On August 10, at seven thirty-three in the morning, our radio monitors heard this news item being given out over Radio Tokyo:

“The Japanese Government today addressed the following communication to the Swiss and Swedish Governments respectively for transmission to the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union:

“‘In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor, who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about an early termination of hostilities with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed on them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-à-vis the enemy powers.

“‘Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government, in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end to the untold sufferings engendered by the war, have decided on the following:

“‘The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945, by the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.

“‘The Japanese Government hopes sincerely that this understanding is warranted and desires keenly that an explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming.’”

This was not an official communication, but it was enough notice of Japanese intention to permit us to discuss what our reply should be. I asked Admiral Leahy to have Secretaries Byrnes, Stimson, and Forrestal come to my office at nine o’clock to confer on the next step to be taken.

When the four had arrived, I turned to each in turn and asked his opinion on these questions: Were we to treat this message from Tokyo as an acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration? There had been many in this country who felt that the Emperor was an integral part of that Japanese system which we were pledged to destroy. Could we continue the Emperor and yet expect to eliminate the warlike spirit in Japan? Could we even consider a message with so large a “but” as the kind of unconditional surrender we had fought for?

Secretary Stimson had always expressed the opinion that it would be to our advantage to retain the Emperor. He urged the same point now. We needed, as he saw it, to keep the only symbol of authority which all Japanese acknowledged. Admiral Leahy also recommended that we accept the Japanese proposal if for no other reason than that we would be able to use the Emperor in effecting the surrender. Secretary Byrnes was less certain that we should accept anything short of an unequivocal declaration of surrender. He argued that in the present position it should be the United States and not Japan that should state conditions. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal offered the suggestion that we might in our reply indicate willingness to accept, yet define the terms of surrender in such a manner that the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration would be clearly accomplished.

I asked Byrnes to draft a reply that might convey such an understanding. The Cabinet officers then returned to their respective departments. Shortly before noon, Secretary Byrnes came back to the White House, bringing with him the official communication from the Japanese government which had just been received from the Swiss legation. It was identical with the earlier radio transmission, except for an added paragraph that informed us that the same request had also been forwarded, through neutral intermediaries, to the governments of China, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R.

Byrnes also submitted for my approval a draft of a proposed reply to be sent to Japan. I asked the Secretary of State to stay for lunch, while I summoned a Cabinet meeting for two o’clock. During lunch, we worked out an urgent communication to go to the British, Russian, and Chinese governments to get their concurrence to the answer we proposed to send to Japan and were joined by Admiral Leahy, who helped with the drafting.

At two o’clock the Cabinet convened, and I read them the text of the Japanese note. Then Byrnes presented the proposed reply and indicated by what procedure we would seek the approval of our allies. We dispatched identical messages to London, Moscow, and Chungking, and in each of these we instructed our Ambassador to make immediate delivery of the message to impress upon the recipients that speed was of the essence. The message we enclosed read, in part, as follows:

“With regard to the Japanese Government’s message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement ‘with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler’ - our position is as follows:

“‘From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

“‘The Emperor and the Japanese High Command will be required to sign the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, to issue orders to all the armed forces of Japan to cease hostilities and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

“‘Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can be quickly placed aboard allied transports.

“‘The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

“‘The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.’ “

The message to London left the White House at three forty-five Eastern War Time; it was received by our Embassy in London at four fifty-eight, our time, and was in the Foreign Secretary’s hands thirty minutes later. The British answer was received in Washington at nine forty-eight that evening.

Attlee and Bevin agreed, but expressed doubts that it would be wise to ask the Emperor personally to sign the surrender terms. They therefore suggested this change in the language of the proposed reply:

“The Emperor shall authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval, and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, etc. as in your draft.”

Ambassador Winant also reported that Mr. Churchill had telephoned him, saying that he agreed entirely with our approach.

Our message to Chiang Kai-shek brought us this reply, which my naval aide brought to me at seven thirty-five on the morning of August 11:

“President Truman: I concur in all the conditions and join you in your reply to the Japanese Government on the acceptance of the Potsdam proclamation. I especially concur in the condition to require the Emperor and the Japanese High Command to sign the surrender terms and issue orders to make surrender effective. I also concur in the condition requiring that the ultimate form of government of Japan shall be in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. This latter is a condition which I have expressed over a period of years. Chiang Kai-shek.”

Ambassador Harriman’s report of the reaction in Moscow was handed me when I arose that morning:

“The British Ambassador and I were with Molotov when your . . . message . . . was delivered to me. Molotov was in process of inquiring what the attitudes of our respective governments were to the Japanese Government’s proposal. He informed us that the Soviet attitude towards it was ‘skeptical’ since the Soviets did not consider it unconditional surrender, and that the Soviet forces, therefore, were continuing their advance into Manchuria. As this was shortly after midnight, he emphasized that it was the third day of the Soviet campaign which would continue. He gave me the definite impression that he was quite willing to have the war continue.

“Your message then arrived, and it was translated to him. His reaction was noncommittal and suggested that he would give me an answer tomorrow. I told him that this would not be satisfactory and that we wished it tonight. He thereupon agreed to take it up with his Government and attempt to give me an answer tonight. If I do not hear from him in a reasonable time, I will telephone him and keep you informed of the developments.”

A second message from Harriman followed shortly.

“Molotov asked the British Ambassador and me to call again,” Harriman cabled. “He handed us the following statement:

“‘The Soviet Government agrees to the draft reply of the Allied Powers proposed by the United States Government to the statement of the Japanese Government concerning surrender.

“‘The Soviet Government considers that the above mentioned reply should be presented in the name of the principal powers waging war with Japan.

“‘The Soviet Government also considers that, in case of an affirmative reply from the Japanese Government, the Allied Powers should reach an agreement on the candidacy or candidacies for representation of the Allied High Command to which the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese Government are to be subordinated.

“‘August 11, 1945, 2:00 a.m. Moscow time.

“‘On the authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R., signed: V. Molotov.’

“I took a firm exception to the last paragraph and said that in my opinion my Government would never agree to it. I pointed out this was a qualification of the Soviet Government’s acceptance of our proposal and that it gave the Soviet Government veto power on the selection of the Allied High Command. In answer to my inquiry as to his meaning, he finally suggested that the High Command might consist of two persons, both an American and a Soviet general, specifying Marshal Vasilevsky by name. I stated that it was unthinkable that the supreme commander could be other than American.

“After a most heated discussion he insisted that I send his communication to my government. I maintained, however, that in my opinion it would be unacceptable.

“When I reached my office, I found Pavlov, Molotov’s secretary, on the telephone, advising me that Molotov had consulted Stalin. He said that there had been a misunderstanding and that only consultation had been intended and not the necessity of reaching an agreement. I pointed out to the secretary that I believed the words ‘or candidacies’ would also be unacceptable and asked him to convey this message to Molotov. Within a very few minutes he called back stating that Stalin had agreed to the deletion of these words. He agreed to confirm this in writing.

“The last paragraph will, therefore, read ‘The Soviet Government also considers that, in case of an affirmative reply from the Japanese Government, the Allied Powers should consult on the candidacy for representation of the Allied High Command to which the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese Government are to be subordinated.’

“I would appreciate advice as to whether the Soviet reply as now amended is acceptable.”

Harriman was, of course, expressing our set policy. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee had some time ago formulated our position on the postwar control of Japan, and I had approved it. We wanted Japan controlled by an American commander, acting on behalf of the Allies, who might coordinate their desires through a conference or council which we proposed to call the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

I was determined that the Japanese occupation should not follow in the footsteps of our German experience. I did not want divided control or separate zones. I did not want to give the Russians any opportunity to behave as they had in Germany and Austria. I wanted the country administered in such a manner that it could be restored to its place in the society of nations. I had impressed these thoughts strongly on all our officials at Potsdam. Thus Harriman, who was there, was able to speak up at once when Molotov tried to change the basic policy for Japan.

With the concurrence of the three governments received, we were now ready to dispatch a formal reply to the Japanese. We accepted the change proposed by the British, but altered one phrase in it to make it clearer. Where the British had proposed that we say “The Emperor shall authorize and ensure the signature, etc.,” we put “The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure . . .”

The completed message, dated August 11, was handed to Herr Max Grassli, the Chargé d’Affaires of Switzerland, by Secretary Byrnes, to be transmitted to Tokyo by way of Berne. The war was, of course, not at an end. Admiral Nimitz had sent out an order to the Pacific fleet that must have been typical of many:

“The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor Allied Forces have stopped fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general surrender should be suddenly announced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be continued unless otherwise specifically directed.”

General Arnold sent out an order to the Strategic Air Forces to drop leaflets over centers of population in Japan to advise the people there of the status of the peace negotiations.

Meanwhile in Washington a message was prepared to inform our allies of the selection of General Douglas MacArthur to be the Supreme Commander in Japan. In the same message, I proposed that the new Supreme Commander should instruct the Japanese to surrender their forces in Southeast Asia to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander in that area; those forces facing the Russians, to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East; and all other forces in China, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Steps were also taken to disseminate the acceptance of our terms by the Japanese as quickly as possible. The State Department prepared identical messages to go to the Soviet, British, and Chinese governments that would require nothing but the insertion of the time and date the reply was received. With these steps completed, there remained nothing to do but to await that reply.

The next day - August 12 - was a Sunday, but I spent nearly the entire day in my office, frequently joined by the Secretary of State and the heads of the armed forces. The place was beleaguered by press and radio people, and large crowds gathered outside the White House and in Lafayette Park. A report that the Japanese had accepted was circulated early in the evening, but it turned out to be false.

In the midst of this, I wrote my sister Mary.

Dear Mary: This is your birthday, and I had intended to have a letter there this morning. But conditions here have been such that it was impossible to get it done. I surely hope you have a happy one. Margaret should be out with some presents, and I mailed you one from Germany.

I have a beautiful Belgian luncheon set for Mama and some handkerchiefs for Luella and a Swiss watch for Martha Ann. I also have a present for Gilbert.

Since I landed last Tuesday there hasn’t been a minute. The speech, the Russian entry into the war, the Jap surrender offer and the usual business of the President’s office have kept me busy night and day.

It seems that things are going all right. Nearly every crisis seems to be the worst one, but after it’s over, it isn’t so bad. . . .

Happy birthday and lots of love,

Harry

In the meantime I received word from Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek, and Attlee that the selection of Douglas MacArthur to be the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers met with their approval. Despite these agreements, however, there were also ominous notes. Ambassador Pauley, who was in Moscow on another - futile - attempt to find agreement on reparations matters with the Russians, urged quick action in the Far East to prevent Russian excesses:

“Conclusions I have reached,” a message from him read, “through discussions on reparations and otherwise (I repeat otherwise) lead me to the belief that our forces should occupy quickly as much of the industrial areas of Korea and Manchuria as we can, starting at the southerly tip and progressing northward. I am assuming all of this will be done at no risk of American lives after organized hostilities have ceased, and occupancy to continue until satisfactory agreements have been reached between the nations concerned with respect to reparations and territorial rights or other concessions.”

Harriman similarly urged us to counter Russian intransigence with action.

“While at Potsdam,” he cabled, “General Marshall and Admiral King told me of the proposed landings in Korea and Dairen if the Japanese gave in prior to Soviet troops occupying these areas.

“Considering the way Stalin is behaving in increasing his demands on Soong I recommend that these landings be made to accept surrender of the Japanese troops at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea. I cannot see that we are under any obligation to the Soviets to respect any zone of Soviet military operation.”

Complications were also beginning to arise in China. Hurley reported that the Communists were seeking to take the greatest possible advantage of the impending Japanese collapse. In a detailed message, he told the State Department that General Chu Teh, commanding general of the Chinese Communist forces, had broadcast an order that any “anti-Japanese armed force” in the liberated areas could, on the basis of the Potsdam proclamation, deliver an ultimatum to the enemy troops or their headquarters in the nearby cities, towns, or communication centers, ordering them to hand over their arms within a certain limit of time. After being thus disarmed, they would be treated according to the regulations governing the preferential treatment of war prisoners, and their lives would be protected. He also proclaimed that his troops had the right to enter and occupy any city, town, or communication center occupied by the enemy or the puppets, carry on military management there to maintain order, and appoint a commissioner to look after the administrative affairs of the locality.

This order was clearly in open defiance of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and in conflict with the Potsdam Declaration, which designated the governments to which surrender was to be made.

“If the United States,” Ambassador Hurley cabled, “and the United Nations permit an armed belligerent political party in China to accept surrender of the Japanese and to acquire Japanese arms, a fratricidal war in China will thereby be made certain. I have already suggested that in the terms of surrender Japan be required to surrender all Japanese arms in China, including Japanese arms that are in the hands of Japanese soldiers, Chinese puppet troops supporting Japan, and Chinese partisan organizations operating with Japan, to the National Government of China. We have also recommended that the terms of surrender should penalize Japan for any attempt to arm any belligerent forces within China against the National Government. . . .

“General Wedemeyer has shown me his report to the Chief of Staff setting out his opinion of the situation that will prevail if the Japanese are allowed to surrender their arms to the Communist armed party. I concur in General Wedemeyer’s report and recommend that the State Department urge that the surrender terms provide that none of the Japanese arms will be surrendered to the Chinese Communist armed party.”

These messages from Moscow and Chungking did not, of course, raise new issues. The preceding months had shown us that Stalin and his colleagues did not view matters in the same light we did. The delicate balance in China between the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and those of the Chinese Communists had been the subject of many discussions among our policy experts. But the opportunity of the moment was to put an end to the years of war. A dictator can use his soldiers as soulless pawns, but in a government like ours the voice of the people must be heeded; and the American people wanted nothing more in that summer of 1945 than to end the fighting and bring the boys back home.

On August 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied drafts of the letters of instruction that were to go to General MacArthur. I approved the documents the following day, with one change: Whereas the draft called for only one signature on the surrender documents to represent the Allies, that of the Supreme Commander, I instructed the Joint Chiefs to tell MacArthur that, after his signature on behalf of all the Allies, each of the four major powers’ representatives should affix his signature.

August 13 passed without word from the Japanese. On the morning of August 14, however, Commodore Vardaman brought word that a coded telegram from Tokyo had been received in Berne. That should be the answer we were waiting for. Byrnes came over after breakfast, and we checked the steps to be taken if - as we were confident - the Japanese had accepted. Shortly before noon, too, the Secretary of State called Mr. Harrison, our Minister in Berne, to find out what the message from Tokyo had contained. It turned out that it was not an answer to our message at all, and the wait continued.

At three o’clock, Byrnes informed me that he had just learned that a coded message was then being received in Berne from Tokyo. At five minutes after four, he put through a call to Harrison, who gave him the answer we wanted: Japan had surrendered!

Byrnes now called Bevin, Harriman, and Hurley and arranged for the news to be announced at the same time, seven o’clock Washington time, in the four capitals.

At 6:00 p.m., the Swiss Chargé d’Affaires in Washington delivered the formal reply to Byrnes, who brought it at once to the White House. Here are the words that ended the war:

August 14, 1945

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your note of August 11, in which you requested me to transmit to my Government the reply of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China to the message from the Japanese Government which was communicated in my note of August 10.

At 20:10 today (Swiss time) the Japanese Minister to Switzerland conveyed the following written statement to the Swiss Government for transmission to the Allied Governments:

“Communication of the Japanese Government of August 14, 1945, addressed to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China:

“With reference to the Japanese Government’s note of August 10, regarding their acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration and the reply of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China sent by American Secretary of State Byrnes under the date of August 11, the Japanese Government have the honor to communicate to the Governments of the four powers as follows:

“1. His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial rescript regarding Japanese acceptance of the provisions of the Potsdam declaration.

“2. His Majesty the Emperor is prepared to authorize and ensure the signature by his Government and the Imperial General Headquarters of the necessary terms for carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration. His Majesty is also prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms and to issue such other orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned terms.”

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ Grassli

Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Switzerland

The Honorable

James F. Byrnes

Secretary of State

At 7:00 p.m., the White House correspondents gathered in my office. Mrs. Truman was with me, and most of the members of the Cabinet were present. I had also asked a former Cabinet member to join me on this momentous occasion. Cordell Hull, now seriously ill and for many years a most distinguished Secretary of State, did not arrive until the conference was nearly over, but I was glad that we could include him in the official picture that was taken of the event. He had done much to make this day possible.

When everybody was in, I stood behind my desk and read this statement:

“I have received this afternoon a message from the Japanese Government in reply to the message forwarded to that Government by the Secretary of State on August eleventh. I deem this reply a full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no qualification.

“Arrangements are now being made for the formal signing of the surrender terms at the earliest possible moment.

“General Douglas MacArthur has been appointed the Supreme Allied Commander to receive the Japanese surrender. Great Britain, Russia and China will be represented by high-ranking officers.

“Meantime, the Allied armed forces have been ordered to suspend offensive action.

“The proclamation of V-J Day must wait upon the formal signing of the surrender terms by Japan. . . .”

The remainder of the statement was the text of the Japanese note.

The correspondents shouted congratulations as they rushed out the doors to flash the word to their papers. Mrs. Truman and I went out to the fountain on the north lawn. A vast crowd had assembled outside the gates, and when I made a V sign in the manner of Churchill, a great cheer went up. I remained outside only a few minutes and then went back into the White House and called my mother at her home in Grandview, Missouri.

Around eight o’clock, the crowds outside were still growing, and I went out on the north portico and spoke a few words through a loudspeaker that had been set up there. This was a most significant and dramatic moment, and I felt deeply moved by the excitement, perhaps as much as were the crowds that were celebrating in cities and towns all over the nation.

We had won the war. It was my hope now that the people of Germany and Japan could be rehabilitated under the occupation. The United States, as I had stated at Berlin, wanted no territory, no reparations. Peace and happiness for all countries were the goals toward which we would work and for which we had fought. No nation in the history of the world had taken such a position in complete victory. No nation with the military power of the United States of America had been so generous to its enemies and so helpful to its friends. Maybe the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount could be put into effect.