CHAPTER THREE
AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1864
After parting company with Grant at Monocacy Station, Phil Sheridan set off to the Shenandoah Valley to see the command he was to lead. He was headed to the theater where Confederates had always held court. On August 9, VI Corps brigade commander Brig. Gen. Emory Upton wrote to his sister, “A new campaign will be inaugurated tomorrow … . [H]ow soon it may develop … what may be its consequences no one knows but I trust it will be successful.”
The next morning, August 10, the campaign began in earnest. The Army of the Shenandoah struck out south, headed for Berryville, Virginia, 20 miles away. The march to this small hamlet east of Winchester was an effort to dislodge the Confederates from their position near Bunker Hill.
Confederate Brig. Gen. John Imboden, who had gained a favorable reputation the previous year when overseeing the wagon-train of wounded Confederates from Gettysburg, had been monitoring Union preparations in the lower Valley. He sent a report to Early, dated August 9—the same day Sheridan left Monocacy Station. Imboden reported that “a large force had been concentrated at Harper’s Ferry, consisting of the VI, IXX, and Crook’s corps … and that it was moving towards Berryville,” Early later recalled.
The intelligence gained by Imboden’s troopers and the subsequent Yankee movement prompted Early to retire from his position around Bunker Hill. Early ordered a “movement from Bunker Hill to the east of Winchester to cover the roads from Charlestown and Berryville to that place.”
Sheridan’s maneuver had the desired effect. Within days, the Federals encamped south of Middletown along the banks of Cedar Creek. The Confederates lay some eight miles to the south, ensconced atop Fisher’s Hill. Approximately 10 miles separated the opposing forces.
Harper’s Ferry, where Sheridan first met the Army of the Shenandoah (PG)
The two armies sat directly across from one another from August 12 to August 14. During this time, Sheridan attempted to develop his enemy’s position. The probes against the Confederates were minor and resulted in desultory fighting. Late on the afternoon of August 14, Sheridan received a dispatch from Grant informing him that a Confederate force had left the siege lines around Richmond and Petersburg. These Rebels were bound for the Valley. This additional force would even the numerical odds.
With Sheridan leading, the Army of the Shenandoah pursued Early’s army up the Valley. (LOC)
The force that Grant informed Sheridan about were elements from the Confederate First Corps under the command of Lt. Gen. Richard Anderson. On August 6, General Lee dispatched Maj. Gen. Joseph Kershaw’s infantry division and Maj. Wilfred Cutshaw’s artillery battalion to the Valley. In addition, Lee also sent the cavalry division under his nephew, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee. With these reinforcements, Lee hoped that Early could capture the initiative from the Federals.
On August 14, Anderson’s men began arriving in Front Royal. Anderson had received communication from Lee on August 12 providing information that Early had fallen back from Newtown toward Fisher’s Hill, as Sheridan’s forces threatened his right flank, approximately 15 miles to Fisher’s Hill. Believing that Sheridan might attempt to gain Early’s rear, Lee directed Anderson to resume his march. Circumstances would dictate his approach. At all times, Anderson was to have frequent communication with Early.
Sheridan’s army withdrawing from Strasburg. (WRHS)
However, at Anderson’s approach, Sheridan elected to march north, down the Valley, to find a more suitable defensive position. The withdrawal negated the maneuvering of the last week as the Federals began their march to Halltown, just south of Harper’s Ferry. All in all, the withdrawal took around six days, and by August 22, Sheridan reached his destination. Due to the time they’d already spent in the area, one soldier compared the army to a popular newspaper, coining it “Harper’s Weekly.”
The marching to and fro also had an effect on the Confederates. One soldier from Alabama had a pet dog named Collins. When his division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes rode through the camp one day, he inquired about the dog’s whereabouts. The soldier did not know but took the moment to compare the current campaign with the dog’s habits. “Every morning Custer, or some other Yankee comes galloping down the road with cavalry,” the Alabamian said, “and you [Rodes] go after them as hard as you can split, and you haven’t cotched a single cavarlyman yet, and Collins [the dog], every time a train passes shoots out after it, and she ain’t cotched narry train yet. You and Collins just alike.”
* * *
The Federal and Confederate forces continued their waltz through the end of August. Early moved back to Bunker Hill and Sheridan marched to Charlestown. On September 3, the Army of the Shenandoah marched to Berryville. The next few days were spent building and improving on a line of earthworks that stretched for some eight miles.
This strong posture on the part of Federals exhibited Sheridan’s desire to remain on the defensive. Although he still outnumbered his opponent, Sheridan felt that an attack and the risk of defeat outweighed any reward. The feeling seemingly intensified with word that the Federal armies under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had captured the vital southern city of Atlanta, Georgia. Any setback suffered by Sheridan would nullify Sherman’s gains.
Sheridan’s mindset began to change when word reached the Union camp that Anderson’s force was returning to Petersburg. Word of the Rebel departure was indeed confirmed by two Winchester citizens. This sudden turn of events convinced him that it was now time to act. The two armies had stood staring at each other for the better part of two weeks, and it now seemed that fortune was beginning to tilt in Sheridan’s favor. First, though, he had to convince Grant that his offensive plan was sound.
The general in chief viewed the fall of Atlanta differently, however, and he would have preferred that Sheridan follow up the victory in Georgia with a grand offensive in Virginia. When none came, Grant took it upon himself to visit his lieutenant. Just as they had met a month earlier, the two met in person again, this time at Charlestown. There, Grant approved Sheridan’s plan to move the Army of the Shenandoah south from Berryville to Newtown and turn the Confederate flank. Once again, the two men parted ways—Grant with an understanding of Sheridan’s strategy and Sheridan with an understanding of his superior’s expectations.
On September 17, Grant and Sheridan met in Charlestown so the commanding general could reiterate his expectations. (WRHS)
Within just a few days of their meeting, though, Sheridan altered his plan. This came about due to intelligence from Brig. Gen. William Averell. Averell’s cavalry had confirmed that Early had sent two divisions to Stephenson’s Depot, north of Winchester. The maneuver had left the Confederates strung out and vulnerable to being attacked and annihilated in detail. Rather than moving to Newtown as originally envisioned, Sheridan decided to march directly to Winchester in the hope that he could catch Early’s forces separated and defeat them piecemeal.
Alfred Waud sketched the September movements of the army. (LOC)
Supplemental orders went out late on the night of September 18 directing the army to be prepared to move the next morning. The Army of the Shenandoah would be marching to battle for the first time. Would this Union force have better luck than their predecessors?
The Union army marched through Charlestown. (WRHS)
