Most vital of all, we must have the will power never to give in to the terrorist.
—Margaret Thatcher
This chapter explores the psychology behind terrorism and terrorist actors to include cultural and ideological influences on why individuals engage in terrorist activities. Many theories have been posited over the years ranging from the psychopathology of the perpetrators to their religious fanaticism to a description of their impoverished and disenfranchised condition to the failed or collapsed state from which they plot their terrorist acts. In addition to addressing the origins of terrorism and the theories proposed to explain the phenomenon, attention is directed toward the process of self-radicalization and a review of de-radicalization programs and protective factors.
Although many myths continue to be perpetuated about the psychology of terrorism and the profiles of those who commit acts of violence, the reality is that such individuals come from all walks of life, cultures, and ethnicities (McGilloway, Ghosh, & Bhui, 2015). As a result, focusing on characteristics and contextual factors that underlie these surface features may be more instructive, especially when overlaid onto patterns of behavior that precede terrorist activity. As with any evolving construct, it is often useful to operationally define terms and concepts prior to any detailed discussion. When it comes to the psychology of terrorism, the study of terroristic acts, and an examination of the individuals who perpetrate such acts, the literature is replete with various definitions and perspectives.
According to Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (DoS, 2004). In contrast, the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines it as “violent acts … intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping” (FBI, 2005). The Department of Defense (DoD) has characterized terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political” (DoD, 2010). Schmid and Jongman (1988) offer over 35 definitions of terrorism from government, academia, and other sources, as well as their own, which includes the following:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets … and … are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)) … depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (p. 28)
Taken collectively, we see that terrorism contains political, social, religious, and ideological components. Descriptively, it is planned, calculated, and systematic in its acts. It does not follow the traditional rules of engagement associated with conventional war. Terrorism may be simply a threat of violence or force that is designed to have a psychological effect beyond the act itself, resulting in a gap between the terrorists’ ability to strike anywhere, anytime, and the target’s inability to provide “all-the-time” protection.
As Horgan (2017) rightly points out, the “Big Bang” question for students of terrorism is, “who becomes a terrorist?” Reliable and valid answers to this question have been hard to come by. Some argue that one person’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter. In 1974, a young Palestinian Liberation fighter asserted, “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist” (Yasser Arafat). One of the strongest voices in terrorism studies agrees, “I generally agree with those who say—the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is mostly in the politics of the beholder” (McCauley, 2004). Others may argue that what differentiates “freedom fighters” and revolutionaries from terrorists is the willingness to kill indiscriminately—from those who are armed against them to noncombatants who symbolically represent the culture they have demonized or whose deaths may conveniently advance the cause—to achieve their desired end state.
To be sure, terrorism has ancient roots. There are several well-known examples of early terrorist groups. The Jewish “Sicarii” zealots of the first century C.E. were a group of assassination squads who terrorized the occupying Romans. The Sicarri, or dagger men, were renown for ambushing unprepared or vulnerable Roman soldiers with concealed knives (hence their nom de guerre). Their acts include one of the earliest examples of chemical warfare, in which they poisoned the drinking wells, granaries, and other water supplies of their unwanted occupation force. Seventh-century Hindi gangs known as “thugs” are another example. As devotees of the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction (Kali), these groups slaughtered an estimated one million hostages. A third example is the medieval era group of Islamic Nizari Ismailis known as the “hashishiyyin.” It is from this famous group that we owe the term “assassin.” Their martyrdom operations and political assassinations targeted the occupying Seljuks and Christian crusaders of their day. There is value in examining these ancient terror groups because they share many similar characteristics with their modern counterparts such as foreign occupation, unjust oppression, target selection, and religious or ideological factors used to justify violence.
As mentioned previously, many theories have been proposed regarding who and why some individuals engage in terrorism while others do not. These theories include religious fanaticism, models of economic disenfranchisement, personal revenge, and psychopathology, just to name a few. The truth is, however, that no single group or type of person has monopolized terror. Different people from various faith backgrounds and economic spheres have engaged in terrorism, and they have done so for different reasons. That said, researchers and policy makers must identify risk factors for recruitment and radicalization in the hope of being able to predict and prevent such occurrences.
A number of models and frameworks have been proposed regarding radicalization and terrorism. Moghaddam (2005) referenced a staircase of ascending extremism and violence culminating in terrorist acts. In his model, individuals begin with a recognition of inequity and injustice. This belief is followed by an attempt to problem-solve and identify potential options in the hope of restoring justice and equality. In situations where this is not possible, individuals develop a sense of resentment and hostility toward those benefitting or perpetrating the inequities. Moral justification for violence often follows, driving these individuals toward a terrorist group. Members are encouraged to dehumanize their perceived enemy, and in doing so, their decision to act violently is reinforced and encouraged. Each step in the staircase requires choice, and each subsequent decision to ascend is not guaranteed. In other words, just because an individual finds himself or herself on the first or second step does not mean the individual will continue to climb the staircase. Moghaddam’s model is just one of many (Horgan, 2005; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Wiktorowicz, 2005) that detail a process of progressive maturation. While some models appear to emphasize specific events or injustices, others focus on ideologies that fuel violent actors.
Increasingly, there has been a recognition that linear pathways, from awareness to extremist ideology to radicalized action, may not describe how individuals become involved in terrorism. Borum (2011) and others (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) contend that becoming radicalized in one’s belief is not necessarily a pathway to terrorist acts. In fact, in many instances these individuals may represent two distinct groups, not one group at different stages of evolution in ideology and action. This “two-pyramids” model (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) asserts two separate, albeit somewhat similar, linear pathways, one ending in extreme views, while the other ending in extreme behavior. The authors argue that when comparing other low-frequency violent acts (suicide and homicide), researchers find many individuals with ideation who never act as well as destructive actors who behave impulsively. The research connecting radicalized belief and extremist behavior is weak. There are many individuals who have radicalized beliefs but will never act on those beliefs. In contrast, a relatively small number of individuals will commit acts of terror.
Terrorism works because it leverages a center of gravity, the people, through fear and anxiety. What makes it so effective in achieving short-term objectives? Its violence or threats of violence are unpredictable, uncontrollable, and often seemingly random. This set of conditions forces the impossible—a constant state of weariness, readiness, and vigilance on the part of the target individuals, groups, or social structure. In turn, terrorist actors garner attention, evoke emotion, alter perceptions, and ultimately change behavior—their desired end state. However, the historical success of sustained terrorism to achieve long-term political objectives (e.g., ISIL’s efforts to establish a caliphate) has been limited, at best. This limited success may be related to the nearly certain eventuality that terror groups ultimately will alienate local support networks by directly or indirectly harming the people and infrastructure that support them.
Though more of a focus in the literature appears to be on the concepts of radicalization (including self-radicalization) than terrorist recruitment, those who address the topics—especially in the popular media—often tend to write about them as related, but mutually exclusive phenomena. Most often, these phenomena are depicted in a linear manner, with radicalization being the first and necessary step before someone might be recruited into an organization that conducts violent acts in the name of its respective religion or belief system. Given that much of the available literature on this topic is from Western sources, it is a reasonable leap of logic for most authors who cannot imagine joining a controversial organization such as a terrorist group without first being completely convinced of the group’s ideology and goals. In reality, it appears that the concepts and practices of radicalization are much more overlaid and interrelated than the simplistic, linear view that many share.
In fact, Gehrwehr and Daly (2006) provide a comprehensive view of recruitment that treats radicalization as a seemingly natural component of the recruitment process, one that not only influences recruitment strategies and practices but also informs desired characteristics of targeted individuals. The authors recognize that there is no single recipe for recruiting success, which, inevitably, dictates that there is no universal counter-recruitment method to impose on potentially vulnerable populations. Four models of recruitment are proposed:
The authors also offer that recruiting communication can be explained along two dimensions identified by Goffman (1963)—proximity and channels of communication. Proximity ranges from “proximate” (i.e., close and personal) to “mediated” (distributed through multiple means from a greater distance), and the channels of communication range from “public” to “private” channels. For example, a propaganda video viewed through an open website would be “mediated and public” recruiting, while proselytizing to a peer would be “proximate and private” recruiting. Though not the only explanation of recruiting methods, the discussion provides a useful framework that is easily adaptable outside the studied group (al-Qaida), and consistent with Fishman and Warius’s (2009) description of a jihadist recruiting handbook.
“A Course in the Art of Recruitment” is a 51-page handbook by Abu ‘Amr al-Qa’idi, which may be an early attempt to provide a more “corporate” approach to recruiting, with the recognition that most jihadist recruiters likely are not scholars or seasoned jihadist experts. The handbook promotes “Individual Da’wa,” that is, calling an individual to Islam, instead of “Collective Da’wa,” due to the increased operational security that individual interactions can provide and the ability to systematically assess the prospective recruit’s commitment to the cause. The handbook describes a five-stage process for terrorist recruitment (Fishman and Warius, 2009):
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, several practices described in the handbook clearly utilize tactics that align with psychological principles of persuasion that are identified in Cialdini’s (2007) seminal work on the topic. In Stage 1, the handbook advocates selecting a friend, a relative, or an individual of similar age or place in life, which leverages the liking and similarity principles of persuasion. Cialdini (2007) argues that we are more likely to be persuaded by those we like (e.g., a friend) and those who appear similar to us (relative or individual of similar age or place in life). Stage 2 continues the impact of the liking and similarity principles but also adds the principle of reciprocation, which suggests that an individual (the recruit, in this case) is more likely to be persuaded to act in support of another (the recruiter)—possibly out of a feeling of indebtedness—if that person has given him or her something. Stage 2 advocates for building a strong friendship with the recruit before advancing political or ideological causes, specifically recommending eating with recruits (possibly buying lunch) and providing them with gifts. This stage also begins to employ the principle of consistency (an individual usually feels compelled to act in a manner that is consistent with previous public statements) by encouraging recruits to embrace basic Islamic rituals, which later will be used in support of the justification for violence. Stages 3 and 4 appear to build on the consistency principle as rituals and indoctrination tactics increase, though the recruiter is regularly instructed to avoid moving too fast or pushing too hard so that resistance is not encountered or minimized (thus reinforcing the consistency between beliefs and action in a slow, methodical manner). Likewise, Stage 5 is begun only after the recruiter is fully convinced that the recruit accepts the ideology and is truly committed to violent jihad. Though the proliferation and success rate of this recruiting methodology is unknown, the sheer psychological sophistication of the plan suggests that the application of psychological principles plays an important (though likely informal) role in terrorist recruitment.
Porges (2012) identifies other mechanisms of recruitment, including the use of cellphones, social media, and “taranas” (i.e., poems and songs) to promote jihad. The author also highlights the use of a small number of influential madrasas to teach extremism at an early age, citing the poignant example of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who taught extremism at a madrasa in Peshawar for years, sowing the seeds that later bore recruits for his militant group, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). In addition to gaining agreement from young children that would drive the consistency principle of persuasion, Hekmatyar’s status in the community also leverages the authority principle of persuasion, which states that we are more likely to be persuaded by someone who is seen by others as credible.
Terrorist training camps often are viewed as completely homogenous groups of people who are wholly committed to the cause and will blindly follow and sacrifice in the name of jihad. Literature about the activity in these short-lived groups suggests that beliefs of the group members are not as solidified as many popular media sources may suggest. Reviewing testimony of now-convicted terrorist Faisal Shahzad, who failed to detonate a massive VBIED in Times Square, Keating (2010) indicates that indoctrination was a significant, regular component of daily training in the camp that Shahzad attended, which suggests that indoctrination is a continuous process instead of a binary variable, and that recruits are not simply obedient automatons preparing to be set into motion.
In fact, Keating (2010) argues that “local recruits are reportedly often cajoled or forced into attending by their families or madrasas,” which is consistent with other assertions about the strong influence of family; Hafez (2016) reports that 33 percent of foreign fighters have terrorist roots in their respective family trees. Keating (2010) describes a typical day in the training camp as beginning with prayer and a sermon, followed by small arms (e.g., AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade [RPG] launcher) training, IED planting procedures, and other military tactics throughout the day. In the evening, the aforementioned indoctrination occurred, in which recruits were subjected to countless hours of propaganda videos and other materials in support of violent jihad. Al-hammadin (2015) describes training that includes similar paramilitary skill-building activities, including advanced training in more complex weapons systems (e.g., chemical weapons), and refers to simultaneous indoctrination and religious teaching as “combination training” highlighting that this training is not available to the self-trained “lone offender” terrorist.
It is widely known that many terrorist training camps exist in austere environments (e.g., Al-hammadin, 2015; Keating, 2010; Porges, 2012;), though Keating (2010) points out that modern terrorist training camps are much smaller in size and population than those were before the 9/11 terror attacks. For easier concealment, modern camps typically consist of one to two buildings and train about 20 recruits at a time.
The concept of “self-radicalization” has been a focus over the past decade due to case examples of lone offender attacks in which the attacker appears to have received no direction from a terrorist group to commit the attack. Likewise, some cases (e.g., Nidal Hasan) have been hotly debated as to whether the attacker was directed or influenced through electronic communication. Advances in technology, which make terrorist propaganda and contacts increasingly more accessible, further incite interest in how an individual may “self-radicalize” in the absence of any terrorist contact or material support. The heightened attention self-radicalization is getting in science, government, and journalism likely is borne out of the very legitimate fear that self-radicalized terrorists are more difficult to identify (e.g., rather than someone who boasts on social media about traveling to a known terrorist training hotspot) and an interest in developing prevention strategies and countermeasures to address the threat of self-radicalization.
The most common route associated with self-radicalization, that may not be present in cases of radicalization through affiliation with a terrorist organization, is the influence of the Internet and social media. Dr. Garth Davies, of Simon Fraser University, suggests that the Internet and social media may provide “venues and support for people drawn to deviant communities, who otherwise would have trouble finding and communicating with like-minded others” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2015, p.7). Unlike a few decades ago, “people who are drawn to deviant communities” can access like-minded individuals without having to attend a secretive meeting or hide a controversial pamphlet (e.g., KKK rallies and recruiting materials in the early to mid-1900s). Conversely, those individuals can search for like-minded people from the safety and security of home without the threat of public shame. For example, groups that advocate for legalizing sexual abuse of children (called “sexual relationships” or other more benign terminology by these groups) are present online, a movement that would be nearly impossible to grow in a public forum. Similarly, those who advocate for the killing of innocents in furtherance of their cause, or those who argue that there are none who are innocent in the context of their collective grievances, can reach countless individuals who may also feel aggrieved and are searching for others who may provide justification for violent action. As discussed earlier, the concept of social proof suggests that someone is more likely to act on a socially unacceptable desire if he or she observes that an individual with whom that person identifies has acted on a similar desire (Cialdini, 2007). This postulate is consistent with von Behr, Reding, Edwards, and Gribbon (2013), who identified five hypotheses in the literature regarding the role of the Internet in radicalization processes (pp. 16–17):
The authors studied 15 cases of self-radicalization to test these hypotheses, and their findings supported hypotheses 1 and 2, but did not support hypotheses 3–5. Specifically, von Behr et al. (2013) confirm support for the Internet enabling like-minded individuals to connect—all 15 individuals used the Internet as a “key source of information, communication and propaganda,”—and that the Internet offered more opportunities to confirm existing beliefs (i.e., “echo chamber”) than offline interactions. However, though the Internet can facilitate the radicalization process, no evidence suggested that the Internet was responsible for accelerating the process and, of the 15 cases studied, all had contact with other individuals (i.e., none truly could have been considered self-radicalized). Though the sample size of their case studies is small (n = 15), the authors argue that they “have seen very little evidence” to support the concept of self-radicalization. The authors suggest that “[most] cases of so-called online self-radicalization involve virtual communication and interaction with others,” that policy makers and law enforcement view self-radicalization as a “largely defunct” notion, and that the few cases of truly self-radicalized individuals (e.g., Roshana Choudhry) are outliers (pp. 29–30). The popularity of self-radicalization as a research topic is recognized as is the continued growth of this topic in the field, but von Behr et al. (2013) emphasize the very limited empirical research using actual online activity of terrorists, stating that secondhand and anecdotal evidence often are cited in academic studies of the phenomenon. Given that current technology has advanced to the point of terrorists having the ability to communicate with individuals all over the world and live-stream from the battlefield, perhaps a more useful delineation focuses on directed versus non-directed attacks (Borum, Fein, & Vossekuil, 2012), though even that distinction is subject to the same difficulties in determining the “ground truth” as the self-radicalization question detailed next.
Current efforts to determine the “secret formula” of self-radicalization may be misguided. In a comprehensive review of social science theories on radicalization and violent extremism, Borum (2011) argues the following:
No single theory is likely to explain all violent radicalizations. But achieving clarity in defining our concepts and appropriately using guidance from decades of social science theory and research may help curtail the reinvention of a problem and provide a platform for moving forward. (emphasis added, p. 31)
Just as there has been very limited success in identifying a “psychological profile” of people who join terrorist groups due to widely varying individual characteristics, no profile of self-radicalized terrorists has been established. In addition, there is no method currently available to develop the “ground truth” as to whether an individual self-radicalized. Not all communications can be discovered following a terrorist act, and any organization whose objectives are advanced by the attack may decide to take credit and bestow honors on the attacker. Further, the attacker may decide to claim or deny affiliation for legal, personal, or psychological reasons. Focusing on self-radicalization as a separate, yet related, phenomenon—as opposed to just another route to terrorism—may be an example of the “reinvention of a problem” that Borum (2011) warns against, and once again diverts resources toward the search for the roots of terrorism instead of maintaining a focus on the seemingly more fruitful and applicable study into the routes (Horgan, 2008) to terrorist acts and disengagement.
Growing evidence points to culture as a contextual precondition of extremist ideology and terrorist behavior. Meta-analytic study of terrorism across 21 countries and four decades has identified several critical correlates linking various cultural factors to extremism and terrorist acts (Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, & Feinberg, 2013). It is yet unclear as to whether these factors are predictive of terrorist behavior or simply highly correlated with those who commit such acts. Regardless, the following contextual factors have been found in association with a greater frequency, and lethality, of extremism and terrorism: (1) the presence of a strong sense of fatalism, (2) tight normative behavior, and (3) low egalitarianism between men and women (with clear male dominance). Even after accounting for religious/ideological beliefs and socioeconomic factors, these three variables were found disproportionately in cultures with higher rates of terrorism and extremism. We have provided descriptions of each factor next.
Fatalistic belief asserts that one’s destiny (fate) is determined in advance, controlled by outside external forces. It is not up to the individual to choose a course of action; that path has already been directed by a divine God or other forces beyond the individual. These forces exercise dominion over the individual’s life and his or her daily experience. Luck, karma, and even chance augment the beliefs of many who hold fatalistic worldviews. The research literature suggests that cultural groups adhering to this type of perspective tend to experience lower life expectancy, a reduced gross domestic product, reduced voter turnout, and higher rates of suicide (Leung & Bond, 2004). In contrast, cultural groups with a less fatalistic worldview tend to see themselves as autonomous moral actors responsible for their own destiny. In other words, good outcomes are seen as a result of their action and decision making, and bad outcomes are seen as the result of a failure to act or poor decision making. Concerns have been raised about groups that tend to be fatalistic, due to the resulting decrease in personal ownership and responsibility over their behavior (Gelfand et al., 2013). It may seem ironic that a group holding to fatalism would act in a manner to create terror in others, since their very beliefs suggest the outcome is not in their hands. However, these individuals often believe that they are the instruments of divine justice as opposed to its architects. Of course, it may be reasonable to assume that such groups are merely claiming divine inspiration or direction as a justification for their own personal or collective goals.
The closeness or tightknit nature of a society may also contribute to its risk for terrorism. Groups that demonstrate social closeness (tightness within group social norms) are associated with more frequent terrorist acts, as well as acts of greater lethality. The more pervasive their normative structures, the greater the clarity of these norms. With such clarity, there is an increase in intolerance for norm violations (Triandis, 1989). Countries such as Japan and Pakistan demand greater conformity, obedience, and discipline from their citizens and do so through high normative clarity, social monitoring, and strong punitive systems employed for norm violations (Gelfand et al., 2013). Research suggests that tight social norming groups are less tolerant of cultural deviations and more ethnocentric. These factors likely contribute to a within-group orientation that establishes a strong “us versus them” mentality. While protective of within-group norms and culture, this social construction may also incline its members to justify violence in order to secure the status quo, particularly in consideration of moral deviations like homosexuality, prostitution, or divorce (Gelfand et al., 2011).
The visibility and position of women in society matters. When societies ascribe to low gender equality (lower egalitarianism between men and women), women tend to come out at the bottom. This results in fewer women in positions of leadership, a tendency for women to be less educated, and diminishes opportunities for women and men to share daily space, interactions, and decision making (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). In contrast, egalitarian societies tend to fare better in a number of important ways, including human development and longevity.
Societies and cultural groups that espouse inequalities between genders reinforce the notion that women require protection. This protection tends to be localized to external influences that threaten the gender imbalance. Specific triggers that appear common include threats to prevailing gender roles, encouraging non-conformity in gender-related ideas, and perceived threats to a woman’s sexual purity. Lower gender equity tends to accompany cultures that espouse traditional masculine values (aggressiveness and competitiveness) while de-emphasizing traditional feminine values (compassion, cooperation, and nurturance).
In addition to cultures that promote fatalistic worldviews, adhere to tight social norming, and practice reduced gender egalitarianism, researchers have identified other cultural preconditions that may facilitate extremist ideology and terrorist activity. The propagation of sacred values has emerged as one such example (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Atran & Ginges, 2012; Ginges & Atran, 2013). In other words, cultures that tend to align religious ideologies with cultural and societal practices (normative behaviors) may be at greater risk for extremism.
Collectivism versus individualism is one of the most widely studied phenomenon in cross-cultural research. There are many admirable qualities in both styles of cultural interaction and worldview. Individualistic cultures promote the individual, independence, independent thinking, and autonomy. In contrast, collectivistic societies tend to seek group identity and cohesion over individual expression. Collectivism is associated with interdependence and promotes important distinctions between those within the group and those external to the group. Collectivistic cultures promote values of self-sacrifice in service to the larger group. Strong punitive penalties are levied against members who violate within-group norms and act against the collective good. In this context, group goals are often experienced as individual goals (Wenzlaff, 2004).
When it comes to collectivism and the risk for extremist ideology and terrorism, a number of connections have been proposed. Triandis (1989) identified potential risk factors focusing on intolerance for violations of within-group moral virtues, the strong distinction between within-group and outside-group morality in general, and the perceived position of moral superiority by those within the group when comparing themselves to outsiders. Other research has pointed to the fact that group cohesion and shared belief has been associated with a willingness to justify violence directed against individuals external to the group (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009).
Individualism accepts and even promotes dissention. Debate, defiance, and protest are prized and promoted as well. Such actions are considered a natural outgrowth of liberty, critical thinking, and an expression of individual freedoms, not as a threat to group cohesion. Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Knezevic, and Stankov (2009) analyzed available data concerning militant extremist groups across different cultures and regions. They found 16 culture-related themes that were well aligned with Gelfand et al.’s (2013) findings, including intolerance for norm violations, cohesive social norming, and ideological justification for violence.
While the literature includes many studies that examine risk factors across cultural groups, Post and Sheffer (2007) restricted their lens to risk factors among countries with large Muslim diasporic communities. Their findings suggest that individuals residing in Middle Eastern diasporas are at an increased risk for radicalization. When examining Salafist recruits specifically, the authors found that 80 percent of these recruits came from communities that were cut off from their host nation. The authors identified six common strategies employed by diasporas in their attempt to integrate with host countries. On the far end of the spectrum is isolationism in which the diasporic community chooses to live apart from both their culture of origin and their host nation. The opposing end of the continuum terminates in fully integrated communities who have learned to operate and be successful in their host culture, while still celebrating the unique aspects of their own culture of origin. Several gradations of acculturation lie between (acculturation, communalism, corporatism, and autonomism). The majority of ethno-national diasporic communities tend to choose an approach that falls between the two poles. Post and Sheffer (2007) determined that most settle on either the communalist or autonomist approach to integration into their host cultures. Communalist communities maintain the integrity and separation of their own cultural group, while autonomistic groups remain true to their culture of origin with regard to political and economic systems as well as social norms. However, unlike isolationist communities, both of these two alternative approaches find greater balance in their ability to coexist among host culture majorities.
Acculturation appears to come more easily to some cultural groups as opposed to others. Oyserman (1993) found that Arab Israelis experienced greater difficulty in their integration into Western culture as compared to Jewish Israelis. This struggle may be based on the level of collectivism in their cultural backgrounds. Prejudice and other socio-cultural or ethno-religious variables may also be at work in these findings. Communities that possess similar contextual features to their host nation’s majority cultural community may find it easier to acculturate. This fact is likely due to both the perceptions of the diasporic members and those of the host nation community.
Researchers have also explored the role of sacred and secular ideology as it relates to terrorism. Harari (2005) and Hoffman (1998) argue that religious ideology often fuels violence against others using the defense that such acts are required as a divine duty or sacrifice. In such instances, terrorist actors are unconstrained by moral, social, or political parameters. In contrast, groups that do not appeal to sacred ideologies are at less risk of catastrophic measures, like employing weapons of mass destruction (Staal, 2016). If such weapons were employed, there would likely be widespread condemnation of the group, and the fallout of their use (biochemical, nerve, or nuclear) would affect the organization’s own members and its supporters. Hoffman (1998) calculated that religiously motivated terrorists perpetrate 25 percent of all terrorist acts. However, these acts accounted for 58 percent of all resulting fatalities, suggesting that terrorists acting on religious ideology tend to commit acts of greater intensity and lethality than those fueled by secular ideology.
Moral justification to act in these ways is often provided by a central authority, a religious leader, or spiritual advisor who portrays himself as a conduit between the fighting faithful and the divine. As such, issued orders from this individual are tantamount to issued orders from God Himself. Violence is not only permissible but also required. This framework supports the redefinition of conventional religious understanding, facilitating innovations and reformations in religious text interpretation and application that are subsequently co-opted to serve the purposes of the group. This framework, including the requirement of violence, often is communicated as a tactic that serves to inspire followers and change the narrative in favor of their cause. If the targeted society is convinced that the terrorist actors do not have the capacity for rational thought or decision making in the face of such perceived offenses—much like a wild predator that is programmed to chase when presented with prey-like behavior—then the targeted society may blame itself for inciting the terrorism and seek to change itself, which takes resources away from counterterrorism activities and advances the cause of the terrorists.
Research has focused heavily on attempting to identify and predict risk factors, while little has been examined in the area of preventative or protective factors. One approach to this exploration has been to consider the process of radicalization in the hope of derailing its progression in a given individual. As previously noted, Horgan (2008) encourages researchers to focus on pathways (i.e., “routes”) to radicalization and terrorism as opposed to the individual characteristics (i.e., “roots”); contextual factors may be a starting point for many on the “route” to radicalization and terrorism. Contextual factors, such as cultural preconditions, may not only set communities at greater risk, but they may also immunize groups from extremist ideology (Post & Sheffer, 2007; Rynning, 2003).
Demonstrating an appreciation for cultural and religious differences, particularly those present among our most vulnerable communities, may be one key consideration by host nation leaders. Such appreciation appears to have a positive effect on the facilitation of acculturation by diasporic groups. Such valuation aids in striking a healthy community balance between the diaspora’s need for connectivity with its cultural homeland and its need for effective assimilation. For example, the French government recently enacted legal prohibitions that have forced Muslim girls to remove their traditional headscarves (the hijab) during school attendance. Its decision, despite being applied equitably across sacred and secular communities, received widespread criticism by French Muslims. The backlash was swift and violent and speaks to the lack of perceived understanding or appreciation for Islamic faith practices. This incident was avoidable had French leaders considered a more strategically advisable course of action (BBC, 2014). Host communities may also choose to encourage or incentivize assimilation into their country’s cultural values. However, finding a balance between this pressure and the ability of dislocated community members to participate in important aspects of their own cultural heritage is critical.
Community-based interventions should identify at-risk émigré populations in order to efficiently employ support programs. Celebrations of diasporic cultural values and faith practices are one example. Such efforts can encourage connection and a sense of host -nation identity that may facilitate needed acculturation among otherwise-at-risk individuals. Encouraging cultural exchange and intercommunity dialogue is another way community leaders can communicate respect and value (Post & Sheffer, 2007). In comparison to more closed societies, the U.S.’s open embrace of diversity in many of its forms has been hailed as a protective factor against radicalization and extremist thought. As our nation’s leaders choose greater isolationist or nationalist policies, we may increase our vulnerability.
In the past decade, a number of different programs emerged in an attempt to de-radicalize individuals who adopted extremist ideology and acted in violent ways as a result: (1) Northern Ireland established its Early Release Scheme, for the Irish Republican Army members; (2) Columbia designed a similar program for former FARC members, known as the Disengagement and Reincorporation Program; (3) Indonesia employs its own Disengagement Program; (4) Yemen has a Religious Dialogue Committee that handles extremists who have adopted corrupted Islamic teaching; and (5) Saudi Arabia has implemented its Advisory Committee Counseling Program. Saudi Arabia’s program is perhaps the most well known. Jihadists are provided vocational training, psychological counseling, physical fitness and athletic programming, and religious re-education in Riyadh. Individuals are treated as victims who were exploited, and Saudi Arabia expends extensive resources to facilitate its process of societal reintegration and de-programming. A success rate from this program suggests that only 10–20 percent of graduates return to their radicalized behavior. It should be noted, however, that independent data on de-radicalization programs remains largely unknown and unvalidated.
In this chapter we’ve explored the psychology behind terrorism and terrorist actors, including the many cultural and ideological influences that help illuminate why individuals engage in terrorist activities. We’ve also attempted to dispel past theories and myths about what kind of person chooses to engage in terrorism. Although much of contemporary discourse centers on Middle Eastern and Islamic terrorism, it is important to note that terrorists come from all walks of life and across ethnic and cultural lines. Moreover, it is often more important to focus on underlying factors that contribute to vulnerabilities, how those vulnerabilities are highlighted for tactical advantage, and those factors that act as a protection against recruitment and radicalization.
Focus on contextual factors and preconditions for radicalization, adopting extremist ideology, and acting out violence may be critical in understanding the process of terrorist development as well as preventing it. Community engagement strategies are considered as potential protective measures against terrorist risk, and de-radicalization programs are seen as an after-the-fact approach to rehabilitation and reintegration of violent actors.
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