Evidence in this chapter needs to be viewed in the light of British Embassy involvement in the Embalming, Royal Control and Repatriation – Chapters 2, 3 and 4 – in Part 4.
Coroner, Scott Baker, only used the word “embassy” four times in his 2½ days of Summing Up for the jury: twice in connection with allegations of Robert Fellowes’ presence there on the night of the crash – 31 Mar 08: 45.23 and 45.25; twice when describing Consul-General Keith Moss as being “from the embassy” – 31 Mar 08: 85.15 and 86.1. Ambassador, Michael Jay, also receives just four mentions: three in connection with the allegation that Jay was involved in the decision to embalm (addressed in Part 4) – 31 Mar 08: 47.13, 50.3 and 86.15; once regarding the claim that Jay was part of the murder conspiracy – 31 Mar 08: 71.5.
In contrast, during Baker’s Opening Remarks, at the beginning of the inquest, he used “embassy” 20 times and referred to Jay 14 times.
Keith Moss, Witness Statement, 22 October 2004, reproduced in Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw, 2010, p648 (UK Edition)
These reports and the letter and telegram referred to below were not available to the jury and were not published in the Paget Report.
Michael Jay, Witness Statement, 13 December 2005, reproduced in Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw, 2010, pp630-1 (UK Edition)
Evidence of this report is supported by Keith Moss – see above.
See Part 4.
Vice-Consul, Stephen Donnelly, said: “the normal procedure would be that [the original notes] would be put into the registration office for filing into the consular file” – see later in Missing Notes section.
This section should be viewed in conjunction with the Prior Knowledge section of chapter 9D in Part 2.
The following items of evidence relate the accounts of the phone calls in the chronological order in which the phone calls are claimed to have occurred.
This chronology – “as comprehensive as possible a log of the events at the time was made in 1997” – is obviously a very significant document, yet it was not included in the Paget Report and was not shown to the jury at Baker’s “thorough” inquest.
The words “the hospital” were inserted by Ian Burnett, the lawyer. Without seeing Massoni’s statement – which has never been made available and wasn’t seen by the jury – it is not possible to know precisely what Massoni said. If the name of the hospital – La Pitié Salpêtrière – was written there then that could be evidence of prior knowledge of Diana’s hospital destination well before it was officially decided on (see Part 2).
These dots are in the inquest transcript.
It has been shown in Part 2 that the hospital was named in the original transcript of the telephone log – see Prior Knowledge section of chapter 9D, Part 2.
This was stated before the police showed Younes a copy of the log – see above.
For 31 August 1997.
This is a summary statement by Paget that indicates that the variation in evidence relates to the timing – i.e. 12.50 as opposed to 1.10 a.m. Other evidence – also included in the Paget Report – shows that Younes said the 12.50 (actually 12.50 to 1.00 a.m.) call was from Massoni and the 1.10 a.m. call was from the Elysée Palace.
The Operation Paget Inquiry Report into the Allegation of Conspiracy to Murder Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El-Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed, December 14 2006, page 610
This was before a decision on the choice of hospital is supposed to have been made – this has been covered in Part 2.
Although Moss specifically mentions the need to contact the next of kin here, in his next answer he details the people who needed to know and the adult next of kin – Diana’s mother, stepmother, siblings – are left off it. This issue has been covered in Part 4.
Keith Moss, Witness Statement, 22 October 2004, reproduced in Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw, 2010, pp648-9 (UK Edition)
This communication with Jay almost comes in as an afterthought from Younes – it is in response to the question: “I have been asked if I notified anybody else following my conversation with Mr Shannon.” Younes included in the occurrence log calls to Shannon – 1.15 a.m. – and Livesey – 1.50 a.m. But when it comes to this notification to Jay he says: “I do not remember at what time”. Jay was the head of the embassy, so from Younes’ point of view, that could be a significant conversation. Younes though does not appear to be claiming that he was the one who first notified Jay – he says: “I also recall talking to … Jay, by telephone and informing him of what I had been told”. So Younes doesn’t say who initiated the call – it could have been Jay who called Younes. A little further on Younes says: “At 2 a.m. I telephoned [Moss] and put him through to [Jay].” That could have been at Jay’s request and Younes could have talked to Jay at that point. The significance of the timing of Jay’s notification will become apparent later.
Moss arrived at the hospital and set up an incident room at 2.15 a.m. – see Part 4. It is possible that Jay was trying to contact Moss but couldn’t reach him at home and asked Younes to contact Moss and put him through.
Michael Jay, Witness Statement, 13 December 2005, reproduced in Diana Inquest: The Documents the Jury Never Saw, 2010, pp631-3 (UK Edition)
The Operation Paget Inquiry Report into the Allegation of Conspiracy to Murder Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El-Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed, December 14 2006, page 610
Not all phone calls mentioned in the evidence are in this table, but all the important calls are.
This table lists the phone calls claimed to have been made in the evidence. It will be shown later that not all of these phone calls actually took place.
Most times are approximate.
Massoni stated that the call was made “on my behalf by Nicola Basselier, my assistant private secretary”.
This call probably never took place – see later.
Duty officer.
Younes said: “I then … contacted … Shannon at 1.15 a.m. Keith Shannon did not reply and I left a message on his answerphone at home. I then called his mobile telephone and left another message. I continued to call his home number and eventually managed to wake him at home.” Shannon’s statement has never been made available.
Moss originally timed this at 1.10 a.m. That is before Shannon had been woken up. It will later be shown that it is unlikely this phone call occurred in the way Moss described, if at all.
Shannon’s statement is not available and wasn’t shown to the jury. Paget has summarised the information in the statements about phone calls made – Shannon doesn’t appear to have mentioned this call. See later.
It is unlikely this phone call took place – see later.
It is unlikely this call occurred – at least, not in the manner described (see later).
Livesey timed this at 1.20 a.m. but Younes appeared to get the timing of 1.50 a.m. from the copy of the log provided by Paget. The log – written up at the time – is likely to give the most accurate information.
Livesey made a police statement which was not shown to the jury and is not available. Paget made no mention of this call in its evidence from Livesey.
Younes passed this call onto Shannon, who by that stage had come into the embassy.
This call is mentioned in Younes’ statement.
This appears to mean a second phone call – the call from Younes being the first. It is unlikely that Shannon said he received two calls from Massoni. Shannon’s statement has never been made available.
One could suggest that if Massoni had intended to call Jay, but instead got Younes, that he would have asked Younes to tell Jay. Later evidence will indicate that this call to Younes never occurred.
There was an attempt at the scene to revive Dodi Fayed, but according to Younes, Massoni had said, “Mr Al Fayed had died in the accident”. Henri Paul died instantly as well and there was no attempt to revive him.
Younes timed the Massoni call as “between 12.50 a.m. and 1.00 a.m.” and the Elysée Palace call “is logged at 1.10 a.m.” – so that makes a maximum time difference between the two calls of 20 minutes (12.50 to 1.10) and a minimum of 10 minutes (1.00 to 1.10).
Some may argue that there was not enough information on Diana’s condition in the Massoni call for Younes to act. Both calls stated that there was one fatality or more in the car. The Elysée call included that Diana was going to hospital. Neither of the calls commented on Diana’s condition. I suggest that if Younes received a call from Massoni – and the evidence will indicate that he didn’t – stating Princess Diana was involved in a Paris car crash with one dead in her car and the Paris Prefect of Police being at the scene, that would have been enough information for Younes to pass it on immediately, as he did after the Elysée call.
Put another way: What was Younes doing between the 12.55 a.m. Massoni call – after which he knew about the crash – and the 1.10 a.m. Elysée Palace call?
Younes’ statement was taken in August 2005, eight years after the crash.
It will be shown that it is unlikely this call ever occurred and that Massoni was in communication with Jay, not Younes.
It is important to understand – and this will be explained – that it is the FCO copies of the log sheets that are missing, not the embassy originals. Paget says: “The copy log entries ‘1’ and ‘2’ [for 31 August 1997] are missing.” The jury did not hear this.
During Mansfield’s cross-examination of Jay.
Younes’ statement does not mention that documents are missing, but a person listening carefully may have deduced that Younes was only presented with FCO copies of entry 3 onwards. Younes was also “asked where the original Chancery daily occurrence log is for 30th and 31st August 1997”. It would have been difficult for a jury member to link the information in Younes statement to what was said during the Jay cross-examination – the Younes statement was read out on 17 December 2007, whereas Jay wasn’t heard until 11 February 2008, nearly two months later.
Jay was asked by Mansfield in 2008; Younes was asked by the British police in 2005.
There have been occurrences of this in Establishment evidence – it has been discussed earlier.
When he gave his inquest evidence.
In his statement Jay had said: “The death of the Princess of Wales was an event of immense importance” and later: “The death of the Princess of Wales … was momentous and unprecedented in my experience”: Michael Jay, Witness Statement, reproduced in The Documents book, pp630, 637. Jay also confirmed to Mansfield: “Obviously records for that night would be considered to be of paramount importance at the time”.
17 Dec 07: 108.13
Even if Jay didn’t know the answer himself, he would have known who did and could have consulted them – if he had wanted to.
This was also supported when Jay confirmed to Mansfield that “records for that night [of the crash] would be considered to be of paramount importance at the time”.
That the FCO keeps copies of these logs in London indicates the importance and significance of these documents to the organisation.
I suggest that it is possible copies are made at the embassy close to the time they are written up, before being despatched to the FCO for checking and subsequent storage.
That is the time given for Entry 3, the Elysée Palace call.
The full quote appeared earlier.
Younes’ statement was not made public until it was read out to the inquest on 17 December 2007. This meant that readers of the Paget Report – when it was published a year earlier, on 14 December 2006 – were unaware that they were being misled by Paget’s false interpretation of Younes’ statement.
It will be shown to be false.
Paget should have shown Younes the log entries for 30 August 1997 – that would have then determined whether the security check occurred before or after midnight.
Bearing in mind, Younes’ statement evidence: “the occurrence log is not a book but is in fact loose-leafed”.
Baker should have sought evidence from Whiteman for the inquest.
See earlier.
This is part of the evidence indicating that the Massoni-Younes call never occurred – if it had, then Moss would be quoting Younes saying he had been first alerted to the crash by Massoni, not the Elysée Palace. Paget moves the focus away from that, when they falsely imply that the witnesses were using the occurrence log copies to formulate their testimony.
Even if embassy officials did base their evidence on the log sheets – and I am not suggesting they have – they would presumably not be using the FCO copy, but instead the original held at the embassy.
Younes even had told them the identity of the security manager – Phil Whiteman – and who he worked for – the British police.
Whomersley gave the police an answer “to the best of his knowledge”. Why didn’t Whomersley point them in the direction of the people who would be able to answer their questions? Maybe he did and Paget hasn’t said.
This is also a factor that could add to the evidence indicating the Shannon-Moss call may not have occurred. Shannon was woken at home at around 1.20 a.m. and was already in at the embassy before 1.55 a.m. It is not however known where Shannon lived – but this evidence points to a rush into work that may not have left time for making other phone calls. It is possible Younes rang Shannon to primarily ask him to come in to the embassy to help out.
The Elysée Palace caller.
This Paget lie only became known when the Massoni statement was read to the inquest in 2007.
Possibly Shannon as well, but we don’t have his statement.
This quote is taken from the Paget Report – see endnote. When this was read out, during Younes’ statement, it was transcribed as “there is a death in her car”. Paget directly recorded their version from the occurrence log entry 3. “Death” could refer to one or more bodies, whereas “a death” means just one. Evidence shows there were two dead – Dodi Fayed and Henri Paul. It is not known whether Younes changed it to “a death” or the lawyer who read his statement out changed it. Younes’ actual statement has never been made available. A change at the inquest in the reading out of the information regarding the hospital name has already been addressed in Part 2.
The Operation Paget Inquiry Report into the Allegation of Conspiracy to Murder Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El-Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed, December 14 2006, page 612
In his statement Moss starts by saying Shannon told him “reports were coming out”, but then when Moss asked Shannon to repeat the information he says: “[Shannon] informed me that he had received this information from George Younes”. These calls occurred too early for accurate information to be coming from media reports. This call was timed by Moss at the inquest as “10 or 15 minutes” after 1.10 a.m. – so, 1.20 to 1.25 a.m. Diana’s ambulance didn’t leave the Alma Tunnel until 1.41 a.m., but the destination was of course known to the authorities earlier than that – but not to the media. The timings are thoroughly gone through in Part 2. The general evidence is that Shannon would have called Moss straight after hearing from Younes, but Shannon’s statement has not been made available. There is a query over whether this Shannon-Moss call occurred in the way it has been described by Moss, or even at all – see earlier and later.
The day after the crash.
Keith Moss, in his police statement: “I compiled my report on Monday 1st September 1997…. [It] was made whilst the events were fresh in my mind and using contemporaneous notes I had made in a notebook…. The report was as comprehensive as possible. To enable me to complete this statement, I am using a copy of this report in order to refresh my memory of the events that took place in Paris.”: Keith Moss, Witness Statement, 22 Oct 04, reproduced in The Documents book, p648 (UK edition).
According to Younes – apparently from the log: “I informed Tim Livesey, the press officer, at 1.50 a.m.” Livesey timed it at 1.20 a.m., but the written record in the log would carry more weight. This means that Jay was called by both Moss and Livesey, both receiving their information from Younes – Livesey directly, and Moss, via Shannon.
In phone call to George Younes at 1.10 a.m. on 31 August 1997.
Reproduced by George Younes in his police statement and also in the Paget Report, p612.
It is difficult to explain the significant variations between Moss and Jay’s accounts. There has to be a possibility that their first notifications were from different undisclosed sources. This is briefly addressed later in this Comment.
“Death” is the word Younes wrote in the log – this could mean one or more dead.
How the Elysée Palace knew that Diana was going to La Pitié at 1.10 a.m., when the ambulance didn’t leave the tunnel until 1.41 a.m., has been addressed in Part 2.
Jay doesn’t specifically state that, but he does say he was woken by Moss and then Livesey – and their information came from Younes.
It is also likely that when Younes phoned Shannon he would have used his occurrence log notes to ensure he passed on the correct information.
The night of 31 August 1997. See 11 Feb 08: 102.8.
Moss said: “The report was as comprehensive as possible.”: Keith Moss, Witness Statement, 22 Oct 04, reproduced in The Documents book, p648 (UK edition)
Moss was interviewed first, in October 2004. Younes was interviewed in August 2005 and Jay was four months later in December. The police also probably had Shannon’s statement, although the date of his interview is not known. Massoni wasn’t interviewed until 14 November 2006, exactly a month before the Paget Report was made public.
Although we know Shannon claimed he received an early call from Massoni – he was “at the scene of the crash” – we can’t know the precise words Shannon used because Paget only gave a third person description.
Someone could argue that a call to the British Embassy could have been considered by Massoni as the equivalent to a call to the Ambassador. There are two points: a) the police specifically asked if Massoni informed “the British Embassy in Paris”. Massoni changed this in his answer to “the British Ambassador” and later in his second answer spoke of “his Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir Michael Jay”; b) in the same sentence Massoni detailed communications to “the office of the President [and] the office of the Prime Minister” – apparently meaning he spoke to duty personnel instead of the leaders themselves.
Based on the answer, the question appears to have been related to the precise timing of the call, who made it and who it was to.
Shannon’s statement was also not read out to the jury.
Moss appears to add to the distancing of Michael Jay in the events. In his statement, after describing his 2.15 a.m. arrival at La Pitié hospital, Moss says: “I hadn’t been directed to go to the hospital, but I was aware that the Princess of Wales had been taken there.” This is after he briefly mentioned calling Jay. I suggest it is inconceivable that during the Moss-Jay conversation the subject of Moss’ role didn’t come up. Jay was Moss’ boss and I believe it is very likely that, at the least, Moss would have sought Jay’s approval for going to the hospital, and quite possibly had been instructed by Jay to set up the embassy operation at the hospital. Jay says in his statement that he gave Moss instructions regarding his role at the hospital: “I left Keith Moss at the Hospital with instructions to ensure that no one entered the room where the Princess’ body lay without his agreement and without being accompanied by him or by another member of the Embassy staff.” Michael Jay, Witness Statement, reproduced in The Documents book, pp635-6 (UK edition). See also the Role of the British Embassy section of Chapter 2 in Part 4 for more on the Jay-Moss relationship regarding the Embalming in Paris.
The question: “Did you inform the British Embassy in Paris of the accident? Do you remember who you informed and when?”
In Massoni’s answer – although the question was specifically about a call to the British Embassy – he appears to give a list of high-level calls to remove the focus from his call to Jay. In other words, Massoni is saying something like, “I did call Jay, but I also called these other people or their offices – so there is nothing special about the fact I called Jay”.
In Jay’s role as the chief British diplomat in France at the time.
This is an aspect Jay says he had to deal with post-crash: “I tasked [Cowper-Coles] with acting as my assistant in dealing with French officials and also with those in the UK” – see earlier.
In this light, it is significant that the inquest heard evidence on the contents of the Chancery occurrence log post-crash, but nothing was said about the pre-crash phone records in both the Chancery and the Residence logs.
In his police statement, Michael Jay related a phone call he made to Philippe Massoni on the night of 31 August 1997 – he quoted from a telegram he sent to the FCO: “I telephoned Massoni, the Paris Prefect de Police. Massoni said that the investigation was now out of the hands of the police and with the judicial authorities.” Jay’s full account of this is reproduced in The Documents book, pp642-3 (UK edition). Jay also appears to refer to this Massoni phone call in a late entry of his diary for 31 August 1997, read out at the inquest: “We regroup in my office until about 9 [p.m.], and I send off a telegram praising the French authorities’ reaction and another on the telephone conversation with the Prefet de Police about the accident.”: 11 Feb 08: 108.25.
There is no excuse for why Jay wasn’t asked at the inquest – Massoni’s statement was read out in November 2007 and Jay was cross-examined in February 2008. It is also obvious that Massoni should have been cross-examined, but that too never happened.
Approximate.
Paul Johnston – who says he was in Normandy at the time – told Hervé Stéphan in 1998 about a call from “the police” to the “duty officer” – this is addressed later.
Livesey’s statement has also never been released.
Jay’s wife has never been questioned by any of the investigations and was not heard from at the inquest.
They took statements from Shannon and Livesey that have never been released.
The only public release of the Moss and Jay statements was in The Documents book, published in 2010.
Younes provided helpful information on the identities of the security officers – see earlier.
Younes said in his statement: “As a result of this telephone call, I thanked him and I told him that we were already aware of the accident”, referring to the Massoni call – but that part is not in the occurrence log and was added by Younes in his statement.
That was in turn supported by Moss’ later inquest account: “I … got [Jay] out of bed”.
To Jay.
According to Paget, Massoni called Keith Shannon, who was Second Secretary Technology. I suggest it is common sense that Massoni would call the ambassador, rather than a much lower ranked official.
In his evidence Moss appears to help Jay with that – he shows no urgency in contacting him: “First of all, I tried to collect my senses. I then sat down and worked out the immediate things that I needed to do; for example, who did I need to inform?… My first telephone call was to the so-called resident clerk in the Foreign Office…. I then telephoned the Ambassador….”
Younes called Shannon at 1.15 a.m., but didn’t reach him straightaway – see earlier.
The conflict between the initial information received by Jay and Moss – see earlier table – raises the possibility Moss was initially notified by someone other than Jay, but not Shannon. See later footnote.
1.10 a.m. for the notification of Keith Moss also fits closer with the timing he provided for his arrival at the hospital – 2.15 a.m. Moss told the inquest that after receiving the notification call, “I tried to collect my senses. I then sat down and worked out the immediate things that I needed to do”. Later he described his actions up to arriving at the hospital: “Once I had made my calls and there was a series of them – I cannot remember now how long it took, certainly 15 or so minutes – I then washed, brushed my teeth, dressed and I walked to my motor car which, because of where we were living in Paris, it was not parked in the building that we were in, it was in a separate building in an underground lock-up, which would have taken me about ten minutes, I suppose. Then I drove from my residence where I lived to the Pitié Salpêtrière Hospital, which was not very far from where I was living. It must have taken me no more than 15 minutes maximum, I would have thought, to reach the hospital, where I arrived at I think something in the region of 2.15 in the morning.” 22 Nov 07: 12.4. If you allow Moss 10 minutes for the notification call and thinking time – working out “the immediate things that I needed to do”; phone calls – 15 minutes; washing, teeth and dressing – 10 minutes; walk to car – 10 minutes; drive to hospital – 15 minutes. All up, that’s 60 minutes, or one hour of activities. That means, with a notification call at 1.10 a.m. he could have arrived at the hospital at 2.10 a.m., and Moss said it was “in the region of 2.15 [a.m.]”. These calculations of course are based on a call from Jay at around 1.10 a.m. If the call came from Shannon – as Moss has maintained – then it would have been at around 1.25 a.m. Add on the 60 minutes of activities and we end up with a hospital arrival time of 2.25 a.m. – about 10 minutes later than Moss has stated.
In Moss’ police statement he said the walk from his home to the car was 5 minutes – “I took the five-minute walk to the secure underground garage where I kept my car”. But in that account he has not provided detailed timings for his other activities, so I suggest the inquest evidence (of 10 minutes) could be more accurate. Source: Keith Moss, Witness Statement, reproduced in The Documents book, p649 (UK edition).
Jay has said that Moss phoned him at 1.45 a.m. The timings in the previous footnote indicate that Moss didn’t wash and get dressed until after that phone call. If the call – after waking Jay up – lasted say, 5 minutes, then that is 1.50 a.m., then add 10 minutes for washing and dressing, 10 minutes walk to the car and 15 minutes for the drive to the hospital. That would mean that Moss wouldn’t have arrived at the hospital until 2.25 a.m. – 10 minutes later than Moss said. Other evidence has shown that Jay was called by Massoni around 12.50 a.m. and his evidence that Moss woke him at 1.45 a.m. is fictional.
Even a quick look at the earlier table regarding the notification call accounts reveals variations between Moss’ and Jay’s account of what they were told. Although I believe that Moss and Jay got their first notification from the same source, Massoni – Massoni to Jay to Moss – I am not able to explain why their accounts differ. There has to be a possibility that Moss received his information from another source, particularly in relation to his claimed knowledge of information regarding the bodyguard.
A call which I suggest never occurred – see earlier.
Bearing in mind that Moss didn’t mention the location of the crash – the Alma Tunnel. Moss wasn’t asked about this – had he been asked, I suggest he probably would have agreed that the location was mentioned in the call.
There is a build-up of evidence – these factors need to be viewed together as a whole, not individually.
It could be significant that when Mansfield initially asked Jay about the nature of the occurrence log, he failed to mention that phone calls were included in it: Mansfield: “Is a log kept at the Embassy of incoming communications and outgoing communications and other occurrences, rather like an occurrence book in fact?” Jay: “Certainly as far as telegrams and electronic communications, yes, there would be records kept of those telegrams going in and going out.”: 11 Feb 08: 114.3.
Information that was later shown to be accurate.
After Younes, Shannon and Moss.
Inquest website: INQ0008320
The Operation Paget Inquiry Report into the Allegation of Conspiracy to Murder Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El-Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed, December 14 2006, page 611
The Operation Paget Inquiry Report into the Allegation of Conspiracy to Murder Diana, Princess of Wales and Emad El-Din Mohamed Abdel Moneim Fayed, December 14 2006, page 611
This also conflicts with the evidence of Charles Ritchie who says he became aware of Diana’s presence in Paris at around 11.55 p.m. on 30 August 1997 – see later.
The Younes evidence was that the call came from Prefect of police, Philippe Massoni – that is a person who could have been well known to Stéphan.
It is viewable on the inquest website – INQ0049253 and INQ0049254.
There is a possibility that these Johnston letters are responding to allegations (most likely from Richard Tomlinson) of British embassy – maybe via MI6 – involvement in the orchestration of the crash.
See Paget Report, p611.