeing to declare this and bear public witness to it—I do not doubt, I say, that if this takes place, all the erroneous views that have ever been held on these questions will swiftly be erased from people’s minds. For the truth itself will readily bring other intelligent and learned men to subscribe to your judgement; and your authority will bring atheists, who are generally pretenders to knowledge rather than genuinely intelligent and learned, to lay aside their urge to contradict, and perhaps even to give their support to reasons that they know are regarded as demonstrative by all people of intelligence, in case they might seem incapable of understanding them. And finally everyone else will readily believe so many testimonies, and there will be no one else in the world who dares to question the existence of God or the real distinction between the human soul and the body. How useful this would be, you yourselves, with your outstanding wisdom, will judge better than anybody; nor would it be seemly for me to recommend the cause of God and religion any further to you, who have always been the staunchest support of the Catholic Church.