Shortly before five o’clock on the afternoon of July 17, I arrived at Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam for the opening session of the conference. Cecilienhof had been the country estate of the former Crown Prince Wilhelm. It was a two-story brownstone house of four wings with a courtyard in the center - a courtyard which was now brilliantly carpeted with a twenty-four-foot red star of geraniums, pink roses, and hydrangeas planted by the Soviets. The flags of the three Allied nations were flying over the main entrance to the palace.

Cecilienhof had been used as a hospital during the war by both the Germans and the Soviets. It had been stripped of all its furnishings, but the Russians had done an impressive job in refurnishing and refitting it for the conference. The furniture and furnishings had been brought in from Moscow. There were separate suites for the Prime Minister, the generalissimo, and myself, and each delegation had a retiring room and offices.

The place for the meetings was a big room, about forty by sixty feet, at one end of which was a balcony. Near the center of the room was a large round table twelve or fourteen feet in diameter, around which were chairs for the principal delegates from each of the three governments. I had a place on one side of the table with Byrnes, former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and Leahy, and my interpreter, Bohlen, sat next to me. Immediately behind me were other members of my staff. Stalin sat part way around the table to my right with Molotov, Vishinsky, and his interpreter. Behind him were members of his military and civilian staffs. Churchill was similarly placed to my left, where he sat with Eden, Clement Attlee, and several others of his staff. This arrangement permitted any persons coming in with information to have easy access to the delegations of the governments with which they were connected.

Guards were placed unobtrusively in strategic spots in the room. The guards were made up of the Secret Service or their equivalent of each of the three governments. Around the palace and its gardens, armed men policed the conference.

Present at the opening meeting were:

For Russia: Premier Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, Ambassador Gromyko, Ambassador Gouseve, Novikov, Sobolev, and the translator, Pavlov.

For Great Britain: Prime Minister Churchill, Anthony Eden, Clement Attlee, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Sir William Strang, and Major Birse, the interpreter.

For the United States: the President, Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Ambassadors Harriman, Pauley, and Davies, Assistant Secretaries Dunn and Clayton, Benjamin Cohen, H. Freeman Matthews, and the interpreter, Charles E. Bohlen.

At ten minutes past five, the Potsdam conference was officially called to order. Premier Stalin opened the meeting by suggesting that I be asked to serve as the presiding officer. Churchill seconded the motion. I thanked them both for this courtesy.

The general purpose of this first meeting was to draw up the agenda of items which would be discussed in detail at subsequent meetings. I thereupon stated that I had some concrete proposals to lay before the conference. My first proposal was to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers. I said that we should not repeat the mistakes that we made in the peace settlements of World War I.

“One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today,” I pointed out, “is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world.

“The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the hope that a full formal peace conference can succeed without preliminary preparation.”

I proposed that the Council be made up of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Russia, China, France, and the United States. These countries were the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. I suggested that this Council meet as soon as possible after our meeting.

Churchill suggested that the proposal be referred to Foreign Secretaries Byrnes, Eden, and Molotov for study.

Stalin agreed with that procedure but said he was not clear about the inclusion of China in a Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the European peace.

I told Stalin that his question could be discussed by the foreign ministers and then referred back to us.

I then placed my second proposal before the conference. This dealt with the control of Germany during the initial period. I explained that the United States believed that the Control Council should begin to function at once. I submitted a statement of proposed political and economic principles under which Germany would be controlled. This document, copies of which I passed to Stalin and Churchill, outlined the basic principles that should guide the Control Council:

Complete disarmament of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production.

The German people should be made to feel that they had suffered a total military defeat and that they could not escape responsibility for what they had brought upon themselves.

The National Socialist party and all Nazi institutions should be destroyed, and all Nazi officials removed.

Preparations should be made for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

Nazi laws of the Hitler regime which established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion should be abolished.

War criminals and those who had participated in planning or carrying on Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes should be arrested and brought to judgment.

Economic controls should be imposed only in so far as they were necessary to the accomplishment of these ends. Germany, I stressed, should be treated as a single economic unit.

This proposal was not discussed, but was referred to the foreign secretaries with instructions to report back to us the following day.

I then submitted the following statement, which I read:

“In the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe signed February 11, 1945, the three governments assumed certain obligations in regard to the liberated peoples of Europe and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states. Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations assumed under this declaration have not been carried out. In the opinion of the United States Government the continued failure to implement these obligations would be regarded throughout the world as evidence of lack of unity between the three great powers, and would undermine confidence in the sincerity of their declared aims.

“The United States Government proposes, therefore, that the following steps to carry out the obligations of the Declaration be agreed upon at this meeting:

“1. The three Allied Governments should agree on necessity of the immediate reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in conformity with Clause (C) of the third paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe.

“2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of these governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements. Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganization has taken place.

“3. That in conformity with the obligations contained in Clause (D) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on liberated Europe, the three governments consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfettered elections. Such assistance is immediately required in the case of Greece, and will in due course undoubtedly be required in Rumania and Bulgaria, and possibly other countries.”

Churchill then spoke up. He said he wanted time to read and study the document and that probably he generally concurred in it.

My final suggestion for the agenda concerned a revision of our policy toward Italy. I explained that because the Italians had entered the war against Japan, I thought the time had come to admit Italy into the United Nations, and I wished to submit a proposal looking toward the establishment of peace with Italy.

Churchill interrupted. He pointed out that we were preparing to deal with very important policies too hastily. The British, he said, were attacked by Italy in 1940, at the time France was going down, which was described by President Roosevelt as “a stab in the back.” The British, he said, fought the Italians for some time before the United States entered the war. At a most critical time, the British were obliged to send sorely needed troops to Africa, and they had fought two years on those shores until the arrival of the American forces, he added. He also pointed out that the British had suffered heavy naval losses in the war with Italy in the Mediterranean.

Churchill suggested that I proceed with the presentation of my proposal. Stalin agreed. I then submitted a document on Italy which stated in part:

“The objectives of the three governments with regard to Italy are directed towards her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government. . . .

“Under an interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only to cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy and to safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes.”

After submitting the four American proposals, I said that although I considered these questions of the highest importance, I wanted it understood that I might add other items to the agenda. Turning to Churchill and Stalin, I expressed my appreciation for the honor of being designated chairman and said that I would welcome any proposals or suggestions they had in mind. I added that I was glad to be at this conference. I had come with some trepidation, I said, realizing that I had to succeed a man who really was irreplaceable. I was aware that President Roosevelt had been on the friendliest terms with both the Prime Minister and Premier Stalin, and I said that I was hopeful of meriting that same friendship and good will.

Churchill replied that he felt certain that both he and Stalin wished to renew with me the regard and affection which they had had for President Roosevelt, and that he had every hope and confidence that the ties between our nations and us personally would increase.

Stalin, on behalf of the whole Russian delegation, expressed the desire to join in the sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister.

Churchill then proposed that we go ahead with the simple question of the agenda and either deal with the items or refer them to the foreign ministers. The British, Churchill said, wished to add the Polish problem to the agenda.

Stalin spoke next. He set forth the questions Russia wished to discuss. These dealt with (1) the division of the German merchant fleet and Navy; (2) reparations; (3) trusteeships for Russia under the United Nations Charter; (4) relations with the Axis satellite states; (5) the Franco regime in Spain. At this point in the outline of his proposals, the Russian leader digressed to declare that the Spanish regime did not originate in Spain, but was imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It was a danger to the United Nations, he said, and he thought it would be well to create conditions that would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they wanted.

Churchill pointed out to Stalin that “we are only discussing things to go on the agenda,” but agreed that the matter of Spain should be added.

Stalin continued his list with (6) the question of Tangier; (7) the problem of Syria and Lebanon; and (8) the Polish question, involving the determination of Poland’s western frontier and the liquidation of the London government-in-exile.

Churchill agreed that all aspects of the Polish question should be taken up. He stated that he was sure the Premier and I would realize that Britain had been the home of the Polish government and the base from which the Polish armies were maintained and paid. He said that, although all three of us might have the same objectives, the British would have a harder task than the other two powers because they would have the details to handle. They did not wish to release large numbers of soldiers in their midst without making proper provision for them, he added. He observed that it was important to continue to carry out the Yalta agreement and that he attached great importance to the Polish elections in order that the will of the Polish people would be reflected. He added that the British delegation were submitting their proposed agenda in writing, and suggested that the foreign secretaries meet that night and agree on the items we would discuss the following day. Stalin and I agreed.

Churchill remarked, “The foreign ministers can prepare a menu for us better than we could at this table, so tomorrow we will have prepared for us the points which are most agreeable - or, perhaps I should say, the least disagreeable.”

Stalin rejoined that all the same, we would not escape the disagreeable ones.

Before adjourning the first session, I asked if there were any further suggestions. Stalin brought up the question of the Council of Foreign Ministers which I had proposed at the beginning of the meeting. He objected to the inclusion of China.

I explained that China had been suggested as a member of the proposed Council because she was one of the five members of the Security Council.

Stalin wanted to know if the quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries, which had been in effect ever since Yalta, was not to continue.

I reminded him that the arrangement at Yalta was a temporary one.

Churchill said that he had found the quarterly meetings of the foreign secretaries very helpful in advising his government. He added that he considered it a complication to bring China into the Council and questioned the advisability of bringing in from the other part of the world a country which had contributed little to the defeat of the enemy in Europe.

I then explained that the problems to be considered by the Council would be quite different from those that would arise in the ordinary meetings of the foreign secretaries. The Council I was proposing was for certain distinct and specific purposes. These were: to draw up for submission to the United Nations treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council was also to be used for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany.

Stalin commented that this would be a “conference to prepare for the future peace conference” and that this Council would deal with postwar reparations and decide on the date for the peace conference.

I replied that the date could be fixed when we felt we were adequately prepared to hold the peace conference.

Churchill said that he could foresee no difficulty in reconciling our different objectives. Until the Japanese were defeated, he said, there would be difficulties in China’s having an important role in settling the tangled problems of Europe – “the volcano from which war springs.” It was possible, he stated, that while the Council was sitting, the war with Japan would end; then China could come into the world peace conference. Until that time, he said, China would have only an intellectual interest in the peace settlements.

I said that I would not object to the exclusion of China from the Council until the war with Japan was ended. At Stalin’s suggestion I referred the whole question to the foreign ministers to consider and submit recommendations to us at a later date.

Stalin quipped, “As all the questions are to be discussed by the foreign ministers, we shall have nothing to do.”

Stalin’s wry humor was frequently in evidence during the meeting. When Churchill suggested that the foreign ministers look into the question of there being four or five members on the Council, the Russian interrupted him to say, “Or three members?”

I told Stalin and Churchill that we should discuss the next day some of those points on which we could come to a conclusion. Churchill replied that the secretaries should give us three or four points - enough to keep us busy.

I said I did not want just to discuss. I wanted to decide.

Churchill asked if I wanted something in the bag each day.

He was as right as he could be. I was there to get something accomplished, and if we could not do that, I meant to go back home. I proposed that we meet at four o’clock instead of five in order to get more done during the time we would be meeting. The others agreed to this. I then proposed we adjourn.

Stalin agreed to the adjournment, but said there was one question he would like to raise first: Why did Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet?

Churchill explained that he thought the fleet should be destroyed or shared, saying that weapons of war are horrible things and that the captured vessels should be sunk.

Whereupon Stalin said, “Let us divide it,” adding, “If Mr. Churchill wishes, he can sink his share.”

With that, the first meeting of the Potsdam conference adjourned.

After that first meeting with Churchill and Stalin, I returned to my temporary home at Babelsberg with some confidence. I hoped that Stalin was a man who would keep his agreements. We had much to learn on this subject. Because the Russians had made immense sacrifices in men and materials - over 5 million men killed in action, more millions slain and starved wantonly by Hitler in his invasion of the Ukraine - we hoped that Russia would join wholeheartedly in a plan for world peace.

I did not underestimate the difficulties before us. I realized that as chairman, I would be faced with many problems arising out of the conflict of interests. I knew that Stalin and Churchill each would have special interests that might clash and distract us.

Stalin, I knew, wanted the Black Sea straits for Russia, as had all the czars before him. Churchill was determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen her control of the Mediterranean. I knew that I was dealing with two men of entirely different temperaments, attitudes, and backgrounds. Churchill was great in argument. His command of the spoken word is hard to equal. Stalin was not given to long speeches. He would reduce arguments quickly to the question of power and had little patience with any other kind of approach.

I was pleased with the orderly manner in which the interpreters conducted their very essential functions. These three men had been at all the conferences before and were masters at their jobs. There was no difficulty at all in understanding what was being said. Bohlen would translate for me when I talked, Pavlov would translate while Stalin was speaking, and Major Birse would translate Churchill’s words for the Russians. We would slow down from time to time so the interpreters could translate each sentence. If there was any disagreement among the interpreters as to the proper Russian word for the English equivalent, they would settle it right there while Stalin would sit back and grin. There were times when I suspected he really understood English.

Following the adjournment of the first meeting, we were invited into a large banquet room in Cecilienhof Palace, where the Russians entertained at a lavish buffet dinner spread on a tremendous table about twenty feet wide and thirty feet long. The table was set with everything you could think of - goose liver, caviar, all sorts of meats, cheeses, chicken, turkey, duck, wines, and spirits. The major-domo in charge was from Moscow’s leading hotel. He spoke English and was very careful to show the greatest respect for all the heads of government and their foreign ministers.

On our way back to Babelsberg, it was necessary for us to drive through various parts of the Russian zone. Admiral Leahy and Secretary Byrnes were with me, and at one of the crossings our car was stopped by a Russian lieutenant. The delay was no more than a matter of minutes, for we were quickly identified by other Russian officers arriving on the scene. These officers proceeded to scare the life out of the lieutenant for making such a blunder. Leahy turned to me and said, “I’ll bet that lieutenant is shot in the morning.”

I worked late that evening on a big batch of mail that had arrived from Washington. At 11:00 p.m., my nephew, Harry Truman, arrived for a few days’ visit. He is the son of my brother Vivian, and I had mentioned to General Lee a few days earlier in Antwerp that my nephew was in the European Theater and that I would like to see him. They found him on board the Queen Elizabeth in Glasgow Harbor ready to sail for home, but General Lee got him off the ship in time and had him flown to Babelsberg. I introduced him to all the heads of government and the members of my party, and after three days Sergeant Truman was put on our communications plane, which carried mail between Washington and Potsdam, and was flown to the United States. He arrived at Norfolk ahead of the rest of his outfit and joined them as they left the Queen Elizabeth.

On the morning of the eighteenth, after a conference with my advisers, I walked to the British Prime Minister’s residence for a return visit. Later I went to Marshal Stalin’s quarters to return his call, and by four o’clock in the afternoon I arrived at Cecilienhof Palace for the second meeting of the conference.

Churchill opened the second meeting of the conference by raising a question of the relation of the press to the conference. At Teheran, he said, it was difficult for the press to have access to the conference, while at Yalta it had been impossible. But here, he complained, there were many representatives of the press outside the well-guarded fortress in which the conference was taking place, and they were raising a great cry in the world press regarding the inadequacy of their access to information.

“Who let them in?” Stalin shouted in a loud voice.

Churchill told the Premier that the press was being kept outside the compound. If his colleagues agreed, Churchill said he was willing to have a talk with the press, not to explain the work of the meeting, but rather why the press must be excluded.

I saw no need for this. I pointed out that each delegation had a press representative here and suggested that it be left to them to handle. We were still at war in the Pacific, and many delicate problems remained to be settled in Europe, and we therefore could not open the proceedings to the press.

Churchill agreed, saying, “I only offered myself as the lamb and, in any event, I would only go if the generalissimo agreed to rescue me.”

I think Churchill enjoyed the reaction of his colleagues to the dramatic suggestion of his acting as spokesman in a situation such as this one.

At this second meeting, I placed on the agenda three topics submitted to the conference by the foreign ministers. The first dealt with a redraft of the American proposal for setting up a Council of Foreign Ministers. It provided that the Council be made up of those countries which had already signed terms of surrender with the enemy. This left the door open for China to participate in the Council later at the close of the war with Japan. Therefore, this proposal was acceptable to us. The make-up of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the procedure for peace settlements were agreed to unanimously.

In the discussion on the submission of all treaties to the United Nations, Stalin observed that this made no difference, as “the three powers would represent the interests of all.”

That was Stalin’s viewpoint all the way. His viewpoint was that Russia, Britain, and the United States would settle world affairs and that it was nobody else’s business. I felt very strongly that participation of all nations, small and large, was just as important to world peace as that of the Big Three. It was my policy and purpose to make the United Nations a going and vital organization.

I then asked Secretary Byrnes to read the foreign ministers’ report on the American proposal on policy toward Germany. Byrnes said the political and economic experts had not yet completed their work. The foreign ministers recommended, however, that the heads of government hold an exploratory discussion on the political questions dealing with the occupation of Germany.

Churchill remarked that the word “Germany” was used repeatedly and asked what was meant by the term. If it meant prewar Germany, he was in agreement.

Stalin replied, “Germany is what she has become after the war. No other Germany exists now. Austria is not a part of Germany.”

I proposed that we consider the Germany of 1937.

Stalin then suggested that we add, “Minus what Germany lost in 1945.”

Germany had lost all in 1945, I said to Stalin. The generalissimo referred to the Sudetenland, which Germany had taken from Czechoslovakia, and asked if his colleagues were proposing that this be considered part of Germany. I replied that I was suggesting the Germany of 1937.

Stalin agreed that from a formal point of view Germany might be considered in this way. He suggested that the western frontier of Poland be fixed now and that the question would then become clear.

I said that this could best be done when it had been decided what to do with Germany.

Stalin, obviously stalling, said that Germany was a country with no government and with no definite frontier. It had no frontier guards, no troops. The country was broken up into four occupation zones.

I repeated that the Germany of 1937 would give us a starting point.

Stalin replied that as a starting point he would accept the Germany of 1937.

Churchill said he agreed.

As chairman, I ruled that the Germany of the Versailles Treaty as it existed in 1937 would be the basis of discussion.

Churchill drew attention to a clause in the document which covered the destruction of arms, implements of war, etc., in Germany. There were many things, he said, that should not be destroyed, such as wind tunnels and other technical facilities.

Stalin said that the Russians were not barbarians and that they would not destroy research institutions.

All this, of course, was before Manchuria. We were to see later what the Russians would do with the technical facilities of a conquered country. Even in Berlin, they showed evidence of lack of association with civilized facilities. They robbed houses of such rare items as fine old grandfather clocks, often putting them in the bottoms of wagons and throwing heavy objects on top of them. They would smash art objects in the same way.

We now turned to a discussion of the Polish question. Stalin introduced a Russian draft proposal on Poland. The substance of this was that the conference should call upon all member governments of the United Nations to withdraw recognition from the Polish government-in-exile in London and that all assets of that government would be transferred to the provisional government in Warsaw. The Russian draft proposed placing all Polish armed forces under the control of the Warsaw government and left it up to that government to dispose of them.

What the Russians wanted to accomplish with this proposal was plain: They wished to get all the property and equipment of the 150,000 men in the Polish Army for the Warsaw regime, although this equipment had originally been supplied by Great Britain and the United States.

Churchill immediately pointed out that the burden of this proposal would fall most heavily on Britain. The United Kingdom had received the Poles when they were driven out by the Germans. He did not remind the Russian Premier that Russian connivance had made this possible. There was no property of any kind or extent belonging to the old Polish government, he added. There were 20 million pounds of gold in London and Canada, which was frozen and was the ultimate property of the Polish national state. There was a Polish embassy vacated by the old Ambassador, he said, which was available to the Ambassador of the new government as soon as they sent one, and “the sooner the better.”

Churchill talked at length about the contribution the Polish forces had made to the Allied victory over the Axis, and added that Britain had pledged her honor to these men. He told us that he had said in Parliament that if there were Polish soldiers who had fought with the Allies and did not wish to return to Poland, Great Britain would receive them as British subjects.

“We cannot cast adrift men who have been brothers in arms,” he declared.

He hoped that most of them would want to go back to their own country, but he felt that there should be reassurances that they would be safe there in the pursuit of their livelihoods. Subject to these reservations, he said, he was in agreement with the Russian proposal and would be pleased to have it passed on to the foreign secretaries for study.

Stalin said that he appreciated the difficulties of the British and that there was no intention on the part of Russia to make the British position more complicated. He merely wished to put an end to the former Polish government in London. Stalin offered to withdraw any part of the Russian draft which Churchill felt would complicate the British position.

I said I wanted an agreement on the Polish question, but what I was particularly interested in was free elections for Poland, as assured by the Yalta agreement.

Stalin replied that the Polish government had never refused to hold elections. He suggested that the question be referred to the foreign secretaries, and Churchill and I agreed.

That was all of the agenda for the second meeting, and the session adjourned at six o’clock, after meeting only an hour and forty-five minutes. I felt that some progress had been made, but I was beginning to grow impatient for more action and fewer words.

Late that night, I talked with Mrs. Truman in Independence via transatlantic radiotelephone. It was the first call from Berlin to America since 1942. The connection was just as clear as if it had been between Independence and Washington. I learned later that the calls were routed over Signal Corps circuits through Frankfurt and London to New York and from there to Independence.