The presidency of the United States in recent times, even in the prewar period, had become a highly complicated and exacting job. But to this already heavy burden the war had added new and crushing responsibilities. Not only did the President now have to function as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, but he also had to assume the major share of the leadership of a far-flung coalition of allied nations. As I took the oath of office, I was conscious of how vast in scope the presidency had become. Although we were on our way to eventual victory in the Pacific, we still had a long way to go. But by April 1945, the war in Europe was taking a decisive turn.

German resistance had begun to crumble on all fronts by the middle of April. Until almost the end, however, there was talk of a last-ditch stand by the top Nazis and the German Command. It was believed that this stand would revolve about the so-called Redoubt in the mountain areas of Bavaria, Austria, and North Italy. To this region it was expected the Nazi leaders would withdraw with what was left of the SS and other trusted troops, and there they would stage a long-drawn-out resistance. Allied operations for the final phase of the war made provision to head this off. It was rumored that Hitler had left Berlin on April 20 for the Redoubt, but when the American Third and Seventh Armies moved deep into this area, they found the Germans had not been able to build this final fortress.

During the last days of April came the linking up of the American and Russian armies, the surrender of the German forces in Italy, and finally the total collapse of German resistance. As our military plans continued to develop with unrivaled speed, frightened Nazi leaders began seeking deals with the Western Allies. The thought of falling into Russian hands drove them into a panic. As the lesser of two evils, they turned to us. One of these attempts at a separate deal had already made some trouble for us with the Russians. In March, General Karl Wolff, the chief SS officer of the German forces in Italy, had started parleys with American OSS agents in Switzerland with a view toward the possible surrender of Kesselring’s German army in Italy. Nothing ever came of these parleys except to make the Russians highly suspicious of our motives. Molotov wrote to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow demanding that the negotiations with the Germans be broken off. President Roosevelt cabled Stalin that the Russians were misinformed. He explained that there was no reason why we should not listen to offers by the enemy to surrender to Allied commanders in the field, and that he could not agree to suspend efforts of this sort because Molotov objected. This did not satisfy Stalin, who answered that the Germans had tricked the Allies and had profited by moving three divisions from the Italian front to the Russian front. Actually, those three divisions went to the Western Front, against us. It was not a good situation. Any break with the Russians at this time would have interfered with our advances in Germany.

The Russians were always suspicious of everything and everybody, and Wolff’s approach to the Americans and British made them suspect that we were trying to get the German forces in the West to surrender to us while they still continued to fight on the Russian front. The Russians also appeared to be afraid that we would occupy all Germany and leave them on the other side of the Polish border.

At the time this incident occurred, the Germans still had a powerful fighting force in Italy, made up of twenty-five German divisions and five Italian Fascist divisions. They were holding strong positions south of the Po, on a line stretching from the west coast near Pisa to the Adriatic near Lake Comacchio, and a surrender at that moment would have been important to us.

The purpose of listening to any German offers by our military command in Italy was not to negotiate but to facilitate an unconditional surrender. But the Germans were hesitant about accepting the terms of surrender upon which we insisted. At Churchill’s urging, in order to avoid further friction with the Russians, the Allied commander in Italy, Field Marshal Alexander, was instructed to drop the talks. And the OSS in Switzerland was instructed by our Chiefs of Staff to cease contact with the Germans. We then informed the Russians of our action.

It was not long after this that the Allied forces in Italy jumped off on their final offensive. On April 21, they captured the city of Bologna. On the twenty-third, American units crossed the Po. Soon thereafter, the Germans ceased to be an effective force, and Alexander asked for permission to communicate with German officers who would have authority to surrender. This time arrangements were made for the Russians to have a representative on hand. The end came quickly.

On April 28, the terms of surrender were handed to the Germans at Allied headquarters in Italy. These terms were agreed to that same day and signed on the twenty-ninth. General Kislenko and another Russian officer were present. The terms of surrender called for hostilities to cease at noon on May 2. The surrender was to include the Italian Fascist divisions that were part of the German command. By this time, Mussolini’s puppet Italian Socialist Republic had ceased to exist. Mussolini himself was assassinated in late April by the partisans.

The war in Italy was over, and I sent a message of congratulation to Field Marshal Alexander and to the ranking American commander in that theater, General Mark W. Clark. I used the occasion of the surrender in Italy to warn the Germans and the Japanese that only unconditional surrender could save them from destruction.

“The Allied Armies in Italy,” this statement read, “have won the unconditional surrender of German forces on the first European soil to which, from the West, we carried our arms and our determination. The collapse of military tyranny in Italy, however, is no victory in Italy alone, but a part of the general triumph we are expectantly awaiting on the whole continent of Europe. Only folly and chaos can now delay the general capitulation of the everywhere defeated German armies.

“I have dispatched congratulatory messages to the Allied and American officers who led our forces to complete defeat of the Germans in Italy. They deserve our praise for the victory. We have a right to be proud of the success of our armies.

“Let Japan as well as Germany understand the meaning of these events. Unless they are lost in fanaticism or determined upon suicide, they must recognize the meaning of the increasing, swifter-moving power now ready for the capitulation or destruction of the so recently arrogant enemies of mankind.”

There was no Russian army in Italy. The German surrender there was consequently made to the Western Allies. Outside Italy the question was different. On all the main fronts, the Germans were attempting to make separate surrenders to the Western Allies. There were obvious implications and complications here, for the Nazi leaders and some of their generals were playing a devious game.

It was clear to us that they were trying to create trouble between the Western Allies and Russia, in a last desperate effort to save their necks and salvage as much of their regime as possible. A good indication of this was the Himmler affair.

Himmler, the ruthless head of the Gestapo, approached the Swedish government with a surrender proposition, and Count Bernadotte of the Swedish Foreign Office met him in Lübeck at one o’clock in the morning of April 24. At that meeting, Himmler announced himself as being in full power in Germany, the reason being, he explained, that Hitler had suffered a brain hemorrhage and was dying. Himmler then added that he wanted to meet Eisenhower in order to arrange a surrender to the Western Allies only, and asked that the Swedish government arrange the meeting. Himmler pointed out that he expected to continue the fight on the Eastern Front. Reports of this Himmler-Bernadotte conference were sent through the British and American ministers in Stockholm to Churchill and to me. But before the message reached me, Churchill called me on the transatlantic telephone on April 25. We discussed the matter in detail, and we reaffirmed our position that we would consider no separate peace and no partial or conditional surrender.

The Himmler affair created considerable excitement when the story leaked out at the San Francisco conference. I gave little weight, however, to all these last-minute maneuvers by the Nazi leaders. We knew that there was no longer any constituted authority in Germany and that no Nazi leader could speak for the German people or for their armies. Any enemy forces who wanted to surrender could do so, as a tactical matter, to the Allied commanders in the field. Except for local surrenders, there was no question during these last days of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to all three major allies, and military operations continued toward that goal.

In the meantime, plans were being made to attack the Germans in Norway, in case they continued to hold out. Back in March, the Norwegian government had asked Sweden to help expel the Germans by intervening in the war. The Swedish government, however, had declined to go along. They argued that any intervention would result in the certain destruction of Norway by the Germans and would also bring reprisals against her people. Norway expressed irritation over the Swedish assumption that the Swedes knew better than the Norwegians what was good for Norway. They felt they had been led by the Swedes to believe that a favorable answer would be given. Late in April, however, when the end of the war was plainly in sight, there were indications that Sweden might play a part in the liberation of Norway. This was a little bit late, but it could still be important, and on April 25, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Grew reported to me that there was a good possibility that the Swedes would be willing to intervene if a request were made by the American, British, and Norwegian governments and if no objection were raised by the Soviets. It was thought extremely doubtful, however, that the Swedes would declare war on Germany.

In the last week of the war, the Swedish government accepted an Allied proposal that would have amounted to Swedish intervention. It was the Allied plan to attack the German forces in Norway through Swedish territory, but surrender of the German forces in Norway came as the operation was being planned.

German resistance was now crumbling everywhere. On May 1, the German radio announced the death of Hitler. This man, who had brought such infinite misery to the world, had died in the ruins of his Chancellery. The reports I received said he was a suicide. I had expected that many high German officers would take this way out in case of defeat, but I knew that Hitler had never lived by the code of the Prussian officer, and I thought that in his fanaticism he would resist to the very end.

Hitler’s monstrous assault on civilization cost the lives of 15 million people, and he and his regime left countless others maimed in body and soul. But now, at last, the stranglehold this demon of a man had held on the German people had been broken. Throughout the world, men could now be certain that his death had brought us closer to the end of fighting and nearer to the return of peace.

When the German surrender came, it was through the military commanders, not through the politically defunct Nazi leaders. And now there was no issue over the terms of unconditional surrender. Germany was in ruins and its armies beaten. Its military leaders knew it and also knew we knew it. But still, they preferred to come to the Western Allies for surrender.

On May 2, General Eisenhower reported that General Blumentritt, commanding an army group in northwest Germany, had indicated that he wished to surrender his forces to the British Army. Eisenhower explained that he had given instructions that the surrender must be unconditional and added, “I am treating it as a tactical matter and will inform Russian General Suslaparov accordingly.”

The next day, May 3, Eisenhower reported that Blumentritt had not appeared at Field Marshal Montgomery’s headquarters and that the Germans now had other intentions. Instead of Blumentritt, Admiral Friedeburg and other high officers had arrived carrying authority from Field Marshal Keitel, chief of the German High Command. They asked Montgomery to accept the surrender of the Twelfth and Twenty-first German Armies then facing the Russians and to permit German refugees to pass through the Allied lines to Schleswig-Holstein. These requests were turned down. The Germans were instructed to inform Keitel that only unconditional surrender could be accepted. Eisenhower said that he had instructed Montgomery that the surrender of Denmark, Holland, the Frisian Islands, Heligoland, and Schleswig-Holstein could be regarded by Montgomery as a tactical matter and the deal closed on the spot.

“If, however,” Eisenhower’s instructions continued, “any larger offer such as to surrender Norway and forces on other fronts is proposed, the emissaries should be sent at once to my headquarters.”

To this Eisenhower added that “General Suslaparov is being informed of above.”

On May 4, the Germans surrendered to Montgomery all the German forces in Holland, northwest Germany, and Denmark. Hostilities were to cease at 8:00 a.m. the next day, May 5. On May 4, Eisenhower reported as follows to the War Department:

“Representative of Doenitz is proceeding to my Headquarters tomorrow apparently to negotiate surrender of remaining enemy forces. I am sending a message to the Russian High Command at once informing them that I propose to instruct this representative to advise his government to surrender to the Russian High Command all enemy forces facing the Russians and to surrender to me those facing this front, including Norway.

“I am suggesting to the Russians that if this is agreeable to them, I suggest further that the surrenders on both fronts be made simultaneously and at the earliest possible hour.”

On May 6, Eisenhower described the situation in the following report:

General Jodl appeared at my headquarters tonight and in company with Admiral Friedeburg continued negotiations with my Chief of Staff and his assistants. It was obvious from the beginning of the discussion that the Germans are stalling for time, their purpose being to evacuate the largest possible number of German soldiers and civilians from the Russian front to within our lines. They continued the effort to surrender this front separately, even stating that no matter what my answer was, they were going to order all German forces remaining on the Western Front to cease firing and to refuse to fire against British or American troops. They asked for a meeting on Tuesday morning for signing final surrender terms with a forty-eight hour interval thereafter in order to get the necessary instructions to all their outlying units. Their actual purpose was merely to gain time. I finally had to inform them that I would break off all negotiations and seal the Western Front preventing by force any further westward movement of German soldiers and civilians, unless they agreed to my terms of surrender. When faced with this ultimatum, they immediately drafted a telegram to Doenitz asking for authority to make a full and complete surrender but specifying that actual fighting would cease 48 hours after the time of signing. Since this solution obviously places the decision as to when fighting would cease in the hands of the Germans, I refused to accept it and stated that all fighting would have to cease on both fronts in 48 hours from midnight tonight, or I would carry out my threat. I repeat that their purpose is to continue to make a front against the Russians as long as they possibly can in order to evacuate maximum numbers of Germans into our lines.

In any event, for all practical purposes fighting will cease almost immediately on this front for the reason that with minor exceptions my troops are on the line I have directed them to occupy.

If the arrangement goes through as above indicated, I suggest that a proclamation should be made on Tuesday by the governments announcing Wednesday, May 9th, as V-E Day, with a statement that fighting has already largely ceased throughout the front and that by the terms of the agreement hostilities will formally cease on one minute after midnight, night of May 8/9. . . .

We hope to have a formal signing by tomorrow.

On May 7, Eisenhower reported that a brief instrument of unconditional military surrender had been signed at 2:41 that morning. He said that he was prepared to go to Berlin the next day for the final formal signing, at which Marshal Zhukov would be the Russian representative.

The Russians had serious misgivings as to whether the Germans on their front would in fact surrender, and for that reason Moscow delayed the official announcement of the surrender by one day. We had previously agreed with Stalin that the announcement would be on Tuesday, May 8, at 9:00 a.m. Washington time. Churchill was now pressing for a day earlier, and the Russians were insisting on a day later. On the seventh, Churchill sent messages by phone and cable urging that the formal announcement be made that day. I could see no way of accepting this change unless Stalin agreed. Stalin insisted, however, that the uncertain situation on the Russian front made this difficult. He still preferred May 9, and the final outcome of the several exchanges of messages was that the official announcements of the German unconditional surrender were made at the time originally agreed upon, Tuesday, May 8, at 9:00 a.m. Washington time.

The German surrender came only a little less than four weeks after I had taken the oath of office as President. On May 7, the night before V-E Day, we moved from Blair House to the White House.

I got up early V-E Day and wrote a letter to Mama and my sister Mary:

May 8, 1945

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

Dear Mama & Mary:

I am sixty-one this morning, and I slept in the President’s room in the White House last night. They have finished the painting and have some of the furniture in place, I’m hoping it will all be ready for you by Friday. My expensive gold pen doesn’t work as well as it should.

This will be a historical day. At 9 o’clock this morning I must make a broadcast to the country; announcing the German surrender. The papers were signed yesterday morning and hostilities will cease on all fronts at midnight tonight. Isn’t that some birthday present?

Have had one heck of a time with the Prime Minister of Great Britain. He, Stalin and the U.S. President made an agreement to release the news all at once from the three capitals at an hour that would fit us all. We agreed on 9 a.m. Washington time which is 3 p.m. London and 4 p.m. Moscow time.

Mr. Churchill began calling me at daylight to know if we shouldn’t make an immediate release without considering the Russians. He was refused and then he kept pushing me to talk to Stalin. He finally had to stick to the agreed plan - but he was mad as a wet hen.

Things have moved at a terrific rate here since April 12. Never a day has gone by that some momentous decision didn’t have to be made. So far luck has been with me. I hope it keeps up. It can’t stay with me forever however and I hope when the mistake comes it won’t be too great to remedy.

We are looking forward to a grand visit with you. I may not be able to come for you as planned but I’m sending the safest finest plane and all kinds of help so please don’t disappoint me.

Lots & lots of love to you both.

Harry

By 8:35 that morning of May 8, I was in the Executive Office of the White House. I was about to proclaim to the American people the end of the war in Europe. With me at that moment were Mrs. Truman, my daughter Margaret, high United States and British Army and Navy officials, and a number of leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

First I was to receive the press, but before the doors were opened Senator McKellar, president pro tempore of the Senate, greeted me.

“Happy birthday, Mr. President,” he said.

I thanked him. The representatives of the press and radio hurried in - unusually silent.

I read them the official announcement:

“This is a solemn but glorious hour. General Eisenhower informs me that the forces of Germany have surrendered to the United Nations. The flags of freedom fly all over Europe.

“For this victory, we join in offering our thanks to the Providence which has guided and sustained us through the dark days of adversity. Our rejoicing is sobered and subdued by a supreme consciousness of the terrible price we have paid to rid the world of Hitler and his evil band. Let us not forget, my fellow Americans, the sorrow and the heartache which today abide in the homes of so many of our neighbors - neighbors whose most priceless possession has been rendered as a sacrifice to redeem our liberty.

“We can repay the debt which we owe to our God, to our dead, and to our children, only by work, by ceaseless devotion to the responsibilities which lie ahead of us. If I could give you a single watchword for the coming months, that word is work, work and more work. We must work to finish the war. Our victory is only half over.”

I then read them another statement in which I informed the Japanese what they could expect, and called their attention to the fact that we were now in a position to turn the greatest war machine in the history of the world loose in the Pacific.

“The Japanese people,” this statement warned, “have felt the weight of our land, air and naval attacks. So long as their leaders and the armed forces continue the war, the striking power and intensity of our blows will steadily increase, and will bring utter destruction to Japan’s industrial war production, to its shipping, and to everything that supports its military activity.

“The longer the war lasts, the greater will be the suffering and hardships which the people of Japan will undergo - all in vain. Our blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in unconditional surrender.

“Just what does the unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan mean for the Japanese people?

“It means the end of the war.

“It means the termination of the influence of the military leaders who brought Japan to the present brink of disaster.

“It means provision for the return of soldiers and sailors to their families, their farms, and their jobs.

“And it means not prolonging the present agony and suffering of the Japanese in the vain hope of victory.

“Unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.”

At nine o’clock, following the press conference, I broadcast an address to the nation, announcing the surrender of Germany and calling upon the people to turn their efforts to the great tasks ahead - first to win the war in the Pacific, and then to win the peace.

I said: “I only wish that Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived to witness this day. General Eisenhower informs me that the forces of Germany have surrendered to the United Nations. The flags of freedom fly over all Europe. . . .

“We must work to bind up the wounds of a suffering world, to build an abiding peace, a peace rooted in justice and in law. We can build such a peace only by hard, toilsome, painstaking work - by understanding and working with our Allies in peace as we have in war.

“The job ahead is no less important, no less urgent, no less difficult than the task which now happily is done.

“I call upon every American to stick to his post until the last battle is won. Until that day, let no man abandon his post or slacken his efforts.”

During the course of the war I had listened to many arguments on the question of unconditional surrender, both pro and con. The complete collapse of the German armies and their unconditional surrender had settled the argument by itself.

The three major allies in the war in Europe had agreed on unconditional surrender as far back as 1943. By the time I became President, there was a straight-line commitment on it. Churchill and Roosevelt had first announced this at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 as a basic principle for the conduct of the war. Thereafter came frequent official confirmations, straight through to Yalta. At that conference, the Allies agreed to bring about, at the earliest possible date, “the unconditional surrender of Germany.”

What lay behind this fixed policy of unconditional surrender is clear. When the meeting was held at Yalta, the Allies knew that the complete defeat of Germany was only a matter of time, and they wanted the German people to know that the German armies had been totally defeated in the field, as well as in all other respects. Germany at that time had already suffered enormous destruction, but destruction even on such a scale does not necessarily mean military defeat. There must be a collapse of all military effort, and this collapse was what the Allies wanted to impress clearly on the German people.

The Allies had not forgotten what had happened after World War I. When the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, the German armies were still massed in formation on the Western Front, and this front lay in France and Belgium. Nowhere was there any foreign military on German sod. There had been no fighting in Germany, and even Allied bombers had inflicted nothing more than minor damage on the country.

All this was concrete - something the German people in 1918 could see for themselves. They could not see, and did not recognize, the internal disintegration that was under way in the German armies - a disintegration which, in the face of the overpowering and ever-increasing Allied forces, made further German resistance futile. And in a short time, because of the failure of the German people to recognize these facts, German nationalists were able to contend loudly that Germany had been stabbed in the back by traitors. When it came time to sign the peace treaty in June 1919, there was a great deal of trouble with the Germans. The Nazis made great capital of this betrayal myth. It was one of the main tricks by which Hitler came to power, for the German nation, in the fifteen years that followed World War I, had come to be convinced that they had lost the war by betrayal and not by military defeat. This time, however, unconditional surrender was decided on. The Allies wanted to be sure that there would be no room left for doubt in the German mind as to the reason or the completeness of their military defeat. I am not certain that things always work that way. We have had some defeats ourselves, but in our minds, and over the long years, they have become something less than defeats. If we won the War of 1812, for example, it is not so admitted in English history books.

It seems to me that what happens is that national pride outlives military defeat. It is a delusion to think otherwise. I also think that it is a mistake to insist on unconditional surrender for moral or educational purposes. Any surrender is at the will of the victor, whether the surrender terms be conditional or unconditional. If there is any reason for unconditional surrender, it is only the practical matter of taking over a defeated country and making its control easier.

On the other hand, I am not sure that unconditional surrender would have been pressed unduly if the Germans had quit in time - if Hitler had realized at the proper moment that he was finished and had permitted a new government to take over and submit to the Allies.

A good time for the Germans to surrender would have been after the Russians had driven them from Stalingrad, and the Western Allies had landed in Italy and France. Had the Germans surrendered then, it would have meant a quicker recovery for all of Europe and especially for Germany. Furthermore, there would not have been the present division of Germany, which was largely brought about by the presence of great Allied armies in Germany when the war ended.

It is possible that the whole business of surrender will be academic in any large-scale future war, although I do not think so. If, unfortunately, there should be a future war, we can anticipate the absolute devastation of vital parts of one or the other of the belligerent nations, and probably of both of them. Our new and frightfully destructive weapons can surely wipe out the greatest cities. We would probably be dealing in annihilation from the first, and in the event of such a war there would come a time sooner or later - possibly soon after the very first attack - when one of the belligerents would be compelled to ask for terms.

The old question would then confront the victor: Does he want to take over the enemy country completely? If he does, he might find it necessary to fight further, thereby running the risk of atomic-hydrogen attacks on his own territory. And in any event, the power of destruction, vast as it is with the new weapons, does not necessarily do away with political-military objectives such as have always existed in modern war.

Warfare, no matter what weapons it employs, is a means to an end, and if that end can be achieved by negotiated settlements of conditional surrender, there is no need for war. I believe this to be true even in the case of ruthless and terroristic powers ambitious for world conquest.

The thought that frightens me is the possibility of the deliberate annihilation of whole peoples as a political-military objective. There were indications of such madness in the Nazi leadership group, and it could happen elsewhere. Terms of surrender have no meaning here. The only thing that does have meaning, and in all my thinking I have found no alternative, is organized international effort. I know of no other way to meet this terrible menace.

A major difficulty that arises in connection with such a formula as unconditional surrender is that it cuts across the line which should divide political from military decisions. Von Clausewitz long ago pointed out that “war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means,” and many of our generals, as well as a large proportion of the public, conclude from this that, once war has begun, all decisions become military in nature. Von Clausewitz, however, said a great deal more than just that easily remembered sentence. He said that both diplomacy and war are merely means to an end and that the nature of that end is a matter for political determination.

My meetings with the Chiefs of Staff were always highly informative and productive. Many complex problems were resolved during these sessions. But the one question never fully answered was whether political considerations took priority over military considerations in the midst of war operations. It is a fact, of course, that the policy of the government determines the policy of the military. The military is always subordinate to the government. But in a situation where the military commanders are convinced that a certain political proposal is militarily too risky or costly or not practical, then the government is bound to take into account the position taken by the military.

We were faced with that kind of problem in the closing phase of the war in Europe. As a result of the rapid advances of our armies on the central front, our operational lines began to outstrip the lines of the occupation zones that had long since been agreed upon. This raised the issue of how far east our armies should go, what lines they should hold when the fighting stopped, and the relation of all this to the occupation zones.

Churchill, on political grounds, pressed for getting a line as far to the east as possible before the fighting ended. Opposed to this policy were our military chiefs, whose arguments were based on military grounds.

At this time, it was our objective to destroy all remaining resistance. This was to be achieved by a general advance eastward until our armies met the Russian armies coming westward. In all this, there was nothing at all binding on how far our Western Allied armies should go eastward or what lines they should be holding when the fighting stopped. While this matter involved serious political considerations, it also posed a major problem for the military.

All broad strategic plans, wherever they might originate, had to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff and finally by the President. The matter of advances, or of retreats if necessary, was, however, left to the judgment of the field commanders. This enabled them to take advantage of unexpected enemy weaknesses in order to advance as far as their military judgment permitted them to go.

As the war was drawing to a close, we were having a great deal of difficulty with our Russian ally. Politically we would have been pleased to see our lines extend as far to the east as possible. We had already found ourselves practically shut out of countries that the Russians had occupied, and we therefore had reason to question their intentions here in Germany. But the specified zones in Germany had been previously agreed upon, and to these zones the British, American, and Russian armies were to withdraw at the end of the war, regardless of where they might be when the fighting stopped. The Russian military commanders, as well as our own, were well aware of the official commitments on these occupation zones.

The matter of occupation zones had first come to my attention in a telegram that Churchill sent me on April 18. It was one of several in which he urged that our armies should push as far to the east as they could reach and firmly hold. Churchill, in fact, had been pressing this point for some time in messages to President Roosevelt. Churchill waged his own battle over it with the military, too, particularly with our military chiefs, and had clashed on this general issue with Eisenhower when the plan for the last big offensive was prepared.

This plan called for our troops to stop at the Elbe. The main thrust was to be made by Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group, straight across the center of Germany to the Elbe, while Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group on the north and Devers’ Sixth Army Group on the south would support Bradley’s advance by advances in their own sectors. Once Bradley had reached the Elbe, he would turn north to support Montgomery and south to support Devers, in this way aiding in the capture of the Baltic ports as far as Lübeck and as much of Austria as possible.

Churchill wanted the main thrust on the north to be by Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group reinforced with large American forces. The capture of Berlin, in his belief, should be its great objective. Eisenhower, however, would not give in, and we supported him. Eisenhower maintained that his plan, in conjunction with the Russian armies, would best achieve the over-all objective of crushing German resistance. He objected to the Churchill plan on the grounds that such a procedure would inject political considerations into military operations. Berlin, Eisenhower maintained, might be a matter of prestige, but it was a difficult job to take. Furthermore, Berlin was within the 200-mile agreed-upon Russian occupation zone.

On March 30, General Eisenhower had reported this situation to General Marshall.

“May I point out,” his message read, “that Berlin itself is no longer a particularly important objective. Its usefulness to the Germans has been largely destroyed and even their government is preparing to move to another area. What is now important is to gather up our forces for a single drive and this will more quickly bring about the fall of Berlin, the relief of Norway, and the acquisition of the shipping of the Swedish ports than will the scattering around of our efforts.”

“The battle of Germany,” Marshall replied on March 31, with Roosevelt’s approval, “is now at a point where it is up to the field commander to judge the measures which should be taken. To deliberately turn away from the exploitation of the enemy’s weakness does not appear sound. The single objective should be quick and complete victory. While recognizing there are factors not of direct concern to SCAEF, the U. S. Chiefs consider his strategic concept is sound and should receive full support. He should continue to communicate freely with the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Army.”

Churchill was worried over Russian intentions and wanted all the territory we could get for bargaining purposes after the war. All this, he argued, was part of broad strategy and could not be left out of war plans. For him, Berlin was not just a military matter but a matter of state, to be decided by the heads of government. However, our Chiefs of Staff supported Eisenhower, and Roosevelt would not interfere with the operational plan.

By April 18, the military situation had changed, and this was reflected in Churchill’s message to me. On April 12, the advance forces under Bradley had reached the Elbe at Magdeburg, while the Russians were still on the Oder, some eighty miles away.

On April 13, the Russian armies in the south took Vienna, and by the eighteenth, their main force was on the outskirts of Berlin. On the same day, the U. S. Third Army was entering Czechoslovakia. German resistance was nearing collapse, opening wide areas for possible Allied occupation. On this aspect of the situation Churchill kept pressing.

In his April 18 message, Churchill proposed that a directive be issued to the supreme commander, General Eisenhower, on how to act, as our armies would soon meet up with the Russians. The functions of field commanders, he pointed out, related only to what he called tactical zones, and in such areas our troops should hold the line they had reached, except for such tactical deployment as might be necessary against further enemy resistance.

As for the occupation zones, Churchill expressed his willingness to adhere to them, but pointed out that this matter would come up only after V-E Day and that there would be problems to discuss with the Russians. Churchill added that the occupation zones had been decided in some haste at the Quebec conference in 1944, at a time when no one could foresee our great advances in Germany.

This shows conclusively that heads of state should be very careful about horseback agreements, because there is no way of foretelling the final result.

I took some time in answering this message, in order to examine the whole situation. I knew what worried Churchill. His experience with the Russians was as trying as ours. The intentions of the Russians to act on their own, without our cooperation, in all the countries they had liberated was evident to us. In fact, on this very day, I had sent a protest to Stalin on the Polish situation.

I made a careful study of the subject of occupation zones. As regards Germany, I found that we were clearly committed on specific zones. In the case of Austria, while we were also committed, specific zones had not yet been worked out. Harriman reported from Moscow that Stalin told him that the capture of Vienna now made it necessary to fix the zones of Allied occupation for the city, and Stalin suggested that American, British, and French representatives proceed as soon as possible to Vienna to establish the zones there.

The zones for Germany, however, had been worked out by the European Advisory Commission sitting in London. This commission had been set up in January 1944 to study European questions that arose as the war developed. Ambassador Winant was our representative; Sir William Strang represented the British, and Gousev, the Soviet Ambassador, the Russians.

This group made joint recommendations, which were sent to each government for its approval, and on September 12, 1944, with aid from the military, had drawn up a rough agreement on the zones. This was accepted in a general way by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Quebec conference which met during that month. No definite arrangements could be made at this conference, however, for the Russians were not present.

In November 1944, the European Advisory Commission submitted a final draft agreement on the zones to be occupied by the three major powers. Each power was to have its own zone, and boundaries of each were specifically delineated, although Berlin was made a special joint zone. At Yalta, the zones laid down in this draft agreement were accepted by all three powers. Provision was also made there for a fourth zone, for France, the details to be worked out by the Advisory Commission.

Our commitment on the occupation zones was thus an established fact, and our government had been proceeding on that basis ever since Yalta. Our American Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had it in mind in planning their last great offensive, and our Chiefs were already working out plans for the administration of military government in our zone.

A departmental committee was working out general policy. This committee, made up of the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury, had been set up soon after the Yalta conference, in compliance with President Roosevelt’s request that the Yalta decisions be carried forward.

After thus examining the situation, I could see no valid reason for questioning an agreement on which we were so clearly committed, nor could I see any useful purpose in interfering with successful military operations. The only practical thing to do was to stick carefully to our agreement and to try our best to make the Russians carry out their agreements.

It was with this in mind that I replied to Churchill on April 23. This message contained a draft proposal to be sent to Stalin, if Churchill agreed, outlining the procedure to be followed by the armed forces in occupying the various zones.

On the next day, I received a reply from Churchill. He was agreeable to most of the text of my proposed message to Stalin but was unhappy over the opening part, in which I proposed that the troops withdraw to their respective zones as soon as the military situation permitted. This meant, he said, that the American troops would have to fall back some 150 miles in the center and give up considerable territory to the Russians at a time when other questions remained unsettled.

General Eisenhower, in his message of April 23, gave some indication of the many problems that were developing in the matter of procedure with the Russians when they met up with our troops.

“. . . I do not quite understand,” Eisenhower cabled, “why the Prime Minister has been so determined to intermingle political and military considerations in attempting to establish a procedure for the conduct of our own and Russian troops when a meeting takes place. My original recommendation submitted to the CC/S was a simple one, and I thought provided a very sensible arrangement.

“One of my concerns in making that proposal was the possibility that the Russians might arrive in the Danish peninsula before we could fight our way across the Elbe and I wanted a formula that would take them out of that region on my request. The only area in which we will be in the Russian occupation zone is that now held by American troops.

“I really do not anticipate that the Russians will be arbitrary in demanding an instant withdrawal from this region (although I would save troops for the campaigns on the flanks if they should do so), but if they should take an arbitrary stand and serve notice that they intend to push directly ahead to the limits of their occupational zone, the American forces are going to be badly embarrassed. As I say, I think this fear will never be realized - but my hope was to protect my subordinate commanders from uncertainties and worry.

“We are working very hard on the redeployment business and on all our plans for the occupation of the American zone in Germany.

“I telegraphed to you my recommendations on the zone to be allotted to the French. Smith had a conference with Juin and it develops that the French are not particularly concerned about giving up the areas we require.

“They are rather upset, though, about the British refusal to allow them to occupy the Rhineland as far north as Cologne. I suspect there is some underlying political struggle on this point, of which I am ignorant.

“I note that the redeployment schedule is merely going to intensify the continuing struggle regarding service troops. To meet the demands made upon us, our needs in repair and construction companies and many other units of that type will be greater than ever. At the same time they will want identical units in the Pacific to prepare for the later arrival of combat divisions.”

Cabling Churchill on April 26, I took occasion to point out that the armies now in the Soviet zone were American and that any agreement on withdrawal to the occupation zones would have to be by all three powers. I also suggested for his consideration a modified version of the message to Stalin, and the next day he accepted this and sent it on to Stalin. On the same day I sent a message to Stalin saying that the Churchill communication he had received had my agreement. It was not until May 2 that Stalin answered. Russia, he cabled, would proceed along our proposed lines.

Meanwhile, the advance of our forces in Czechoslovakia had added a new aspect to the situation. On April 23, our Embassy in London received a note from the British Foreign Office in which Eden expressed the view that it would be most desirable politically to have Prague liberated by U.S. forces. The note went on to say that the liberation of Czechoslovakia by a Western ally would be of obvious advantage to us and would also help us in establishing our missions in that country.

On April 30, Churchill sent me a message on this matter. He contended that the liberation of Prague, and as much else of Czechoslovakia as possible, could well affect the postwar situation in that country and possibly in the neighboring countries. Churchill pointed out that while this suggestion was not meant to interfere with the main effort against the Germans, it should be brought to Eisenhower’s attention.

Churchill added that he had already instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to ask the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to let Eisenhower know that if the opportunity arose to advance into Czechoslovakia, he should take advantage of it. Churchill said he hoped this would have my approval.

Our own State Department was impressed with the same idea. Acting Secretary of State Grew sent me a memo suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to consider the idea seriously. His argument was along familiar lines. If our armies could push to the Moldau River, which runs through Prague, it would give us something to bargain with in our dealings with the Russians.

The Third Army was already deep into Upper Austria, along the Danube, a part of Austria that would probably be part of our occupation zone. Part of this, however, might be claimed by Russia. If we could take the Moldau River in all its length, it would put us in a strong position in dealing with the Soviet government as to both Austria and Czechoslovakia. Grew added that he was fully aware that a decision would have to rest primarily upon military considerations.

I turned to our military leaders for their appraisals of the situation and referred Churchill’s suggestion that we take Prague and as much of Czechoslovakia as possible to Eisenhower for his judgment. On May 1, I sent Churchill the following reply:

“General Eisenhower’s present attitude, in regard to operations in Czechoslovakia, which meets with my approval, is as follows:

“quote. The Soviet General Staff now contemplates operations into the Vltava Valley. My intention, as soon as current operations permit, is to proceed and destroy any remaining organized German forces.

“If a move into Czechoslovakia is then desirable, and if conditions here permit, our logical initial move would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad, I shall not attempt any move which I deem militarily unwise, unquote.”

Our Chiefs of Staff agreed with Eisenhower. It was always a basic condition of all our military planning that we would not expose our troops to any greater danger than was necessary. Our plans for the advance eastward always had this in mind. The military commanders, General Eisenhower and his staff, decided on how far they could advance without exposing our troops to unnecessary casualties.

Churchill was constantly pressing us to keep the greatest possible military strength in Europe. He wanted as large a force as possible on the continent to counteract the vast Russian armies there. We, however, had to keep in mind that after the defeat of Germany, there still remained Japan. To bring Japan to her knees would require the transfer of many troops from Europe to the Pacific. To be sure, I agreed with Churchill that it would be desirable to hold the great cities of Berlin, Prague, and Vienna, but the fact was, like the countries of eastern Europe, these cities were under Russian control or about to fall under her control. The Russians were in a strong position, and they knew it. On the other hand, if they were firm in their way, we could be firm in ours. And our way was to stick to our agreements and keep insisting that they do the same. And by insisting on orderly procedure, I meant to insist on important details.

There was the matter of Vienna. On April 30, Churchill sent me a message saying he was concerned about Austria. The Russians, without consulting us and in spite of our protests, had established a provisional government in Vienna under Dr. Karl Renner. They were also refusing our missions entry into Vienna.

There was no objection to Renner himself, but Churchill was afraid that the Russians were trying their old trick of organizing a country to suit themselves, and he proposed that we send not troops into Vienna, but a protest to Stalin. A draft message for Stalin accompanied Churchill’s telegram. I replied to Churchill on the same day, saying I had that day sent a protest to Moscow in line with his thoughts.

“In the spirit of the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe,” my message to Stalin said in part, “this Government was preparing with an open mind and in good faith to consult with the Soviet Government about Renner’s proposal, when it was surprised to learn through the press that a provisional Austrian government had already been formed in the Soviet- occupied part of Austria. This development could occur in that area only with the full knowledge and permission of the Soviet authorities.

“Yet they failed to consult us or inform us beyond the meager information conveyed in your recent message or to allow time for us to concert with them prior to the establishment of Renner’s provisional regime, the details of which we have learned solely from the press.

“We assume that it remains the intention of the Soviet Government that supreme authority in Austria will be exercised by the four powers acting jointly on a basis of equality, through the inter-allied military government envisaged in the proposals for control machinery now before the European Advisory Commission ‘until the establishment of an Austrian government recognized by the four powers.’

“In order that we may collaborate with the Soviet authorities effectively in accordance with the Crimea declaration as far as Austria is concerned, it is, in view of this development, all the more necessary that allied representatives proceed at once to Vienna as suggested by Marshal Stalin and that the protocols on zones of occupation and control machinery be completed in EAC without delay.”

The Russians were trying their old tactics in Vienna. Our representatives, they said, would be undesirable in Vienna until after the European Advisory Commission had agreed on the zones. It was clear that the Commission could not agree on the zones until there was an examination on the spot. On May 1, Churchill sent a request to Stalin that Allied representatives be permitted to fly to Vienna at once. On May 3, I sent Stalin a similar request.

In the end, we made our point. We had insisted on a particular thing being done, as a right under our agreement, and the Russians gave in. I doubt whether we could have gotten anywhere by broad demands. It would have given them too many loopholes.

In a message on May 6, Churchill renewed his plea that we hold our lines, which had been extended by this time into Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. I thought the matter had been left to the decision of the military as to where they could safely go and stay. I could feel with Churchill and fully share his views on the problem that lay ahead. But I could not go along with him on method. As before, he wanted us to keep all we could of territory and then show the Russians how much we had to offer or keep back. He observed that the time had come when correspondence was no longer of use and that a meeting of the three heads of government was necessary. I fully agreed with this. On May 9, I sent the following message:

“I am in agreement with your opinion that a meeting of the three heads of government would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments upon which either a decision or a common understanding have not been reached.

“I very much prefer to have the request for such a tripartite meeting originate from Marshal Stalin and not from either one of us. Perhaps you have means of some kind with which to endeavor to induce Stalin to suggest or request such a meeting.

“In the meantime it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude toward all the questions at issue.

“In order to prepare for a possible tripartite meeting in the not distant future, I would be very pleased to have from you a list of the questions that you consider it necessary or desirable for us to bring up for discussion, and also suggestions as to meeting places.

“There should now be no valid excuse for Stalin’s refusing to come west towards us.

“In regard to timing, it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before the end of the fiscal year (30 June), but I probably will be able to get away after that date.”

On May 12, the thirty-day period of mourning for President Roosevelt being over, the flag on the White House was once more flown at full staff. We had moved to the White House from Blair House with very little commotion, except that Margaret’s piano had to be hoisted through a window of the second-floor living room. Our living quarters in the White House had been repainted. We had given up our apartment on Connecticut Avenue and had shipped some of our furniture to our home in Independence. We were now expecting my mother and my sister Mary Jane to arrive as weekend guests. Had the pressure of events been less, I would have liked to go to Grandview, my mother’s home, for Mother’s Day. I had planned to have my mother and sister visit us as early as they could after we were settled in the official residence of the President. I now sent the presidential plane, the Sacred Cow, to bring them to Washington for Mother’s Day. This was Mama’s first airplane trip. The plane that brought her was the one that took President Roosevelt to and from his transatlantic conferences. It had a specially built-in elevator to help lift him in and out of the plane.

Mama got a great kick out of the trip. The only thing she did not like was her experience with the elevator. When the plane landed, and she was being taken down, the elevator stuck. It had to be pulled back to get her out. She turned to Colonel Myers, the pilot, and said:

“I am going to tell Harry that this plane is no good and I could walk just as easily as I could ride.”

By this time, a regular passenger stairway had been rolled up to the plane, and I escorted her down myself. When she saw all the reporters and photographers, she turned to me.

“Oh fiddlesticks,” she said. “Why didn’t you tell me there was going to be all this fuss, and I wouldn’t have come.”

My mother, who was an unreconstructed rebel, had come to Washington a little concerned about the bed she was going to sleep in, because my brother Vivian had told her several days before she left that the only room available for her at the White House was the Lincoln Room. Vivian told her she would have to sleep in the bed where Lincoln had slept. My mother said to Vivian, “You tell Harry, if he puts me in the room with Lincoln’s bed in it I’ll sleep on the floor.”

Many years ago, when I first joined the National Guard, I went to the farm at Grandview in my new blue uniform. It was a beautiful uniform with red stripes down the pants legs and a red fourragère over the shoulder. My good old red-haired grandma, Harriet Louisa Young, looked me over and told me it was a “pretty uniform” but that was the first time a blue uniform had been in the house since the Civil War, and she said please not to come in it again. My mother felt the same way about the uniform, only she did not tell me not to wear it.

But by the time we reached the White House, she had been reassured. She was to sleep in the Rose Room, one of the principal guest rooms. This is the room in which all the queens who had ever visited the White House had slept. But my mother took one look at the bed and started walking around the room. This was not for her. The bed was too high and too big, and the surroundings were too fussy, she said. Then she saw the adjoining room, a much smaller room, which was used by ladies-in-waiting to the queens who were guests at the White House. It was cozier and had a single bed in it.

“This is where I’m going to sleep,” she decided, and that was her room throughout her stay. It was Mary who took the larger room.

Mama made herself at home very quickly. She got along well with the household help. They fell in love with her and felt at ease with her. She never presumed on the position she had as my mother, and everyone liked her frankness. Mama explored all of the White House. The first day, she fell down the stairway at the end of the hall in the East Wing. She was alone at the time, and she told no one about it.

The following day - Sunday, May 13 - was Mother’s Day, and we were to attend religious services in the chapel of the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland. Mama said that she did not feel quite up to going to the services, but I did not know at the time that she had had an accident. She kept this a secret for two weeks.

My mother never tried to give me any advice as President. She had a keen interest in politics, and she knew what was going on. As a matter of fact, she was a regular reader of the Congressional Record, and she kept up a correspondence with several senators. During her stay at the White House, she was interested in everything that was going on. But she did not seem to feel that there was anything special about my being in the White House or about my being President. She thought it was just the natural thing. It did not give her any ideas of grandeur. She was just the same Mama she had always been.