CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

From Temporary Armistice to Lasting Peace: The Importance of the War

AMERICANS WERE QUICK to forget the gross failures of their leaders during the war and the horror people felt in the fall of 1814, when it looked as if the fighting would continue. The country concentrated only on its successes. The amnesia served America well, as her people looked confidently to the future. A major component of this new confidence was the remarkable, totally unexpected political unity that arose immediately after the peace. Albert Gallatin wrote, “The war has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. The people now have more general objects of attachment, with which their pride and political opinions are connected. They are more Americans; they feel and act more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better secured.”

America’s newfound unity and her commitment to a strong military forced Europe to take her more seriously. Before the war, the United States was a big, prosperous country without military capacity. Now she was an incipient power that Britain and the other European imperialists could no longer treat lightly, as they had in the past. The Liverpool ministry’s cynical perpetuation of the war to expand British territory and dismember a rival had unintentionally amplified America’s maritime power. Instead of curbing a competitor, the British had markedly increased her strength.

As Castlereagh and his colleagues considered Britain’s North American policy going forward, the central question was whether to concede the growing power of the United States and reach an accommodation with her or to treat her as a rival and potential enemy, contesting her expansion and inviting conflict at every turn. The combination of a strong army and navy, sound fiscal underpinnings, and political unity in America led the foreign minister to adopt a policy of accommodation rather than confrontation. Liverpool endorsed the new approach, initiating a fundamental change in British policy that became the most important outcome of the War of 1812. It more than compensated for all the horrors borne by ordinary people in America, Canada, and Great Britain.

The reactionary Castlereagh had no love for the American republic; he was simply recognizing that given the new strength of the United States, it was in British interests to prevent their inevitable disagreements from turning lethal. He did all he could to remove barriers to cooperation and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. And he brought Liverpool and the rest of the cabinet along with him. The British historian Charles K. Webster wrote that Castlereagh “was the first British statesman to recognize that the friendship of the United States was a major asset . . . , and to use in his relations with her a language that was neither superior nor intimidating.” An augury of things to come had been the Duke of Wellington (the new British ambassador in Paris) taking the unprecedented step of calling on American ambassador Crawford and congratulating him on the treaty of peace.

It took a considerable amount of time before the United States recognized the fundamental change in British policy. America’s leaders remained leery of London’s intentions. Madison, Monroe, Gallatin, Adams, Clay, and their colleagues would have to be shown by concrete action that a new relationship existed. They wanted one, of course—every administration since Washington had wanted it—but they were not expecting a basic change in British policy. For them, the most important question was: would Britain’s leaders finally accept the independence of the United States and treat her with respect? They had not in the past, and their attitude had eventually led to war. A change of the magnitude that Castlereagh envisioned appeared unlikely to an American leadership that for years had dealt with British ministries with wholly different attitudes.

Napoleon’s triumphal entry into Paris on March 20, 1815, so soon after the Treaty of Ghent, helped move Britain and America toward a new rapport. His appearance was not a surprise in London. For many weeks, Liverpool and his colleagues had worried about a military coup in Paris. Nonetheless, when the event happened, Liverpool had half his army in North America in the quixotic pursuit of more territory. That army was needed immediately in Flanders, but it would not be available for weeks. In that time Bonaparte could raise an immense army and become as big a menace as ever.

Immediately after seizing power, Napoleon tried to reassure the allies that he had changed, that his intentions were peaceful, but they were having none of it. When he entered Paris, the great powers unanimously committed themselves to destroying him before he got too strong. They were ready to bring their full weight to bear against him. Wellington was in Vienna at the time, and the powers looked to him to lead the coalition armies. He had to act fast, however. If Bonaparte were given sufficient time, he could raise an immense army and be hard to defeat. For Liverpool to have a large part of the British army in North America at this critical moment appeared the height of folly.

Fortunately, Napoleon’s timing was not propitious for another grand attempt to rule Europe. The divisions that had plagued the allies since his demise were well on their way to resolution at Vienna. In January the czar had chosen to compromise on Poland, and Prussia and Austria had done the same on Saxony, paving the way for a general agreement.

President Madison was naturally concerned that a renewal of the old war in Europe might reignite the maritime issues that caused the War of 1812. The peace treaty was silent on them because the parties could not agree. Castlereagh was alive to the danger, and he moved quickly to prevent neutral trade and impressment from reemerging to disrupt his rapprochement with the United States. The British were careful not to interfere with American trade, and naval officers were given strict rules to prevent impressment from becoming a problem again. Instead of a callous disregard of American rights on the high seas, there came a sensitivity from London that avoided conflict. Madison, for his part, although unaware of London’s new attitude, was slow to take offense at British actions. Thus, tentatively, the two old enemies took the first, halting steps toward a new relationship.

But would this new British policy continue after Napoleon was defeated and packed off to St. Helena? That critical question was answered quickly as well, when Castlereagh at every opportunity avoided serious controversy. His new policy did not turn out to be an expedient to get Britain through her trial with Napoleon. Castlereagh’s strategy was based on the conviction that the long-term interests of Britain required friendship with America. Castlereagh and Madison thus laid the foundation of a peaceful relationship between the two great English-speaking countries that was to last more than two centuries and was to serve both them and the world extraordinarily well.

The U.S. Navy’s role in bringing about Britain’s newfound respect for the United States was critical. The part played at the battles of Lake Erie and at Plattsburgh Bay are obvious and have been celebrated by historians and the public alike. The role of the navy at Baltimore, although not as well-known, has been recognized. Less so the Battle of New Orleans, where the navy’s part has remained hidden but was nonetheless a key factor in victory, as Jackson himself acknowledged. Even less appreciated is the importance of the great victories on the high seas. Historians, without exception, portray these episodes as spectacular but of no strategic significance. Yet when one considers that they played a major role in changing London’s attitude toward America, they were of great strategic importance, as was the triumph at New Orleans. The battle may have come after the peace treaty, but in turning that document from a temporary armistice into a lasting peace, the victory at New Orleans was of fundamental value. The public was not wrong in celebrating it, for, in many ways, it was the greatest triumph of the war for America and had the most lasting impact.

Of equal significance was the way President Madison conducted the war. He did so within the confines of the Constitution. He managed the conflict in strict accordance with the republican principles he had always espoused. He did not aggregate great power to himself and build up a strong central government, nor did he try to crush his opponents by passing sedition laws. In conducting himself in this manner, he immeasurably strengthened the democratic forces that had been building in America since the start of the Revolution and that had accelerated under Jefferson.

The war strengthened these democratic forces even more by reducing the elitist Federalist Party to insignificance in national politics and by extending the franchise. During the war so much reliance was placed on militias that men who risked their lives demanded that the property qualifications to vote be relaxed so they could participate in elections. It seemed absurd to ask them to fight and die when they could not vote.

The War of 1812 was thus of great importance in the nation’s history because it initiating a fundamental change in Britain’s relationship with the United States while strengthening the nation’s democratic principles. In that sense it was a second War of Independence. Of course, the actual independence of America was never an issue and never in doubt, but her experiment in republican government, which, when the conflict began, was not fully secure, became so as a result of military and political successes achieved during and immediately after the war. America proved that its republican form of government could deal with a crisis and deal with it successfully without discarding its constitution. In that way the War of 1812 completed the fight for independence begun in 1775. The new unity and strength of the republic freed her for a century from European entanglements and allowed her people to prosper in spite of the vicissitudes that would continually challenge them.