It was inevitable that Roosevelt’s death would raise questions about the working relationship between the heads of government of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. In a number of conferences and frequent meetings, a personal knowledge and estimate of each other had grown up between Roosevelt and Churchill and among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. It was natural that a new relationship would have to be established by me and that I would have to meet with Churchill and Stalin. But it was impossible for such a meeting to take place while I was under an enormous burden of work involving so many critical decisions. Apart from that, I wanted to be fully informed about the attitudes of Churchill and Stalin and what changes the death of Roosevelt may have made in their outlook. At the same time, I wanted to get word to Churchill and Stalin through a trusted representative of Roosevelt that there had been no change in the basic policies of the United States.

On May 4, I saw Hopkins again, for the first time since our return from Hyde Park and the graveside of President Roosevelt.

While on the journey to and from Hyde Park, Hopkins and I had continued our talks about Russia. I suggested to Hopkins the possibility of his going on a personal mission for me to Stalin. I inquired about his health, asking whether he thought he would be strong enough to undertake the journey. Hopkins at that time said he would have to talk to his doctor and said, “Why don’t you send Harriman back on a special mission since he is already our Ambassador there?” I had seen Harriman several times between my talks with Hopkins. Harriman suggested that I send Hopkins to Moscow because Hopkins was a link between Roosevelt and Stalin. Since Hopkins had raised the question with me of his health, I told Harriman that I was thinking of him to take a special message to Stalin. Harriman replied that he thought that because Hopkins was very close to Roosevelt he would be in a better position to impress on Stalin that we intended to carry out the Roosevelt policies.

Now, as I shook hands with Hopkins, I saw that he was still a sick man. But Hopkins was a man of courage, and since I was disturbed at the trend of Russian developments, especially since my meeting with Molotov, I presumed again to raise the subject of his undertaking a mission to Stalin.

Hopkins said he understood the urgency of the situation and that he was prepared to go. He asked me when Harriman was planning to return to Moscow. I told him I expected Harriman to return to Washington from San Francisco within a week, when I would talk over with him the Russian situation and his returning to his post. I asked Hopkins to see me the following day for further discussion of the mission. I also asked him to study with the State Department all the latest Russian developments.

This gave me the opportunity of sounding out Cordell Hull, Jimmy Byrnes, and others, not only about this particular mission by Hopkins to Moscow, but about sending the former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Joseph E. Davies, on a special mission to London.

The State Department opposed the idea of sending Hopkins and so did Byrnes. Cordell Hull told me Hopkins was an excellent choice for the mission.

On May 19, Hopkins came to the White House for final instructions. I had telegraphed Stalin that day as follows:

“I am sure you are as aware as I am of the difficulty of dealing by exchange of messages with the complicated and important questions with which we are faced. Pending the possibility of our meeting I am therefore sending Mr. Harry Hopkins with Ambassador Harriman to Moscow in order that they may have an opportunity of discussing personally with you these matters. Following these talks Mr. Hopkins will return immediately to Washington in order to report personally to me. They plan to arrive in Moscow about May 26. I would appreciate your letting me know if this time is convenient for you.”

I asked Hopkins to tell Stalin that I was anxious to have a fair understanding with the Russian government, that we never made commitments which we did not expect to carry out to the letter, and that we expected Stalin to carry out his agreements. I made it plain to Hopkins that in talking to Stalin he was free to use diplomatic language or a baseball bat if he thought that was the proper approach. I further instructed him to tell Stalin that I would be glad to see him personally and that I thought it was now his turn to come to the United States, as our President had been to Russia.

The following evening, I saw Joseph E. Davies and told him that our plans were now definite to send Hopkins to Moscow and that therefore I wanted Davies himself to go to London. I said that Hopkins would arrive in Moscow on May 26, and I asked Davies to arrange to be in London at the same time.

Two days later, on May 21, I received the following message from Stalin:

“I have received your message regarding the arrival of Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow by May 26. I readily accept your proposal to meet Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman. The date - May 26 is quite convenient for me.”

On May 22, I replied to Stalin:

“I was most pleased to receive your wire in regard to Mr. Hopkins’ visit. I feel that it is wiser that I make an announcement of his proposed visit to Moscow following his departure from the United States rather than risk having it leak out and become the subject of speculation in the press. Mr. Hopkins plans to leave tomorrow morning, May 23, and later in the day I propose to announce to the press that he is proceeding to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman to talk over with you matters now in discussion between the Soviet and the United States Government.”

The same day I cabled Churchill:

“I am asking Mr. Joseph E. Davies to come to see you prior to the pending conference between you, Marshal Stalin and myself. There are a number of matters that I want him to explore with you which I would prefer not to handle by cable. Mr. Davies will be in London probably the 25th. I would appreciate it if you could see him at your convenience.”

Churchill replied:

“I shall be delighted to see Mr. Davies as soon as he arrives.”

On May 23, I made public the news of the special missions of Hopkins to Moscow and Davies to London.

I had asked Ambassador Harriman, who was to accompany Hopkins, to proceed in advance to London and see Churchill. I thought it best to have Harriman fill Churchill in on the nature of the Hopkins mission. Harriman dined privately with the British Prime Minister on May 22. The next day Churchill ended the wartime coalition and formed a new interim government. This meant a general election would soon be held.

Harriman cabled me on May 23 from Paris, where he was to be joined by Hopkins, and reported that Churchill was pleased that Hopkins was going to Moscow. Harriman said the resignation of his government and the coming election were much in Churchill’s mind. The Prime Minister, he said, was gravely concerned over the developments with Russia and felt that it was of the utmost importance to go through firmly with the situation in Venezia Giulia. He believed, however, that issues such as Poland could not be settled until “you and he” met with Stalin. Churchill asked Harriman to assure me that he would not take any position in regard to Russia which did not have our full support and that “he is ready to come and meet you anywhere at any time you are prepared to see him.”

Ambassador Davies held his private talks with Prime Minister Churchill from May 26 to May 29 at Chequers and at No. 10 Downing Street. Davies did not cable me any details of his meetings with the British Prime Minister, preferring to report to me in person. However, on May 31, I had a cable from Churchill referring to his talks with Davies, but raising a puzzling question.

Churchill said that he was hoping I would soon be able to let him know the date “of the meeting of ‘the three.’ “ The Prime Minister said his talks with Davies were agreeable, as he would report to me on his return. Then Churchill made the surprising statement that he would not be prepared to attend a meeting which was a continuation of a conference between myself and Stalin and that “the three” should meet simultaneously and on equal terms.

I had at no time proposed seeing Stalin alone at any separate conference. What I was anxious to do was to get Stalin and Churchill and myself at the same table and maintain the unity we had during the war. Unity was even more necessary to keep the peace. I had even rejected the idea of meeting Churchill alone. Churchill intimated through regular channels that he would like to see me before we had a meeting with Stalin. He considered coming over to Washington and the two of us going back together. In my judgment, that would have been a serious mistake at a time when we were trying to settle things with Stalin. Stalin was always fearful that the British and ourselves would gang up on him. We did not want that. We wanted world peace, and we needed the three powers working together to get it. Of course, since I was not personally acquainted with either Stalin or Churchill, I had intended that when we arrived at our meeting place, I would have an opportunity to see each separately. In this way, I would become better acquainted with them and be able to size them up, and they, too, would get a chance to size me up.

I intended to wait to see if Davies could shed more light on this cable of Churchill’s. On June 5, Davies came to report to me. I asked Acting Secretary of State Grew, Admiral Leahy, and Justice Byrnes to join us on this occasion.

Davies made his report orally, then submitted it in writing. He had represented my position and the policy of the United States with accuracy, carrying out instructions with exceptional skill.

Davies told me that he had talked with the Prime Minister alone for approximately eight hours. Their first talk had been at Chequers from eleven Saturday night until four-thirty Sunday morning. The talks were resumed in Churchill’s bedroom Sunday morning at eleven (he sitting up in his bed) and lasted until one-thirty after lunch, and were again resumed later in the afternoon and on the following Tuesday at No. 10 Downing Street.

Davies told Churchill that I was gravely concerned over the serious deterioration in the relations of the Soviets with both Britain and the United States and that I believed that without continued unity of the Big Three, there could be no reasonable prospect of peace. Davies told the Prime Minister my position was that every agreement made by President Roosevelt would be scrupulously supported by me and that if there were differences of opinion as to what these agreements were, I wanted them cleared up.

“It is the President’s conviction,” Davies said to Churchill, “that the paramount objective now must be to conserve peace after victory. He conceives it to be the duty of the three nations which won the war to leave honorably nothing undone in an effort to solve their differences, and through continued unity make possible a just and durable peace structure.

“The President has reason to believe that the situation is the more serious because of Soviet suspicion that Britain and the U.S., along with the United Nations, are now ‘ganging up’ on them. Such suspicion in fact is unjustified, and ought to be dispelled. That requires the establishment of confidence in the good faith and reliability of the parties, which comes only through frank discussions and the opportunity to know and estimate each other.

“On that score the President is at a disadvantage in contrast to that which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin enjoy. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden both have had the benefit of frequent contacts and friendly association with Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov. It is the President’s desire, therefore, in view of the responsibility which he must assume, to have a similar opportunity to know the Marshal and to have Marshal Stalin come to know him. . . .

“The President therefore,” explained Davies, “desires an opportunity to meet the Marshal before the scheduled forthcoming meeting. He feels certain that the Prime Minister will appreciate the reasonableness of his position and facilitate such arrangement.”

At this point I saw how the Prime Minister might have taken this suggestion to mean that I desired to have a preliminary meeting with Stalin first. I had no such idea in mind. What Davies was to convey was that before the meeting got formally under way I planned visits with Stalin, as well as with Churchill, on the spot and in private, in order to get better acquainted with both of them personally.

I took immediate steps to clear this point up with Churchill, advising him of my intent to discuss no business with either him or Stalin separately.

Davies then proceeded to report on Churchill’s analysis of the European situation. Davies said that he was struck by the bitterness of Churchill’s tone as he discussed de Gaulle, Tito, and Stalin. Davies said, “Churchill elaborated at length and with great emphasis and emotion on the grave dangers which would arise with the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. It would be a ‘terrible thing’ if the American army were vacated from Europe. Europe would be prostrate and at the mercy of the Red Army and of communism.”

At this point I interrupted Davies to say that I had no such thing in mind, that we would withdraw only the troops we could spare from Europe for our war in the Pacific. We were committed to the rehabilitation of Europe, and there was to be no abandonment this time.

Hopkins and Harriman saw Stalin and Molotov on May 26. Hopkins reported that Stalin was as anxious to meet with Churchill and me as we were to meet him. A number of important conferences followed, and talks continued until June 7. Hopkins sent me a daily report by cable, keeping me completely informed. This enabled me to take up with Churchill a number of problems affecting the three governments.

One of the first results of Hopkins’ mission was to set the date and place for the meeting of Stalin, Churchill, and myself.

In his first report to me, Hopkins cabled on May 27:

“We outlined at great length the gravity of the feeling in America and expressed as forcibly as we could the point of view that you wished us to convey. The importance of the Polish business was put on the line specifically. Stalin listened with the utmost attention to our description of the present state of American public opinion and gave us the impression that he also was disturbed at the drift of events. . . .”

The Russian dictator, Harriman later reported, showed that he did not fully understand the basis of the difficulties. He took the offensive in complaining “about our misdeeds and aggressively indicated that if we did not wish to deal on a friendly basis with the Soviet Union, she was strong enough to look after herself.” Nevertheless, he was glad to see Hopkins and accepted unquestioningly the fact that I had sent him as an indication of my desire to work with the Russians.

On May 28, Hopkins informed me that Stalin told him he would meet me at any time I wished and that there would be adequate quarters for such a meeting in the suburbs of Berlin.

In reply, I instructed Hopkins to inform Stalin that I perceived no objection to meeting in the Berlin area and that about the fifteenth of July appeared to be a practicable date for me. I so informed Churchill, who in reply once again pleaded for mid-June. Stalin, in turn, agreed to July 15. Churchill argued for early July, but at last the three of us agreed that the date would be July 15, and the place Babelsberg, a suburb of Potsdam.

“Hopkins did a first-rate job,” Harriman said in a message to me, “in presenting your views to Stalin, and in explaining the most important matters - particularly Poland - which were causing us concern. I am afraid,” Harriman continued, “that Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. The Russian Premier is a realist in all of his actions, and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in abstract principles. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland which he considers so important to Russia’s security unless we have some ulterior motive. He does, however, appreciate that he must deal with the position we have taken. . . .”

Hopkins reported that Stalin was ready to talk business at once as to the names of the Poles both in London and in Poland proper who were not members of the Lublin government, but who would be invited to Moscow to meet with the Polish Commission and consult about the organization of a temporary government for Poland. Hopkins therefore proposed a list of three Poles from London and five from within Poland, all of whom had previously been approved by the British and ourselves. Stalin indicated that he wanted three or four from the existing provisional government in Poland, but under no circumstances more than four. Hopkins thought that this tentative list was satisfactory and urged that I approve it. I did so in a telephone conversation with Hopkins on June 1.

In the meantime, messages were going back and forth between Washington and London. We examined the list of names in detail. We tried to reconcile the position of the Polish government-in-exile, our own attitude, and Stalin’s intentions. Finally an agreement was reached, and Hopkins, in his last meeting with Stalin on June 6, was able to bring this matter to a conclusion.

This did not settle the Polish problem. All that was accomplished was to break the deadlock between ourselves and the Russians over the Polish problem.

Before Hopkins left for Moscow, I had impressed upon him the need for getting as early a date as possible on Russia’s entry into the war against Japan. Hopkins had been with Roosevelt at Yalta and knew of Russia’s commitment there to move against Japan after the war in Europe was ended. On May 28 Hopkins and Harriman got from Stalin a very important declaration which Hopkins cabled me.

“Harriman and I saw Stalin and Molotov for the third time last night,” Hopkins said. “Following are the important results:

“The Soviet Army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions by August 8th.

“Stalin repeated the statement he made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on the willingness of China to agree to the Yalta proposals.

“He stated for the first time that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes to Moscow. He wants to see Soong not later than July first and expects us to take matter up at the same time with Chiang Kai-shek. Because of Stalin’s statements about the Far East which follow, this procedure seems most desirable from our point of view.

“He left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack during August. It is therefore important that Soong come here not later than July 1st. Stalin is ready to see him any time now.

“Stalin made categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated no communist leader was strong enough to unify China. He proposes to back the Generalissimo in spite of the reservations he expressed about him.

“He repeated all of his statements made at Yalta, that he wanted a unified and stable China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a United China. He stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang and that he would respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese.

“Stalin stated that he would welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops entering Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria.

“Stalin agreed with America’s ‘open door’ policy and went out of his way to indicate that the United States was the only power with the resources to aid China economically after the war. He observed that Russia would have all it could do to provide for the internal economy of the Soviet Union for many years to come.

“Stalin agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea, under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.”

As to Japan, Hopkins reported that Stalin preferred to go through with unconditional surrender in order to destroy the military might and forces of Japan once and for all. He felt, however, that if we stuck to unconditional surrender the Japanese would not give up, and we would have to destroy them as we did Germany. If they offered to surrender, however, in an effort to seek softer terms, the Allies should depart from the announced policy of unconditional surrender and be prepared to accept a modified surrender. He visualized imposing our will through occupation forces, thereby gaining substantially the same results unconditional surrender would be expected to bring. He added that Russia would expect to share in the actual occupation of Japan and that he wanted an agreement with us and the British as to zones of occupation, as well as an understanding among the Allies as to areas of operation in Manchuria and China.

I cabled Hopkins on May 31:

“We will inform Soong of Stalin’s desire to see him in Moscow not later than July first and will provide the necessary air transportation.

“At the time of Soong’s arrival in Moscow, I will take up with Chiang the conditions stated at the Yalta Conference.”

Hopkins’ last talk with Stalin was about voting procedure in the United Nations. It was clear, Hopkins reported, that Stalin had not understood the issues involved. After Hopkins had cleared up the issues, Stalin accepted our position, despite the opposition of Molotov, whom he waved aside. But Stalin pointed out that he did not consider that “a country is virtuous because it is small,” and that small nations had been responsible for some of the world’s troubles. He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow the Soviet Union’s interests to be affected by such countries.

I was reassured to learn from Hopkins that Stalin had confirmed the understanding reached at Yalta about Russia’s entry into the war against Japan. Our military experts had estimated that an invasion of Japan would cost at least 500,000 American casualties, even if the Japanese forces then in Asia were held on the Chinese mainland. Russian entry into the war against Japan was highly important to us.

At Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had agreed that the Japanese should be deprived of all the conquests they had made since 1894. These included certain territories and privileges that had been Russian before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Since this agreement involved Chinese interests and seaports, the United States had agreed to obtain the concurrence of the Chinese government.

Our Ambassador to China, General Patrick Hurley, sent me several long cables in which he detailed our experience in China during the war and what Roosevelt told him about the Yalta agreements as they affected China. Hurley reported that he had been able to talk to Chiang Kai-shek about all the matters involved without, however, revealing to him anything about the Yalta accord. The Ambassador wired me on May 10 that, with the exception of two words in the accord about the port city of Dairen, he was “convinced that he [Chiang Kai-shek] will agree to every one of the requirements.” These two words were “lease” and “preeminent,” which had a bad connotation to the Chinese people.

“Both Roosevelt and Stalin advised me,” Hurley’s message read, “that it was agreed between them that I would not open the subject of the Yalta decision with Chiang Kai-shek until the signal was given me by Stalin. Stalin said he would give me carte blanche and let me use my own judgment as to when and how to present the subject. However, both Harriman and I were of the opinion that it would be best to delay the presentation because of the possibility of leakage which in turn might bring undesirable results. I explained this to Stalin and it was finally decided that I am not to present the subject to Chiang Kai-shek until we have advised Stalin that, in our opinion, the time is opportune and until we have received the signal from him.”

Hurley now raised the point that the time was opportune for this move, and he asked me to instruct him to ask Stalin for his approval to tell the generalissimo about the Far Eastern decisions that had been reached at Yalta.

On May 12, I sent this message to Hurley:

“Please continue your efforts to accomplish the purposes outlined to you by President Roosevelt.

“I am informed in regard to your previous reports of the attitude of the imperialist governments in China, and hope that the agreement with Churchill and Stalin reported by you may result in the establishment of a free united democratic Chinese Government.

“In regard to the ‘prelude’ to the Yalta agreement on the future conduct of the Pacific war, it is not appropriate at the present time for you to give any information to the Chinese Government.

“When it is appropriate and promising of advantage to the common cause, you will be advised to inform the Chinese Government of the particulars of arrangements that may be in effect at that time.

“We will endeavor to get to Chiang Kai-shek, through you at the earliest practicable date, all the available information on this subject that can be disclosed without damage to the overall prospect.”

Ambassador Hurley had been entrusted by President Roosevelt with two specific missions in addition to his duties as Ambassador to China. The first was to bring Churchill and Stalin to an agreement on the policy that the United States had been pursuing in China. This policy was to take all necessary action to bring about unification under the national government of all anti-Japanese armed forces in China and to endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free, united, democratic Chinese government. The second mission was to continue to insist that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions, and be responsible for her own policies and thus work out her own destiny in her own way.

Our efforts to strengthen and sustain China in her war program involved many operations and included delicate diplomatic negotiations. To achieve this end, we had placed American advisers in China, had provided top-level military and economic advice, and had given extensive credits to the Chinese. On May 14, 1945, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, who had called on me once before, came to see me to get the release of a balance of $200 million in gold still due the Chinese from the $500-million credit approved by the Congress in January 1942. Soong said that this gold was now needed to bolster the Chinese economy, because China was suffering from acute inflation.

My information showed that Chinese prices, over a period of seven years, had increased at an average rate of about 10 percent per month and that during the last three months these increases had risen at a rate of over 30 percent a month. As a result of these price increases China kept issuing more currency, and inflation had reached a “galloping” stage.

The Treasury and the State Department recommended that we advance this gold in keeping with our agreement, although I felt that what China needed more were urgent financial and economic reforms. I therefore approved the shipment of the gold to China. I also approved a letter by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to Dr. Soong stating the American government’s position. The Secretary’s letter pointed out that the purpose of the $500-million financial aid to China, and particularly the agreement in July 1943 to ship gold to China, was to assist in anti-inflationary programs which would strengthen confidence in the Chinese government and its finances and thereby help maintain the Chinese economy.

“It is the opinion of this Government,” the Secretary wrote, “that the sale of gold by China has not proved effective in combating inflation.

“Also the manner in which the gold sales had been conducted and subsequent public criticism of them in China are not conducive to achieving the purposes for which American financial aid was granted.

“Therefore, we ask the Chinese government to consider carefully the matters proposed in the United States Treasury memorandum of May 8, 1945 - in particular the suggestion that China constitute a $500-million fund for combating inflation and stabilizing the currency from its foreign exchange assets.

“This step would be of considerable benefit now and in the future and it would inspire confidence in the Chinese government’s handling of its difficult economic situation. . . .

“The carrying out of effective reforms will do more to insure confidence among the people and give a measure of stability to the present economic and financial situation than the gold program. . . .”

On June 4, after I had heard from Hopkins that Stalin was now ready to talk to the Chinese, I cabled Ambassador Hurley.

“You may expect in the near future,” my message read in part, “instructions to endeavor to obtain approval by Chiang Kai-shek of a military-political matter of the highest importance that, if it is approved, will radically and favorably change the entire military picture in your area.

“For your information, only, Soong is going to Moscow to discuss the same matter.”

My message concluded: “To avoid leakage of highly secret information, the above mentioned instructions to you will be delayed until shortly prior to Soong’s arrival in Russia.”

On June 7, Stettinius notified me from San Francisco that Dr. Soong was flying to see me.

I received Soong at 11:00 a.m. on June 9. The Chinese Foreign Minister was accompanied by Acting Secretary of State Grew.

Stalin, I told Soong, claimed he had no territorial demands against China and favored a unified China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. But Stalin wanted to restore to Russia her former rights in the Pacific, which Japan had taken from her in 1904, and he wanted agreement with China in this matter before Russia would participate in the war against Japan.

Following this meeting with Soong, I directed the Acting Secretary of State to cable Ambassador Hurley as follows:

You are aware of an agreement made in February that the President would take measures to obtain from Chiang Kai-shek his concurrence in the understanding of the Soviet Government stated herewith following.

Stalin wishes to discuss his proposals directly with Soong in Moscow before the first of July.

1. Stalin has made to us a categorical statement that he will do everything he can to promote unification under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

2. That this leadership should continue after the war.

3. That he wants a unified stable China and wants China to control all of Manchuria as a part of a United China.

4. That he has no territorial claims against China, and that he will respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops enter to fight the Japanese.

5. That he will welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops in Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria.

6. That he agrees with America’s “open door” policy in China.

7. That he agrees to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

The conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan are as follows, and if these conditions are met, a Soviet attack will be made in August:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

4. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Inform Chiang Kai-shek that President Roosevelt at Yalta agreed to support these Soviet claims upon the entry of Russia in the war against Japan. I am also in agreement.

T. V. Soong has been given this information.

You are hereby directed to take up this matter with Chiang on June fifteenth and to make every effort to obtain his approval.

On June 14, I again met with Dr. Soong before he left for Chungking. Grew, and Charles E. Bohlen were present. I revealed to Dr. Soong some of the important points of the conversation between Harry Hopkins and Marshal Stalin in Moscow.

Dr. Soong replied that he was glad to hear what I had told him but that he wished to call my attention to a few points that would have to be cleared up. The Yalta understanding, he said, called for the re-establishment of the Russian rights in Manchuria which had been lost as a result of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904.

Soong said that in two treaties made in 1924, the Soviet government had renounced all special concessions, leases, and privileges, including extraterritoriality. He added that it would be necessary to clarify all these points with Stalin when he went to Moscow, including the meaning of the term “preeminent interests” of the Soviet Union in the port of Dairen. The most difficult item of the Soviet demands, Soong pointed out, was the lease of Port Arthur. The Chinese government and people had come to feel very strongly opposed to any re-establishment of the old system of special, leased ports in China, and it would be difficult to accept the Russian position on this point.

I explained to Soong, as I had done previously, that I was anxious to see the Soviet Union come into the war against Japan early enough to shorten the war and thus save countless American and Chinese lives. But while this was my chief concern at the moment, I told him I wanted him to know that I would do nothing that would harm the interests of China, our friend in the Far East.

I was extremely anxious, I told him, to avoid setting up tinderboxes either in the Far East or in Europe, which might cause future trouble and wars. Soong replied that he was happy to hear this statement, remarking that there was no nation in the world that China regarded more as a friend than the United States.

I then cabled Stalin this message:

“T. V. Soong departed by airplane today for Moscow via Chungking.

“He will arrive Moscow before July first to discuss details of arrangements for Soviet-Chinese agreements.

“Ambassador Hurley has been directed to inform Chiang Kai-shek on June fifteenth of Soviet conditions and to make every effort to obtain Generalissimo’s agreement therewith. Hurley is directed to inform Chiang Kai-shek that the Yalta agreement will have the support of the United States Government.”

I also cabled Churchill a similar message, to which the British Prime Minister responded: “I entirely agree and welcome these arrangements.”