BY SCOTT PATCHAN
The 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign resulted from the determined campaign of Gen. U. S. Grant and his hammering style of conducting simultaneous offensives across the so-called Southern Confederacy. When he first took command of all United States forces in early 1864, Grant readily recognized that the Shenandoah Valley had been a constant nuisance to Union commanders since the war began. In 1861, a failed Union offensive there allowed Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and an obscure brigadier from Lexington, Virginia, named Thomas J. Jackson to leave the Valley and play the decisive role in the Confederate victory at the battle of Bull Run. In 1862, Jackson’s marches and maneuvers in the Valley befuddled several Union commanders and led to Federal defeat. More importantly, those setbacks in the Valley prompted President Abraham Lincoln to fear for the safety of Washington, D.C., and withhold vital reinforcements from Maj. Gen. George C. McClellan as his Army of the Potomac inched ever closer to Richmond. In 1863, Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s thrashing of the hapless Maj. Gen. Robert Milroy’s forces at the second battle of Winchester opened the door for Gen. Robert E. Lee’s second invasion of the north, which culminated in the epic battle of Gettysburg.
Grant set about to change that in the spring of 1864, but a combination of inept Federal leadership and Confederate aggressiveness stymied his designs. Politics dictated that Grant place German Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel in command of the forces operating in the Valley, although he was a known bungler. His sluggish campaign and piecemeal tactics allowed the former vice president of the United States and then Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge to assemble a force from far flung regions of Southwestern Virginia and West Virginia in time to rout Sigel at New Market on May 15. Breckinridge then took his troops east and played a part in defeating Grant at the battle of Cold Harbor.
Typically, Grant did not give up but replaced Sigel with the more capable Maj. Gen. David Hunter six days after New Market. Hunter rejuvenated and reorganized the Union forces in the Valley and renewed the offensive. With Breckinridge gone, Lee ordered Brig. Gen. William E. “Grumble” Jones to bring nearly 6,000 men from Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee to confront Hunter’s advance. The two sides met in the shadows of the Blue Ridge in eastern Augusta County on June 5 near the tiny village of Piedmont. In a battle that saw more men killed and wounded than any battle previously fought in the Shenandoah Valley, Hunter routed the Confederate forces and occupied Staunton the next day. Reinforced by Maj. Gen. George Crook’s forces from West Virginia, Hunter then moved against Lynchburg, a vital Confederate logistical center. Lee could not risk its loss and sent Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early to save it from destruction. Early easily succeeded in driving the tentative Hunter back into the mountains of West Virginia and then launched his own offensive down the Shenandoah Valley. He crossed the Potomac River, defeated a small Federal force at the battle of Monocacy on July 9, and marched to the outskirts of Washington by the afternoon on July 11. Learning that two Federal army corps were on the way to the Federal capital, Early cancelled plans for an all-out attack the next morning and instead marched away under cover of darkness, ultimately returning to the Shenandoah Valley.
By July 24, Early was back on the offensive in the Valley seeking to carry out Robert E. Lee’s objective of diverting Union troops to the Valley from the Richmond and Petersburg front. Early attacked George Crook at the second battle of Kernstown, routing him back into Maryland and clearing the way for Jubal’s second raid north of the Potomac River. This time, Early sent his cavalry on a punitive raid into Pennsylvania, burning Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to the ground. Although Gen. William W. Averell tracked down the raiders and wrecked their force at the battle of Moorefield, West Virginia, the damage had been done.
Scott C. Patchan serves as a director on the board of the Kernstown Battlefield Association in Winchester, Virginia, and is a member of the Shenandoah Valley Battlefield Foundation’s Resource Protection Committee. He is the author of many articles and books, including Shenandoah Summer: The 1864 Valley Campaign (2007) and The Last Battle of Winchester: Phil Sheridan, Jubal Early, and the Shenandoah Valley Campaign (2013).
Early’s actions belied the message that Abraham Lincoln was trumpeting in his campaign to be reelected president of the United States in 1864. Lincoln urged the Northern electorate to “stay the course” as Union forces were heading toward ultimate victory. Early’s appearance at the gates of Washington and the burning of Chambersburg belied Lincoln’s claims and left open the very real possibility of a peace candidate defeating the president and opening the door to a negotiated settlement that saw the breakup of the Union and the restoration of slavery in the South.
Grant readily recognized the political realities that resulted from the military actions within and emanating from the Shenandoah Valley and took prompt remedial action. The Sixth and Nineteenth Army Corps returned to the Valley, and Grant sent Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan to take command. What ensued was the largest, bloodiest, and most consequential series of events that occurred in the Shenandoah Valley during the course of the war.
In the ensuing text, Dan and Phill provide both veteran and novice students of the Civil War with a well-written summary of the campaign between Sheridan and Early that culminated with the former winning a series of four major victories in a 30 day period and that also witnessed the destruction of the Shenandoah Valley’s mills and agricultural assets, an act that crippled its ability to support Confederate operations within its bounds. Dan and Phill weave an excellent summary of the campaign that will serve to introduce those new to the Civil War to the events of that “Bloody Autumn” and will serve as a ready refresher for veteran stompers who are heading out to visit those storied fields of conflict.
Scott C. Patchan
November 2013
“In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley … it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy.”
— Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
to Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan
