In the final rush of our armies into Germany, a problem arose which required the exchange of views among Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. This involved the zones of occupation in Germany which had been agreed upon by the three powers at London in the European Advisory Commission in January 1945.

As our armies poured into Germany, it was impossible to have them meet at precisely the lines earlier designated, and many of our troops had overrun those lines. It was therefore necessary to get agreement among Great Britain, Russia, and ourselves on new directives to the military so that our forces could be rearranged in accordance with the plan of occupation.

This was the problem Churchill had in mind when he sent me his message of April 18. After consultation with my military advisers, I cabled Churchill a suggested message that the two of us might send to Stalin. “The approaching end of German resistance makes it necessary that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union decide upon an orderly procedure for the occupation by their forces of the zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria.” I therefore proposed, first, that our troops in both Germany and Austria should retire to their respective zones “as soon as the Military situation permits.” Secondly, I suggested that in order to avoid confusion, each commander, when he felt himself prepared to occupy any portion of his proper zone that was held by other Allied troops, should inform his own government of the sector he was prepared to occupy. And thirdly, I proposed that the government concerned should then consult the other two in order that the necessary instructions might be issued for the immediate evacuation of the area involved and its occupation by the troops of the country to which it was assigned. “It is of course essential,” I said, “that we promptly reach an agreement on the zones which we are to occupy in Austria.”

Because of the great importance of the Polish problem, I had also sent Churchill a copy of the message I had handed Molotov for delivery to Stalin. And now, on April 24, the day after my second talk with Molotov, I received this reply from the Prime Minister:

I have carefully considered the message you had handed to Molotov for Marshal Stalin and have brought it before the War Cabinet, who have authorized me to inform you of their entire agreement with the course you have adopted. I shall now therefore send to Marshal Stalin the message contained in my immediately following telegram.

I have seen the message about Poland, which the President handed to M. Molotov for transmission to you, and I have consulted the War Cabinet on account of its special importance. It is my duty now to inform you that we are all agreed in associating ourselves with the President in the aforesaid message. I earnestly hope that means will be found to compose these serious difficulties which, if they continue, will darken the hour of victory.

Representative Robert T. Doughton, chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, came to see me about the budget and taxes. Mr. Byron Price came in about the role of the press in handling the war news. Leo Crowley came to talk about Lend-Lease and its future.

The Secretary of State sent me a report in which he referred to the observations of George F. Kennan concerning Ambassador Hurley’s interview with Stalin. These observations had been contained in a personal message to Ambassador Harriman, and the Secretary’s report, summarizing Kennan’s message, contained the following passage:

Kennan comments upon the statements attributed to Stalin by Ambassador Hurley to the effect that Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to our Chinese policy, stated that this policy would be supported by Russia and said that he would support immediately action looking toward the unification of Chinese armed forces under Chiang Kai-shek. Kennan does not question that Stalin was correctly cited but calls attention to the fact that words have a different meaning to the Russians. Stalin is prepared to accept the principle of unification of Chinese armed forces and the principle of a united China since he knows that these conditions are feasible only on terms acceptable to the Chinese Communists. Stalin is also prepared to accept the idea of a free and democratic China since a free China means to him a China in which there is a minimum of foreign influence other than Russian. Kennan is convinced that Soviet policy will remain a policy aimed at the achievement of maximum power with minimum responsibility and will involve the exertion of pressure in various areas. He recommends that we study with clinical objectivity the real character and implications of Russian Far Eastern aims, and comments that it would be tragic if our anxiety for Russian support in the Far East were to lead us into an undue reliance on Russian aid.

I realized only too well the implications in this message - and in other related messages, as well. The attitude Russia had assumed had been troubling me right along. During the day, I received from Secretary of War Stimson the following communication:

Dear Mr. President, I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter. I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.

I knew he was referring to our secret atomic project, and I instructed Matt Connelly, my appointment secretary, to arrange for the Secretary to come in the next day, Wednesday, April 25.

One of the most revealing and disquieting messages to reach me during my first days in the White House was one that arrived from Marshal Stalin on the night of April 24. It showed plainly that Churchill and I were going to have persistent, calculated resistance from Stalin in our dealings with the Russians.

This was the message from Stalin:

I have received your joint message with Prime Minister Churchill of April 18, and have also received on April 24 the message transmitted to me through V. M. Molotov.

1. From these messages it is clear that you continue to consider the Provisional Polish Government not as a kernel for the future government of national unity, but just like one of the groups equal to any other group of Poles.

Such an understanding of the position of the Polish government and such an attitude toward it is very difficult to reconcile with the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland. At the Crimea Conference all three of us, including also President Roosevelt, proceeded from the fact that the Provisional Polish Government, as the one now operating in Poland and enjoying the confidence and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the kernel, i.e., the main part of the new reorganized government of national unity. You, evidently, do not agree to such an understanding of the matter. Declining the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland, you thereby confirm that the Provisional Polish Government cannot be considered as a basis and kernel for the future government of national unity.

2 It is also necessary to take into account the fact that Poland borders on the Soviet Union, which cannot be said of Great Britain and the United States.

The question on Poland has the same meaning for the security of the Soviet Union as the question on Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

You, apparently, do not agree that the Soviet Union has a right to make efforts that there should exist in Poland a government friendly toward the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a government hostile toward it. Besides everything else, this is demanded by the blood of the Soviet people abundantly shed on the fields of Poland in the name of liberation of Poland. I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a really representative government, and whether the government in Belgium is really democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were being established there. The Soviet Government did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain.

It is not clear why, while the question of Poland is discussed it is not wanted to take into consideration the interests of the Soviet Union from the point of view of its security.

3. Such conditions must be recognized unusual when two governments - those of the United States and Great Britain - beforehand settle with the Polish question in which the Soviet Union is first of all and most of all interested and put the government of the USSR in an unbearable position trying to dictate to it their demands.

I have to state that such a situation cannot favor a harmonious solution of the question of Poland.

4. I am ready to fulfill your request and do everything possible to reach a harmonious solution. But you demand too much of me. In other words, you demand that I renounce the interests of security of the Soviet Union, but I cannot turn against my country.

In my opinion there is one way out of this situation; to adopt the Yugoslav example as a pattern for Poland. I believe this would allow to come to a harmonious solution.

Without any attempt to hide his role in diplomatic niceties, Stalin for the first time in addressing Churchill and me used the “Big I Am.”

After the arrival of Stalin’s disturbing message, the morning was taken up mostly in meetings with senators and congressmen who continued to offer their good will and co-operation. I was greatly encouraged by this evidence of their desire to work more closely with the President. As senator and as Vice President, I had observed the gradually widening breach between Congress and the Chief Executive. This is natural and even inescapable under our systems of checks and balances, but party lines were too often crossed in the contest between the two branches of government, and important legislation was compromised and sometimes lost because Congress felt a need to assert its authority.

With the war and its consequent effect on the home front reaching a climax, I wanted to do everything I could to encourage the fullest cooperation and exchange of information between Congress and all branches of the Executive Department. I therefore welcomed these visits from members of both Houses and arranged to see as many of them as I could, no matter how crowded my day was. That day I saw Senators McKellar, Bankhead, Scott Lucas, Hugh B. Mitchell, James M. Tunnell, Lister Hill, and Congressmen J. Buell Snyder, Hatton W. Sumners, and Emanuel Celler.

At noon, I saw Secretary of War Stimson in connection with the urgent letter he had written.

Stimson was one of the very few men responsible for the setting up of the atomic bomb project. He had taken a keen and active interest in every stage of its development. He said he wanted specifically to talk to me today about the effect the atomic bomb might likely have on our future foreign relations.

He explained that he thought it necessary for him to share his thoughts with me about the revolutionary changes in warfare that might result from the atomic bomb and the possible effects of such a weapon on our civilization.

I listened with absorbed interest, for Stimson was a man of great wisdom and foresight. He went into considerable detail in describing the nature and the power of the projected weapon. If expectations were to be realized, he told me, the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries. And if it worked, the bomb, in all probability, would shorten the war.

Byrnes had already told me that the weapon might be so powerful as to be potentially capable of wiping out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented scale. And he had added that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war. Stimson, on the other hand, seemed at least as much concerned with the role of the atomic bomb in the shaping of history as in its capacity to shorten this war. As yet, of course, no one could positively know that the gigantic effort that was being made would be successful. Nevertheless, the Secretary appeared confident of the outcome and told me that in all probability success would be attained within the next few months. He also suggested that I designate a committee to study and advise me of the implications of this new force.

I thanked him for his enlightening presentation of this awesome subject, and as I saw him to the door, I felt how fortunate the country was to have so able and so wise a man in its service.

From the time I first sat down in the President’s chair, I found myself part of an immense administrative operation. There had been a change of executives, but the machinery kept going on in its customary routine manner, and properly so. It would have been sheer nonsense to expect anything else.

There is a story of the great, but not good, queen, Catherine of Russia, who in her way was as dictatorial as any of her modern successors. It seems that a river with a rapid current flows through the Baltic city of Riga, and in Catherine’s time a bridge was built across it. This bridge, I am told, still stands and carries a bronze tablet which reads, in Russian: “Oh current, stop thy flow. The Queen demands it.”

From my experience in the Senate, I knew how difficult it was to make much of a dent in routine administrative methods. In fact, from my committee’s experience, I knew this was also true of private industry and even of emergency activities connected with the war. But I had some ideas of my own on certain details of war administration, and I hoped to make some changes in procedures that involved the Executive.

From the time I became President I made it plain, in my relations with the military, that I was interested in the details of actual administration as much as in the larger objectives. I had implicit faith and trust in Marshall, but I took the position that the President, as the Commander in Chief, had to know everything that was going on. I had had just enough experience to know that if you are not careful the military will hedge you in.

It had long been customary for the “high brass” in the Army and Navy to “take over” the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as well as the military committees of the two Houses. I knew this, for I had been on the military committee in the Senate. And more than that, I had understood perfectly that they had tried to surround me even as chairman of my special committee.

I should make it clear that these very capable officers did not try to get around the President on major policies. The Chiefs of Staff were always most cooperative. But on the administrative level, the military usually tried to take over, especially in the management of purchases where vast sums of money were being spent.

I knew, for example, that Army and Navy professionals seldom had any idea of the value of money. They did not seem to care what the cost was, and one of my first moves was to request a complete survey of their whole spending policy. As a result, adjustments began to come about automatically in the Army and Navy.

The pressure of appointments continued, and I had to find time to read the urgent messages in between visitors. Ambassador Winant in London then notified me that Churchill wished to talk to me over the transatlantic telephone. Heinrich Himmler, the German Gestapo chief, had approached the Swedish government with an offer to surrender the German forces on the Western Front.

This was my first telephone conversation with Churchill. It was recorded in the presence of Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Hull, and Colonel Park, and I am able to give it here, without editing, exactly as it was recorded:

“Churchill: Is that you, Mr. President?

“Truman: This is the President, Mr. Prime Minister.

“Churchill: How glad I am to hear your voice.

“Truman: Thank you very much, I am glad to hear yours.

“Churchill: I have several times talked to Franklin, but . . . Have you received the report from Stockholm by your Ambassador?

“Truman: Yes, I have.

“Churchill: On that proposal?

“Truman: Yes. I have just a short message saying that there was such a proposal in existence.

“Churchill: Yes, it’s of course . . . we thought it looked very good.

“Truman: Has he anything to surrender?

“Churchill: I called the War Cabinet together, and they opposed my telegraphing to tell Stalin and also repeating our news through the usual channels to you.

“Truman: What has he to surrender: Does that mean everything, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Holland?

“Churchill: They mentioned Italy, and Yugoslavia. We mentioned everything and have included that to take in Denmark and Norway. Everything on the Western Front, but he hasn’t proposed to surrender on the Eastern Front. So we thought perhaps it would be necessary to report it to Stalin; that is, of course, to say that in our view the surrender must be simultaneous to agree to our terms.

“Truman: I think he should be forced to surrender to all three governments, Russia, you and the United States. I don’t think we ought to even consider a piecemeal surrender.

“Churchill: No, no, no. Not a piecemeal surrender to a man like Himmler. Himmler will be speaking for the German state as much as anybody can. And therefore we thought that his negotiations must be carried on with the three governments.

“Truman: That’s right, that’s the way I feel exactly.

“Churchill: I see, of course, that’s local surrender on the front, Himmler’s allied front. And then Eisenhower is still authorized to make the surrender, well, then he will wish to surrender.

“Truman: Yes, of course.

“Churchill: You understand that?

“Truman: I understand that. If he is speaking for the German government as a whole, that ought to include the surrender of everything, and it ought to be to all three governments.

“Churchill: Certainly, what we actually sent was that there could be no question as far as His Majesty’s Government is concerned of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers.

“Truman: All right. I agree to that.

“Churchill: Have you said anything to the Russians yet?

“Truman: No, I haven’t. I was waiting to hear from you. I haven’t received the message from Stockholm. This information that you are giving me now is the only information that I have on the subject, except that I was informed that your conversation was based on a message that you had from Stockholm.

“Churchill: Yes.

“Truman: I have no other information except what I am receiving now from you.

“Churchill: I see. I can give you the message which our Ambassador in Stockholm sent me. Would you like me to read it to you?

“Truman: I would appreciate it very much if you will.

“Churchill: Yes. It is a little long. Tell me if you don’t hear it as it comes.

“‘The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs wants me and my United States colleague to call upon him at 23 hours, April 25 . . . and Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross were also present. Bernadotte had just returned from Germany via Denmark tonight. Himmler was on the Eastern Front and asked him to come from Presburg to meet him at the . . . and Bernadotte requested . . . where the meeting took place at ten o’clock this morning, April 24. Himmler, though tired, and admitting Germany was finished, was still strong and coherent. Himmler said that Hitler was so desperately ill, he might be dead already, and in any case would be so in two days’ time.’

“Could you hear that all right?

“Truman: Yes, I could hear.

“Churchill: ‘And General Finisberg of Himmler’s staff told Bernadotte that it was hemorrhage of the brain.

“‘In that statement, that while Hitler was still active he would not have been able to take the steps he now proposed but that as Herr Hitler was finished he was now in a position of full authority to act. He then asked Bernadotte to forward to the Swedish Government his desire that they would make arrangements in order to arrange for him to meet General Eisenhower in order to capitulate on the whole Western Front. Bernadotte remarked that such a meeting’ (Bernadotte is a Swede, a Swedish Red Cross man) ‘was not necessary in that Himmler could simply order his troops to surrender. That announcement asked him to forward Himmler’s request to the Swedish Government, and that Norway and Denmark were included in this capitulation. If this were the case, there might be some point in a meeting because special technical arrangements might have to be made with Eisenhower and de Gaulle if the Germans were to lay down their arms in those two countries. He then replied that he was prepared to order the troops in Denmark and Norway to surrender to either British, American, or Swedish troops. He in there hopes to continue resistance on the Eastern Front at least for a time, which Bernadotte told him was hardly possible; in fact, that it would not be acceptable to the Allies. Himmler mentioned, for instance, that he hoped that the Western Allies rather than the Russians would be first to make this step in order to save the civilian populations.

“‘Then he said that Himmler’s staff officer, Herr Stinsberg, was eagerly awaiting to hear something and was putting through immediate delivery to Himmler any message which it might be desired to convey. Bernadotte remarked to . . . that if no reaction at all was forthcoming from the Allies that may mean a lot of unnecessary suffering and loss of human life, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs at . . . explained that he thought this was such an important piece of news that he ought to communicate it to my United States colleague and me (that’s the British Ambassador) immediately. Is it okay with you?

“‘I wrote that my United States colleague and I remarked that in reference to the Axis’ unwillingness to surrender on the Eastern Front looks like a last attempt to sow discord between the Western Allies and Russia. Obviously the Nazis would have to surrender to all the Allies simultaneously.’

“Truman: That is right. That is exactly the way I feel. He ought to surrender to all the Allies at once.

“Churchill: ‘The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Government, while admitting that this motive could not be excluded, pointed out that the fact that the Nazi chiefs would order capitulation of all troops on the whole Western Front, and in Norway, and Denmark might be of great advantage for all the Allies, including Russia, and would in fact lead to early total capitulation,’ (these are all the Swedes talking) ‘and they say in any case, the Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped to clear this up, this provision. He said pass it on to the British and United States governments who were, as far as the Swedish Government were concerned, at complete liberty to transmit it to the Soviet Government. That the Swedish Government would in no way be, or propose to be, an instrument in promoting any attempt to sow discord between the Allies. The only reason for not informing the Soviet Government directly was because Himmler had stipulated that this information was exclusively for the Western Allies.’ (He said that if the United States colleague is sending a telegram to say so.) Of course we are not bound by that, and it’s our duty to tell Stalin, in my opinion.

“Truman: I think so, too. Have you notified Stalin?

“Churchill: I held it up for about two hours, hoping to get an answer to the telegram I sent you, but I have now released the telegram. This is the telegram I have sent.

“Truman: All right, then you notify Stalin, and I shall do the same immediately of this conversation between us.,

“Churchill: Exactly. Here is what I have said to Stalin, and I have telegraphed it over to you. The telegram immediately following is one I have just received exactly from the British Ambassador in Sweden.

“‘The President of the United States has the news also,’ I thought you had gotten it. Your telegram has not gotten through.

“Truman: No, I haven’t received my telegram as yet.

“Churchill: ‘There can be no question as far as His Majesty’s Government is concerned, arranging thus an unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers.’

“Truman: I agree to that fully.

“Churchill: ‘We consider Himmler should be told that German folk either as individuals or in units should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens, the attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theaters where resistance continues will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor.

“‘Nothing in the above telegram should affect the release of our oration [?].’ I sent it off a few minutes ago, and I was sending it to you with the following telegram from me, you see. That which I read you. I called the War Cabinet together at once, and they approved of this telegram I’ve just read you.

“Truman: I approve of it, too.

“Churchill; The one I sent to Stalin?

“Truman: I approve of that telegram you sent to Stalin, and I shall immediately wire Stalin on exactly the same line.

“Churchill: Thank you so much. That is exactly what I wanted. We hoped you would find it possible to telegraph to Marshal Stalin and to us in the same sense.

“Truman: Mr. Prime Minister, would you please repeat your message to Stalin and repeat it slowly so I can take it down here?

“Churchill: I have already done so through the American Embassy over an hour and a half ago, and it should be with you almost immediately. Would you like me to send you also the telegram I got from Stockholm today?

“Truman: I would very much.

“Churchill: I will. You will get it very soon. You will get the one from me, the one I just sent out.

“Truman: I would like for you to repeat the one which you sent to Stalin so I can send one substantially like it to him.

“Churchill: Good. I hope I may . . .

“Truman: Would you do it slowly, please, Mr. Prime Minister?

“Churchill: The telegram immediately follows. It is a long one.

“Truman: I thank you very much.

“Churchill: ‘I have just received from the British Ambassador in Sweden . . . The President of the United States has the news also.’ (That is what I thought.) There can be no question as far as state history is concerned about anything else but unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major powers. We consider Himmler should be told that German folk, either as individuals or in units, should everywhere surrender themselves to the Allied troops or representatives on the spot. Until this happens, the attack of the Allies upon them on all sides and in all theaters where resistance continues will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. Nothing in the above telegram should affect the release of our oration [?].’ (That is intact.) That is what I sent, I think, about half an hour ago.

“Truman: Thank you very much. I shall get one off immediately to him, and I certainly do appreciate your talking to me on it.

“Churchill: I’m delighted. I am sure we would be pretty well in agreement, and I hope that Stalin will wire back and say, ‘I agree, too.’ In which case we could authorize our representatives, in Stockholm, to tell Bernadotte that you will pass on the message to Himmler. Because nothing can be done about that until we are all three agreed on it.

“Truman: All right.

“Churchill: You have my text and your own, and let’s see what Stalin says.

“Truman: All right.

“Churchill: Thank you very much, indeed.

“Truman: Thank you.

“Churchill: You remember those speeches we were going to make about the link up in Europe?

“Truman: I didn’t understand that last statement, Mr. Prime Minister.

“Churchill: You know what I am talking about, the speech, the statements that are written. Well, I think they should be let out just as they would be anyhow as soon as the link up occurs.

“Truman: I think you’re right on that. I agree on that.

“Churchill: Anything helps to beat the enemy.

“Truman: I agree with that.

“Churchill: Good. I rejoice that our first conversation will be about the first of June. It’s very good news.

“Truman: I hope to see you someday soon.

“Churchill: I am planning to. I’ll be sending you some telegrams about that quite soon. I entirely agree with all that you’ve done on the Polish situation. We are walking hand in hand together.

“Truman: Well, I want to continue just that.

“Churchill: In fact, I am following your lead, backing up whatever you do on the matter.

“Truman: Thank you. Good night.”

Without further delay I cabled Marshal Stalin.

“I am informed by the American Minister to Sweden,” my message to Stalin read, “that Himmler, speaking for the German government in the absence of Hitler due to incapacity, approached the Swedish government with an offer to surrender all the German forces on the western front including Holland, Denmark and Norway.

“In keeping with our agreement with the British and Soviet governments it is the view of the United States government that the only acceptable terms of surrender are unconditional surrender at all fronts to the Soviet, Great Britain and the United States.

“If the Germans accept the terms of paragraph 2 above, they should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field.

“If you are in agreement with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, I will direct my minister in Sweden to so inform Himmler’s agent.

“An identical message is sent to Churchill.”

It was that same evening, at eight o’clock, that I spoke over the radio from the White House to the delegates who had assembled in San Francisco for the opening of the United Nations Conference.

“At no time in history,” I began, “has there been a more important conference, or a more necessary meeting, than this one in San Francisco which you are opening today.

“On behalf of the American people, I extend to you a most hearty welcome.”

I then referred to the delegation President Roosevelt had appointed to represent the United States and expressed my complete confidence in them. I referred to Roosevelt himself and to his high ideals, his foresight, and his determination. I referred, as well, to the great sacrifice he and so many others had made in the cause of liberty.

“You members of the conference,” I went on to say, “are to be the architects of the better world. In your hands rests our future. By your labors at this conference we shall know if suffering humanity is to achieve a just and lasting peace.”

I warned them of the ever-increasing brutality and destructiveness of modern warfare and of the danger that it might ultimately crush all civilization.

“It is not the purpose of this conference,” I told them, “to draft a treaty of peace in the old sense of that term. It is not our assignment to settle specific questions of territories, boundaries, citizenship and reparations.

“This conference will devote its energies and its labors exclusively to the single problem of setting up the essential organization to keep the peace. You are to write the fundamental charter.

“The essence of our problem here, is to provide sensible machinery for the settlement of disputes among nations.

“We must build a new world,” I concluded, “a far better world - one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected.

“As we are about to undertake our heavy duties, we beseech Almighty God to guide us in building a permanent monument to those who gave their lives that this moment might come.

“May He lead our steps in His own righteous path of peace.”

On Thursday, April 26, I had my second conference with the Director of the Budget, Harold D. Smith. Developments on the war front were compelling a swift restudy and reappraisal of policies and commitments, both foreign and domestic. I had previously instructed Smith to prepare new estimates for various war agencies such as the War Manpower Commission, the Office of War Information, the War Production Board, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Maritime Commission. We would be safe, I thought, if we were to reduce some of these agencies and drastically cut, or even eliminate, others. During the war, so many agencies had been set up that the government had grown to unwieldy proportions. As an example of this, I cited to Smith the condition in the field of manpower.

So many organizations were functioning in this area that our permanent department in the government, the Department of Labor, had been virtually dormant. In view of this fact, I asked Smith to prepare a presidential order directing that the scattered labor functions now administered by the wartime agencies be placed within the Department of Labor and under the direction of the Secretary of Labor.

I told Smith in confidence that in view of this fundamental reorganization of the Labor Department it would probably be necessary to appoint a new secretary of the department. Labor-management relations had grown tense and explosive because of the wage and price controls of the war years, and the Department of Labor in the period ahead would require a secretary who, in addition to having the full support of labor, would have the experience and reputation necessary for dealing successfully with Congress. I suggested to Smith that he defer his conference with the Department of Labor until I had found a successor to Miss Perkins.

Miss Perkins had already expressed her desire to be relieved of the post, saying, “I have survived my usefulness.” I held her in very high regard and believed she had done a good job despite the fact that many of her responsibilities had been taken from the department by the emergency agencies. She understood the problems of labor and had played an important role in the development of relations between labor and management. She was convinced that a new head of the department during the postwar period would have the advantage of a fresh start and better support from the Congress.

I first met Miss Perkins in 1933, when the New Deal administration had come into power. At that time, she had appointed me employment director for the state of Missouri in connection with the federal government’s activities to meet the economic crisis. From June 1933 until I went to the Senate, I combined these federal duties with the job of running Jackson County and first came to understand and appreciate Miss Perkins’ ability and stature. As the years went by, I learned what a fine human being she was. When I came to Washington as a senator, I saw her from time to time, and on occasion we were members of a group which lunched at the Allies Inn, a cafeteria where, with other government employees, we carried our own trays and talked over common problems.

From labor, I turned to the housing problem and asked Smith to make a comprehensive survey of housing and what the government was doing about it. Frankly, I thought the housing situation was a mess. What government participation there was had not been adequately managed during the war. And housing would play an important role in the planning of our peace economy.

I cautioned Smith that in planning for peace we should not lose sight of the fact that, even with victory in Europe, we still had a major war to win in the Pacific. Any premature letdown of morale in the departments and war agencies would be harmful. Therefore, in making cuts in the budget for the war agencies, we had to keep in mind that we might create a wholesale exodus of personnel, thus crippling the usefulness of the agencies that still had work to do.

Our methods, I said, should be guided by orderly liquidation and by the proper briefing of the department heads who would be affected. Smith agreed and promised that before recommending any cuts to me he would consult with the heads of all departments and agencies.

I was particularly anxious that such agencies as the Office of Price Administration, the Petroleum Administration for War, and the Foreign Economic Administration should not be touched because of their importance to economic stabilization. Smith recommended a reduction in the budget of the Maritime Commission of $4 billion in contract authorization and $3 billion in cash. This was what I wanted, and I approved the slash. And I added that this was a good time to liquidate the Office of Civilian Defense and to reduce the budgets of the Office of Censorship and the Office of Defense Transportation.

Unemployment compensation and old-age assistance, on the other hand, formed a very different problem. They would increase when our war production changed over to peacetime industry. In fact, many of the older men and women had already been withdrawn from the labor market, and we had to keep an eye on the human and economic consequences of this trend.

Smith submitted a memorandum proposing to appropriate a sum of money for the Red Cross. He told me that President Roosevelt had twice before rejected this proposal but had recently reversed himself and asked that the item be included. Smith, however, declared that he himself was still opposed to the proposal, and I agreed. It was my belief that if we undertook to appropriate money for the Red Cross we would find ourselves obliged to appropriate money for many other private groups, as well. There was also the possibility that appropriations of this nature would tend to undercut the UNRRA program. I intended to discuss the whole subject of foreign relief with Governor Lehman, head of UNRRA. I asked Smith for all available data on the relief situation in the countries where UNRRA was now functioning.

We next took up the proposed Lend-Lease appropriations concerning which I had already had a talk with Leo Crowley, Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration. The amount suggested by Smith was slightly below that of the previous year, one reason being that resistance to Lend-Lease was growing in Congress. This was fostered by the isolationist bloc, which grew bolder as victory in Europe approached. The country was being flooded with isolationist propaganda under various guises, and many of us were apprehensive lest the isolationist spirit again become an important political factor.

Lend-Lease was intended to provide our allies with the weapons of war and the materiel necessary to supplement their own war production. Under broad interpretations of what constituted materiel, however, some supplies were diverted to civilian use and industrial rehabilitation, and this became one of the targets at which the critics aimed.

The original Lend-Lease Act was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate on January 10, 1941. After hearings and debate, it was passed by both branches and signed by President Roosevelt on March 11, 1941. Thereafter it was extended twice, and on April 17, five days after I had become President, I signed the third extension, approving an act which had come before the Senate when I was presiding as Vice President.

Smith recalled that a Republican-sponsored amendment which would have prohibited the President from contracting for use of the Lend-Lease program for postwar relief, rehabilitation, or reconstruction had resulted in a 39 - 39 vote, and that I, as Vice President, had cast the deciding vote which defeated the amendment. The act had then passed the Senate on April 10 by unanimous voice vote.

I understood that if we were to use Lend-Lease funds for rehabilitation purposes we would open ourselves to a lot of trouble with the Senate. However, Leo Crowley also recognized this fact and had suggested that a better way to handle rehabilitation would be to enlarge the Export-Import Bank so as to make funds available for that purpose and also to encourage more use of the International Bank. I explained Crowley’s suggestion to Smith, with whom I then discussed the problem of making unilateral loans to foreign countries. Such loans, of course, would lead to repercussions at home and might cause Allied suspicion of our moves. They might even provide Russia with an excuse, if she needed one, to undertake unilateral arrangements of her own. For these reasons, I was opposed to unilateral action in any field. Loans to some countries, however, were so essential to their survival that I felt it necessary to make them even at some risk that they would not be fully repaid.

Smith had previously sent President Roosevelt a Bureau of the Budget memorandum concerning the organization of intelligence in the government, and I had read it. In it he had pointed out that a tug of war was going on among the FBI, the Office of Strategic Services, the Army and Navy Intelligence, and the State Department. He added that recently the Bureau of the Budget had worked closely with the General Staff of the Army, which had reorganized the intelligence operations in the Army, and I was now told that the Budget Bureau itself had some experienced and competent people who had become specialists in the problems of intelligence organization.

I considered it very important to this country to have a sound, well-organized intelligence system, both in the present and in the future. Properly developed, such a service would require new concepts as well as better-trained and more competent personnel. Smith suggested, and I agreed, that studies should be undertaken at once by his specially trained experts in this field. Plans needed to be made, but it was imperative that we refrain from rushing into something that would produce harmful and unnecessary rivalries among the various intelligence agencies. I told Smith that one thing was certain - this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason.

At the conclusion of my long session with the Director of the Budget, I again called his attention to Lend-Lease, emphasizing the importance of refining the estimates still further. This was to be my first budget as President, and I hoped to be able to justify every detail it contained.

Early that morning, I had received a group of Pennsylvanians headed by Senators Joseph F. Guffey and Francis J. Myers. Mrs. Emma Guffey Miller, Senator Guffey’s sister and Democratic national committeewoman from Pennsylvania, was in the group, which also included David L. Lawrence, chairman of the Democratic State Committee, and James P. Clark, chairman of the Democratic City Committee of Philadelphia. The delegation assured me of the solid support of their state’s Democratic organizations, and I heard Mayor Lawrence say something about supporting me in 1948. I could say nothing, of course, because any comment would have been improper. In the position I occupied a day seemed like an eternity, and I had no right or mind to look ahead in that direction. This was hardly a time for political speculation. War was still raging, and a shattered world needed restoration. I could give no serious thought to anything else.

It was the next day that I received the following cable from Marshal Stalin:

I have received your message of April 26. Thank you for your information of the intention of Himmler to capitulate on the Western Front. I consider your proposed reply to Himmler along the lines of unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, absolutely correct. I ask you to act in the spirit of your proposal, and we Russians pledge to continue our attacks against the Germans.

For your information I wish you to know that I have given a similar reply to Premier Churchill, who communicated with me on the same question.

I replied immediately.

I have today sent the following message to Minister Johnson, Stockholm: QUOTE. Replying to your message of April 25, 3 a.m., inform Himmler’s agent that the only acceptable terms of surrender by Germany are unconditional surrender on all fronts to the Soviet Government, Great Britain and the United States.

If the above-stated terms of surrender are accepted the German forces should surrender on all fronts at once to the local commanders in the field.

In all theaters where resistance continues the attack of the Allies upon them will be vigorously prosecuted until complete victory is attached. UNQUOTE.