The ceremony at which I had taken the oath of office had lasted hardly more than a minute, but a delay followed while the inevitable official photographs were taken. Then, after most of those present had gripped my hand - often without a word, so great were their pent-up emotions - and after Mrs. Truman and Margaret had left, everyone else withdrew except the members of the Cabinet.

We took our places around the table, though Postmaster General Walker’s chair was vacant, for he was ill, and as we did so, Secretary Early entered. The press, be explained, wanted to know if the San Francisco conference on the United Nations would meet, as had been planned, on April 25.

I did not hesitate a second. I told Early that the conference would be held as President Roosevelt had directed. There was no question in my mind that the conference had to take place. It was of supreme importance that we build an organization to help keep the future peace of the world. It was the first decision I made as President.

When Early had left, I spoke to the Cabinet. I told them briefly, as I had already told some of them individually that I would be pleased if all of them would remain in their posts. It was my intention, I said, to continue both the foreign and the domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration. I made it clear, however, that I would be President in my own right and that I would assume full responsibility for such decisions as had to be made. I told them that I hoped they would not hesitate to give me their advice - that I would be glad to listen to them. I left them in no doubt that they could differ with me if they felt it necessary, but that all final policy decisions would be mine. I added that once such decisions had been made I expected them to support me. When there is a change in administration, there are bound to be some changes in the Cabinet, but I knew how necessary it was for me to keep an open mind on all the members of the Cabinet until we had had an opportunity to work together. Their experience with President Roosevelt and their knowledge were necessary to me in this crisis.

I intended, also, to maintain a similar attitude toward the heads of all the federal agencies. But I had some mental reservations about the heads of certain temporary war agencies.

That first meeting of the Cabinet was short, and when it adjourned, the members rose and silently made their way from the room - except for Secretary Stimson.

He asked to speak to me about a most urgent matter. Stimson told me that he wanted me to know about an immense project that was under way - a project looking to the development of a new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power. That was all he felt free to say at the time, and his statement left me puzzled. It was the first bit of information that had come to me about the atomic bomb, but he gave me no details. It was not until the next day that I was told enough to give me some understanding of the almost incredible developments that were under way and the awful power that might soon be placed in our hands.

That so vast an enterprise had been successfully kept secret even from the members of Congress was a miracle. I had known, and probably others had, that something that was unusually important was brewing in our war plants. Many months before, as part of the work of the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, of which I was chairman, I had had investigators going into war plants all over the country. I had even sent investigators into Tennessee and the state of Washington with instructions to find out what certain enormous constructions were and what their purpose was.

At that time, when these investigators were sent out, Secretary Stimson had phoned me to say that he wanted to have a private talk with me. I told him that I would come to his office at once, but he said he would rather come to see me.

As soon as he arrived, I learned that the subject he had in mind was connected with the immense installations I had sent the committee representatives to investigate in Tennessee and the state of Washington.

“Senator,” the Secretary told me as he sat beside my desk, “I can’t tell you what it is, but it is the greatest project in the history of the world. It is most top secret. Many of the people who are actually engaged in the work have no idea what it is, and we who do would appreciate your not going into those plants.”

I had long known Henry L. Stimson to be a great American patriot and statesman.

“I’ll take you at your word,” I told him. “I’ll order the investigations into those plants called off.”

I did so at once, and I was not to learn anything whatever as to what that secret was until the Secretary spoke to me after that first Cabinet meeting. The next day Jimmy Byrnes, who until shortly before had been Director of War Mobilization for President Roosevelt, came to see me, and even he told me few details, though with great solemnity he said that we were perfecting an explosive great enough to destroy the whole world. It was later, when Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, came to the White House that I was given a scientist’s version of the atomic bomb.

Admiral Leahy was with me when Dr. Bush told me this astonishing fact.

“That is the biggest fool thing we have ever done,” he observed in his sturdy, salty manner. “The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives.”

But on my first evening as President, my principal concern was about the San Francisco conference, After the Cabinet meeting, Stettinius, Early, and Daniels suggested that something needed to be done further to reassure our allies and the world that the San Francisco conference would be held as planned. We went to the Oval Room of the executive office to discuss the matter.

I felt strongly about the idea on which the United Nations organization was based and had been supporting it in every way I could on the Hill. I wanted to scotch any rumors or fears in the United States and abroad that there would be any changes in the plans that had been made. It was with that in mind that I decided to issue a statement at once, reassuring our allies of my support of the coming conference.

Meanwhile, the White House correspondents were asking for a press conference, since they were not present when I took the oath of office.

“For the time being,” I told Steve Early to inform them, “I prefer not to hold a press conference. It will be my effort to carry on as I believe the President would have done, and to that end I have asked the Cabinet to stay on with me.”

During those first few hours, painful as they were because of our tragic loss, my mind kept turning to the task I had inherited and to the grave responsibilities that confronted our nation at that critical moment in history. From my reading of American history, I knew there was no cut-and-dried answer to the question of what obligations a President by inheritance had in regard to the program of his predecessor - especially a program on which a great President had recently been re-elected for the fourth time.

Fortunately that program was no problem for me. I had not only been elected on the platform in which it had been outlined and which I had helped to write at the Chicago convention, but also I believed in it firmly and without reservation. Its principal objectives were to win the war through coordinated military and economic action with our allies; to win an organized peace, along lines already laid down during the war years, in close cooperation with our allies and other peace-loving nations; and at home to operate the government in the interest of all the people.

Neither as a member of the Senate nor as Vice President had I undergone any conscious change in my basic philosophy of government or my beliefs in the relationship of government to the people. I classify myself as a Jefferson Democrat living in modern times. I apply his principles to the situation as it is today. We often hear about Jefferson’s attitude toward the power of the federal government and the power of the state governments. We hear much talk of what he would have done. It seems to me that he would probably have met conditions as he found them and that he would not have departed from his fundamental beliefs. Had he lived in our day, I believe he would have adjusted himself to this industrial age without abandoning his principles.

I had made my campaign for the Senate on the basis of a policy I have pursued all my life - that the country should be operated for the benefit of all the people. In Jackson County, Missouri, when I came to the point of expending great amounts of public money for contracts, it was openly done with all the figures shown, and the lowest bidder got the contract. I upset the specially favored contractor policy of my predecessors and awarded the contracts in the interest of the people and taxpayers. The simple truth as I see it, and as I saw it then, was that the country should be run for the benefit of all the people and not for just the special crew who has the inside track. No one will question, I believe, that that was the basic thought and practice of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln.

I always fully supported the Roosevelt program - both international and domestic - but I knew that certain major administrative weaknesses existed. President Roosevelt often said he was no administrator. He was a man of vision and ideas, and he preferred to delegate administration to others - sometimes to others who were not ideally suited to carry out what he had in mind. I was well aware of this, and even on that first day I knew that I would eventually have to make changes, both in the Cabinet and administrative policy.

Many problems confronted me, and I was tired. Within half an hour of the time the Cabinet meeting adjourned, I left for our apartment at 4701 Connecticut Avenue.

When I arrived, I found Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and Mrs. Truman’s mother, Mrs. Wallace, at the apartment of General Jeff Davis, our next-door neighbor. The Davises had had a ham and turkey dinner that evening, and they gave us something to eat. I do not know when Mrs. Truman and Margaret had eaten last, but I had had nothing since noon. Shortly, we returned to our apartment, where I went to bed and to sleep.

On April 13, I began my first full day in office. I was up at 6:30, and at 9:00, after a walk and breakfast, I left for the White House with Hugh Fulton, who had served as my counsel on the Truman Committee and who had been waiting with the Secret Service men until I was ready to leave.

As I entered the White House car, I noticed Tony Vaccaro, Capitol Hill correspondent for the Associated Press, as he stood on the curb. I told him to hop in, and the three of us drove to the White House together. In our conversation I remember saying that few men in history equaled the one into whose shoes I was stepping and that I silently prayed to God that I could measure up to the task.

When we reached the White House, I went at once to the oval executive office. President Roosevelt’s belongings were numerous in the room. Ship models and ship prints were especially obvious, and the desk was laden with mementos. Everywhere were signs of the man who had labored there so long. I had no wish to change the room as yet, but I was forced to use the desk, and so I asked an aide to put away the former President’s belongings. Except for the objects on the desk, I carefully avoided disturbing the late President’s possessions. I even attempted, as much as possible, to keep from interfering with his personal staff, who were already overwhelmed with duties in connection with the plans for the coming funeral.

As yet, of course, I had no adequate staff of my own. Matthew J. Connelly, my Vice Presidential secretary, was already with me, but he was as new to the executive offices as I. He needed help, and I found it necessary at once to call in William D. Simmons, who had been the executive office receptionist for several years. His familiarity with the surroundings simplified many problems that arose, and he answered many of my phone calls, received many of my callers, and otherwise took on the duties of a secretary during those early, unplanned hours.

My first official business was with Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who reported to me on current diplomatic matters and discussed some of the plans for the coming United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

Stettinius informed me that at President Roosevelt’s request the State Department prepared for the President each day a two-page summary of the important diplomatic developments, and he handed me the current report. He asked whether I wished to have this daily summary continued, and he informed me that an up-to-date reference book on the major points of the foreign policies of the United States was being prepared for me.

I told Stettinius that I would welcome both the daily summary and the reference book, but I requested him to let me have that same day an outline of the background and the present status of the principal problems confronting this government in its relations with other countries. These written reports, along with material from other departments and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, came to me regularly from then on and were immensely helpful in filling gaps in my information. In fact, they were indispensable as aids in dealing with many issues, and from the first I studied them with the greatest care. Night after night I went over them in detail and never went to bed until I had thoroughly digested the information they contained.

The report I requested from Stettinius reached me that afternoon. I found no time to read it until that evening at home, when I could do so without interruption. This was the report:

FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

April 13, 1945

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

UNITED KINGDOM. Mr. Churchill’s policy is based fundamentally upon cooperation with the United States. It is based secondarily on maintaining the unity of the three great powers but the British Government has been showing increasing apprehension of Russia and her intentions. Churchill fully shares this Government’s interpretation of the Yalta Agreements on Eastern Europe and liberated areas. He is inclined however to press this position with the Russians with what we consider unnecessary rigidity as to detail. The British long for security but are deeply conscious of their decline from a leading position to that of the junior partner of the Big Three and are anxious to buttress their position vis-a-vis United States and Russia both through exerting leadership over the countries of Western Europe and through knitting the Commonwealth more closely together.

FRANCE. The best interests of the United States require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence.

It is recognized that the French Provisional Government and the French people are at present unduly preoccupied, as a result of the military defeat of 1940 and the subsequent occupation of their country by the enemy, with questions of national prestige. They have consequently from time to time put forward requests which are out of all proportion to their present strength and have in certain cases, notably in connection with Indochina, showed unreasonable suspicions of American aims and motives. It is believed that it is in the interest of the United States to take full account of this psychological factor in the French mind and to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength. Positive American contributions toward the rebuilding of France include: present and future rearming of the French Army; support of French participation in the European Advisory Commission, the control and occupation of Germany, the Reparations Commission and other organizations; and the conclusion of a Lend-Lease Agreement. De Gaulle has recently stated his appreciation of the necessity for the closest possible cooperation between France and the United States.

SOVIET UNION. Since the Yalta Conference the Soviet Government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on nearly every major question that has arisen in our relations. The more important of these are the Polish question, the application of the Crimea agreement on liberated areas, the agreement on the exchange of liberated prisoners of war and civilians, and the San Francisco Conference. In the liberated areas under Soviet control, the Soviet Government is proceeding largely on a unilateral basis and does not agree that the developments which have taken place justify application of the Crimea agreement. Permission for our contact teams to go into Poland to assist in the evacuation of liberated prisoners of war has been refused although in general our prisoners have been reasonably well treated by Soviet standards. The Soviet Government appears to desire to proceed with the San Francisco Conference but was unwilling to send their Foreign Minister. They have asked for a large postwar credit and pending a decision on this matter have so far been unwilling to conclude an agreement providing for the orderly liquidation of lend-lease aid. In the politico-military field, similar difficulties have been encountered in collaboration with the Soviet authorities.

POLAND. The present situation relating to Poland is highly unsatisfactory with the Soviet authorities consistently sabotaging Ambassador Harriman’s efforts in the Moscow Commission to hasten the implementation of the decisions at the Crimea Conference. Direct appeals to Marshal Stalin have not yet produced any worthwhile results. The Soviet Government likewise seeks to complicate the problem by initiating and supporting claims of the Warsaw Provisional Polish Government to represent and speak for Poland in international matters such as the San Francisco Conference, reparations and territorial questions. Because of its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and other United Nations and upon public opinion in this country, the question of the future status of Poland and its government remains one of our most complex and urgent problems both in the international and the domestic field.

THE BALKAN AREA. The chief problem facing this Government in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary concerns the operation of the Allied Control Commissions which were set up for the execution of the respective armistices. The essence is in the relations with the Soviet Government, which, as the power in military control and as the predominant element in the ACC’s, uses its position for unilateral political interference in the respective countries. This conflicts with the definite responsibilities of this Government under the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. We have invoked this declaration for Rumania (a minority Government imposed by intimidation) and Bulgaria (in anticipation of unfair elections). The Soviet Government rejected the first, but we are renewing the request, and has not yet replied to the second.

There are no immediate problems in Yugoslavia though here, too, we may be obliged to invoke the Yalta Declaration unless the government shows more moderation toward democratic elements in the country which are not yet represented in the administration.

GERMANY. The policy of the United States toward Germany was outlined in a memorandum approved by President Roosevelt on March 23, 1945. The principal features of that policy are: destruction of National Socialist organizations and influence, punishment of war criminals, disbandment of the German military establishment, military government administered with a view to political decentralization, reparation from existing wealth and future production, prevention of the manufacture of arms and destruction of all specialized facilities for their production, and controls over the German economy to secure these objectives.

Agreements have been reached with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the text of the instrument of unconditional surrender on control machinery for Germany, and on zones of occupation. France has approved the first two agreements. The War Department is now studying the zone originally allocated to the United States with a view to transferring a portion of it to France in conformity with the Crimea undertaking.

No tripartite or quadripartite agreement on the treatment of Germany during the period of military government has been reached. This Government, however, has submitted the memorandum of March 23 for negotiations in the European Advisory Commission meeting in London. This Government has prepared a program of reparation for presentation to the forthcoming conference in Moscow on that subject.

AUSTRIA. The four principal Allies have declared their intention to liberate Austria from German domination and reestablish it as a free and independent country. The European Advisory Commission is this week actively discussing plans for the zoning of Austria for occupation by forces of these countries, and for an inter-Allied military government of Austria pending the reestablishment of a democratic Austrian state.

ITALY. Although a cobelligerent since October 1943, Italy is still subject to an armistice regime and considerable control by the Allied Commission. Chiefly through our efforts, Italy’s status has improved, but less than we desire in view of the British policy of keeping Italy dependent. We have been unable to end the anomaly of Italy’s dual status as active cobelligerent and as a defeated enemy. Great pressure is being brought to bear by groups in this country to make Italy one of the United Nations - a step essentially in accordance with our policy but not with that of certain other allied governments.

Our gravest problem at present, aside from the country’s economic distress, is to forestall Yugoslav occupation of an important part of northeastern Italy, prejudicing by unilateral action a final equitable settlement of this territorial dispute and precipitating serious trouble within Italy. Difficulties may be encountered in maintaining Allied (Anglo-American) military government in this area.

SUPPLIES FOR LIBERATED AREAS. A problem of urgent importance to the U.S. is that of supplies for areas liberated from enemy occupation. The chaos and collapse which may result in these countries from starvation, unemployment and inflation can be averted principally by making available essential civilian supplies. Political stability and the maintenance of democratic governments which can withstand the pressures of extremist groups depend on the restoration of a minimum of economic stability. To do our part we must carefully analyze the needs and reserves of all claimants, military and civilian, domestic and foreign, and insist that they be reduced to absolute essentials. This will involve a reexamination both of U.S. military requirements and supply procedures and of U.S. civilian consumption. The British Cabinet Members are here to discuss critical food and other supply problems with the U.S. and Canada and have authority to reach decisions. It is essential that we organize ourselves at once to meet this problem. The Department is prepared to play its full role in this matter.

During the day, friends and acquaintances arrived from time to time, and, as I could, I saw them. The day was not organized, of course. Official tasks were numerous, but as yet no schedule had been arranged, and there were many interruptions.

Only a little while after Secretary Stettinius left, I met with the military leaders for the first time. It was eleven o’clock when Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal came in with General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles of the Air Force, and Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. I knew and respected all these men, and it was comforting to know that I would be advised by leaders of such ability and distinction.

In their report to me they were brief and to the point. Germany, they told me, would not be finally overcome for another six months at least. Japan would not be conquered for another year and a half. Their summary covered our far-flung military operations, but there was little detailed examination of our various positions. Everywhere, it appeared, our forces and those of our allies were doing well.

It did not take them long to give me the latest war developments and prospects, and when they had finished, I told them that I considered it urgent to send some word to our armed forces as to what they could expect from me. I added, however, that before doing so I thought I should first address Congress. As the new Chief Executive, I wanted the support of the legislative arm of the government, as I wished to assure our people, our armed forces, and our allies that we would continue our efforts unabated.

The military leaders agreed, and as they were leaving I asked Admiral Leahy to remain with me.

Leahy had occupied a unique position in the White House under President Roosevelt. He was a man of wide experience and was well known for his directness of expression and independence of judgment. Direct in manner and blunt in expression, he typified the Navy at its best, and Roosevelt had appointed him to act in a highly confidential role as chief of staff to the Commander in Chief. Prior to World War II there had been no such position in our government, but in Leahy’s hands it soon proved to be immensely useful.

When the others had left, I told him that I would like to have him continue in a similar capacity under me.

“Are you sure you want me, Mr. President?” he asked. “I always say what’s on my mind.”

“I want the truth,” I told him, “and I want the facts at all times. I want you to stay with me and always to tell me what’s on your mind. You may not always agree with my decisions, but I know you will carry them out faithfully.”

With Admiral Leahy in the White House, I felt that, whether they were good or bad, all the information and communications bearing on the war would reach me promptly. Furthermore, I felt convinced that he would see that I got the facts without suppression or censorship from any source.

The admiral looked at me with a warm twinkle in his eyes.

“You have my pledge,” he told me. “You can count on me.”

When Leahy left, I reached for the telephone and called Les Biffle again. During my years as senator I had worked closely with Biffle. He was always unusually well informed on legislative matters and was a parliamentarian who intimately understood the shadings and opinions of the dominant figures on the Hill. When I had called him earlier, I had asked him to arrange a luncheon in his office that noon with the leaders of Congress. I was anxious to meet the policy-making heads of both parties so that I might tell them of my earnest desire and need for the fullest cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches of the government.

I drove to the Capitol, surrounded and followed, as I was to be from that time on, by my ever-present Secret Service guards, and shortly after noon we sat down to lunch in Biffle’s office - thirteen senators, four members of the House of Representatives, Les Biffle, and the very new President of the United States.

I was glad to see these congressional leaders - Senators Barkley, Vandenberg, Connally, George, O’Mahoney, Hill, Magnuson, Pepper, White, Austin, La Follette, Hatch, and Wheeler, together with Speaker Rayburn, House Majority Leader McCormack, House Minority Leader Martin, and House Democratic Whip Ramspeck. I was deeply touched by the cordial reception they gave me.

I had come, I told them, in order to ask that a joint session of the Senate and the House be arranged so that I might address them in person. It would not be fitting, of course, to call such a meeting until the funeral of Franklin Roosevelt had been held, but I suggested that they make the necessary arrangements as soon as possible thereafter - Monday, April 16, three days hence.

Some of the group were opposed, and others were doubtful. Most, however, were in agreement. I asked each one for his opinion and listened carefully to what they had to say. I then outlined my reasons for considering it imperative to let the nation know through Congress that I proposed to continue the policies of the late President. I felt that it was important, too, to ask for continued bi-partisan support of the conduct of the war.

The points I made appeared convincing, for those who had been doubtful now expressed their agreement.

“Harry,” remarked one senator with whom I had long worked closely, “you were planning to come whether we liked it or not.”

“You know I would have,” I replied, “but I would rather do it with your full and understanding support and welcome.”

As I was leaving the Senate office, a long line of white-shirted page boys gathered outside to greet me. Reporters crowded in and joined the line as well, and I shook hands with every one of them.

“Boys,” I said, “if you ever pray, pray for me now. I don’t know whether you fellows ever had a load of hay fall on you, but when they told me yesterday what had happened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me. I’ve got the most terribly responsible job a man ever had.”

“Good luck, Mr. President,” said one of the reporters.

“I wish you didn’t have to call me that,” I told him.

I turned away from that long line of serious faces and entered the Senate cloakroom. I looked into the empty Senate Chamber and entered the silent vice-presidential office. These were the surroundings in which I had spent ten active, happy years. In a way, this had been my political home, and here I had experienced the most exciting adventure I had ever expected to have. Less than twenty-four hours before, I had been here presiding over the Senate. But now I was President of the United States and had to return to the White House, there to take over the job in which my great predecessor had only yesterday been stricken.

It was later that day when I signed the first official document to which I added my name as President. The proclamation as I wrote it read, in part, as follows:

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES:

It has pleased God in His infinite wisdom to take from us the immortal spirit of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd President of the United States.

The leader of his people in a great war, he lived to see the assurance of the victory but not to share it. He lived to see the first foundations of the free and peaceful world to which his life was dedicated, but not to enter on that world himself.

His fellow countrymen will sorely miss his fortitude and faith and courage in the time to come. The peoples of the earth who love the ways of freedom and hope will mourn for him.

But though his voice is silent, his courage is not spent, his faith is not extinguished. The courage of great men outlives them to become the courage of their people and the peoples of the world. It lives beyond them and upholds their purposes and brings their hopes to pass.

The proclamation, I believe, well expressed the feeling of the country, as it surely expressed what was in my mind and heart.

Messages were coming in throughout the day, of course, and one from Prime Minister Churchill was handed to me.

“Pray accept from me,” it read, “the expression of my personal sympathy in the loss which you and the American nation have sustained in the death of our illustrious friend. I hope that I may be privileged to renew with you the intimate comradeship in the great cause we all served that I enjoyed through these terrible years with him. I offer you my respectful good wishes as you step into the breach in the victorious lines of the United Nations.”

In cabling the Prime Minister in reply, I assured him that there would be no change in our close relations. “I am grateful for your message of sympathy to me and to the nation,” I told him, and I concluded my message by saying, “You can count on me to continue the loyal and close collaboration which to the benefit of the entire world existed between you and our great President.”

Other messages of sympathy and support arrived in great numbers. They came from sovereign heads of nations. They came from men and women in all walks of life. They came from many parts of the world. One was a special message from His Holiness Pope Pius XII. Ambassador Harriman cabled from Moscow, saying that Foreign Secretary Molotov had called on him at three o’clock in the morning to express his sympathy on Roosevelt’s death and to extend his respects and good wishes. Later in the day, too, a message came from Stalin.

“In the name of the Soviet Government and in my personal behalf,” it read, “I express deep condolences to the Government of the United States of America on the untimely death of President Roosevelt. The American people and the United Nations have lost in the person of Franklin Roosevelt a great world statesman and the herald of world organization and security after the war. The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its deep sympathy to the American people in this heavy loss and its confidence that the policy of collaboration between the great powers engaged right now in the war against the common foe will continue to grow strong in the future.”

My reply to Stalin was as follows: “My countrymen join with me in sincerely thanking you for your message of sympathy, which is a source of great comfort in our loss. It is my conviction that President Roosevelt’s sacrifice for the cause of freedom will serve to strengthen the determination of all peoples that the goal for which he so faithfully strove shall not have been in vain.”

From the leaders and citizens at home there was an unprecedented expression of deep mourning, and there were many tenders of support. As one that suggested how united America was, the message I received from Senator Arthur Vandenberg stands out in my mind. Arthur Vandenberg was a great American and a highly respected Republican leader. I especially appreciated the message he sent.

“Good luck,” it read, “and God bless you. Let me help you whenever I can. America marches on.”

As was to be expected, the press had a banner day. The country’s newspapers largely forgot their customary partisanship. There was a good deal of speculation, and there were some doubts as to the course I would follow, especially in regard to President Roosevelt’s program. Some papers carried vague reports that the troops at the fronts feared the effect that the President’s death would have on the consummation of peace, and some foreign dispatches suggested that the same question was being asked by peoples and their leaders all over the world.

Some congressmen were in doubt as to whether I would continue Roosevelt’s foreign policy. A few senators wanted to know whether I intended to give strong support to the proposed international organization, and at the same time some of the old isolationists even imagined that I would go further than the late President had. This latter point of view, I suppose, was based on the fact that I had taken the lead, along with Senators Ball, Burton, Hatch, and Hill, in trying to get a resolution passed to encourage the administration in its efforts to set up a new international organization.

My real concern at the moment, however, was divided between the war situation on the one hand and the problems of the coming peace on the other. We were close to victory, but the situation that would follow was not so clear. Already I was coming to be more fully informed on the most important and pressing problems in this complicated field, for I had been reading many documents and diplomatic messages that were being brought to me. I could see that there were more difficulties ahead. Already we were at odds with the Soviet government over the question of setting up a truly representative Polish government, and there were troubles in other areas. Many of these seemed to indicate an ominous trend. The next few months, I knew, could well be decisive in our effort to achieve an orderly world, reasonably secure in peace.

James F. Byrnes was at his home in Spartanburg, South Carolina, when he heard the radio announcement of Roosevelt’s death. Later that evening, Secretary Forrestal had called him on the phone to say that a plane was being sent for him. He came at once, and when I was told he was in Washington, I invited him to the White House. His appointment was for 2:30 p.m.

I had known Byrnes well for years, and I wanted to get his firsthand account of what had gone on at Yalta, and all the information he had of the meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. I had heard that he had personally made shorthand notes of all the secret meetings he had attended. I greeted him as an old friend when he entered, and we talked for half an hour about everything he could recall without referring to his notes. Then I asked him to transcribe his notes for me, especially since he had indicated that there were no available stenographic or official transcripts of the Yalta meetings. It was not until some ten days later that I received from him a typed and leather-bound transcript of his notes, which bore as a title, “The Crimean Conference, Minutes of Meetings, prepared by James F. Byrnes.”

During our discussion I had told Byrnes that I was considering asking him to become Secretary of State after the San Francisco conference. In considering Byrnes for this most important Cabinet post, a number of factors influenced me. The first of these was the question of succession to the presidency. Under the law, as matters now stood, the next man in line after me was the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Stettinius, however, had never been a candidate for any elective office, and it was my feeling that any man who stepped into the presidency should have held at least some office to which he had been elected by a vote of the people. I already had in mind the idea of recommending to Congress a change in the order of succession in case the Vice President, as well as the President, were to die in office.

I felt that the Speaker of the House, as an elected representative of the people of his district as well as the chosen representative of the majority of the elected representatives of the people, was the proper man under our form of government to be the next in line after the Vice President to assume the presidency. This would necessitate legislation, of course, and that would take time. Pending a change in the law, I felt it my duty to choose without too much delay a Secretary of State with proper qualifications to succeed, if necessary, to the presidency. At this time, I regarded Byrnes as the man best qualified. He had served many terms in the House and in the Senate, where he had acted as chairman of important committees. His record was so conspicuous that President Roosevelt had named him an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Later Roosevelt called on him for very special service by asking him to move into the White House to become assistant to the President, in charge of war mobilization. Byrnes agreed, but to do this he sacrificed a lifetime post of great prestige and resigned from the Supreme Court.

With this impressive record, I felt that Byrnes could make a further major contribution if he were to be appointed Secretary of State. But this was not all. There was still another consideration, though it was mostly personal.

Byrnes had felt that by virtue of his record of service to the party and the country he had been the logical choice to be the running mate of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1944 election. In fact, he had asked me to nominate him and give him my support before that convention.

As it turned out, Roosevelt and the convention willed otherwise, and Byrnes, undoubtedly, was deeply disappointed and hurt. I thought that my calling on him at this time might help balance things up.

At three-thirty that afternoon, not long after Byrnes had left, Secretary of State Stettinius made his second call of the day. He was accompanied by Charles Bohlen, the State Department’s expert on Russia, who had acted as interpreter at all the Roosevelt meetings with Stalin. The three of us plunged into the harassing question of Poland and the difficulties we were having with the Soviet leaders because of it.

As Vice President, I had been familiar only with the basic elements of the Polish problem. Now, however, the full picture was becoming clearer to me since I had read the secret documents, including the messages between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. The plain story is this: We and the British wanted to see the establishment in Poland of a government truly representative of all the people. The tragic fact was that, though we were allies of Russia, we had not been permitted to send our observers into Poland, Russia was in full military occupation of the country at the time and had given her full support to the so-called Lublin government - a puppet regime of Russia’s own making.

Both Great Britain and the United States had made their viewpoints clear, but Russia refused to budge no matter what we proposed in our efforts to compose the matter. She persisted in this attitude even in disregard of the agreement into which she had entered at Yalta. As a result of this, it had become apparent, because of the activities of the anti-Communist Poles, both in Poland and abroad, that what we actually faced in Poland was not merely a political situation but one that seriously threatened civil war. This had been clear, I now learned, even at the time Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at Yalta. In fact, at that meeting the question of a provisional or interim government for Poland had taken up more time than any other subject.

The reports now being made to me by Byrnes, Stettinius, and Bohlen, and my study of secret messages and cables, revealed the three alternatives that faced the negotiators at Yalta. First, there was the Polish government-in-exile, which had been established in London early in the war. This was made up of real Polish patriots, but its relations with the British had cooled. On the other hand, it was in close touch with the very active underground resistance movement in Poland which was determined in its opposition to the Russian-sponsored Lublin government and which had also opposed the Red Army which had moved through Poland.

Though the government-in-exile had long since been recognized by both Great Britain and the United States, it was obvious that those who composed it could not be forced on the Russians as a group, and no attempt had been made by Roosevelt or Churchill to do that.

A second alternative had been the one sponsored by Stalin. He had insisted - and he still maintained this view - that the Lublin group or, as it was being called by this time, the Warsaw government, was a fully functioning de facto government and should continue. He claimed, though we had information to the contrary, that it was purely Polish in origin and policy and that it had the support of the overwhelming majority of the population. His real reason for favoring this group, of course, was that it was subservient to the Soviet government.

After much discussion, it became apparent at Yalta that neither the Polish government-in-exile nor the Warsaw provisional government, as such, would be accepted by all three powers. Consequently, the discussion turned to the third alternative. This was that the Warsaw provisional government then functioning in Poland should be broadened by the inclusion of certain democratic leaders who were still in Poland and by others who were living abroad at the time. This new government would then be pledged to hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In this proposed election, furthermore, there were to be candidates representing all the democratic and anti-Nazi political parties of Poland.

This was the compromise solution to which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had finally agreed. Properly carried out, it might very well have solved the problem. We were now faced, however, with the failure of the Russians to live up to this agreement.

This was the matter on which I felt impelled to act so promptly now. In fact, when I had cabled Churchill my reply to his message of sympathy, I told him that I was also about to cable my views and suggestions on this Polish matter, and late on the afternoon of April 13, this second message was sent.

Churchill had already proposed a joint public statement by the American and British governments concerning our difficulties with the Russians and had let me know that he was under some compulsion to speak on this subject in the House of Commons. I felt that military and political collaboration with Russia was still so important that the time was not ripe for a public statement on this difficult and still unsettled Polish situation. Some positive steps, however, were certainly called for, and I now suggested to Churchill that a joint British-American message be sent to Stalin, putting definite proposals to him and setting them forth in direct language. I even included a sample text and asked for his comments and suggestions, in case he approved the plan.

The situation, as Churchill saw it - and as I now saw it, too - was that the Russians had no intention, if they could prevent it, of seeing a new provisional government of national unity organized on the lines to which they had agreed at Yalta. The reason for this attitude was that they were in no doubt that such a government would mean the end of the Lublin group’s Communist control in Poland.

If there were any genuine fears by the Russians that we were attempting to impose a new and unfriendly Polish government on them, it seemed to me that the proposals set forth in my message to Churchill would dispel them, or at least would give a definite basis for further discussions.

“Stalin’s reply to you and to President Roosevelt,” my message began, “makes our next step of the greatest importance. Although with a few exceptions he does not leave much ground for optimism, I feel very strongly that we should have another go at him.”

I then agreed with several arguments Churchill had offered, but contended that any public announcement of a breakdown in the negotiations would dash the hopes of the Polish people and might also adversely affect our political and military collaboration with the Soviet Union. And finally, I added the suggested text of the note I had in mind. This pointed out that the British and United States governments had tried to be constructive and fair in their approach to the problem. It also attempted to correct certain erroneous impressions the Russians pretended to have of certain earlier communications. And finally, it outlined four points.

The first of these suggested the names of three Poles from London and four from Warsaw who were to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation, leaving a place for one more Warsaw Pole, who was to be selected by Russia. The second suggestion was that the group from Warsaw be permitted to arrive in Moscow first “if desired.” Third, the Polish leaders who were to be called for consultation were to be permitted to suggest other names, so that all major Polish groups might be represented at the discussions. Fourth, we would make it clear that Great Britain and the United States had no wish to commit themselves in advance to any formula for determining the new Government of National Unity.

This Polish problem was not the only difficulty that had arisen in connection with Russia. One of the serious obstacles to the launching of the imminent United Nations Conference in San Francisco centered around Stalin’s reluctance to send his Foreign Minister Molotov instead of a lesser envoy. In fact, Secretary Stettinius now brought me a message from Ambassador Harriman stating that he and Stalin had discussed this subject at a meeting that very day. Stalin, the message said, had voiced his deep sorrow over the death of President Roosevelt and had expressed his desire to work with me as he had with Roosevelt. Harriman, seizing this opening, had suggested that the most effective method of assuring the United States and the world of the Soviet desire to continue collaboration would be for Molotov to go to the United States, first to see me, and second to attend the conference at San Francisco. Harriman added that he was expressing his personal opinion but that he felt sure I would concur.

Stalin replied that if, with the approval of the President, Harriman could be authorized to renew the hope he had just expressed, arrangements would be made for Molotov to visit both Washington and San Francisco.

Stettinius and I felt that here was a little progress, and I instructed him to draft a reply. Then, with the message to Churchill about Poland also approved, I turned to a long memorandum from the Secretary of State requesting instructions for the American delegation to the forthcoming conference in San Francisco.

My desk was piled with papers, and all through the day I had been alternately reading and conferring. I have always been a heavy reader, and it is easy for me to concentrate. Fortunately, too, my memory is retentive, and this helped me greatly as I conferred with advisers and experts or found it necessary to make decisions. Nevertheless, on that first full day as President I did more reading than I ever thought I could. I even selected some papers to take home so that I might study them before retiring and upon waking. This was the first step in a routine of nightly work that I found to be one of the most trying but also one of the necessary duties of the President.

It was now evening, and I was weary. I picked up the papers I had decided to take with me, and as I left my desk, I heard a loud buzzing. It was the signal to the Secret Service, who now came through the corridors to escort me home. An automobile was waiting for me at the Executive Avenue entrance - a closed car that was followed by a long, open one which carried the Secret Service men, some of whom rode standing on the running board.

Kind and considerate as the Secret Service men were in the performance of their duty, I couldn’t help feeling uncomfortable. There was no escaping the fact that my privacy and personal freedom were to be greatly restricted from now on. I even began to realize, as I rode toward my apartment that evening, that our neighbors were beginning to be imposed upon. They were no longer able to come and go as they pleased. To enter their own homes it was now necessary for them to be properly identified and cleared by the Secret Service men.

They were all very nice about it, but Mrs. Truman and I felt that the sooner we could move to an official residence the easier it would be on neighbors and friends, from many of whom we hated to part. Furthermore, it was now necessary for me to be available at all times for messages and official callers, and such business could not be adequately conducted in an apartment house on Connecticut Avenue.

I had told Mrs. Roosevelt that Mrs. Truman and I had no intention of moving into the White House until she had had all the time necessary in which to make other arrangements. In the meantime, Blair House, which stands across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House and which serves as an official guest house for foreign dignitaries visiting Washington, was being made ready for us as our temporary official residence.