Like the declining Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia needs “New Thinking” in its foreign and security policy—as part of its urgent modernisation. The West, particularly NATO, should facilitate that by self-critically acknowledging its share of the responsibility for the constant deterioration of the relationship over almost 20 years (although of course no mistake on the Western side justifies military aggression). This is the main thesis of the present chapter. I will leave no doubt about my critical stance on Russia’s policy towards its near abroad, on its military actions in Syria, and on its general hostility towards the West. But I will try not to dwell upon that for too long, and rather focus on some constructive reflections “for a better future,” as it were.
Let me insert a personal reminiscence here, which I also told students at MGIMO University (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) in a lecture one year ago: In October 1990 General Moiseiev, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, visited NATO Headquarters for the first time, invited to the Military Committee’s biannual Chief of Staff session. As a colonel in the International Military Staff (IMS) I was tasked with drafting for the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), the highest NATO military figure, the welcome speech—for the Soviet Chief of Defence! I can, as I said to those students, regard myself as a contemporary witness for the sincerity of our offers of cooperation. Things could have moved in a different direction.
Also in later phases, I was involved in developing a partnership between NATO and the Soviet Union, respectively Russia—for instance, in the creation of what we programmatically called a “strategy without an adversary,” which was articulated in NATO’s Strategic Concept of November 1991. And Western readiness to integrate Russia was much broader than some Russian leaders would have it: think of the G20, IMF, World Bank, G8, WTO, the Council of Europe—and the NATO Russia Founding Act of 1997, in which both sides pledged not to regard each other as adversaries any longer, agreed a broad common agenda, and established the NATO-Russia Council as well as the modernisation partnership proposed by Germany. The West did not do everything wrong.
But alas, the concept of stabilising and integrating the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, while at the same time cultivating ever-closer partnership with Russia, increasingly failed. Reasons are to be found on both sides, as I indicated above and will elaborate on below. In any event, the partnership appears to have been renounced for good by President Putin. The often-heard mantra is true: that security in Europe (and beyond) can, in the long run, be brought about only with, not against or without Russia. But sadly, due to Russian policy in recent years, security from Russia is now a priority again for many. That is not in Russia’s interest.
What is Russia’s interest? I reflect on that question quite a lot. Sometimes I think it is largely of a political-psychological character, in terms of resentment and grudge. For instance: Certainly NATO enlargement is a thorn in Russia’s flesh, as it were. But it is by no means a threat to Russia’s security; it was not even an active expansion, but the urgent desire of countries liberated from the Soviet yoke and from their limited sovereignty within the Warsaw Pact to join the West. In Moscow, one should think more about the motives for this. So there is wounded pride, the feeling of being treated as a loser in the Cold War, humiliated and taken advantage of. Check the reality content of all this. Some years ago I heard Sergey Karaganov say that Russia was in the same situation as Germany after the Versailles Treaty. That is absurd, but indicative!
It is of course important to put oneself in the opposite number’s shoes, to take into account what the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik recently pointed out: While we see Russia’s present policy as revisionist, Russia sees itself as a status quo power and accuses the West of revisionism. I am aware that perceptions are reality, which is why dealing with them in very candid dialogue is so important.
But in this chapter I will not hide my views. I see President Putin’s confrontational policy as driven by a bundle of motives, among which I identify: revisionism and the desire for exclusive zones of influence; the externalisation of domestic problems; the wish to keep Ukraine reliably away from the West; “democracy containment,” as a scholar recently called it; and—a motive to which I will return towards the end—the frustration of not being respected at eye level by the West, particularly by the United States.
Let me crisply state my personal assessment of the present Russian policy:
In Ukraine, Crimea was illegally annexed with the help of a faked referendum on the tip of the bayonets, as it were; war was brought to Eastern Ukraine, where Russian military involvement is still denied, against all evidence.
No real interest is shown in finding a solution to the situation, because another frozen conflict seems to serve Moscow’s interest.
By this course of action, Putin has called into question all the cardinal principles of the European security order, as laid down in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and confirmed in the Paris Charter of 1990: sovereignty and equality of European nations, inviolability of borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, right of choice of security arrangements, etc. Again military force has been used to attain political goals.
Thus, Russia has catapulted NATO back into the Article 5 world, where it is required to once again give substance to the principle that an attack on one ally would be regarded as an attack on all. I will not go into the details of NATO’s reaction at the Wales and Warsaw summit meetings, but it is not “sabre-rattling” or “war cries”—it is the minimum that NATO owes to its Eastern allies and to itself.
In Syria, Russian motives are far from ending war and suffering, but rather have to do with the objection to any kind of regime change, with Russian military bases, the demonstration of military power, the uncritical adoption of Assad’s definition of terrorists, and above all with the desire to “show it to America” and re-establish Russia as a great power. Backed by Russia, Assad sees no reason for any compromise or peace deal. This has led to a situation, particularly in Aleppo, which historians one day will equate with Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995.
The hostility towards the West results not in a new Cold War, but in a confrontation, where cyber and propaganda measures, disinformation and fake news are used abundantly, and everything is done to sharpen the difficulties of European countries, not least by support for the populist simplifiers.
And Russians must be aware of the bitterness that the Lisa case created in Germany, with the awareness that an invented story can—under the guise of the alleged obligation to protect Russians wherever they live—lead to demonstrations in German cities, fueled by the Russian Foreign Minister, who on television personally accused the German police and judiciary of a cover-up. Fortunately, all of this blew over, but there was never a word of apology from the Russian government.8
I felt I should not hold back on these aspects, but now I would like to follow the appeal the famous German writer Erich Kästner used to quote: “Frequently my readers ask me, ‘Herr Kästner, wo bleibt das Positive?’” So I return to my main thesis, as mentioned at the beginning: Like the declining Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia needs New Thinking in its foreign and security policy—as part of its urgent modernisation. The West, particularly NATO, should facilitate that by self-critically acknowledging its share of the responsibility for the constant deterioration of the relationship over almost 20 years.
Having said unfriendly things about Russia, I will start with the Western side. Where are self-criticism and soul-searching needed?
First of all, Russian political psychology and what was aptly called “imperial phantom pain” were insufficiently understood. After the end of the Cold War, too little attention was given to the question of Russia’s place in the European security order. Also, for example, Russian proposals for the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) were ostentatiously disregarded.
The NATO accession ambitions of Ukraine and Georgia were not handled constructively. When mainly the US pushed for offering them the Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest Summit meeting, both countries were, for different reasons, not in a position to take that step. More importantly, no understanding was sought with Russia, whilst previous enlargement rounds had been cushioned through the creation or upgrading (respectively) of the NATO-Russia Council. And the now-so-controversial missile defense plan, which should be in the interest of both sides, was offered as a cooperative project much too late. Furthermore, the West underestimated the significance for Moscow of the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, although the analogy with the annexation of Crimea, as construed by Putin, is flawed.
The NATO-Russia Council was insufficiently used and developed. And among Western actions that influenced Russia’s stance and the development of its relations with the West, one must also mention the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, although they are all different cases. And we have learnt from them—not least that toppling a regime is not yet regime change.
New thinking on the Russian side would comprise the following: NATO clichés and stereotypes from the Cold War period should be overcome, as should their instrumentalisation for domestic purposes. Since its London Declaration in July 1990, the alliance has sincerely extended to former adversaries the hand of cooperation, and, as mentioned above, in their Founding Act NATO and Russia declared that they would no longer regard each other as adversaries. Russia must realise that dangers to its security loom in the South and possibly in the East, but not from the West. At the same time, the Kremlin must understand the worries that arise in neighbouring countries when it insists on a privileged sphere of influence, proclaims its “obligation” to “protect Russians wherever they live,” and pursues a “history policy” which is, to some extent, Stalin revivus.
The sovereignty, integrity, and independence of the post-Soviet states have to be recognised, and Moscow should actively contribute to their reassurance instead of undermining it. Respect for the obligations, rules, and institutions—according to the 1990 Paris Charter—is the basis of cooperative security in Europe. Here, just as in global affairs, Russia should constructively contribute to problem-solving. This includes the requirement to actively promote solutions for so-called frozen conflicts (such as Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abchasia, and now Eastern Ukraine) instead of keeping them simmering for the sake of destabilisation and influence. Nineteenth-century geopolitical categories should be laid aside, and what is urgent in general is to overcome the concept of security as a zero-sum game, where allegedly one side can only gain security or advantages at the expense of the other. One must admit, though, that this thinking is not quite unfamiliar to the Western side either. It is one of the greatest evils in today’s world.
I very much deplore the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, we have all failed to conduct a thorough dialogue about Russia’s place in the European security order. One of the mistakes on our side was not to have responded much more actively to the proposal made by then-President Medvedev in Berlin in 2008 to negotiate a European security treaty. Not that I liked the content of the proposal, but we should have used it as an opportunity to establish a structured dialogue about the European security order and Russia’s legitimate place therein. The so-called Corfu process in the framework of the OSCE was half-hearted. And Western anxiety vis-à-vis the proposal was not justified: Did not the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, with its beneficial consequences for European history, also originate in Soviet proposals that many in the West initially regarded with great suspicion? One day the initiative should be revitalised, leading to a structured format for substantial and very frank discussions—with perseverance and patience—of NATO’s and Russia’s contrasting concepts for the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as Russia’s place therein.
Confronted with grave regional and global problems, both sides need to define common interests and aim to see the advantages of cooperative as opposed to confrontational security. Whether this insight reaches Putin and could influence him to change course is doubtful. But I think that the number of thoughtful forces around him who realise that he has led the country into a dead end is growing. Without undue acquiescence, which Putin interprets as weakness, NATO should continue to offer the dialogue that is part of its Harmel philosophy and was again emphasised at its Warsaw Summit in July 2016: deterrence and détente, firmness and readiness for dialogue.
NATO as well as its members need to spell out more creatively what the offer of dialogue means. For years I have argued that NATO readiness for a structured dialogue with the CSTO (the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization) might be constructive. With regard to further NATO enlargement, the policy of the open door, in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, cannot be given up. But between “no veto for Russia” and totally bending to Russian indignation there must be a middle road, where Russia’s sensitivities would be taken into account.
Furthermore, innovative approaches in conventional arms control are needed. The adaptation of the CFE Treaty—from a bloc-to-bloc format to that of individual states as parties to the agreement—failed, not least because of Western insistence on relatively insignificant conditions and, as I mentioned, its disregard for Russian proposals. Not unexpectedly Russia suspended the treaty following Putin’s 2007 Munich speech (of which, incidentally, I was a personal witness). This is not important because of the numerical limits for tanks, artillery, airplanes, and the like, which are factually undershot anyway, but because of the deactivation of notification, verification, transparency, and inspection provisions that had an important confidence-building function. Robert Legvold recently pointed to the opportunity cost of the new confrontation beyond the damage done—that is, the many positive things that are not done. A revitalisation of the CFE Treaty appears unrealistic. Thus, a new departure is necessary. Confidence-building, transparency, mutual reassurance, doctrine talks, and credible defensive orientation of armed forces and infrastructure would be part of that approach, as would cooperative endeavours. Former German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has recently made proposals in this regard.
Having referred to the former German Foreign Minister, let me insert one remark: Germany, whose relationship with Russia is of course very important, must be careful not to give the 90 million people living between our two countries the impression that Russia and Germany find agreement above their heads. That would raise very unpleasant historical reminiscences. In the same vein, incidentally, I would warn against the hope for Trump-Putin deals that might be at the expense of Ukraine, which should be allowed to solve its problems without military interference from outside.
To be more concrete: The NATO-Russia Council should play a central role in the dialogue between Russia and the West. The council has been insufficiently used and developed from both sides. During the Georgia War in 2008, NATO put it on ice, just as Russia had done during the Kosovo Conflict, for which it was harshly criticised. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, concrete cooperation was interrupted, and only the “political channel” was kept open. But for two years the NRC was convened only twice at ambassadorial level—and that was not good enough! In my view, it should have been sitting in quasi-permanence since the outbreak of the conflict.
In the short run, the NRC and its sub-groups should work towards the prevention of unwanted escalation and military incidents. In the medium term—and of course on the condition of a solution to the Ukraine conflict according to international law, beginning in Eastern Ukraine—it should be led to a higher quality, with an extension of the areas where there is potential for conformable interests and joint action. In the long run, the NRC should play an important role in the dialogue about Russia’s place and role in both the European and the international security order. Perhaps for this purpose a new forum would even be necessary. As I stressed above, the different views of and perspectives on the Euro-Atlantic area from Russia and the West should be discussed with great frankness, with patience, and with the long haul in mind. This is more promising than trying to outwit each other in the current crises. Awareness of common responsibility for world affairs must be developed.
Under certain conditions, I can think of many attractive offers that could be made to Russia: a free trade zone that would comprise the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union; cooperation in Russia’s economic modernisation; joint, cooperative approaches to the so-called frozen conflicts, which might allow Russia to do without such counterproductive levers of influence; concertation in regional and global crisis situations, and more.
Finally, let me come back to one of the motives for President Putin’s policies, as I see them: the frustration of not being accepted by the West, and particularly the US, at eye level and as a great power. Putin once said that the US wanted to “keep Russia small.” There I say, No! A Russia that constructively contributed to regional and global problem-solving (as in the almost singular case of the Iran nuclear deal)—instead of relying on nuisance power, prevention force, military surprise actions, regional military superiority, destabilisation and fear of neighbours, hostility towards democracy and the West—would be highly welcome as a great power. But respect and equal status cannot be enforced; it must be earned. Russia’s present policy and course of action do not appear to be predominantly motivated by reaction to Western activities, but rather conditioned by internally steered political change, by creating domestic unity, and by blaming the grave problems of Russian society and economy on the West.
At the end of one of the German-Russian Schlangenbad talks, in which I have been involved for almost 20 years, one of the German co-organisers said to our Russian friends: “For two-and-a-half days you have been hearing a lot of self-criticism from us—a little dose of that would also be welcome from your side.” And this year, a well-known Russian politician asked us for patience, pointing out that “the road from the Gulag to Hyde Park Corner is long”—to which a Russian author drily responded, “Yes, and if we take the opposite direction, it is even longer.”
In conclusion, in 2014 I published ideas such as these in the Atlantic Times, whose editor ignored my title and called the article “The West is Not Russia’s Enemy.”9 That is the spirit in which I criticise the present policies and seek to develop ideas “for a better future.”
The “Lisa case”: Germany as a target of Russian disinformation (2016). Nato Review. Available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm.
Wittmann, Klaus (2014). The West is not Russia’s enemy. The Atlantic Times. Available online at http://www.aspeninstitute.de/wp-content/uploads/Atlantic-Times-96-The-West-and-Russia-Oct-2014.pdf.