On Saturday morning, April 14, I arose at dawn. I have always been an early riser, but this was earlier than usual. The body of Franklin Roosevelt was to arrive that morning from Warm Springs, Georgia, and I was going to the Union Station to meet the funeral train.

Before breakfast, I added some additional notes to the outline of the speech I was preparing for my appearance before Congress on Monday. With the help of Steve Early and Judge Rosenman, Roosevelt’s personal counsel, I had already begun this outline. I then studied the memorandum from the Secretary of State in which he dealt with the coming United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Our delegates were waiting for final instructions, and I had agreed to meet the full delegation early Tuesday morning, It was necessary that we decide what our attitude was to be on problems having to do with such matters as the presidency of the conference, as well as on the very complex question of trusteeships and the number of votes the Russians were to have.

At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to support at San Francisco, Stalin’s proposal that two Soviet republics, White Russia and the Ukraine, be admitted to initial membership. Now, however, the Russians were taking the position that the commitment at Yalta extended to giving these two Soviet republics the right to be represented at the San Francisco conference itself.

I got to the White Home at 8:30 a.m. and was met by Steve Early and Bill Simmons. When I reached my desk, I found many telegrams and communications already there, and I read as many as I could before nine o’clock, when my first appointment was scheduled.

My first visitor that morning was John W. Snyder of St. Louis. He was one of my closest personal friends, and I already knew that I wanted him in my administration in a trusted capacity. There was an important post vacant - that of Federal Loan Administrator, from which, not long before, Fred Vinson had resigned to become Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion - and Snyder was ideally fitted for it. He was an experienced banker who had been executive assistant to RFC Administrator Jesse Jones and the director of the Defense Plants Corporation.

“I don’t think you ought to appoint me to that job,” he told me when I had explained what I had in mind. “I’m not sure I am the right man.”

“I think you are the right man for the place,” I replied. “I’m sending your name to the Senate.”

Later I telephoned Jesse Jones and said “the President” had appointed Snyder as Federal Loan Administrator.

“Did he make that appointment before he died?” asked Jones.

“No,” I answered. “He made it just now.”

Everyone, including myself, still continued to think of Roosevelt as “the President.”

When Snyder left, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau came in for a brief conference. He was with me only a few minutes, and I asked him to submit to me as soon as possible a comprehensive report on the state of the nation’s finances. Secretary of Commerce Wallace and Justice Byrnes then joined me, and presently the three of us left for the Union Station. Mrs. Truman and Margaret were making arrangements to leave with me that evening for Hyde Park in order to be present at the interment of President Roosevelt. For that reason they were unable to go with me to the station.

The train bearing the body of Franklin Roosevelt arrived at the Union Station at ten o’clock. I went aboard at once, accompanied by Wallace and Byrnes, and we paid our respects to Mrs. Roosevelt, who had accompanied the body from Warm Springs. Brigadier General Elliott Roosevelt and Anna Roosevelt Boettiger were with their mother, and present also were Colonel John Boettiger and some of the younger members of the Roosevelt family.

The body of the late President was to lie in state during the day in the East Room of the White House, and as the funeral procession was formed, I took the place that had been assigned to me. Slowly we moved through the streets that were massed with mourners all the way to the White House.

I shall never forget the sight of so many grief-stricken people. Some wept without restraint. Some shed their tears in silence. Others were grim and stoic, but all were genuine in their mourning. It was impossible now to tell who had been for him and who had not. Throughout that enormous throng, all of them were expressing their sense of loss and sadness at the passing of a remarkable man.

I saw an old Negro woman with her apron to her eyes as she sat on the curb. She was crying as if she had lost her son, and when the cortege passed along Constitution Avenue, most of those who lined the street were in tears.

The procession reached the White House at eleven o’clock, and the flag-draped casket was borne into the East Room. It was placed before a French door, banked high with lilies, roses, and other flowers. Five members of the armed forces stood guard, with an American flag on a standard at one side of the coffin and the blue presidential banner at the other. Chairs were placed before the bier for members of the immediate family, members of the Cabinet, and other state dignitaries.

Again I paid my respects to Mrs. Roosevelt, and then returned to the executive offices of the White House.

I had received word that Harry Hopkins had left a sickbed in the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, in order to attend the funeral of his chief and friend. He had already arrived in Washington, and I had sent word that I wanted very much to see him. An appointment had been set for eleven-thirty that morning.

Hopkins had been close to Roosevelt throughout his administration. He had performed many confidential tasks and, as the President’s personal representative, had carried out a number of secret missions. He was a man whom Roosevelt trusted implicitly and leaned upon heavily. He was a dedicated man who never sought credit or the limelight, yet willingly bore the brunt of criticism, just or unjust. He was a rare figure in Washington officialdom and was one of my old friends. I, too, trusted him implicitly, and unless his health had been seriously impaired, I hoped that he would continue with me in the same role he had played with my predecessor.

Before I went to the Senate, and while I was still presiding judge in Jackson County and Hopkins was WPA Administrator, I had worked with him in the WPA setup in Missouri. When I was a junior senator, I had his ear in getting action from the White House on matters that concerned the state I represented. He proved helpful to me again in 1944, shortly after I was nominated for Vice President. At that time, I wanted to know from him the more intimate side of the President’s approach to public matters and his estimate of certain people, and so the two of us had a long personal conversation just before my luncheon with the President on the White House lawn late in July 1944. In great detail he described to me President Roosevelt’s attitude on domestic questions and his opinions of leading legislative and executive personalities. He also gave me the President’s judgment on certain international problems and his appraisal of the leading personalities and heads of foreign states. Many times since then the information he gave me proved invaluable.

He spoke of Roosevelt’s special fondness for Churchill and of Churchill’s for Roosevelt, too. He told me how they dealt with each other. “Roosevelt and Churchill,” he said, “have had a strong influence on each other in world affairs.”

What I now wanted from Hopkins was more firsthand information about the heads of state with whom I would have to deal, particularly Stalin. But I also wanted to go over the whole situation with Hopkins in regard to Russia and Poland and the United Nations.

Harry Hopkins had always looked pale and cadaverous, but when he entered my office this time, he looked worse than ever before. He was ill, of course, and the death of Roosevelt had affected him profoundly. If I had not known his great patriotism and his spirit of self-sacrifice, I would have hesitated to tax his strength.

“How do you feel, Harry?” I asked as we shook hands.

“Terrible,” he replied, and I knew what he meant.

“I hope you don’t mind my calling you in at this time,” I went on, “but I need to know everything you can tell me about our relations with Russia - all that you know about Stalin and Churchill and the conferences at Cairo, Casablanca, Teheran, and Yalta.”

“One reason I’m glad to be here,” he replied, “and am glad to offer all the assistance I can is because I’m confident that you will continue to carry out the policies of Franklin Roosevelt. And I know that you know how to carry them out.”

We talked for over two hours. We did not even take time out for luncheon. Instead, I ordered a tray for each of us from the White House kitchen, and with our minds on other things we ate a bite or two there at my desk.

Hopkins was a storehouse of information and was rarely at a loss for a word or a fact. Furthermore, he was usually able to describe and characterize the many important figures he had met. Certainly he understood the leaders of the Soviet Union.

“Stalin,” he told me, “is a forthright, rough, tough Russian. He is a Russian partisan through and through, thinking always first of Russia. But he can be talked to frankly.”

He assured me that he would be glad to do all he could, but as he was about to leave he suddenly asked, “Did you know that I had planned to retire from the government on May 12?”

I told him that I knew nothing of his plans to retire and, if his health permitted, I wanted him to stay. He left without giving me any positive reply, but he promised to give the matter serious thought.

Ed Flynn, the New York Democratic leader, was my next caller. He had been a close political associate of President Roosevelt and had come to pay his respects to me. Nevertheless, he hesitatingly brought up some of the political consequences that might result from Mr. Roosevelt’s death. These were matters that I felt to be inappropriate at the moment, and when I suggested as much, he understood.

At 2:15 p.m., Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Justice Byrnes, came in with two messages from Churchill. Our armies and the Russian armies were rapidly approaching each other from the east and west, and it now seemed only a matter of days before forward units would meet in Eastern Germany or Czechoslovakia. With this in mind, Churchill’s first cable suggested that we anticipate this historic event by an announcement by the heads of the Big Three powers.

“A link up of Soviet and Anglo-American forces in Germany is rapidly approaching,” his message read. He thought it would be heartening for all our peoples if the occasion could be marked by short messages broadcast by me, Marshal Stalin, and himself. He asked me to let him know if I agreed to his proposal, saying he was sending a similar message to Marshal Stalin.

“I thoroughly approve of the suggestion made in your cable,” I replied. “If Stalin agrees, I would be pleased to receive from you for consideration your draft of the message.”

The Prime Minister’s second cable dealt with the question of a final all-out air attack against Germany. The blow he had in mind would have for its objective the smashing of the German war industries that had so far managed to survive all our bombing efforts.

There was good reason for this, for the Germans were reported to be ready for a suicidal last-ditch stand, and our Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that such an effort might prolong the fighting for another six months.

On March 29, Roosevelt had sent Churchill the details of a project prepared by the Chiefs of Staff for launching pilotless old bombers against large industrial targets in Germany. These bombers, carrying huge loads of explosives, were to be guided by remote control and set off by timing devices. Churchill had been disturbed by this proposal and probably partly on that account had delayed his answer for two weeks. What naturally troubled him was that the Germans might retaliate on London.

In his cable to me, which actually was a reply to Roosevelt’s message, Churchill understandably stressed the point that the British people had suffered greatly from German bombings and might have to suffer more if this project was put into practice. Nevertheless, he left the decision to us and ended his message in characteristic terms.

The Prime Minister’s message said that he had received a telegram from President Roosevelt on March 29. He regretted that there had been a delay in replying to this communication, but he felt it was his duty to refer it to the British Chiefs of Staff. Churchill said that if the United States military authorities really considered this practice necessary to bring about the end of the German war, the British would not dissent.

However, he said first that the war situation had turned so much in our favor that large-scale bombing of German cities was no longer of its former importance. He added that if the Germans had a number of war-weary bombers that could make the distance, London was the obvious and, indeed, the only target, and even a few very big explosions in London would be demoralizing to the people at a time when they had hoped that their prolonged ordeal was over.

Churchill added in this connection that a calculation had been made showing that in the greater London area one person in 131 had been killed by enemy action, including London citizens in the armed forces and 30,000 civilians killed by the air onslaught. This figure of one in 131, Churchill said, represented far the highest losses sustained by any similar locality on the Allied side in the second great war.

He concluded: “Having put the facts before you I leave the decisions entirely in the hands of your military advisers, and we shall make no complaint if misfortune comes to us in consequence.”

I reviewed with the Chiefs of Staff the project to which Churchill had referred, and having done so, I cabled a reply.

“Taking into account all the considerations involved,” my message said, “it seems to me this project concerning war-weary, explosive-laden aircraft should not be pressed further in Europe at this time. I am instructing my Chiefs of Staff accordingly.”

A little later, when Byrnes had returned to my office in order to go over with me my notes for the speech to Congress on Monday, another message from Churchill arrived. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, was on his way from London to San Francisco for the conference, and I had agreed to see him. It was with that in mind that I now read this latest Churchill message, which bore upon the Polish issue.

Churchill cabled that he had just read the draft of the joint message which I proposed we should send to Stalin. In principle Churchill said he was in complete agreement with its terms, “but there is one important point which Eden will put before you, and as you and he will be able to discuss the text together, any points of detail can I am sure be adjusted.” He said he would consult the Cabinet on Monday if the final draft had reached him by then, and he hoped we might dispatch the message with our joint authority on that very day, as he strongly agreed with me that our reply was of high urgency.

Churchill went on to say: “Meanwhile Eden will no doubt discuss with you our impressions of what is actually happening in Moscow and Warsaw. As I see it, the Lublin Government are feeling the strong sentiment of the Polish nation, which though not unfriendly to Russia, is fiercely resolved on independence, and views with increasing disfavour a Polish Provisional Government, which is, in the main, a Soviet puppet. They are, therefore, endeavouring, in accord with the Soviet Government, to form a government more broad-based than the present one, by the addition of Polish personalities (including perhaps Witos) whom they have in their power but whose aid they seek and need. This is a step in the right direction but would not satisfy our requirements or decisions of Crimea Conference.”

The war situation in the Pacific was as pressing as the war in Europe, and it, too, demanded my immediate attention. The Japanese had shortly before taken over Indo-China, and Churchill and Roosevelt had exchanged messages on the whole question of Southeast Asia. Admiral Mountbatten, commander of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), was preparing to carry out counter military operations. Plans had already been made for such “pre-occupational” activities as would be required before the regular forces could advance. What were known as “pre-occupational” activities were actually clandestine operations, including guerrilla warfare, in territory which was technically, if not actually, occupied by the enemy Japanese.

Some of our own units under the command of Admiral Mountbatten had been engaged for some time in such operations in Burma. A French resistance movement was already active in Indo-China. The situation was further complicated by the fact that forces of the China Command would also soon be operating in the same theater.

Churchill had reported the situation to Roosevelt on April 11, saying that Mountbatten had been in conference with General Wedemeyer, then chief of staff and military adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the China Theater. He also reported that the two had come to a satisfactory agreement on the procedure to be followed, thus settling difficulties which had arisen over theater commands. Churchill, however, had proposed to Roosevelt that directives be sent to Admiral Mountbatten and General Wedemeyer to keep one another completely informed on all operations, plans, and intelligence. But Mountbatten was to be left free to conduct whatever pre-occupational activities he decided were needed for the advance of his regular forces.

When the matter came to my attention, I found that General Wedemeyer had reported a somewhat different agreement between himself and Admiral Mountbatten. Wedemeyer understood that Mountbatten would notify him before undertaking any operation in Indo-China and that the operation would not be undertaken until approval was given by the generalissimo. He further understood that if the proposed SEAC operation could not be integrated with China Theater plans, then Mountbatten would not undertake it. According to our Chiefs of Staff, the arrangement as reported by General Wedemeyer conformed to accepted practice and was the proper way of handling operations that overlapped adjoining theaters. Theater commanders were almost always sensitive on such matters, and the generalissimo was no exception.

The procedure, as Wedemeyer had reported it, seemed to me a satisfactory method of solving the problem of SEAC forces operating in the generalissimo’s theater, and I so informed Churchill on April 14.

I had been constantly busy since returning to the executive offices. And now, shortly before four o’clock, I was joined by Mrs. Truman and Margaret, who were to go with me to the Executive Mansion for the service that was to be conducted by the Right Reverend Angus Dun, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington, before the flag-draped coffin in the East Room.

At Mrs. Roosevelt’s request, there were no eulogies. The late President’s favorite hymns were sung by all of us, the first being “Eternal Father, Strong to Save.” Mrs. Roosevelt asked Bishop Dun to repeat, as part of the service, the expression of faith which President Roosevelt used in his first inaugural address in 1933 – “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”

At the conclusion of the service, Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and I returned to our apartment, where I rested for a time before resuming the reading of documents and reports.

The body of President Roosevelt was removed from the White House shortly after 9:30 p.m. and, accompanied by Mrs. Roosevelt and her family, was borne to the Union Station and placed again aboard the funeral train.

Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and I boarded the train a little later for the night trip to Hyde Park. Cabinet officers, members of the Supreme Court, military leaders, high government officials, friends of the Roosevelts, and representatives of the press and radio also occupied many of the cars of the long special train that carried the body of Franklin Roosevelt on his last trip home.

We arrived at Hyde Park about nine-thirty on Sunday morning and soon thereafter went to the Roosevelt garden, where the final ceremony took place. There Franklin Delano Roosevelt was buried.

We left for Washington at noon. With us were Mrs. Roosevelt, Anna, Elliott, and other members of the Roosevelt family. Mrs. Roosevelt, wonderfully in command of herself, broke the tension by talking about some of the household problems of the White House, which we would have to face. Elliott complained about having been starved by the menus of Mrs. Nesbitt, the White House housekeeper. To which Mrs. Roosevelt replied that Mrs. Nesbitt had been properly trying to keep within the food budget.

The schedule that lay ahead for me was so pressing that I spent a good part of the return journey working on the speech I was to make at the joint session of Congress on the following day. I went over some of the points in the speech with the legislative leaders who were on the train. I discussed others with members of the Roosevelt administration.

Almost every presidential message is a complicated business. Many individuals and departments of the government are called on to take some part in it in order to maintain full coordination of policy. Experts and researchers are assigned to check and compile data, because no President can or should rely entirely on his own memory. Careful consideration must be given to every element of a presidential speech because of the impact it may have on the nation or the world.

A speech by the President is one of the principal means of informing the public what the policy of the administration is. Because of this, presidential messages have to be written and rewritten many times.

All presidential messages must begin with the President himself. He must decide what he wants to say and how he wants to say it. Many drafts are usually drawn up, and this fact leads to the assumption that presidential speeches are “ghosted.” The final version, however, is the final word of the President himself, expressing his own convictions and his policy. These he cannot delegate to any man if he would be President in his own right.

Back in Washington that evening, I felt that an epoch had come to an end. A great President, whose deeds and words had profoundly affected our times, was gone. Chance had chosen me to carry on his work, and in these three days I had already experienced some of the weight of its unbelievable burdens.

As I went to bed that night, I prayed I would be equal to the task.

I rose early. On this day, Monday, April 16, 1945, I was to make my first address to Congress as President. I hoped it would go well. I looked over my speech and penciled in some changes. Next I read some papers and dispatches on the latest developments in the Polish situation, for at ten o’clock that morning I was to receive Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador. There was much for me to do, and even before I sat down to breakfast I had covered a good deal of ground. I got to the White House executive office at eight o’clock, and the Secretary of State was my first visitor, followed by Admiral Leahy. Both of them brought me more dispatches. One was from Churchill, quoting a telegram he had received from Stalin.

“I agree with you,” the Stalin message read, “that it would be a good thing to give short messages to troops from you, the President and myself in connection with the expected meeting of our troops, if in fact President Truman has no objection to it. We should of course come to an agreement about the day on which statements should be made.”

The Secretary of State next handed me a memorandum summarizing a report from Harriman on Stalin’s previous reply to Roosevelt and Churchill on the Polish question. This summary read in part:

Harriman considers that Stalin’s replies to President Roosevelt and Churchill in regard to the Polish question contribute little of a concrete nature toward a solution of the impasse now existing. It is possible that Stalin’s only concession regarding Mikolajczyk may lead to others which will make it possible to find a common ground for a satisfactory solution. Harriman refutes a number of Stalin’s assertions regarding the work of the Polish Commission.

He recommends that we should adhere to our interpretation of the Crimea decisions under which the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broad Democratic Basis and that members of this government should play a prominent role in the new government. Harriman points out that Stalin essentially is asking us to agree to the establishment of a thinly disguised version of the present Warsaw regime and recommends that we continue to insist that we cannot accept a whitewash of the Warsaw regime. Regarding the question of observers, Harriman believes that the real reason for Soviet reluctance to permit them is a fear that observers might discover the small support actually possessed by the Warsaw government. . . .

Other reports and messages followed until, at ten o’clock, Secretary Stettinius escorted Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax into my office.

Eden brought me greetings and messages from Churchill as well as the Prime Minister’s version of the joint communication we were to send to Stalin on the Polish issue. Together, the British Foreign Secretary and I went over our respective drafts and agreed upon a final text.

We discussed the importance of having Molotov present at the San Francisco conference, and I informed the British Foreign Secretary that Stalin had just sent word through Harriman that Molotov would attend. And finally, we agreed to meet again before his departure for the conference.

When Eden and Halifax left, I sent the following message to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow:

You are instructed, together with the British Ambassador, who will receive similar instructions, to arrange immediately for an interview with Marshal Stalin and hand to him the following text of a joint message from the Prime Minister and myself. If you are unable to see Marshal Stalin before your departure, you and the British Ambassador should transmit the message to Marshal Stalin through the appropriate channels.

(In the event that Ambassadors Harriman and Clark Kerr have departed, the Chargé d’Affaires with his British colleague should address a joint communication to Marshal Stalin transmitting the message from the President and the Prime Minister.)

FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER FOR MARSHAL STALIN

We are sending this joint reply to your messages of April 7 in regard to Polish negotiations for the sake of greater clarity and in order that there will be no misunderstanding as to our position on this matter. The British and United States Governments have tried most earnestly to be constructive and fair in their approach and will continue to do so.

Before putting before you the concrete and constructive suggestion which is the purpose of this message we feel it necessary, however, to correct the completely erroneous impression which you have apparently received in regard to the position Of the British and United States Governments as set forth by our Ambassadors under direct instructions during the negotiations.

It is most surprising to have you state that the present Government functioning in Warsaw has been in any way ignored during these negotiations.

Such has never been our intention nor our position. You must be cognizant of the fact that our Ambassadors in Moscow have agreed without question that the three leaders of the Warsaw Government should be included in the list of Poles to be invited to come to Moscow for consultation with the Commission.

We have never denied that among the three elements from which the new Provisional Government of National Unity is to be formed the representatives of the present Warsaw Government will play, unquestionably, a prominent part.

Nor can it be said with any justification that our Ambassadors are demanding the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles. The right to put forward and have accepted by the Commission individual representative Poles from abroad and from within Poland to be invited to Moscow for consultation cannot be interpreted in that sense.

Indeed, in his message of April 1, President Roosevelt specifically said QUOTE in order to facilitate the agreement, the Commission might first of all select a small but representative group of Polish leaders who could suggest other names for consideration by the Commission, END QUOTE.

The real issue between us is whether or not the Warsaw Government has the right to veto individual candidates for consultation. No such interpretation in our considered opinion can be found in the Crimea decision. It appears to us that you are reverting to the original position taken by the Soviet delegation at the Crimea which was subsequently modified in the agreement. Let us keep clearly in mind that we are now speaking only of the group of Poles who are to be invited to Moscow for consultation. With reference to the statement which you attribute to Ambassador Harriman it would appear that real misunderstanding has occurred since from his reports to his Government the remark in question would appear to refer to the Polish Government in London and not, as you maintain, to the Provisional Government in Warsaw.

You mention the desirability of inviting eight Poles - five from within Poland and three from London - to take part in these first consultations and in your message to the Prime Minister you indicate that Mikolajczyk would be acceptable if he issued a statement in support of the Crimean decision. We, therefore, submit the following proposal for your consideration in order to prevent a breakdown, with all its incalculable consequences, of our endeavors to settle the Polish question. We hope that you will give them your most careful and earnest consideration.

1. That we instruct our representatives on the Commission to extend immediately invitations to the following Polish leaders to come to Moscow to consult; Bierut, Osubka-Morawaski, Rola-Zymierski, Bishop Sapieha: one representative Polish political party leader not connected with the present Warsaw Government (if any of the following were agreeable to you they would be agreeable to us; Witos, Zulawski, Chacinski, Jasiukowicz); and from London, Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Stanczyk.

2. That once the invitations to come for consultation have been issued by the Commission the representatives of Warsaw could arrive first, if desired.

3. That it be agreed that these Polish leaders called for consultation could suggest to the Commission the names of a certain number of other Polish leaders from within Poland or abroad who might be brought in for consultation in order that all major Polish groups be represented in the discussions.

4. We do not feel that we could commit ourselves to any formula for determining the composition of the New Government of National Unity in advance of consultation with the Polish leaders, and we do not in any case consider the Yugoslav precedent to be applicable to Poland.

We ask you to read again carefully the American and British message of April 1 since they set forth the larger considerations which we still have very much in mind and to which we must adhere.

By now the morning was gone, and I had had no time since reaching the executive offices to give more thought to the speech I had prepared, I went over it again but made no further changes.

I rose from my desk and heard the buzzing signal that called my Secret Service guard. I had not yet grown accustomed to that - was never really to grow accustomed to it, though I ultimately learned to take it in stride. Now, however, my mind was elsewhere.

It was shortly after noon and time for me to leave for the Hill, where I was to give my first address to Congress.