My appointment calendar for Thursday, April 19, was crowded. Senator Taft was my first visitor. He called for a personal chat during which he renewed his pledge of cooperation. Then followed a number of unofficial visitors whom a President has to see, because part of his duties are to receive citizens, leaders and spokesmen of representative organizations. These visits are valuable to the President, for they help him keep in touch with the cross section of American interests and opinion.

I like people. I like to see them and hear what they have to say. But seeing people takes time and effort. It is more than a mere ceremonial duty, and although it is a heavy burden on the President, he cannot share it with anyone, for in the White House he is the only directly elected representative of all the people.

On this particular morning, when these visits had been completed, I met with the Big Four for the first time in my new capacity. Senator McKellar, as President pro tempore of the Senate, occupied the place in this group that had formerly been mine, but otherwise its members remained the same and included Senate Majority Leader Barkley, Speaker Sam Rayburn, and House Majority Leader John W. McCormack.

At this first meeting, I gave them the latest information on the war and diplomatic fronts and outlined the need for revisions in the federal budget now that we were approaching the end of the European war.

At eleven-thirty, I met for half an hour with General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, in order to review the rapid developments that were taking place on the European front. I discussed with him the draft of a message I proposed to issue following the meeting of the British, American, and Russian armies in Germany, and when we had gone over it I cabled it to the British Prime Minister, from whom a related message had just arrived.

The following quoted message [my cable to Churchill read] is a preliminary draft of the message which I propose to issue following the meeting of the Anglo-American and Soviet Armies in Germany at a date and time that will be agreed upon by the three of us.

I will be very pleased to receive any comments and suggestions that you may wish to make.

QUOTE. The Anglo-American armies under the command of General Eisenhower have met the Soviet forces where they intended to meet - in the heart of Nazi Germany. The enemy has been cut in two.

This is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but the hour draws near, the hour for which all the American people, all the British people and all the Soviet people have toiled and prayed so long.

The union of our arms in the heart of Germany has a meaning for the world which the world will not miss. It means, first, that the last faint, desperate hope of Hitler and his gangster government has been extinguished. The common front and the common cause of the powers allied in this war against tyranny and inhumanity have been demonstrated in fact as they have long been demonstrated in determination. Nothing can divide or weaken the common purpose of our veteran armies to pursue their victorious purpose to its final allied triumph in Germany.

Second, the junction of our forces at this moment signalizes to ourselves and to the world that the collaboration of our nations in the cause of peace and freedom is an effective collaboration which can surmount the greatest difficulties of the most extensive campaign in military history and succeed. Nations which can plan and fight together shoulder to shoulder in the face of such obstacles of distance and of language and of communications as we have overcome, can live together and can work together in the common labor of the organization of the world for peace.

Finally, this great triumph of Allied arms and Allied strategy is such a tribute to the courage and determination of Franklin Roosevelt as no words could ever speak, and that could be accomplished only by the persistence and the courage of the fighting soldiers and sailors of the Allied nations.

But, until our enemies are finally subdued in Europe and in the Pacific, there must be no relaxation of effort on the home front in support of our heroic soldiers and sailors as we all know there will be no pause on the battle fronts. UNQUOTE.

With these matters attended to, General Marshall left, and next I saw His Excellency Huseyin Ragip Baydur, the Turkish Ambassador, and Dr. Charles Malik, the Minister of Lebanon, both of whom came in to pay their respects.

It was now noon and time to receive Sergio Osmeña, President of the Philippines. It was a pleasure for me to greet President Osmeña, as I am sure it was for Secretaries Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, and Ickes, who joined us. The war in the Pacific was going well, and though the Philippines had suffered terribly as a result of the Japanese invasion, our forces had now returned to the islands, which had been very largely freed. Osmeña, however, was concerned about the postwar period. He brought up the urgent need that the people of the Philippines would have to rebuild their war-devastated land, and he wanted to know what American assistance they might expect. I told him that America would not fail them. We had promised freedom and independence to the Philippines. I assured President Osmeña that I would ask Congress for generous aid to help reconstruction in the Philippines.

The Secretaries of State, War, and Navy remained with me when President Osmeña departed, and I next received T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China, who informed me that after he attended the San Francisco conference he would be on his way to Moscow to conclude a treaty of trade and mutual assistance with Russia.

I expressed the hope that China and Russia could reach an agreement satisfactory to both countries. I told the Chinese Foreign Minister that the United States wanted to see China emerge strong and prosperous from this war and to become a leading power in Asia. I therefore urged him to go to Moscow as soon as he could so that relations between China and Russia could be established on a firmer basis in the interest of organizing the peace of the world.

Soong said he had something else on his mind. He said China wanted more help from us. We already were giving Chiang Kai-shek substantial help, but Soong now pleaded for increased shipments of gold. Inflation, I knew, had been added to China’s other problems. I told Soong I would do all I could.

There was one more visitor. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault of France, who, with Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador, was now brought in. Bidault was on his way to the San Francisco conference and had come in for a brief visit to pay his respects, bringing greetings from General de Gaulle and expressing the sorrow of the French people over the news of President Roosevelt’s death.

I told Mr. Bidault how much I appreciated the word he brought and in what high esteem the American people and I myself held the French Republic. Having made their courtesy call, they left, and it was now time to go to lunch.

As a relief from official duties, I had asked my brother Vivian, as well as Fred Canfil and Ted Sanders, to join me at lunch. Canfil was United States Marshal for the Western District of Missouri, and Sanders was a Democratic leader in that state. I spent as much time as I could with them after lunch, listening to the news from home. This gave me a break and a change, and I went back to work refreshed.

There were many others whom I saw that day. Robert E. Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was one, and the Reverend Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, chaplain of the Senate, was another. Now and again, I was photographed with some of my callers on the terrace behind the presidential offices - once with twenty-two military legal officers from thirteen South and Central American countries, all of whom had been attending law conferences in the United States.

At the end of appointments for the day, I turned to the accumulated papers that demanded my attention. There were many documents to sign, a bill to veto, reports and messages and diplomatic cables to be read. When I was ready to make my way across Pennsylvania Avenue to Blair House, I again found it necessary - as I did from then on - to take with me another accumulation of papers.

On the morning of April 20, I found that I was faced with what I was told was the longest list of scheduled callers in the memory of any member of the executive office staff. As yet the Secret Service had not succeeded in convincing me that I should permit myself to be driven in one of the big White House cars from Blair House to the executive offices, and, with my usual Secret Service guards, I had walked across the street that morning. I had made only a little dent in the work that faced me when the time for my first appointment arrived.

Not many weeks before, during the battle for Iwo Jima, Joe Rosen, an Associated Press photographer, had taken his inspired photograph of the American flag being raised on Mount Suribachi. Never before, perhaps, had any photograph been so enthusiastically received, and now, with the Seventh War Loan campaign about to begin, Secretary Morgenthau was to bring, as a gift to me, a painting made from that photograph for use as a War Loan campaign poster. In addition, he was to bring with him, for presentation to me, three of the surviving marines portrayed in that picture - Pfc. Rene A. Gagnon of Manchester, New Hampshire, Pharmacist’s Mate John H. Bradley of Appleton, Wisconsin, and Pfc. Ira Hayes of the Pima Indian Reservation in Arizona.

The ceremony was a simple one and took but little time. I gladly accepted the painting and commended the three survivors. I told them the spirit they had displayed had been caught by the photographer and typified the greatness of those who wore their country’s uniform.

When it was over, I asked Secretary Morgenthau to stay. He reported to me on the current situation with regard to the financing of the war, as well as on the many other operations conducted by the Treasury. Our expenditures for the current fiscal year, he told me, were estimated at $99 billion, of which $88 billion had been set aside for war activities. Our receipts, on the other hand, had been estimated at only $46 billion, or less than half of the total that was being spent.

The Secretary also reported on the plans of the Treasury to wage an extensive nationwide campaign against tax evaders and black-market operations. He described for me in detail how vigilant the Treasury Department had been in this respect.

I knew that the resources of the United States were under enormous pressure, not only because of the direct costs of the war, but also because of the many requests other nations were making on us. The Secretary reported on the most important of these.

China, Morgenthau said, wanted “greatly enlarged gold shipments” because of severe inflation.

Great Britain wanted to dispatch a financial mission to the United States immediately after V-E Day to discuss the whole question of financial assistance to the United Kingdom. They were more worried about their postwar international position, the Secretary told me, than about almost any other subject.

France was sending its Finance Minister to discuss the financial side of their reconstruction problem.

The Mexican Finance Minister was asking for assurances that we would continue the stabilization agreement under which they were operating.

Cuba wanted to know whether we wished to extend our gold-sale agreement for another four years.

The Indian government had requested that we lend-lease them an additional 210 million ounces of silver, although the Secretary pointed out that there was some question as to whether they needed so large a quantity for anti-inflation purposes.

The Secretary concluded his report with a summary of enemy assets in the United States and in neutral countries, and of the future of Lend-Lease.

Edward Scheiberling, national commander of the American Legion, followed Morgenthau to discuss veterans’ problems.

Shortly before noon, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, came in to talk to me about the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and the serious problem of the resettlement of the refugees, which led naturally to a discussion of a proposed Jewish state and homeland in Palestine.

I had before me President Roosevelt’s records and statements regarding Palestine. And the Secretary of State had sent me a special communication two days before, expressing the attitude and the thinking of the State Department on Palestine.

“It is very likely,” this communication read, “that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state. As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe.

“There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East,” the communication concluded, “largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of the country.”

Since I was in agreement with the expressed policy of the Roosevelt administration on Palestine, I told Rabbi Wise that I would do everything possible to carry out that policy. I had carefully read the Balfour Declaration, in which Great Britain was committed to a homeland in Palestine for the Jews. I had familiarized myself with the history of the question of a Jewish homeland and the position of the British and the Arabs. I was skeptical, as I read over the whole record up to date, about some of the views and attitudes assumed by the “striped-pants boys” in the State Department. It seemed to me that they didn’t care enough about what happened to the thousands of displaced persons who were involved. It was my feeling that it would be possible for US to watch out for the long range interests of our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to find a home. And before Rabbi Wise left, I believe I made this clear to him.

From time to time throughout that morning, and also after lunch, I received individual senators and congressmen who came to pay their respects and to renew their personal friendship. I welcomed each one who came and hoped I would be able to find time soon to visit with every one of my former colleagues of both parties. But in the midst of this, I found it necessary to cable Prime Minister Churchill, informing him that it would be impracticable for me to broadcast the joint “linking-up message” we had planned. “I therefore propose to issue it,” I told him, “as a statement from me to the press and radio for release on the date and hour that is agreed upon. Since I have had no communication on this subject with Marshal Stalin will you be kind enough to transmit this information to him.”

The impossibility, because of mechanical complications, of putting Moscow, London, and Washington on a radio hookup at the same time had ruled out simultaneous broadcasts, and I took this method of suggesting that each of us should issue a statement instead.

Sometime during that busy morning, I received a message from Prime Minister Churchill in response to my message of six days before in which I had suggested closer cooperation by Admiral Mountbatten, supreme commander of Allied forces in Southeast Asia, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the China Theater.

“We are willing,” Churchill’s message read, “to give full and fair trial to the arrangements you have been good enough to propose. If difficulties arise, I am sure you would wish me to present them to you. Orders have been given in accordance with this message to Admiral Mountbatten.”

At the same time another message from the Prime Minister approved the text of the proposed three-power message to be issued when the British, Russian, and American troops met in Germany.

“Thank you,” he cabled, “for your draft message on link up. I can think of no improvement. It will do good to the troops to hear it.”

At noon I held an important policy meeting on our relations with Soviet Russia. Ambassador Harriman had just returned from his post in Moscow, and with Secretary of State Stettinius, Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, and Charles E. Bohlen, the department’s Russian expert, he attended the conference in my office.

I thanked Harriman for the vital service he had performed in connection with inducing Molotov to attend the San Francisco conference. I expressed the hope that he would return to Moscow and continue his excellent work there when the San Francisco conference was over. Then I asked him to tell us what the most urgent problems were in relation to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, Harriman replied, had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time. One was the policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, and the second was the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states by independent action. He said that certain elements around Stalin misinterpreted our generosity and our desire to cooperate as an indication of softness, so that the Soviet government could do as it pleased without risking challenge from the United States.

In Harriman’s opinion, the Soviet government had no wish to break with the United States, because they needed our help in their reconstruction program. He felt, for this reason, we could stand firm on important issues without running serious risks. Harriman outlined a number of specific difficulties which he encountered at his post at Moscow, pointing out the deterioration of the Soviet attitude since the Yalta conference.

At this point, I stopped Harriman to say that I was not afraid of the Russians and that I intended to be firm. I would be fair, of course, and anyway the Russians needed us more than we needed them.

Harriman replied that there were some quarters in Moscow that believed it was a matter of life and death to American business to increase our exports to Russia. He made it clear that he knew this to be untrue but that a number of Russian officials nevertheless believed it. I declared that it was ridiculous for the Russians to think this, and I repeated that we intended to be firm with the Russians and make no concessions from American principles or traditions in order to win their favor. I said that the only way to establish sound relations between Russia and ourselves was on a give-and-take basis.

Ambassador Harriman continued that, in his judgment, we were faced with a “barbarian invasion of Europe.” He was convinced that Soviet control over any foreign country meant not only that their influence would be paramount in that country’s foreign relations but also that the Soviet system with its secret police and its extinction of freedom of speech would prevail. In his opinion we had to decide what our attitude should be in the face of these unpleasant facts.

He added that he was not pessimistic, for he felt that it was possible for us to arrive at a workable basis with the Russians. He believed that this would require a reconsideration of our policy and the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet government was likely soon to act in accordance with the principles to which the rest of the world held in international affairs, Harriman observed that obviously in any international negotiations there is give-and-take, and both sides make concessions.

I agreed, saying I understood this and that I would not expect 100 percent of what we proposed. But I felt we should be able to get 85 percent.

Harriman then outlined the issues involved in the Polish question. It was his belief that Stalin had discovered that an honest execution of the Crimea decision would mean the end of the Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland. With this in mind, he felt that it was important for us to consider what we should do in the event that Stalin rejected the proposals contained in the joint message Churchill and I had sent, and if Molotov proved adamant in the negotiations here in Washington.

Harriman then asked how important I felt the Polish question to be in relation to the San Francisco conference and our participation in the proposed United Nations Organization.

I replied emphatically that it was my considered opinion that, unless settlement of the Polish question was achieved along the lines of the Crimea decision, the treaty of American adherence to a world organization would not get through the Senate. I said I intended to tell Molotov just that in words of one syllable.

Secretary Stettinius asked if I would want the conversation on Poland to continue in San Francisco if Molotov arrived late in Washington and there was not sufficient time for a full discussion among the British, Russian, and American foreign ministers. I said I hoped it would not interfere with the work of the conference, but he had my approval to proceed that way.

Harriman then asked whether or not we would be disposed to go ahead with the world organization plans even if Russia dropped out.

I replied that the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be a world organization.

Before concluding the meeting I said that I was trying to catch all the intricacies of our foreign affairs and that I would look, of course, to the State Department and our ambassadors for information and help.

I ended the meeting by saying, “I intend to be firm in my dealings with the Soviet government,” and asked Harriman and Stettinius to see me again before my meeting with Molotov.

Before leaving, Harriman took me aside and said, “Frankly, one of the reasons that made me rush back to Washington was the fear that you did not understand, as I had seen Roosevelt understand, that Stalin is breaking his agreements. My fear was inspired by the fact that you could not have had time to catch up with all the recent cables. But I must say that I am greatly relieved to discover that you have read them all and that we see eye to eye on the situation.”

“I am glad,” I said, “that you are going to be available to our delegation in San Francisco. And keep on sending me long messages.”

I then called a special press conference to announce that I was appointing Charles G. Ross as my press and radio secretary effective May 15.

Charlie was a native of Independence, Missouri, and had been a classmate of mine in the Independence High School in the class of 1901. I informed the White House correspondents that Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, had granted Ross a two-year leave of absence.

Charlie then telephoned from my desk to our former schoolteacher, Miss Tillie Brown, at Independence to tell her about his appointment. Although frail, she became quite excited and in a high voice said, “You and Harry have made good, and I am very proud of you.” I got on the phone to say I was reporting to my teacher. She was flustered and had too many kind things to say.

Many foreign missions on their way to attend the San Francisco conference had already arrived in the United States, and most of them were now in Washington. All were busy in the capital preparing for the conference. I had arranged for a reception at Blair House to welcome the heads of the missions. The reception was at four o’clock in the afternoon, and as I greeted them, I expressed my pleasure at meeting them. I said that it was my hope that our relationship would continue “on the same cordial plane, nationally and with the world, as it is between you and me.”

On the following morning, April 21, I went directly to the Map Room for my daily briefing on the war situation. German resistance was collapsing on all fronts. There was a rumor from Switzerland that Hitler had left Berlin. There could be no doubt that the end of the war in Europe was in sight.

During the morning, I met with Secretary Stettinius and handed him a letter of instructions to take with him to San Francisco. We had discussed this matter previously and had decided that it would be helpful if he had such a written directive from me which he could use publicly if necessary.

“My dear Mr. Secretary,” these instructions began. “As you are aware, at the Crimean Conference President Roosevelt on behalf of the Government of the United States agreed that at the San Francisco Conference the United States would support a Soviet proposal to admit the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to initial membership in the proposed International Organization.

“You have explained to me that in agreeing to support the proposal of the Soviet Government on this question President Roosevelt felt that the importance of the Ukraine and White Russia among the Soviet Republics and their contribution to the prosecution of the war and the untold devastation and sacrifices which their people have undergone in the cause of the United Nations entitled them to special consideration.

“The decision as to the admission of these two Republics as initial members in the proposed International Organization is of course a matter for the Conference itself to decide. In the loyal execution at the Conference of the obligation assumed on this question by President Roosevelt on behalf of the United States Government, I direct you to cast the vote of the United States in favor of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as initial members of the International Organization.”

After Secretary Stettinius had left, I met with Senator Carl Hatch and then with Ambassador Harriman, who was followed by Fred M. Vinson, the War Mobilization Director. The next appointments were with the heads and assistants of the offices of the White House.

Although it was Saturday, and I had already seen him once, Secretary Stettinius personally brought me a memorandum that afternoon.

“Mr. Molotov will arrive this evening and sleep at Great Falls, Montana,” it read. “The take-off time tomorrow morning is uncertain but it is now rather definite, weather permitting, that he will reach Washington Sunday evening. I shall notify Mr. Connelly by telephone immediately after Mr. Molotov arrives in order that he may receive your instructions as to when you desire to receive him.”

I then handed Stettinius a message to be transmitted to Stalin:

“Referring to arrangements for making an announcement of the linking up of our armies in Germany, I will see that General Eisenhower is given instructions to inform the Soviet, British and United States Governments at earliest possible date when an announcement may be made by the three Chiefs of Government of the Soviet-Anglo-American Armies meeting in Germany.

“In order that the announcement may be made simultaneously in the three capitals, I would like to have your agreement that the hour of the day recommended by Eisenhower be twelve o’clock noon Washington time.”

Returning to Blair House, I wrote to my mother and sister.

Dear Mamma & Mary, Well I’ve been the President for nine days. And such nine days no one ever went through before, I really believe. The job started at 5:30 on the afternoon of the 12th. It was necessary for me to begin making decisions an hour and a half before I was sworn in, and I’ve been making them ever since.

The two high points in the whole nine days were the appearance before Congress on Monday and the press conference on Tuesday. Evidently from the comments in all the papers and magazines both appearances were successful.

But it is only a start and we’ll see what develops. It has been necessary to talk to all the people you read about - Byrnes, Hopkins, Baruch, Marshall, King, Leahy, and all the Cabinet collectively and one at a time. I’ve seen a lot of Senators and Representatives, too. . . .

Tomorrow we are going to church at the Chapel at Walter Reed Hospital, and I’m going to call on Gen. Pershing. He’s bedfast now, and I thought I ought to go say hello to my first World War commander.

Surely appreciated your letter. You both have done fine under this terrible blow. Just keep yourselves well and don’t worry. When we get into the White House, we’ll send for you, and you can pay us a visit. They are painting and cleaning house now, and it will be some time before we get moved in.

Love to you both,

Harry

On Sunday, April 22, I attended church at the Walter Reed Hospital and visited General Pershing. I wanted to pay my respects to him.

I invited Secretary Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, and Mr. Bohlen to Blair House in preparation for my meeting with Molotov that evening. The Secretary of State told me of the arrangements that had been made for Molotov’s reception at the airport. There would be no military honors, but after dinner I was to receive Mr. Molotov with Ambassador Harriman present and with Mr. Bohlen acting as interpreter.

Despite our suggestion that the Soviet-Polish treaty negotiations be postponed, Moscow and the Lublin government had concluded the pact. Secretary Stettinius therefore asked whether I intended to make any reference to the matter when Molotov arrived. I replied that I preferred not to raise that question myself, but that if Molotov chose to mention it, I would tell him quite frankly that it had not been helpful in furthering a solution of the Polish question.

At this point in our discussion, Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Minister, arrived, and when he, too, raised the question of the Soviet-Polish treaty I repeated what I had just told the Secretary of State. Mr. Eden then inquired whether it would be possible for me to visit England any time during the coming summer for a meeting with Prime Minister Churchill. I said I hoped to be able to do so but that I could not give a definite answer now because of the pressure of problems in the domestic field. I assured him that I wished to meet Mr. Churchill soon, and was told that if I found it impossible to visit Europe in the months ahead, the Prime Minister, if he could get away, would be prepared to come to Washington. I said that if the San Francisco conference got off to a good start it might be a good time for the Prime Minister to come here.

Stettinius and Eden both said that the relations between Great Britain and the United States had never been better or closer, and were on the basis of complete frankness. I declared that I would do everything in my power to maintain them on that plane.

It was at eight-thirty that evening that I received Molotov at Blair House. With me were Secretary Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Bohlen, while Mr. Molotov was accompanied by his official interpreter, Mr. Pavlov.

I welcomed the Soviet Foreign Minister to the United States and inquired about his long trip by air. I assured him of my admiration for the war deeds of Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that it would be possible to maintain the relationship which President Roosevelt had established between our two countries.

Molotov said he brought greetings to me from Stalin and expressed his pleasure in hearing personally from me that I intended to continue the policy of friendship.

This afforded me the opportunity to tell Molotov that I stood squarely behind all commitments and agreements entered into by our late great President and that I would do everything I could to follow along that path.

In response, Molotov declared that the government and the people of the Soviet Union shared that hope, and he was sure they could work out successfully any difficulty which lay in the path. I agreed that we must work out these difficulties.

The Russian Foreign Minister expressed the belief that a good basis for agreement existed in the Dumbarton Oaks and the Crimea decisions, and I replied that I stood firmly by those decisions and intended to carry them out. I said that I wanted to bring up at this point that the most difficult question relating to the Crimea decision was the Polish matter. The proper solution was of great importance because of the effect on American public opinion.

Molotov expressed his understanding of that point but contended that the matter was even more important for the Soviet Union. Poland, he said, was far from the United States but bordered on the Soviet Union. The Polish question was therefore vital to them. And here again he added that he thought the Crimea decisions provided a suitable basis for a solution.

I agreed, but I pointed out that in its larger aspects the Polish question had become for our people the symbol of the future development of our international relations. I said that there were a number of minor matters which I hoped that he, together with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius, would settle here in Washington. Molotov replied that he thought an agreement could be easily reached on these points, provided the views of the Soviet Union were taken into consideration. He said the Soviet government attached the greatest importance to the San Francisco conference and that, with the military developments of recent weeks, political questions had taken on greater importance. I agreed, pointing out that this was one of the reasons I wanted to talk to him.

Molotov asserted that the discussions between the three heads of state had always been fruitful and had led to good agreements. He inquired whether the agreements in regard to the Far Eastern situation made at Yalta still stood. They did, I replied, and again I repeated that I intended to carry out all the agreements made by President Roosevelt. I expressed the hope that I would meet with Marshal Stalin before too long, and Molotov replied that he knew the marshal was eager to meet with me.

Molotov then left with Stettinius to join Eden in talks at the State Department.

I spent most of Monday morning, April 23, meeting with different congressmen, including the Missouri delegation from the House. I also met with a group of forty Democratic senators, former colleagues of mine, who renewed their pledge of support. Then J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation called at eleven-thirty and was followed by the Postmaster General, Frank Walker. After Walker came the District of Columbia commissioners and, finally, Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, head of the Veterans Administration.

In connection with Molotov’s visit, I held an important conference at two o’clock with my chief diplomatic and military advisers. Those present were Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, Ambassador Harriman, General Deane, and Mr. Bohlen.

We discussed Russia and the Polish problem, and Stettinius reported that though Molotov had arrived Sunday in apparent good spirits, which he had maintained even after his Blair House talk with me, overnight the atmosphere had changed. At the evening meeting with Eden in the State Department, great difficulties had developed over the Polish question. Moreover, a continuance of the foreign ministers’ meeting this morning had produced no improvement. In fact, a complete deadlock had been reached on the subject of carrying out the Yalta agreement on Poland.

The Secretary pointed out once more that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government was not representative of the Polish people and that it was now clear that the Russians intended to try to force this puppet government upon the United States and England. He added that it had been made plain to Molotov how seriously the United States regarded this matter and how much public confidence would be shaken by failure to carry out the Crimea decision.

It was now obvious, I said, that our agreements with the Soviet Union had so far been a one-way street and that this could not continue. I told my advisers that we intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco, and if the Russians did not wish to join us, that would be too bad. Then, one by one, I asked each of those present to state his views.

Secretary Stimson said that this whole difficulty with the Russians over Poland was new to him, and he felt it was important to find out what the Russians were driving at. In the big military matters, he told us, the Soviet government had kept its word, and the military authorities of the United States had come to count on it. In fact, he said they had often done better than they had promised. On that account, he felt that it was important to find out what motives they had in connection with these border countries and what their ideas of independence and democracy were in areas they regarded as vital to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Stimson remarked that the Russians had made a good deal of trouble on minor military matters, and it had sometimes been necessary in these cases to teach them manners. In this greater matter, however, it was his belief that without fully understanding how seriously the Russians took this Polish question we might be heading into very dangerous waters, and that their viewpoint was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that before World War I most of Poland had been controlled by Russia.

Secretary Forrestal expressed the view that this difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident - that there had been many evidences of the Soviet desire to dominate adjacent countries and to disregard the wishes of her allies. It was his belief that for some time the Russians had been under the impression that we would not object if they took over all of Eastern Europe, and he said it was his profound conviction that if the Russians were to be rigid in their attitude we had better have a showdown with them now rather than later.

Ambassador Harriman, in replying to Mr. Stimson’s question about issues and motives, said he felt that when Stalin and Molotov had returned to Moscow after Yalta they had learned more of the situation in Poland and had realized how shaky the provisional government was. On that account, they had come to realize that the introduction of any genuine Polish leader such as Mikolajczyk would probably mean the elimination of the Soviet hand-picked crop of leaders. It was his belief, therefore, that the real issue was whether we were to be a party to a program of Soviet domination of Poland. He said obviously we were faced with the possibility of a break with the Russians, but he felt that, properly handled, it might still be avoided.

At this point, I explained that I had no intention of delivering an ultimatum to Mr. Molotov - that my purpose was merely to make clear the position of this government.

Mr. Stimson then said he would like to know how far the Russian reaction to a strong position on Poland would go. He said he thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security.

Admiral Leahy, in response to a question from me, observed that he had left Yalta with the impression that the Soviet government had no intention of permitting a free government to operate in Poland and that he would have been surprised had the Russians behaved any differently. In his opinion, the Yalta agreement was susceptible of two interpretations. He added that he felt it was a serious matter to break with the Russians, but that he believed we should tell them that we stood for a free and independent Poland.

Stettinius then read the part of the Yalta decision relating to the formation of the new government and the holding of free elections and said he felt that this was susceptible of only one interpretation.

General Marshall said he was not familiar with the political aspects of the Polish issues. He said from the military point of view the situation in Europe was secure but that we hoped for Soviet participation in the war against Japan at a time when it would be useful to us. The Russians had it within their power to delay their entry into the Far Eastern war until we had done all the dirty work. He was inclined to agree with Mr. Stimson that the possibility of a break with Russia was very serious.

Mr. Stimson observed that he agreed with General Marshall and that he felt the Russians would not yield on the Polish question. He said we had to understand that outside the United States, with the exception of Great Britain, there were few countries that understood free elections; that the party in power always ran the elections, as he well knew from his experience in Nicaragua.

Admiral King inquired whether the issue was the invitation to the Lublin government to San Francisco.

I answered that that was a settled matter and not the issue. The issue was the execution of agreements entered into between this government and the Soviet Union. I said that I intended to tell Mr. Molotov that we expected Russia to carry out the Yalta decision as we were prepared to do for our part.

Ambassador Harriman then remarked that while it was true that the Soviet Union had kept its big agreements on military matters, those were decisions it had already reached by itself, but on other military matters it was impossible to say they had lived up to their commitments. For example, over a year ago they had agreed to start on preparations for collaboration in the Far Eastern war, but none of these had been carried out.

General Deane said he felt that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war as soon as it was able, regardless of what happened in other fields. He felt that the Russians had to do this because they could not afford too long a period of letdown for their people, who were tired. He said he was convinced after his experience in Moscow that if we were afraid of the Russians we would get nowhere, and he felt that we should be firm when we were right.

I thanked the military leaders and said I had their points of view well in mind. Then I asked Stettinius, Harriman, Dunn, and Bohlen to stay behind to work out subjects for my next talk with Molotov, which was scheduled for five-thirty.

When Molotov arrived, Secretary Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Bohlen, and Admiral Leahy were with me in my office. Molotov was accompanied by Ambassador Gromyko and interpreter Pavlov.

Unlike the evening before, there was little protocol, and after greeting the Russian Foreign Minister and his associates, I went straight to the point. I was sorry to learn, I said, that no progress had been made in solving the Polish problem.

Mr. Molotov responded that he also regretted that fact.

I told him that the proposals which were contained in the joint message from Churchill and me and which had been transmitted to Moscow on April 16 were eminently fair and reasonable. We had gone as far as we could to meet the proposals of the Soviet government as expressed in the message from Marshal Stalin on April 7. The United States Government, I pointed out, could not agree to be a party to the formation of a Polish government which was not representative of all Polish democratic elements. I said bluntly that I was deeply disappointed that the Soviet government had not held consultations with representatives of the Polish government other than the officials of the Warsaw regime.

I told Molotov that the United States was determined, together with other members of the United Nations, to go ahead with plans for the world organization, no matter what difficulties or differences might arise with regard to other matters. I pointed out that the failure of the three principal allies who had borne the brunt of the war to carry out the Crimea decision with regard to Poland would cast serious doubt upon their unity of purpose in postwar collaboration.

I explained to Molotov that in Roosevelt’s last message to Marshal Stalin on April 1, the late President had made it plain that no policy in the United States, whether foreign or domestic, could succeed unless it had public confidence and support. This, I pointed out, applied in the field of economic as well as political collaboration. In this country, I said, legislative appropriations were required for any economic measures in the foreign field, and I had no hope of getting such measures through Congress unless there was public support for them. I expressed the hope that the Soviet government would keep these factors in mind in considering the request that joint British and American proposals be accepted, and that Mr. Molotov would be authorized to continue the discussions in San Francisco on that basis.

I then handed him a message which I asked him to transmit to Marshal Stalin immediately.

“There was an agreement at Yalta,” this communication read, “in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government, to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new government of National Unity in Poland by means of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad.

“In the opinion of the United States Government the Crimean decision on Poland can only be carried out if a group of genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders are invited to Moscow for consultation. The United States Government cannot be party to any method of consultation with Polish leaders which would not result in the establishment of a new Provisional Government of National Unity genuinely representative of the democratic elements of the Polish people. The United States and British Governments have gone as far as they can to meet the situation and carry out the intent of the Crimean decisions in their joint message delivered to Marshal Stalin on April 18th.

“The United States Government earnestly requests that the Soviet Government accept the proposals set forth in the joint message of the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, and that Mr. Molotov continue the conversations with the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden in San Francisco on that basis.

“The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past.”

Molotov asked if he could make a few observations. It was his hope, he said, that he expressed the views of the Soviet government in stating that they wished to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain as before.

I answered that I agreed. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the talk we then were having.

Molotov went on to say that he had been authorized to set forth the following point of view of the Soviet government:

1. The basis of collaboration had been established, and although inevitable difficulties had arisen, the three governments had been able to find a common language and that on this basis they had been settling these differences.

2. The three governments had dealt as equal parties, and there had been no case where one or two of the three had attempted to impose their will on another and that as a basis of cooperation this was the only one acceptable to the Soviet government.

I told him that all we were asking was that the Soviet government carry out the Crimea decision on Poland.

Mr. Molotov answered that as an advocate of the Crimea decisions his government stood by them and that it was a matter of honor for them. His government felt that the good basis which existed was the result of former work and that it offered even brighter prospects for the future. The Soviet government, he added, was convinced that all difficulties could be overcome.

I replied sharply that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that there was only one thing to do, and that was for Marshal Stalin to carry out that agreement in accordance with his word.

Molotov said that Marshal Stalin, in his message of April 7, had given his views on the agreement, and added that he personally could not understand why, if the three governments could reach an agreement on the question of the composition of the Yugoslav government, the same formula could not be applied in the case of Poland.

Replying sharply again, I said that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only required to be carried out by the Soviet government.

Mr. Molotov repeated that his government supported the Crimea decisions but that he could not agree that an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered a violation by the Soviet government. He added that surely the Polish question, involving as it did a neighboring country, was of very great interest to the Soviet government.

Since Molotov insisted on avoiding the main issue, I said what I had said before - that the United States Government was prepared to carry out loyally all the agreements reached at Yalta and asked only that the Soviet government do the same. I expressed once more the desire of the United States for friendship with Russia, but I wanted it clearly understood that this could be only on a basis of the mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one-way street.

“I have never been talked to like that in my life,” Molotov said.

I told him, “Carry out your agreements, and you won’t get talked to like that.”